State v. McGlone, 570 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 1991). · Go Syfert
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State v. McGlone, 570 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 1991). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 3 distinct cases, last quoted 1994 · 2 courts · …an intoxicated person who is in the driver's seat of a motor vehicle parked on private or public property with the key in the ignition is operating the vehicle in violation of r.c. 4511.19(a)(1). ✓
104 citation events (36 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Blount (ohioctapp, 2019-08-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1991 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1991 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Blount
Ohio Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Jan. 23, 2010); State v. Gill, 70 Ohio St.3d 150, 152, 153 , 637 N.E.2d 897 (1994); State v. McGlone, 59 Ohio St.3d 122, 123, 124 , 570 N.E.2d 1115 (1991); State v. Cleary, 22 Ohio St.3d 198 , 490 N.E.2d 574 (1986), syllabus. 6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS primarily for the trier of fact.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Howard, Unpublished Decision (10-12-1998) (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
In State v. McGlone (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 122 , the Supreme Court reiterated that "an intoxicated person who is in the driver's seat of a motor vehicle parked on private or public property with the key in the ignition is operating the vehicle in violation of R.C. 4511.19 (A)(1)." This broader statement of the holding was necessary because this court had distinguished Cleary stating that it was "entirely possible appellee entered his vehicle at a time when he was not yet under the influence of alcohol." Id. at 123 (emphasis sic).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Anderson (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
Wallace at ¶ 9 , quoting State v. Cleary, 22 Ohio St.3d 198, 199 , 490 N.E.2d 574 (1986); see State v. McGlone, 59 Ohio St.3d 122 , 570 N.E.2d 1115 (1991). {¶13} We recognized that subsequently in State v. Gill, 70 Ohio St.3d 150 , 637 N.E.2d 897 (1994), syllabus, the Supreme Court had held that “[a] person who is in the driver’s seat of a motor vehicle with the ignition key in the ignition and who, in his or her body has a prohibited concentration of alcohol, is ‘operating’ the vehicle within the meaning of R.C. 4511.19 whether or not the engine of the vehicle is running.” See Wal…
cited Cited "see" State v. Latham, Unpublished Decision (7-12-1999)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. McGlone (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 122 , 123 .
discussed Cited "see" State v. Weber, Unpublished Decision (8-10-1998)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See, State v. McGlone (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 122 ("[A]n intoxicated person who is in the driver's seat of a motor vehicle parked on private or public property with the key in the ignition is operating the vehicle in violation of R.C. 4511.19 (A)(1).").
cited Cited "see" State v. Moran, Unpublished Decision (5-27-1998)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. McGlone, supra. A person of ordinary intelligence is clearly informed that such conduct is prohibited by the express wording of the statute.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Wilson (2×)
Ohio · 2022 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Gill, 70 Ohio St.3d 150 , 637 N.E.2d 897 , at syllabus; see also State v. McGlone, 59 Ohio St.3d 122 , 570 N.E.2d 1115 (1991), syllabus. {¶ 9} Approximately a decade after our decision in Gill, in 2002, the General Assembly enacted through Am.Sub.S.B.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Cleveland v. Perez (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, State v. McGlone (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 122 , 570 N.E.2d 1115 . {¶ 13} In State v. Gill, 70 Ohio St.3d 150 , 1994-Ohio-403 , 637 N.E.2d 897 , the Ohio Supreme Court expanded the definition of “operate” to include situations where the keys are in the ignition but the engine is not running. {¶ 14} But in S.B.123, the General Assembly modified the definition in Gill and its predecessors by specifically defining “operate” in R.C. 4511.01(HHH), as well as by adding the words “at the time of the operation” to R.C. 4511.19(A)(1).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Pesa, Unpublished Decision (12-27-2001)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
In State v. Gill (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 150 , the Ohio Supreme Court held: "A person who is in the driver's seat of a motor vehicle with the ignition key in the ignition and who, in his or her body has a prohibited concentration of alcohol, is `operating' the vehicle within the meaning of R.C. 4511.19 whether or not the engine of the vehicle is running. ( State v. Clearly [1996], 22 Ohio St.3d 198 , 22 OBR 351, 490 N.E.2d 574 ; State v. McGlone [1991], 59 Ohio St.3d 122 , 570 N.E.2d 1115 , applied and followed.)" Id . at syllabus; see also State v. McGlone (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 122 , syllabus; …
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. Heck, Unpublished Decision (7-22-1998)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, State v. McGlone (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 122 ; State v. Gill (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 150 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Long (2×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence low
Id.; see, also, State v. McGlone (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 122 , 570 N.E.2d 1115 , at the syllabus.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. McNeil
Vt. · 1995 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., State v. McGlone, 570 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ohio 1991) (Ohio DUI law prohibits driving under the influence “anywhere in the state” and not just on public streets).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The State of Ohio
v.
McGlone
No. 90-525.
Ohio Supreme Court.
May 1, 1991.
570 N.E.2d 1115
1991 Ohio LEXIS 1045
Donald W. White, prosecuting attorney, and David Henry Hoffmann, for appellant., T. David Burgess, for appellee.
Brown, Douglas, Holmes, Moyer, Resnick, Sweeney, Wright.
Cited by 47 opinions  |  Published
Moyer, C.J.

Whether McGlone was intoxicated before or after he entered his car is neither a necessary nor proper distinction when considering a violation of the drunken driving statutes. The focus of the inquiry is upon an individual’s level of intoxication while operating the vehicle, not when or how such individual came to be in an intoxicated condition. Thus, in this case we are concerned with whether McGlone operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) and (3).

This court has held previously that driving and operating a motor vehicle are not synonymous. We observed in Cleary, supra, at 199, 22 OBR at 352, 490 N.E. 2d at 575, that: “Operation of a motor vehicle within contemplation of the statute is a broader term than mere driving and a person in the driver’s position in the front seat with the ignition key in his possession indicating either his actual or potential movement of the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol * * * can be found in violation of R.C. 4511.19 (A)(1).”

McGlone was sitting in the driver’s seat of his car with the motor running. The car was under his control. He could have moved the car whenever he wanted and, in fact, admitted he had been driving the car. A breathalyzer test showed he was legally under the influence of alcohol. In spite of these facts, McGlone urges us to agree with the court of appeals and consider him both reasonable and prudent because he drove from a public highway into the driveway of a private residence[*124] and fell asleep. We do not share the commendations given his conduct by a majority of the court of appeals.

R.C. 4511.19 is not only directed to those who drive on public streets. It prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle anywhere in the state while the driver is under the influence of drugs or alcohol. We agree with the dissent’s observation in the court of appeals that: “If you are under the influence [of alcohol or drugs], don’t drive or put yourself in a position of control of a vehicle. If you do, you pay the penalty.” Had McGlone struck a car or a person in the driveway as a result of his intoxication, his conduct would have been no less reprehensible than if he had struck a person or another vehicle on the highway.

As we said in Cleary: “A person under the influence of alcohol or any drug of abuse behind the wheel of a motor vehicle is the obvious hazard at which the statute is directed whether the vehicle is stationary or in motion.” Id. at 201, 22 OBR at 354, 490 N.E. 2d at 577. We follow the rationale adopted in Cleary and hold that McGlone was operating his vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) and (3), and that the trial court erred when it granted McGlone’s motion to dismiss. We hold that an intoxicated person who is in the driver’s seat of a motor vehicle parked on private or public property with the key in the ignition is operating the vehicle in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1).

The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Sweeney, Holmes, Douglas, Wright and Resnick, JJ., concur. H. Brown, J., dissents.