section 14 legal disqualification in New York

2026It is well settled that “[a]bsent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a Trial Judge is the sole arbiter of recusal” (People of State of N.Y. v Grasso, 49 AD3d 303, 306 [1st Dept 2008], quoting People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]; see Matter of Alizia McK., 25 AD3d 429, 430 [1st Dept 2006]; Best v Best, 302 AD2d 295, 295 [1st Dept 2003]).

2025"Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a Trial Judge is the sole arbiter of recusal" ( People v Moreno , 70 NY2d 403, 405 ).

2025"Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience" ( Matter of O'Donnell v Goldenberg , 68 AD3d 1000, 1000 ; see People v Moreno , 70 NY2d 403, 405-406 ; Hayes v Barroga-Hayes , 117 AD3d 794, 794 ; Vigo v 501 Second St.

2020Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a trial judge is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and the decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience ( see People v Moreno , 70 NY2d 403, 405 ; Matter of O'Donnell v Goldenberg , 68 AD3d 1000 ).

2017In any event, “ ‘[a]bsent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a trial judge is the sole arbiter of recusal and his or her decision in that regard will not be lightly overturned’” (Ashmore v Ashmore, 92 AD3d 817, 820 [2012], quoting Matter of Khan v Dolly, 39 AD3d 649, 650 [2007]). “ ‘Recusal, as a matter of due process, is required only where there exists a direct, personal, substantial or pecuniary interest in reaching a particular conclusion, or where a clash in judicial roles is seen to exist’ ” (Ashmore v Ashmore, 92 AD3d at 820 , quoting People v Alomar, 93 NY2d 239, 246 [1

2007“Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a trial judge is the sole arbiter of recusal and his or her decision in that regard will not be lightly overturned [citations omitted]. ‘Recusal, as a matter of due process, is required only where there exists a direct, personal, substantial or pecuniary interest in reaching a particular conclusion or where a clash in judicial roles is seen to exist’ ” (Matter of Khan v Dolly, 39 AD3d 649, 650-651 [2007], quoting People v Alomar, 93 NY2d 239, 246 [1999]).

2012“Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience” (Matter of O’Donnell v Goldenberg, 68 AD3d 1000, 1000 [2009]; see People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405-406 [1987]; Matter of Imre v Johnson, 54 AD3d 427 [2008]).

2012“Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience” (Matter of O’Donnell v Goldenberg, 68 AD3d 1000, 1000 [2009]; see People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405-406 [1987]; Matter of Imre v Johnson, 54 AD3d 427 [2008]).

2024In Patrick UU. v Frances VV . ( 200 AD3d 1156 [3d Dept 2012]), the court held that allegations of bias against a judge because he previously ruled against a party "do[es] not establish a statutory basis for recusal under Judiciary Law § 14, and the record does not demonstrate that the trial judge has 'a direct, personal, substantial[ ] or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the custody litigation.' " It has also been held, "Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a trial judge is the sole arbiter of recusal and his or her decision in that regard will not be lightly overturne

2024In Patrick UU. v Frances VV . ( 200 AD3d 1156 [3d Dept 2012]), the court held that allegations of bias against a judge because he previously ruled against a party "do[es] not establish a statutory basis for recusal under Judiciary Law § 14, and the record does not demonstrate that the trial judge has 'a direct, personal, substantial[ ] or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the custody litigation.' " It has also been held, "Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a trial judge is the sole arbiter of recusal and his or her decision in that regard will not be lightly overturne

2015As for the recusal/disqualification motion, “[a]bsent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, which is not at issue here, a . . . judge is the sole arbiter of recusal and his or her decision, which lies within the personal conscience of the court, will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion” (Gonzalez v L’Oreal USA, Inc., 92 AD3d 1158, 1159 [2012], lv dismissed 19 NY3d 874 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Matter of Adams v Bracci, 100 AD3d 1214, 1215 [2012]).

2012“Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, which is not at issue here, a . . . judge is the sole arbiter of recusal and his or her decision, which lies within the personal conscience of the court, will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion” (Gonzalez v L’Oreal USA, Inc., 92 AD3d 1158, 1159 [2012], lv dismissed 19 NY3d 874 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Albany County Dept. of Social Servs. v Rossi, 62 AD3d 1049, 1050 [2009]).

2013Where no legal basis for disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14 is alleged, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience (see Matter of McGrath v D'Angio, 85 AD3d 794 [2011]; Matter of Alyssa A. [Michelle N. — Sandra N.], 79 AD3d 740 [2010]; Matter of O'Donnell v Goldenberg, 68 AD3d 1000 [2009]).

2013Where no legal basis for disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14 is alleged, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience (see Matter of McGrath v D'Angio, 85 AD3d 794 [2011]; Matter of Alyssa A. [Michelle N. — Sandra N.], 79 AD3d 740 [2010]; Matter of O'Donnell v Goldenberg, 68 AD3d 1000 [2009]).

