United States v. Laurie Jane Luttrell, United States of Am. v. William Dale Kegley, Aka: Bill Kegley, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1991). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Laurie Jane Luttrell, United States of Am. v. William Dale Kegley, Aka: Bill Kegley, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1991). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“in this circuit, very unsavory government conduct alone has failed to cause the dismissal of indictments.”
57 citation events (16 in the last 25 years) across 15 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Charlot E. Thickstun John Nazaroff (ca9, 1997-04-03) · Strongest negative: United States v. Daniel Clement Jones (ca4, 1992-09-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1991 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1991 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 26 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" United States v. Daniel Clement Jones
4th Cir. · 1992 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
But cf. United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806, 813 (9th Cir.1989) (requiring “reasoned grounds” to investigate a particular individual), vacated in part, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (rejecting the “reasoned grounds” requirement), ce rt. denied, — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 1558 , 118 L.Ed.2d 207 (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Charlot E. Thickstun John Nazaroff
9th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
in this circuit, very unsavory government conduct alone has failed to cause the dismissal of indictments.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Arizona v. Craig A. Williamson
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
The court relied on United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764 (9th Cir.1991), in which it held due process does not require reasonable suspicion of a particular individual before the government conducts an investigation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mayer
9th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
UNITED STATES v. MAYER 12429 Mayer asks us to establish a reasonable suspicion require- ment, separate from good faith, for investigations of organiza- tions that are protected by the First Amendment.1 While this circuit has clearly established that investigations of individu- als require no reasonable suspicion under the Fifth Amend- ment, see United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764 (9th Cir. 1991), Mayer contends that the First Amendment requires such a result when the police engage in surveillance of pro- tected associational activities of a group.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mayer
9th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
Mayer asks us to establish a reasonable suspicion requirement, separate from good faith, for investigations of organizations that are protected by the First Amendment. 1 While this circuit has clearly established that investigations of individuals require no reasonable suspicion under the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764 (9th Cir.1991), Mayer contends that the First Amendment requires such a result when the police engage in surveillance of protected associational activities of a group.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. David Cary Mayer, AKA David Cory Mayer
9th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
Mayer asks us to establish a reasonable suspicion requirement, separate from good faith, for investigations of organizations that are protected by the First Amendment. 1 While this circuit has clearly es *1138 tablished that investigations of individuals require no reasonable suspicion under the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764 (9th Cir.1991), Mayer contends that the First Amendment requires such a result when the police engage in surveillance of protected associational activities of a group.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mayer
9th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
Mayer asks us to establish a reasonable suspicion require- ment, separate from good faith, for investigations of organiza- tions that are protected by the First Amendment.1 While this circuit has clearly established that investigations of individu- als require no reasonable suspicion under the Fifth Amend- ment, see United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764 (9th Cir. 1991), Mayer contends that the First Amendment requires such a result when the police engage in surveillance of pro- tected associational activities of a group.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mayer
9th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
Mayer asks us to establish a reasonable suspicion require- ment, separate from good faith, for investigations of organiza- tions that are protected by the First Amendment.1 While this circuit has clearly established that investigations of individu- als require no reasonable suspicion under the Fifth Amend- ment, see United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764 (9th Cir. 1991), Mayer contends that the First Amendment requires such a result when the police engage in surveillance of pro- tected associational activities of a group.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Labensky v. County of Nassau
E.D.N.Y · 1998 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Chin, 934 F.2d at 397 ; United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc), cert. denied, Kegley v. United States, 503 U.S. 959 , 112 S.Ct. 1558 , 118 L.Ed.2d 207 (1992); United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 182 , (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 914 , 113 S.Ct. 2351 , 124 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jeffrey Harvey
2d Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
See United States v. Allibhai, 939 F.2d 244, 249 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 967 , 117 L.Ed.2d 133 (1992); United States v. Osborne, 935 F.2d 32, 35-36 (4th Cir.1991); Chin, 934 F.2d at 397 ; United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1558 , 118 L.Ed.2d 207 (1992); United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir.1990) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1535 , 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992); United States v. Jenrette, 744 F.2d 817 , 824 n. 13 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carolyn Walker Saturley v. United States
9th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Outrageous Government Conduct 4 Whether the government had reasoned grounds for approaching Saturley is governed by this court's decision in U.S. v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Cordae Black
9th Cir. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (order).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Cordae Black (2×)
9th Cir. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (order).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Baldwin
D.N.M. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.1991)(holding that probable cause or reasonable suspicion are not prerequisites for initiating investigations of individuals); Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 Fordham Urb: L.J. 553, 560 (1999)(“The law does not pretend to dictate when a prosecutor' may- open an investigation-.”).
discussed Cited "see" Armstrong v. Squadrito
7th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir.1989), vacated in part, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.1991) Legal history, however, teaches that we should beware the use of sphygmomanometers to measure anything other than blood pressure itself: The old Frye rule for admission of scientific evidence came about in a dispute over whether a sphygmomanometer could measure deception reliably.
cited Cited "see" Armstrong v. Squadrito
7th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir.1989), vacated in part, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.1991).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Foster
E.D. Mich. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir.1989) (“The Supreme Court opinions give little guidance by which we may determine whether the government’s conduct was outrageous.”), modified, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1991).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Ositadima Igbo, and Phillip Chukwurah
9th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806, 809 (9th Cir.1989), amended on other grounds, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1558 (1992). 35 Appellants also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the distribution of cocaine base charge.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Gary Hugh Orton
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764 (CA9 1991) (in banc), cert. denied, 503 U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1558 (1992).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Yasmin Allibhai and Sultan Allibhai
5th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806 (9th Cir.1989), vacated in part and modified, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.1991). 5 .
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Edward Chin
2d Cir. · 1991 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc); United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir.1990) (en banc), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1618 , 113 L.Ed.2d 716 (1991); United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 860 (10th Cir.1984); United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 , 104 S.Ct. 2683 , 81 L.Ed.2d 878 (1984); see also United States v. Jenrette, 744 F.2d 817 , 824 n. 13 (D.C.Cir.1984) (rejecting reasonable suspicion requirement in context of undercover investigations of public officials), cert. denied, 4…
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. Hayes
Vt. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Circuits); see also United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764, 764 (9th Cir. 1991).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Lively
Wash. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d at 904 ; see also United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 959 , 112 S.Ct. 1558 , 118 L.Ed.2d 207 (1992) (and the cases cited therein).
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. Lively
Wash. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d at 904 ; see also United States v. Luttrell, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 959 (1992) (and the cases cited therein).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. James Albert McClelland Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee
9th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir.1989), amended, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Francis Ravel
9th Cir. · 1991 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806, 810 (9th Cir.1989) (citing the UCC to reject defendant’s argument that credit card drafts were not “lost, stolen, expired, revoked, canceled, or obtained with intent to defraud” under 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (e)(3)), amended on other grounds, 923 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Laurie Jane LUTTRELL, Defendant-Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Dale KEGLEY, AKA: Bill Kegley, Defendant-Appellant
87-5303, 87-5310.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Jan 23, 1991.
923 F.2d 764
Donald B. Marks, Beverly Hills, Cal., for defendant-appellant, Luttrell., Anthony P. Brooklier, Beverly Hills, Cal., for defendant-appellant, Kegley., Maurice A. Leiter, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Goodwin, Wallace, Pregerson, Alarcon, Canby, Norris, Wiggins, Brunetti, Noonan, O'Scannlain, Leavy.
Cited by 48 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 87%
Citer courts: Ninth Circuit (1)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

