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13 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 2004–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hoy v. Angelonegreen2 sentences2019"The conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Hoy v. Angelone, 554 Pa. 134, 151 , 720 A.2d 745, 754 (1998) (quoting Buczek v. A'rst National Bank of Mifflintown, 366 Pa.Super. 551, 558 , 531 A.2d 1122, 1125 (1987)). --------------------------- - -- Here, Plaintiff fails to properly allege an IIED claim. 2019"The conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Hoy v. Angelone, 554 Pa. 134, 151 , 720 A.2d 745, 754 (1998) (quoting Buczek v. A'rst National Bank of Mifflintown, 366 Pa.Super. 551, 558 , 531 A.2d 1122, 1125 (1987)). --------------------------- - -- Here, Plaintiff fails to properly allege an IIED claim. | 3 | 4 |
Jordan, E. v. PSUgreen2 sentences2025“For an IIED claim to survive a preliminary objection, a court must determine, as a matter of law, whether there is sufficient evidence for reasonable persons to find extreme or outrageous conduct.” Jordan v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 276 A.3d 751, 775 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 2025“For an IIED claim to survive a preliminary objection, a court must determine, as a matter of law, whether there is sufficient evidence for reasonable persons to find extreme or outrageous conduct.” Jordan v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 276 A.3d 751, 775 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation and quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Kazatsky v. King David Memorial Park, Inc.green2 sentences2022“The gravamen of the tort of [IIED] is outrageous conduct on the part of the tortfeasor.” Kazatsky v. King David Mem’l Park, Inc., 527 A.2d 988, 991 (Pa. 1987). 2022“The gravamen of the tort of [IIED] is outrageous conduct on the part of the tortfeasor.” Kazatsky v. King David Mem’l Park, Inc., 527 A.2d 988, 991 (Pa. 1987). | 1 | 1 |
Buczek v. First National Bankgreen2 sentences2019"The conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Hoy v. Angelone, 554 Pa. 134, 151 , 720 A.2d 745, 754 (1998) (quoting Buczek v. A'rst National Bank of Mifflintown, 366 Pa.Super. 551, 558 , 531 A.2d 1122, 1125 (1987)). --------------------------- - -- Here, Plaintiff fails to properly allege an IIED claim. 2019"The conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Hoy v. Angelone, 554 Pa. 134, 151 , 720 A.2d 745, 754 (1998) (quoting Buczek v. A'rst National Bank of Mifflintown, 366 Pa.Super. 551, 558 , 531 A.2d 1122, 1125 (1987)). --------------------------- - -- Here, Plaintiff fails to properly allege an IIED claim. | 1 | 1 |
McClease v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.green2 sentences2019McClease , 226 F.Supp.2d at 702-03 (emphasis added). 2019McClease , 226 F.Supp.2d at 702-03 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Hart v. O'MALLEYgreen2 sentences2018See Rolla v. Westmoreland Health Sys., 651 A.2d 160, 161-63 (Pa. Super. 1994) (appeal from order granting appellees’ preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and dismissing with prejudice appellant’s complaint, including claim for emotional distress; appellant asserted that emotional harm is just as damaging as physical harm and contended that “in the area of damages, it is believed that recent United States Supreme Court cases in the area of discrimination establish that physical harm is not necessary to have occurred”; this Court disagreed, holding that, for IIED, plaintiffs must a 2018See Rolla v. Westmoreland Health Sys., 651 A.2d 160, 161-63 (Pa. Super. 1994) (appeal from order granting appellees’ preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and dismissing with prejudice appellant’s complaint, including claim for emotional distress; appellant asserted that emotional harm is just as damaging as physical harm and contended that “in the area of damages, it is believed that recent United States Supreme Court cases in the area of discrimination establish that physical harm is not necessary to have occurred”; this Court disagreed, holding that, for IIED, plaintiffs must a | 1 | 1 |
