green
Positive treatment
Hot · 45 in 5y
Issue: iied claimPA ↗
Issue: nied claimPA ↗
Issue: need rulePA ↗
Quoted verbatim 3×
49.0 score
G Cite
cited 3× by 2 distinct cases, 2022–2024 ·
…breach of contractual or fiduciary duty
at p. 85
⚠ not in text
cited 3× by 2 distinct cases, 2015–2022 · 2 courts ·
…preexisting relationships involving duties that obviously and objectively hold the potential of deep emotional harm in the event of breach.
at p. 95
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 2012 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2012
2019
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
LLOYD v. MANBEL DEVCO I LP
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
nied is not available in garden-variety 'breach of contractual or fiduciary duty' cases. . . .
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Fragale V. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
we must draw lines to prevent unlimited liability to an unlimited number of plaintiffs, notwithstanding the commission of negligent acts.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Gillen v. Boeing Co.
we must draw lines to prevent unlimited liability to an unlimited number of plaintiffs, notwithstanding the commission of negligent acts.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ahmad Williams, Malaika Williams v. Thumbtack, Inc., A-G Eagle Construction LLC
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 84 (Pa. 2011) (citation modified). 19 because plaintiffs have adequately pled a negligence claim based on Mr. Williams’s injuries, their loss of consortium claim focused on Mrs. Williams can also proceed into discovery.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
De Camara v. BRYN MAWR COLLEGE
(2×)
Pa. Sept. 24, 2021), appeal filed, No. 25-2122 (3d Cir. 2025) 152 See Toney, 36 A.3d at 95 (“[W]e find it prudent to limit the reach of this [negligent infliction of emotional distress] claim to preexisting relationships involving duties that obviously and objectively hold the potential of deep emotional harm in the event of breach . . . . we would hold that some relationships, including some doctor-patient relationships, will involve an implied duty to care for the plaintiff’s emotional well-being that, if breached, has the potential to cause emotional distress resulting in physical harm�…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
David Richardson v. United States
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 94 (Pa. 2011) (per curiam).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
WILLIAMS v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 95-99 (Pa. 2011) (noting that negligent infliction of emotional distress claims without a physical injury must be based on the zone of danger, bystander theory, or a pre- existing special relationship involving a recognized duty of care and the foreseeability of severe emotional harm).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
RICHARDSON v. UNITED STATES
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 84 (Pa. 2011)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Miller v. Schmid
A plaintiff asserting a special relationship NIED cause of action absent physical injury, as Plaintiff appears to assert here, must demonstrate “the genuineness of the alleged emotional distress, in part, by proving the element of causation.” Toney v. Chester County Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 99 (Pa. 2011).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Rightmyer v. Philly Pregnancy Center, P.C.
(2×)
Id. at 85.2 However, as the court further explained: NIED is not available in garden-variety “breach of contractual or fiduciary duty” cases, but only in those cases where there exists a special relationship where it is foreseeable that a breach of the relevant duty would result in emotional harm so extreme that a reasonable person should not be expected to endure the resulting distress.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Lamarr, D. v. Delaware County Memorial Hosp.
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 88-89 (Pa. 2011) (emphasis added). - 53 - J-A21037-22 Turning to Appellants’ arguments, they claim that certain Sinn “factors” were disputed at trial.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Monique Russell v. Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduat
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 91 (Pa. 2011) (Baer, J., plurality for an equally divided court). 22 ECFMG raises additional arguments that (1) ECFMG had no duty to Plaintiffs, and (2) Plaintiffs consented to treatment.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL TRISTIAN PAONE, BY AND THROUGH THE ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE, MICHAEL PAONE, JR. AND LISA PAONE v. PLYMOUTH TOWNSHIP
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 85, 100 (Pa. 2011)) (internal quotations omitted); see also Bernstein v. Serv.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
KOVALEV v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC.
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 95 (Pa. 2011).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
KOVALEV v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 95 (Pa. 2011).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
KOVALEV v. WALMART INC.
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Id. at 85.4 However, as Justice Baer further explained: 4 While Toney is not binding precedent, federal and state courts have consistently looked to Justice Baer’s opinion as persuasive authority on the scope of this tort under Pennsylvania law.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
KOVALEV v. WALMART INC.
