43 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1951–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Nelsongreen1 sentence2024(Trial Ct. Op. at 4; R.R at 116a.) The trial court concluded that this conduct justified an award of attorneys’ fees because it was a “relentless pursuit of a claim which plainly lacks legal merit.” Id. (citing Miller v. Nelson, 768 A.2d 858, 862 (Pa. Super. 2001)). | 1 | 1 |
City of Phila v. Estate of T. Labrosciano ~ Appeal of: R. Labroscianogreen1 sentence2023See Labrosciano, 202 A.3d at 152-53 . 13 Despite these issues, we cannot grant relief to F.A. | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Alabamagreen1 sentence2022The trial court, however, stated that, “[t]he Commonwealth conceded [Appellant’s] position and the [o]rder granting relief under [g]round [o]ne was entered without the need for a hearing or argument.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/9/19, at ¶11; see also Appellant’s Reply to Commonwealth’s Answer to PCRA Petition, 3/28/16, at unnumbered page 1 (stating, “[t]he Commonwealth agree[d] at page 6 of its [answer to Appellant’s PCRA petition] that [Appellant] is entitled to be resentenced [pursuant to Miller, supra, and Montgomery, supra]”). -4- J-A25019-20 On April 12, 2018, the PCRA court denied Appellant | 1 | 1 |
Montgomery v. Louisianagreen1 sentence2022The trial court, however, stated that, “[t]he Commonwealth conceded [Appellant’s] position and the [o]rder granting relief under [g]round [o]ne was entered without the need for a hearing or argument.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/9/19, at ¶11; see also Appellant’s Reply to Commonwealth’s Answer to PCRA Petition, 3/28/16, at unnumbered page 1 (stating, “[t]he Commonwealth agree[d] at page 6 of its [answer to Appellant’s PCRA petition] that [Appellant] is entitled to be resentenced [pursuant to Miller, supra, and Montgomery, supra]”). -4- J-A25019-20 On April 12, 2018, the PCRA court denied Appellant | 1 | 1 |
Terwilliger v. Kitchengreen1 sentence2018(See Trial Court Opinion, 3/09/17, at 2); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(a), Comparative Negligence; Terwilliger v. Kitchen, 781 A.2d 1201, 1209 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“Pennsylvania’s comparative negligence statute does not bar recovery by the ____________________________________________ 5We note that Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 407, Subsequent Remedial Measures, provides: When measures are taken by a party that would have made an earlier injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible against that party to prove: • negligence; • culpable conduct; • a def | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Mooregreen2 sentences2017As Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Eagen has stated: “In those instances where an involuntary manslaughter verdict would be supported by the evidence, the failure to so acquaint the jury prevents it from operating with full knowledge of the relevant law and precludes the defendant from having a fair trial.” Commonwealth v. Moore, 463 Pa. 317, 322 , 344 A.2d 850, 853 (1975) (plurality opinion). -8- J-A31004-16 The need for an instruction on involuntary manslaughter also follows from the Commonwealth's burden of proof. 2017As Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Eagen has stated: “In those instances where an involuntary manslaughter verdict would be supported by the evidence, the failure to so acquaint the jury prevents it from operating with full knowledge of the relevant law and precludes the defendant from having a fair trial.” Commonwealth v. Moore, 463 Pa. 317, 322 , 344 A.2d 850, 853 (1975) (plurality opinion). -8- J-A31004-16 The need for an instruction on involuntary manslaughter also follows from the Commonwealth's burden of proof. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Brazilgreen2 sentences2006Trial, 11/15/04, at 5-11. [4] I would note that this Court in Wentz did not require a waiver colloquy in order to find the appellant "waived" his right to counsel. 421 A.2d at 434 . [5] Although I recognize that the appointment of standby counsel does not eliminate the need for a waiver colloquy when an appellant waives his right to counsel, Commonwealth v. Brazil, 549 Pa. 321, 326 , 701 A.2d 216, 219 (1997), such does not affect the analysis of whether Appellant forfeited his right to counsel. 2006Trial, 11/15/04, at 5-11. [4] I would note that this Court in Wentz did not require a waiver colloquy in order to find the appellant "waived" his right to counsel. 421 A.2d at 434 . [5] Although I recognize that the appointment of standby counsel does not eliminate the need for a waiver colloquy when an appellant waives his right to counsel, Commonwealth v. Brazil, 549 Pa. 321, 326 , 701 A.2d 216, 219 (1997), such does not affect the analysis of whether Appellant forfeited his right to counsel. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Eastongreen1 sentence2005Id. at 13-17, 28-29. ¶ 12 For example, the Court stated: Here we are assuming that the legislative findings set forth above, see supra note 14, are substantially valid. | 1 | 1 |