2024In Patrick UU. v Frances VV . ( 200 AD3d 1156 [3d Dept 2012]), the court held that allegations of bias against a judge because he previously ruled against a party "do[es] not establish a statutory basis for recusal under Judiciary Law § 14, and the record does not demonstrate that the trial judge has 'a direct, personal, substantial[ ] or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the custody litigation.' " It has also been held, "Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a trial judge is the sole arbiter of recusal and his or her decision in that regard will not be lightly overturne

2024In Patrick UU. v Frances VV . ( 200 AD3d 1156 [3d Dept 2012]), the court held that allegations of bias against a judge because he previously ruled against a party "do[es] not establish a statutory basis for recusal under Judiciary Law § 14, and the record does not demonstrate that the trial judge has 'a direct, personal, substantial[ ] or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the custody litigation.' " It has also been held, "Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a trial judge is the sole arbiter of recusal and his or her decision in that regard will not be lightly overturne

2013“Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a Trial Judge is the sole arbiter of recusal. . . [and a] court’s decision in this respect may not be overturned unless it was an abuse of discretion” (People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405-406 [1987]; see People v Williams, 66 AD3d 1440, 1441-1442 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 911 [2009]).

2013“Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a Trial Judge is the sole arbiter of recusal. . . [and a] court’s decision in this respect may not be overturned unless it was an abuse of discretion” (People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405-406 [1987]; see People v Williams, 66 AD3d 1440, 1441-1442 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 911 [2009]).

2021"Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, the determination of a motion for recusal of the Justice presiding based on alleged impropriety, bias, or prejudice is within the discretion and the personal conscience of the court" ( Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Balducci , 165 AD3d 959 , 960; see Sassower v Gannett Co, Inc , 109 AD3d 607, 609 ).

2020"Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, the determination of a motion for recusal of the Justice presiding based on alleged impropriety, bias, or prejudice is within the discretion and the personal conscience of the court" ( Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Balducci , 165 AD3d 959 , 960; see Sassower v Gannett Co, Inc , 109 AD3d 607, 609 ).

2012“Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, [Judge Noonan was] the sole arbiter of recusal” (People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]; see People v Patrick, 183 NY 52, 54 [1905]).

2012“Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, [Judge Noonan was] the sole arbiter of recusal” (People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]; see People v Patrick, 183 NY 52, 54 [1905]).

2009Care Ctr., Inc., 28 AD3d 465, 466 [2006]; Anjam v Anjam, 191 AD2d 531 [1993]).

2008The plaintiff failed to set forth any proof of bias or prejudice to warrant the conclusion that the Justice’s failure to recuse himself was an improvident exercise of discretion (see Modica v Modica, 15 AD3d 635, 636 [2005]; Matter of Firestone v Siems, 272 AD2d 544, 545 [2000]; Anjam v Anjam, 191 AD2d 531, 532-533 [1993]).

2021In any event, to the extent the father's contentions are not based on matter dehors the record, "[a]bsent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience" ( Burke v Carrion , 101 AD3d 920, 921 ).

2019"Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience" ( Burke v Carrion , 101 AD3d 920, 921 ; see 22 NYCRR 100.3; People v Moreno , 70 NY2d 403, 405 ; Matter of McGrath v D'Angio , 85 AD3d 794, 795 ; EECP Ctrs. of Am. v Vasomedical, Inc. , 277 AD2d 349 ).

2016Here, the Surrogate’s *918 Court providently exercised its discretion in denying Diane Oteri-Harkins’s motion, which was joined by the appellant, in effect, for recusal of the Surrogate, as her motion failed to set forth any proof of bias or prejudice on the part of the Surrogate that would warrant recusal (see Burke v Carrion, 101 AD3d 920, 921 [2012]; Galanti v Kraus, 98 AD3d at 559; Hayden v Gordon, 91 AD3d 819, 822 [2012]).

2013Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of Schenk’s motion which was for recusal, since she did not establish that there was a basis for recusal pursuant to Judiciary Law § 14, and failed to set forth any proof of bias or prejudice on the part of the Supreme Court Justice (see Burke v Carrion, 101 AD3d 920, 921 [2012]; Galanti v Kraus, 98 AD3d at 559; Hayden v Gordon, 91 AD3d 819 [2012]).

2026Care Ctr., Inc. , 28 AD3d 465, 466 ; see Matter of Lew v Sobel , 192 AD3d 799 , 800-801).

2011Care Ctr., Inc., 28 AD3d 465, 466 [2006]).

2024Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of its recusal ( see Galanti v Kraus , 98 AD3d 559 [2012]), and tenants failed to set forth any demonstrable proof of bias to warrant recusal ( see Matter of Bianco v Bruce-Ross , 151 AD3d 716, 717-718 [2017]; Kupersmith v Winged Foot Golf Club, Inc ., 38 AD3d 847, 849 [2007]).

2024Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of its recusal ( see Galanti v Kraus , 98 AD3d 559 [2012]), and tenants failed to set forth any demonstrable proof of bias to warrant recusal ( see Matter of Bianco v Bruce-Ross , 151 AD3d 716, 717-718 [2017]; Kupersmith v Winged Foot Golf Club, Inc ., 38 AD3d 847, 849 [2007]).