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Id. at 85.3 However, as Justice Baer further explained: 3 While Toney is not binding precedent, federal and state courts have consistently looked to Justice Baer’s opinion as persuasive authority on the scope of this tort under Pennsylvania law.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Qiuyuan Huang v. NGOC BACH PHAN
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 99 (Pa. 2011) (“Unlike cases involving a physical impact, a plaintiff in a non-impact case faces a property,” and that the statute “explicitly provides a cause of action only to the ‘purchaser or lessee,’ which does not include residents who were not parties to the lease agreement.” App. Vol. I at 5 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4852d(b)(3)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
SHARMA v. SANTANDER BANK NA
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 92, 96 (Pa. 2011) (per curiam opinion in support of affirmance)); see also Reply 2-3.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Alfrey v. Whitley
(4×)
Toney, 36 A.3d at 91-95; see also Freeman v. Harris Cty., 183 S.W. 3d 885 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006); Oswald v. LeGrand, 453 N.W. 2d 634 (Iowa 1990); Larsen v. Banner Health Sys., 81 P.3d 196 (Wyo. 2003).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
RUSSELL v. EDUCATIONAL COMMISSION FOR FOREIGN MEDICAL GRADUATES
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 100 (Pa. 2011) (affirmance by evenly-split court).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
OLDHAM v. THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
Second, under Pennsylvania tort law, a plaintiff alleging IIED must show the following: (1) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) it was intentional or reckless; (3) it caused emotional distress; and (4) that distress was severe.297 The plaintiff must show that the conduct at issue was “so outrageous in character and 292 Toney v. Chester County Hospital, 961 A.2d 192 , 197–98 (Pa. Super. 2008), aff’d, 36 A.3d 83 (Pa. 2011). 293 Id. at 198. 294 Doc. 105 ¶ 166. 295 See supra Section III.C.3.b. 296 Toney, 961 A.2d at 197–98. so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible grounds…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
LAMB v. PENNSYLVANIA CVS PHARMACY L.L.C.
(2×)
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court makes clear, “not all breaches of duties should result in compensable emotional distress claims.” Toney v. Chester County Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 91 (Pa. 2011).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Goodling v. Johnson & Johnson
As the Goodlings assert, negligence infliction of emotional distress is a distinct cause of action “cognizable under Pennsylvania law.”104 Specifically, Pennsylvania courts recognize causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in “four factual scenarios: (1) situations where the defendant had a contractual or fiduciary duty toward the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff was subjected to a physical impact; (3) the plaintiff was in a zone of danger, thereby reasonably experiencing a fear of impending physical injury; [and] (4) the plaintiff observed a tortious injury to a clos…
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
RIDEOUT v. WELLS FARGO BANK N.A.
(4×)
Pa. 2019) (citing In Interest of O.A., 717 A.2d 490 , 496 n.4 (Pa. 1998) (“Under Pennsylvania law, ‘[w]hile the ultimate order of a plurality opinion; i.e. an affirmance or reversal, is binding on the parties in that particular case, legal conclusions and/or reasoning employed by a plurality certainly do not constitute binding authority.’”)). 100 Toney, 36 A.3d at 91. 101 Id. 102 Id. at 95. 103 Id. 104 Id. 105 Id. at 99. 106 Herschman, 17 F.Supp.3d at 460 n.8 (collecting cases). 107 Toney, 36 A.3d at 95. 108 ECF Doc.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
SJ Abstract d/b/a InterstateAbstract.com v. OLD REPUBLIC TITLE
Even if Defendant owed a fiduciary duty to Gaber by virtue of their business dealings, it is not one that “obviously and objectively [held] the potential of deep emotional harm in the event of breach,” Toney, 36 A.3d at 95, and is not analogous to the types of relationships previously recognized in “special relationship” NIED claims.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Humphries v. Barber
(4×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
That is, plaintiffs can recover damages for negligently caused emotional distress (1) when “the plaintiff suffers a physical injury which causes the emotional distress”;243 (2) when the plaintiff was in the “zone of danger”—or, in other words, experienced a “near-miss” and suffered 239 Toney, 36 A.3d at 88–89. 240 Id. at 88. 241 Id. at 88. 242 See id. at 88–89. 243 Hershman v. Muhlenberg Coll., 17 F. Supp. 3d 454, 459 (E.D.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
COOKER v. MEADOWOOD CORPORATION
As to all four categories, a plaintiff must show that “defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the defendant breached that duty, the breach resulted in injury to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff suffered an actual loss or damage.” Id. at 198. 2 A court may grant a Fed.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
ABRAHAM v. THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 95 (Pa. 2011).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
KLING v. UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH MEDICAL CENTER
(2×)
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 95 (Pa. 2011) and that she should have found a special relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
ITUAH v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 94-95 (Pa. 2011) (affirming via equally this harm, Ituah asks the Court to: (1) “order a stay on writ of execution... for the costs” of demolishing the 508 W.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
MDB v. Punxsutawney Christian Sch.