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrickgreen1 sentence1996At best, Cipollone supports an inference that an express pre-emption analysis forecloses implied pre-emption; it does not establish a rule. *454 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1488 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 393 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Ruddergreen1 sentence1987The need for such a privilege is widely recognized, see e.g., Ex Parte Rudder, 507 So.2d 411, 413 (Ala.1987); Bond v. District Court of the County of Denver, 682 P.2d 33, 38 (Colo.1984); State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203 , 709 P.2d 225, 232 (1985); State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Bond v. DIST. CT., IN AND FOR DENVER CTY.green1 sentence1987The need for such a privilege is widely recognized, see e.g., Ex Parte Rudder, 507 So.2d 411, 413 (Ala.1987); Bond v. District Court of the County of Denver, 682 P.2d 33, 38 (Colo.1984); State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203 , 709 P.2d 225, 232 (1985); State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Millergreen2 sentences1987The need for such a privilege is widely recognized, see e.g., Ex Parte Rudder, 507 So.2d 411, 413 (Ala.1987); Bond v. District Court of the County of Denver, 682 P.2d 33, 38 (Colo.1984); State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203 , 709 P.2d 225, 232 (1985); State ex rel. 1987The need for such a privilege is widely recognized, see e.g., Ex Parte Rudder, 507 So.2d 411, 413 (Ala.1987); Bond v. District Court of the County of Denver, 682 P.2d 33, 38 (Colo.1984); State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203 , 709 P.2d 225, 232 (1985); State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
| Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Alleghenygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Auel v. Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cribb v. United Health Clubs Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Warden v. Zanellagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Axler v. First Newport Realty Investorsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Johnstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Hubbardred | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Ricegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Martingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Brownmillergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Heisse v. Marklandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
District of Columbia v. Heller
green
2 sentences2024Id. at 628 . 2013The Supreme Court continued: “The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.” Id. | 2 | 2013–2024 |
Missouri v. McNeely
green
2 sentences2019Following McNeely , although the dissipation of BAC evidence "may support a finding of exigency in a specific case, as it did in Schmerber , it does not do so categorically." Id. at 156 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 . 1 Rather, "[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances." Id. 2019Following McNeely , although the dissipation of BAC evidence "may support a finding of exigency in a specific case, as it did in Schmerber , it does not do so categorically." Id. at 156 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 . 1 Rather, "[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances." Id. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Carlson v. Ciavarelli
green
1 sentence2024(Trial Ct. Op. at 4; R.R at 116a.) The trial court concluded that this conduct justified an award of attorneys’ fees because it was a “relentless pursuit of a claim which plainly lacks legal merit.” Id. (citing Miller v. Nelson, 768 A.2d 858, 862 (Pa. Super. 2001)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Energy Conservation Council v. Public Utility Commission
green
1 sentence2022The ALJ noted the question of whether resolving “congestion,” 10 Additional evidence was taken, and findings of fact made, related to the other factors under Section 57.76(a) of the Regulations, such as environmental impacts and reasonable alternatives. 10 alone, is sufficient to meet the need requirement under the Code and the Regulations had not yet been answered and that this Court in Energy Conservation Council of Pennsylvania v. Public Utility Commission, 995 A.2d 465 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), did not resolve the issue, determining that reliability issues within the PJM Region supported the fin | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Commonwealth v. Flor
green
1 sentence2016Further, Mother maintains that the trial court “failed to weigh [her] due process rights against the need to hold a hearing at that time.” Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Clouser v. Shamokin Packing Co.