2026It is well settled that “[a]bsent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a Trial Judge is the sole arbiter of recusal” (People of State of N.Y. v Grasso, 49 AD3d 303, 306 [1st Dept 2008], quoting People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]; see Matter of Alizia McK., 25 AD3d 429, 430 [1st Dept 2006]; Best v Best, 302 AD2d 295, 295 [1st Dept 2003]).

2009Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, petitioners had no clear right to the remedy of mandamus (see Matter of Alizia McK., 25 AD3d 429 [2006]).

2024Contrary to the defendant's contention that the trial justice should have recused himself, the record does not reveal any of the reasons for the disqualification of the justice pursuant to Judiciary Law § 14 ( see People v Moreno , 70 NY2d 403, 405 ; Daniels v City of New York , 96 AD3d 895, 895 ).

2019Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, "the determination concerning a motion seeking recusal based on alleged impropriety, bias, or prejudice is within the discretion and the personal conscience of the court'" ( Daniels v City of New York , 96 AD3d 895, 895 , quoting People v Moreno , 70 NY2d 403, 405 ; see Sassower v Gannett Co., Inc. , 109 AD3d 607, 609 ).

2020This discretionary decision is within the personal conscience of the court when the alleged appearance of impropriety arises from inappropriate awareness of 'nonjuridical data' " ( People v Moreno , 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987], quoting People v Horton , 18 NY2d 355, 362 [1966], cert denied 387 US 934 [1967]).

2011Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and this “discretionary decision is within the personal conscience of the court when the alleged appearance of impropriety arises from inappropriate awareness of ‘nonjudicial data’ ” (People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405-406 [1987], quoting People v Horton, 18 NY2d 355, 362 [1966], cert denied 387 US 934 [1967]; see Matter of Alyssa A. [Michelle N. — Sandra N.], 79 AD3d 740 , 742 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 704 [2011]; Irizarry v State of New York, 56 AD3d 613 , 614 [2008]; Matter of Imre

2019"Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience" ( Burke v Carrion , 101 AD3d 920, 921 ; see 22 NYCRR 100.3; People v Moreno , 70 NY2d 403, 405 ; Matter of McGrath v D'Angio , 85 AD3d 794, 795 ; EECP Ctrs. of Am. v Vasomedical, Inc. , 277 AD2d 349 ).

2013Where no legal basis for disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14 is alleged, a court is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience (see Matter of McGrath v D'Angio, 85 AD3d 794 [2011]; Matter of Alyssa A. [Michelle N. — Sandra N.], 79 AD3d 740 [2010]; Matter of O'Donnell v Goldenberg, 68 AD3d 1000 [2009]).

2013Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, “the determination concerning a motion seeking recused based on alleged impropriety, bias, or prejudice is within the discretion and ‘the personal conscience of the court’ ” (Daniels v City of New York, 96 AD3d 895 , 895 [2012], quoting People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]; see Schreiber-Cross v State of New York, 31 AD3d 425 [2006]).

2013Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, “the determination concerning a motion seeking recused based on alleged impropriety, bias, or prejudice is within the discretion and ‘the personal conscience of the court’ ” (Daniels v City of New York, 96 AD3d 895 , 895 [2012], quoting People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]; see Schreiber-Cross v State of New York, 31 AD3d 425 [2006]).

2018"Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a court is the sole arbiter [of its] recusal, and its decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience" ( Aebly v Lally, 140 AD3d 677, 678 ; see Prince v Prince, 134 AD3d 1008 ; Vogelgesang v Vogelgesang, 71 AD3d 1131 ).

2015The father failed to set forth any demonstrable proof of bias or prejudgment of the matter to warrant recusal (see Matter of Grucci v Villanti, 108 AD3d at 627 ; Matter of Alyssa A. [Michelle N. — Sandra N.], 79 AD3d *881 740, 741-742 [2010]; Vogelgesang v Vogelgesang, 71 AD3d 1131 [2010]; Matter of O’Donnell v Goldenberg, 68 AD3d 1000 [2009]).

2015Where, as here, no basis for disqualification pursuant to Judiciary Law § 14 was presented, it was up to the conscience and discretion of the justice to decide whether or not to recuse himself (see People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405-406 [1987]; People v Daly, 20 AD3d 542 [2005]; People v Hines, 260 AD2d 646 [1999]).

2007Since no basis for disqualification pursuant to Judiciary Law § 14 was presented, it was up to the conscience and discretion of the judge to decide whether or not to recuse herself (see People v Daly, 20 AD3d 542 [2005]; People v Hines, 260 AD2d 646 [1999]).

2013Moreover, the court was not obligated to recuse itself on the ground that it had presided over the trial of defendant’s codefendant (see People v Bennett, 238 AD2d 898, 899-900 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 890 [1997], cert denied 524 US 918 [1998]).

2013Moreover, the court was not obligated to recuse itself on the ground that it had presided over the trial of defendant’s codefendant (see People v Bennett, 238 AD2d 898, 899-900 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 890 [1997], cert denied 524 US 918 [1998]).