Rolla v. Westmoreland Health Systemgreen2 sentences2018See Rolla v. Westmoreland Health Sys., 651 A.2d 160, 161-63 (Pa. Super. 1994) (appeal from order granting appellees’ preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and dismissing with prejudice appellant’s complaint, including claim for emotional distress; appellant asserted that emotional harm is just as damaging as physical harm and contended that “in the area of damages, it is believed that recent United States Supreme Court cases in the area of discrimination establish that physical harm is not necessary to have occurred”; this Court disagreed, holding that, for IIED, plaintiffs must a 2018See Rolla v. Westmoreland Health Sys., 651 A.2d 160, 161-63 (Pa. Super. 1994) (appeal from order granting appellees’ preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and dismissing with prejudice appellant’s complaint, including claim for emotional distress; appellant asserted that emotional harm is just as damaging as physical harm and contended that “in the area of damages, it is believed that recent United States Supreme Court cases in the area of discrimination establish that physical harm is not necessary to have occurred”; this Court disagreed, holding that, for IIED, plaintiffs must a | 1 | 1 |
Hooten v. Pennsylvania College of Optometrygreen2 sentences2016College of Optometry, 601 F.Supp. 1151, 1155 (E.D. 2016College of Optometry, 601 F.Supp. 1151, 1155 (E.D. | 1 | 1 |
Kelly v. Resource Housing of America, Inc.green2 sentences2016See Fewell v. Besner, 444 Pa.Super. 559 , 664 A.2d 577, 582 (1995) (asserting that, under Kazatsky, "[a] plaintiff must also show physical injury or harm in order to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress”); Johnson v. Caparelli, 425 Pa.Super. 404 , 625 A.2d 668, 671 (1993) (discussing the requirements for a claim of IIED under section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and stating "[t]he Supreme Court [in Kazatsky\ has further added the requirement of physical injury or harm in the event that § 46 is to be adopted”); Kelly v. Resource Housing of Americ 2016See Fewell v. Besner, 444 Pa.Super. 559 , 664 A.2d 577, 582 (1995) (asserting that, under Kazatsky, "[a] plaintiff must also show physical injury or harm in order to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress”); Johnson v. Caparelli, 425 Pa.Super. 404 , 625 A.2d 668, 671 (1993) (discussing the requirements for a claim of IIED under section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and stating "[t]he Supreme Court [in Kazatsky\ has further added the requirement of physical injury or harm in the event that § 46 is to be adopted”); Kelly v. Resource Housing of Americ | 1 | 1 |
Hoy v. Angelonegreen2 sentences2016To succeed on an IIED claim: “(1) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (2) it must be intentional or reckless; (3) it must cause emotional distress; [and] (4) that distress must be severe.” Hoy v. Angelone, 691 A.2d 476, 482 (Pa. Super. 1997), citing Hooten v Penna. 2016To succeed on an IIED claim: “(1) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (2) it must be intentional or reckless; (3) it must cause emotional distress; [and] (4) that distress must be severe.” Hoy v. Angelone, 691 A.2d 476, 482 (Pa. Super. 1997), citing Hooten v Penna. | 1 | 1 |
Abadie v. Riddle Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences2016See Fewell v. Besner, 444 Pa.Super. 559 , 664 A.2d 577, 582 (1995) (asserting that, under Kazatsky, "[a] plaintiff must also show physical injury or harm in order to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress”); Johnson v. Caparelli, 425 Pa.Super. 404 , 625 A.2d 668, 671 (1993) (discussing the requirements for a claim of IIED under section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and stating "[t]he Supreme Court [in Kazatsky\ has further added the requirement of physical injury or harm in the event that § 46 is to be adopted”); Kelly v. Resource Housing of Americ 2016See Fewell v. Besner, 444 Pa.Super. 559 , 664 A.2d 577, 582 (1995) (asserting that, under Kazatsky, "[a] plaintiff must also show physical injury or harm in order to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress”); Johnson v. Caparelli, 425 Pa.Super. 404 , 625 A.2d 668, 671 (1993) (discussing the requirements for a claim of IIED under section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and stating "[t]he Supreme Court [in Kazatsky\ has further added the requirement of physical injury or harm in the event that § 46 is to be adopted”); Kelly v. Resource Housing of Americ | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Caparelligreen2 sentences2016See Fewell v. Besner, 444 Pa.Super. 559 , 664 A.2d 577, 582 (1995) (asserting that, under Kazatsky, "[a] plaintiff must also show physical injury or harm in order to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress”); Johnson v. Caparelli, 425 Pa.Super. 404 , 625 A.2d 668, 671 (1993) (discussing the requirements for a claim of IIED under section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and stating "[t]he Supreme Court [in Kazatsky\ has further added the requirement of physical injury or harm in the event that § 46 is to be adopted”); Kelly v. Resource Housing of Americ 2016See Fewell v. Besner, 444 Pa.Super. 559 , 664 A.2d 577, 582 (1995) (asserting that, under Kazatsky, "[a] plaintiff must also show physical injury or harm in order to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress”); Johnson v. Caparelli, 425 Pa.Super. 404 , 625 A.2d 668, 671 (1993) (discussing the requirements for a claim of IIED under section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and stating "[t]he Supreme Court [in Kazatsky\ has further added the requirement of physical injury or harm in the event that § 46 is to be adopted”); Kelly v. Resource Housing of Americ | 1 | 1 |