green
1 sentence2015Accordingly, the Court need not rule on outstanding preliminary objections, as they are being treated as motions for judgment on the pleadings, as "a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is identical to a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 1034, Pa.R.C.P., and is governed by identical standards." Clouser v. Shamokin Packing Co., 361 A.2d 836 , (Pa.Super. 1976). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Grant v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole
green
2 sentences2013The court also “[found] it prudent to limit the reach of this NEED claim to preexisting relationships involving duties that obviously and objectively hold the potential of deep emotional harm in the event of breach.... [T]he special relationships must encompass an implied duty to care for the plaintiff’s emotional well-being.” Id. 2013While not defining each and every relationship that would qualify, the court stated, “[nonetheless, we would hold that some relationships, including some doctor-patient relationships, will involve an implied duty to care for the plaintiff’s emotional well-being that, if breached, has the potential to cause emotional distress resulting in physical harm.” Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Parham v. J. R.
green
2 sentences2010Rejecting the argument of the need for such a hearing, the Court opined that "the supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical decisions for the commitment and treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory than real." Id. at 609 , 99 S.Ct. 2493 . 2010Rejecting the argument of the need for such a hearing, the Court opined that "the supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical decisions for the commitment and treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory than real." Id. at 609 , 99 S.Ct. 2493 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Gtech Corp. v. Commonwealth, Department of Revenue
green
1 sentence2009In that case, the Department of Revenue failed to take immediate action on the bid protest and failed to stay contract negotiations pursuant to Section 1711 (k) of the Procurement Code, 62 Pa.C.S. § 171 l.l(k), which requires a stay of the procurement proceeding upon filing of a protest "unless and until the head of the purchasing agency ... makes a written determination that the protest is clearly without merit or that award of the contract without delay is necessary to protect substantial interests of the Commonwealth.” The GTECH Court held that, "[a]n agency cannot invoke the exception when | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Busik v. Levine
green
2 sentences2006Indeed, the Explanatory Comments single out the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351 , 307 A.2d 571 (1973) which interpreted New Jersey’s rule that provided for an additional six percent to the award “[i]n tort actions, including products liability actions, ... from the date of the institution of the action or from a date six months after the date of the tort, whichever is later.” N.J.R. 4:42-11(b). 2006Indeed, the Explanatory Comments single out the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351 , 307 A.2d 571 (1973) which interpreted New Jersey’s rule that provided for an additional six percent to the award “[i]n tort actions, including products liability actions, ... from the date of the institution of the action or from a date six months after the date of the tort, whichever is later.” N.J.R. 4:42-11(b). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Commonwealth v. Wentz
green
1 sentence2006Trial, 11/15/04, at 5-11. [4] I would note that this Court in Wentz did not require a waiver colloquy in order to find the appellant "waived" his right to counsel. 421 A.2d at 434 . [5] Although I recognize that the appointment of standby counsel does not eliminate the need for a waiver colloquy when an appellant waives his right to counsel, Commonwealth v. Brazil, 549 Pa. 321, 326 , 701 A.2d 216, 219 (1997), such does not affect the analysis of whether Appellant forfeited his right to counsel. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill
green
1 sentence2001These are the private interests in retaining employment, the governmental interest in the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous termination.” Loudermill at 542-43 , 105 S.Ct. at 1493 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education
red
2 sentences1993In Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, 453 Pa. 584 , 305 A.2d 877 (1973), with the abolition of common law governmental immunity, the need for such a test was vitiated. 1993In Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, 453 Pa. 584 , 305 A.2d 877 (1973), with the abolition of common law governmental immunity, the need for such a test was vitiated. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Northampton County Area Community College v. Dow Chemical, U.S.A.
green
2 sentences1993In describing this “function test,” the Superior Court in Northampton County Area Community College v. Dow Chemical, 389 Pa. Superior Ct. 11 , 566 A.2d 591 (1989), affirmed per curiam, 528 Pa. 502 , 598 A.2d 1288 (1991), states: The trial court applied a traditional test for whether a governmental entity can claim governmental immunity, whether the controversy arose by virtue of a governmental or by virtue of a proprietary action by the entity.... 1993In describing this “function test,” the Superior Court in Northampton County Area Community College v. Dow Chemical, 389 Pa. Superior Ct. 11 , 566 A.2d 591 (1989), affirmed per curiam, 528 Pa. 502 , 598 A.2d 1288 (1991), states: The trial court applied a traditional test for whether a governmental entity can claim governmental immunity, whether the controversy arose by virtue of a governmental or by virtue of a proprietary action by the entity.... | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Northampton County Area Community College v. Dow Chemical, U.S.A.