Donald B. Marks, Beverly Hills, Cal., for defendant-appellant, Luttrell.

Anthony P. Brooklier, Beverly Hills, Cal., for defendant-appellant, Kegley.

Maurice A. Leiter, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before GOODWIN, Chief Judge, WALLACE, PREGERSON, ALARCON, CANBY, NORRIS, WIGGINS, BRUNETTI, NOONAN, O'SCANNLAIN, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

Lead Opinion

ORDER

This case was taken en banc on July 19, 1990 and submitted on briefs without oral argument on September 27, 1990. The court now being fully advised, we vacate that part of the three-judge court’s opinion which addresses whether the government need have “reasoned grounds” to investigate a particular individual. See United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806, 812-14 (9th Cir.1989). Specifically, that opinion is hereby amended as follows:

On page 807, right column, first paragraph of text of opinion, last sentence, delete “in part, and remand in part.” Delete from page 812, right column, the first full paragraph, beginning “In an effort to introduce ...” through page 814, first full paragraph, left column, at the sentence ending “In any event....” On page 814, left column, second full paragraph, delete the sentence beginning “On remand.... ” On page 814, right column, delete the words “IN PART and REMANDED IN PART.”

In partially vacating the three-judge court’s opinion, we follow four of our sister circuits in explicitly rejecting a “reasoned grounds” requirement for investigation of an individual under the due process clause. See United States v. Jenrette, 744 F.2d 817, 824 (D.C.Cir.) (no constitutional violation where FBI targeted defendant without “reasonable suspicion” of wrongdoing), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099, 105 S.Ct. 2321, 85 L.Ed.2d 840 (1984); United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 860 (10th Cir.1984) (“government need not have reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing in order to conduct an undercover investigation”); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 608-09 (3d Cir.1982) (en banc) (rejecting “reasonable basis” test), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880, 105 S.Ct. 243, 83 L.Ed.2d 182 (1984); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 941 (2d Cir.) (rejecting “reasonable suspicion” requirement), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956, 101 S.Ct. 364, 66 L.Ed.2d 221 (1980).

We have no reason to review the other parts of the three-judge court’s opinion.

Dissent

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,

dissenting:

I dissent from the order vacating the part of the original panel’s opinion that requires the government to have reasoned grounds to investigate a particular individual. It is well established that constitutional protection of due process is violated when the government engages in outrageous investigatory conduct. See United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir.1986), and cases cited therein. I believe that the category of outrageous government conduct includes instances when the government targets an individual for undercover investigation without reasoned grounds to believe that the particular individual is engaged in or about to engage in criminal activities.

[*765] I agree with Judge Dorothy Nelson that rooted in the Bill of Rights are the concepts that criminal investigation must move purposefully and fairly and that individuals have a right to be left alone. In our society, which places paramount importance on personal liberty, the government must have a legitimate reason to infringe upon an individual’s freedom who is — by all appearances, and according to all information possessed by the police — innocent.

In the present case there is no indication that the police acted out of any personal animus against the defendants or that the police randomly and arbitrarily targeted the defendants. Rather, an informant chose an acquaintance as the target for the police. Nonetheless, the police should not be allowed to hire informants simply to go out on fishing expeditions to find targets for undercover sting operations. I would remand to the district court to determine from a fully developed record whether the government, through its informant, had obtained information to give it reason to believe that the defendants were likely to engage in criminal activities.