Fewell v. Besnergreen2 sentences2016See Fewell v. Besner, 444 Pa.Super. 559 , 664 A.2d 577, 582 (1995) (asserting that, under Kazatsky, "[a] plaintiff must also show physical injury or harm in order to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress”); Johnson v. Caparelli, 425 Pa.Super. 404 , 625 A.2d 668, 671 (1993) (discussing the requirements for a claim of IIED under section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and stating "[t]he Supreme Court [in Kazatsky\ has further added the requirement of physical injury or harm in the event that § 46 is to be adopted”); Kelly v. Resource Housing of Americ 2016See Fewell v. Besner, 444 Pa.Super. 559 , 664 A.2d 577, 582 (1995) (asserting that, under Kazatsky, "[a] plaintiff must also show physical injury or harm in order to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress”); Johnson v. Caparelli, 425 Pa.Super. 404 , 625 A.2d 668, 671 (1993) (discussing the requirements for a claim of IIED under section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and stating "[t]he Supreme Court [in Kazatsky\ has further added the requirement of physical injury or harm in the event that § 46 is to be adopted”); Kelly v. Resource Housing of Americ | 1 | 1 |
Toney v. Chester County Hospitalgreen2 sentences2012The result in Toney v. Chester County Hosp., 961 A.2d 192, 198 (Pa.Super.2008) (era banc), order aff'd by equally divided court, 36 A.3d 83 (Pa.2011), which dealt with an NIED claim, does not change our conclusion that witnessing the event is required for an IIED claim, as per the Restatement text above. 2012The result in Toney v. Chester County Hosp., 961 A.2d 192, 198 (Pa.Super.2008) (era banc), order aff'd by equally divided court, 36 A.3d 83 (Pa.2011), which dealt with an NIED claim, does not change our conclusion that witnessing the event is required for an IIED claim, as per the Restatement text above. | 1 | 1 |
Daughen v. Foxgreen2 sentences2007Hoy v. Angelone, 554 Pa. 134 , 720 A.2d 745, 753-754 (1998) (internal citation omitted), quoting in part Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress, cmt. d; Daughen v. Fox, 372 Pa.Super. 405 , 539 A.2d 858, 861 (1988). ¶ 39 ' Appellant’s amended complaint demonstrates that the crux of her IIED claim is based on the premise that appellees “intentionally and wrongly targeted and accused [appellant] of violations of the college’s honor code,” despite their knowledge of the falsity of these allegations, and that Allegheny and Professor Nelson acted to 2007Hoy v. Angelone, 554 Pa. 134 , 720 A.2d 745, 753-754 (1998) (internal citation omitted), quoting in part Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress, cmt. d; Daughen v. Fox, 372 Pa.Super. 405 , 539 A.2d 858, 861 (1988). ¶ 39 ' Appellant’s amended complaint demonstrates that the crux of her IIED claim is based on the premise that appellees “intentionally and wrongly targeted and accused [appellant] of violations of the college’s honor code,” despite their knowledge of the falsity of these allegations, and that Allegheny and Professor Nelson acted to | 1 | 1 |
PAPIEVES Et Ux. v. Kellygreen2 sentences2004See e.g., Papieves v. Lawrence, 437 Pa. 373 , 263 A.2d 118 (1970) (defendant, after striking and killing plaintiff’s son with an automobile, and after failing to notify authorities or seek medical assistance, buried dead body in a field where it was discovered two months later and returned to the parents); Banyas v. Lower Bucks Hospital, 293 Pa. Super. 122 , 437 A.2d 1236 (1981) (defendants intentionally fabricated records to suggest that plaintiff had killed a third party and such fraud led to plaintiff being indicted); Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) ( 2004See e.g., Papieves v. Lawrence, 437 Pa. 373 , 263 A.2d 118 (1970) (defendant, after striking and killing plaintiff’s son with an automobile, and after failing to notify authorities or seek medical assistance, buried dead body in a field where it was discovered two months later and returned to the parents); Banyas v. Lower Bucks Hospital, 293 Pa. Super. 122 , 437 A.2d 1236 (1981) (defendants intentionally fabricated records to suggest that plaintiff had killed a third party and such fraud led to plaintiff being indicted); Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) ( | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Don Chuy, in No. 77-1412 v. The Philadelphia Eagles Football Club (Sued as \The Philadelphia Eagles\")