green
2 sentences1993In describing this “function test,” the Superior Court in Northampton County Area Community College v. Dow Chemical, 389 Pa. Superior Ct. 11 , 566 A.2d 591 (1989), affirmed per curiam, 528 Pa. 502 , 598 A.2d 1288 (1991), states: The trial court applied a traditional test for whether a governmental entity can claim governmental immunity, whether the controversy arose by virtue of a governmental or by virtue of a proprietary action by the entity.... 1993In describing this “function test,” the Superior Court in Northampton County Area Community College v. Dow Chemical, 389 Pa. Superior Ct. 11 , 566 A.2d 591 (1989), affirmed per curiam, 528 Pa. 502 , 598 A.2d 1288 (1991), states: The trial court applied a traditional test for whether a governmental entity can claim governmental immunity, whether the controversy arose by virtue of a governmental or by virtue of a proprietary action by the entity.... | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Commonwealth v. Brady
green
2 sentences1989Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 336 , 508 A.2d 286 (1986), the Court recognized the need for a rule to prevent the use of a frivolous double jeopardy claim as a tool to disrupt and to delay the functioning of the criminal trial process: The stay of a criminal trial pending appeal necessitates what may be lengthy delays in the prosecution of the defendant. 1989Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 336 , 508 A.2d 286 (1986), the Court recognized the need for a rule to prevent the use of a frivolous double jeopardy claim as a tool to disrupt and to delay the functioning of the criminal trial process: The stay of a criminal trial pending appeal necessitates what may be lengthy delays in the prosecution of the defendant. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
CONSUMERS ED. & PROT. ASS'N v. Schwartz
green
2 sentences1989Judge Johnson recognized the general principle that “repeals by implication are not favored and will not be permitted if there is any other reasonable construction, and that a law is not repealed by a later enactment if the two may be operative without repugnance to each other,” Consumers Education and Protective Association v. Schwartz, 495 Pa. 10 , 23 n. 17, 432 A.2d 173 , 180 n. 17 (1981), and concluded in his opinion: While the Financial Responsibility Law appears to advance the maximum restoration of individuals injured in connection with the use or maintenance of motor vehicles, the Poli 1989Judge Johnson recognized the general principle that “repeals by implication are not favored and will not be permitted if there is any other reasonable construction, and that a law is not repealed by a later enactment if the two may be operative without repugnance to each other,” Consumers Education and Protective Association v. Schwartz, 495 Pa. 10 , 23 n. 17, 432 A.2d 173 , 180 n. 17 (1981), and concluded in his opinion: While the Financial Responsibility Law appears to advance the maximum restoration of individuals injured in connection with the use or maintenance of motor vehicles, the Poli | 1 | 1989–1989 |
STATE EX REL. JUVENILE DEPT., CLATSOP CTY v. Martin
neutral
2 sentences1987Juvenile Dept. of Clatsop County v. Martin, 271 Or. 603 , 606 nn. 2, 3, 533 P.2d 780 , 781 nn. 2, 3 (1975). 1987Juvenile Dept. of Clatsop County v. Martin, 271 Or. 603 , 606 nn. 2, 3, 533 P.2d 780 , 781 nn. 2, 3 (1975). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Rank v. Metropolitan Edison Co. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Brown v. Newkirk green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Petition of Dwyer green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Moreland v. Metrovich green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Commonwealth v. Roane green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Commonwealth v. Goldsmith green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Duggan v. 807 Liberty Ave., Inc. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. Philco Ford Corp. green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Black v. Wyalusing Area School District green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Commonwealth v. Haideman green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Commonwealth v. Hilliard green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Nissley v. Pennsylvania Railroad green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Martorano Appeal green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Commonwealth v. Chapasco green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Commonwealth v. Campana green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Commonwealth v. Kilgallen green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Commonwealth v. Kirk green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Commonwealth v. Kirk green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Farmers & Miners National Bank v. Taylor green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Austin's Estate green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.