Those Justices who favored the availability of such claims wrote that they "find it prudent to limit the reach of this NIED claim to preexisting relationships involving duties that obviously and objectively hold the potential of deep emotional harm in the event of breach" and that these "special relationships must encompass an implied duty to care for the plaintiff's emotional well-being." Toney , 36 A.3d at 95 (Baer, J.).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Julie Heeter v. Honeywell International Inc
Hosp., 614 Pa. 98 , 36 A.3d 83, 99 (2011) (citing Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 688 , 379 A.2d 111, 114 (1977)); see also Vattimo v. Lower Bucks Hosp., Inc., 602 Pa. 241 , 466 A.2d 1231 , 1234 (1983) (“If issues are raised on which a jury may not reasonably differ, it is proper for the trial court to decide them” (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 434 (Am, Law.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kreitzer v. DeMatteo
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Toney v. Chester County Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 84 (Pa. 2011), held that a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress may exist when a plaintiff has suffered only emotional distress “only in those special cases where there exists a special relationship where it is foreseeable that a breach of the relevant duty would result in emotional harm so extreme that a reasonable person should not be expected to endure the resulting distress.” This court notes that the decision in Toney was issued pursuant to an equally divided court; and, consequen…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Runner v. Bard
(2×)
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court expanded NIED claims to encompass “preexisting relationships involving duties that obviously and objectively hold the potential of deep emotional harm in the event of breach.” Id. at 95.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
LaLoup v. United States
(3×)
However, equally true, is the fact that not all breaches of duties should result in compensable emotional distress claims.” Id. at 91.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
LaLoup v. United States
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
In Toney v. Chester County Hosp., 614 Pa. 98 , 36 A.3d 83 (2011), the Pennsylvania Superior Court recognized a tort for negligent infliction of emotional distress where a plaintiff suffered emotional harm of a type “likely to be experienced as a visceral and devastating assault on the self’ caused by the breach of a duty arising out of a “preexisting relationship[ ] involving duties that obviously and objectively hold the potential of deep emotional harm in the event of breach”, such as “relationships involving life and death.” Id. at 95. 9 In concluding that recovery for such a to…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Trotta v. Luckinbill
In Toney v. Chester County Hospital, 36 A.3d 83, 100 (Pa. 2011), the court limited such a claim to those situations “where there exists a special relationship where it is foreseeable that a breach of the relevant duty would result in emotional harm so extreme that a reasonable person should not be expected to endure the resulting distress.” 1 The relationship between a contractor and building owner clearly does not qualify.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Nicholson-Upsey v. Touey
Toney v. Chester County Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 99 (Pa. 2011), aff'g by an equally divided court, 961 A.2d 192 (Pa. Super.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Elizabeth Caserta v. Geico Gen Ins Co
Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 91 (Pa.2011) (equally divided court) (noting that the Court must draw lines to *107 “prevent unlimited liability to an unlimited number of plaintiffs, notwithstanding the commission of negligent acts”); Armstrong v. Paoli Mem’l Hosp., 430 Pa.Super. 36 , 633 A.2d 605, 611 (1993) (noting that “Pennsylvania has consistently refused” to expand liability beyond “close family members” who actually witness the accident).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Lilac Meadows, Inc. v. Rivello
FACTUAL BACKGROUND According to the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint which must be accepted as true for purposes of the defendants’ preliminary objections, see, Toney v. Chester County Hospital, 36 A.3d 83, 99-100 (Pa. 2011), on September 28, 2010, plaintiff Lilac Meadows, Inc. (“Lilac Meadows”) purchased land development plans for a proj ect on Edith Street in Old Forge which had been approved by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), the Lower Lackawanna Valley Sanitary Authority, the Old Forge Zoning Board, the Old Forge Planning Commission, and the Ol…
discussed
Cited "see"
Ortiz v. Conners
(2×)
See Toney v. Chester County Hosp., 36 A.3d 83 , 84 n.1 (Pa. 2011).
cited
Cited "see"
PUKANECZ v. BARTA TRANSIT AUTHORITY
See Toney v. Chester County Hospital, 36 A.3d 83, 84 (Pa. 2011).
cited
Cited "see"
Citibank v. Hull
See Toney v. Chester County Hospital, 36 A.3d 83, 99-100 (Pa.2011).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Valley National Bank v. Engle Eyewear, Inc.
Hoy, 691 A.2d at 482-483 ; see also Toney v. Chester County Hosp., 961 A.2d 192, 203 (Pa.Super. 2008), affirmed, 36 A.3d 83 (Pa. 2011) (per curiam) (“allegations of negligence and carelessness do not rise to the level of conduct premised upon standards such as ‘atrocious’ and ‘utterly intolerable’ behavior”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Demetrius J. GRANT
v.
PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE
v.
PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Dec 21, 2011.
Published
ORDER
PER CURIAM.AND NOW, this 21st day of December, 2011, the Order of the Commonwealth Court is AFFIRMED.