green
2 sentences2022For an IIED claim to 22 survive a preliminary objection, a "court must determine, as a matter of law, whether there is sufficient evidence for reasonable persons to find extreme or outrageous conduct." Id. 2022For an IIED claim to 22 survive a preliminary objection, a "court must determine, as a matter of law, whether there is sufficient evidence for reasonable persons to find extreme or outrageous conduct." Id. | 3 | 2004–2022 |
Bartanus v. Lis
green
2 sentences2022They argue this Court recognized an action for IIED for interference with family bonds in Bartanus v. Lis, 480 A.2d 1178 (Pa.Super. 1984), where the Court found an IIED claim viable where defendants disparaged the father and spread lies about him to have the child return from living in Germany with his father. 2022They argue this Court recognized an action for IIED for interference with family bonds in Bartanus v. Lis, 480 A.2d 1178 (Pa.Super. 1984), where the Court found an IIED claim viable where defendants disparaged the father and spread lies about him to have the child return from living in Germany with his father. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Robert D. Shaner, Jr. v. Synthes (Usa)
green
2 sentences2019Pennsylvania law imposes liability on "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress...." Shaner v. Synthes (USA) , 204 F.3d 494 , 507 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting Hoy v. Angelone , 554 Pa. 134 , 720 A.2d 745 , 753 (1998) ). 2019Pennsylvania law imposes liability on "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress...." Shaner v. Synthes (USA) , 204 F.3d 494 , 507 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting Hoy v. Angelone , 554 Pa. 134 , 720 A.2d 745 , 753 (1998) ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Grant v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole
green
2 sentences2012The result in Toney v. Chester County Hosp., 961 A.2d 192, 198 (Pa.Super.2008) (era banc), order aff'd by equally divided court, 36 A.3d 83 (Pa.2011), which dealt with an NIED claim, does not change our conclusion that witnessing the event is required for an IIED claim, as per the Restatement text above. 2012The result in Toney v. Chester County Hosp., 961 A.2d 192, 198 (Pa.Super.2008) (era banc), order aff'd by equally divided court, 36 A.3d 83 (Pa.2011), which dealt with an NIED claim, does not change our conclusion that witnessing the event is required for an IIED claim, as per the Restatement text above. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Banyas v. Lower Bucks Hospital
green
2 sentences2004See e.g., Papieves v. Lawrence, 437 Pa. 373 , 263 A.2d 118 (1970) (defendant, after striking and killing plaintiff’s son with an automobile, and after failing to notify authorities or seek medical assistance, buried dead body in a field where it was discovered two months later and returned to the parents); Banyas v. Lower Bucks Hospital, 293 Pa. Super. 122 , 437 A.2d 1236 (1981) (defendants intentionally fabricated records to suggest that plaintiff had killed a third party and such fraud led to plaintiff being indicted); Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) ( 2004See e.g., Papieves v. Lawrence, 437 Pa. 373 , 263 A.2d 118 (1970) (defendant, after striking and killing plaintiff’s son with an automobile, and after failing to notify authorities or seek medical assistance, buried dead body in a field where it was discovered two months later and returned to the parents); Banyas v. Lower Bucks Hospital, 293 Pa. Super. 122 , 437 A.2d 1236 (1981) (defendants intentionally fabricated records to suggest that plaintiff had killed a third party and such fraud led to plaintiff being indicted); Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) ( | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Taylor v. Albert Einstein Medical Center
green
2 sentences2004Taylor v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 562 Pa. 176 , 185 n.1, 754 A.2d 650 , 654 n.1 (2000) (Castille, J., concurring). 2004Taylor v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 562 Pa. 176 , 185 n.1, 754 A.2d 650 , 654 n.1 (2000) (Castille, J., concurring). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.