At page 1000 Court's discretion in determining need for recusal19 citing cases“absent a legal disqualification under judiciary law 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience”
- Matter of Bianco v. Bruce-Ross, 151 A.D.3d 716 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2017).publishedThe father failed to set forth any demonstrable proof of the court’s bias or prejudice to *718 warrant recusal (see Matter of O’Donnell v Goldenberg, 68 AD3d 1000, 1000 [2009]; Impastato v Impastato, 62 AD3d 752, 753 [2009]).
- Aebly v. Lally, 140 A.D.3d 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2016).published“Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience” (Matter of O’Donnell v Goldenberg, 68 AD3d 1000, 1000 [2009…
- Matter of Oteri, 137 A.D.3d 917 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2016).publishedThe issues raised on the appeals from those orders are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the decree. “ Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for re…
- Prince v. Prince, 134 A.D.3d 1008 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2015).published“Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience” (Matter of O’Donnell v Goldenberg, 68 AD3d 1000, 1000 [2009…
- Hayes v. Barroga-Hayes, 117 A.D.3d 794 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2014).published “Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience” (Matter of O’Donnell v Goldenberg, 68 AD3d 1000, 1000 [2009…
- Washington Mut. Bank v. Schenk, 112 A.D.3d 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2013).published Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly, in effect, granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against Schenk. “ ‘Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law §…
- Chusid v. Silvera, 110 A.D.3d 662 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2013).published “Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience” (Matter of O’Donnell v Goldenberg, 68 AD3d 1000, 1000 [2009…
- Vigo v. 501 Second Street Holding Corp., 100 A.D.3d 870 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2012).published “Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience” (Matter of O’Donnell v Goldenberg, 68 AD3d 1000, 1000 [2009…
- Galanti v. Kraus, 98 A.D.3d 559 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2012).published “Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience” (Matter of O’Donnell v Goldenberg, 68 AD3d 1000, 1000 [2009…
- Gihon, LLC v. 501 Second Street, LLC, 77 A.D.3d 709 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2010).published“Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience” (Matter of O’Donnell v Goldenberg, 68 AD3d 1000, 1000 [2009…
Show 3 more citing cases
- McGrath v. D'Angio, 85 A.D.3d 794 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2011).published
- In re Dior Polo G., 105 A.D.3d 739 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2013).published
- Gounder v. Melrose Credit Union, 241 A.D.3d 882 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 2025).published
v.
Alan Goldenberg
Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience (see People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405-406 [1987]; Irizarry v State of New York, 56 AD3d 613, 614 [2008]; Matter of Imre v Johnson, 54 AD3d 427, 427-428 [2008])., Here, the father failed to set forth any demonstrable proof of bias to warrant the conclusion that the court’s refusal to recuse itself was an improvident exercise of discretion (see Matter of Imre v Johnson, 54 AD3d at 428; Schwartzberg v Kingsbridge Hgts. Care Ctr., Inc., 28 AD3d 465, 466 [2006]; Anjam v Anjam, 191 AD2d 531 [1993]). Mastro, J.P., Santucci, Belen and Chambers, JJ., concur.