91 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1947–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cartergreen2 sentences2014Therefore, “suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself[.]” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 , 171–72 (1969). {¶11} “Both drivers and passengers in a vehicle may challenge the validity of a traffic stop.” White at ¶ 7, citing State v. Carter, 69 Ohio St.3d 57, 63 (1994). 2011See, e.g., Id. at 130, 138 (Defendants who “did not own the automobile [searched] * * * nor * * * assert that they owned the [items] seized[]” could not object to the lawfulness of the search despite being passengers in the car.); but, cf., State v. Carter (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 57, 58, 63 (holding that passengers in a vehicle can challenge the legality of a stop because “they are * * * seized, and their freedom of movement is * * * affected”). 4 {¶10} Based on the arguments made at the suppression hearing, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it denied Mr. Morris’ motion to suppress a | 4 | 5 |
State v. Frenchgreen2 sentences2025“Generally, motions to suppress are used to raise challenges to evidence that is alleged to have been obtained in violation of the Constitution, while motions in limine are used to raise challenges to evidence based on the Rules of Evidence.” State v. Hubbs, 2010-Ohio-4849, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Edwards, 2005-Ohio-6180 , ¶ 16 and State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 449 (1995). {¶ 29} This court has explained: “A ‘motion to suppress’ is defined as a ‘[d]evice used to eliminate from the trial of a criminal case evidence which has been secured illegally, generally in violation of the 2023Ashtabula No. 2019-A-0028, 2020-Ohio-69, ¶ 15 ; see also State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 449-451 (1995); State v. Jones, 9th Dist. | 3 | 3 |
State v. McGlonegreen2 sentences2000The Ohio Supreme Court has since eliminated any confusion concerning the definition of the term "operate" in State v. McGlone (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 122 , 124 , 570 N.E.2d 1115 , 1117 , by defining the term as follows: We hold that an intoxicated person who is in the driver's seat of a motor vehicle parked on private or public property with the key in the ignition is operating the vehicle in violation of R.C. 4511.19 (A)(1). 2000The Ohio Supreme Court has since eliminated any confusion concerning the definition of the term "operate" in State v. McGlone (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 122 , 124 , 570 N.E.2d 1115 , 1117 , by defining the term as follows: We hold that an intoxicated person who is in the driver's seat of a motor vehicle parked on private or public property with the key in the ignition is operating the vehicle in violation of R.C. 4511.19 (A)(1). | 2 | 9 |
Delaware v. Prousegreen2 sentences2026Id. at 663 . {¶26} The Ohio Supreme Court holds the following about an investigatory stop: Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), a police officer who lacks probable cause to arrest may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, make an investigatory stop, including a traffic stop, of a person if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. 2005No. 97-G-2112, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6163 , at 7-8, citing Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648 . {¶ 18} However, under appropriate circumstances, a law enforcement officer may be justified in stopping a vehicle to provide assistance without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. | 1 | 10 |
City of Defiance v. Kretzgreen2 sentences2007No. 2002-CA-10, 2002-Ohio-4809 , at ¶ 10, citing Defiance v. Kretz , at 5. 1998We find, in obedience to Kretz , supra, a motion to suppress is the appropriate vehicle to challenge a BAC test. | 1 | 6 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2026Id. at 663 . {¶26} The Ohio Supreme Court holds the following about an investigatory stop: Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), a police officer who lacks probable cause to arrest may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, make an investigatory stop, including a traffic stop, of a person if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. 2026Id. at 663 . {¶26} The Ohio Supreme Court holds the following about an investigatory stop: Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), a police officer who lacks probable cause to arrest may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, make an investigatory stop, including a traffic stop, of a person if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. | 1 | 3 |
City of Dayton v. Ericksongreen2 sentences2025City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11 (1996). {¶15} When an officer witnesses a specific violation of the traffic code, a stop of the vehicle in which the violation is committed is supported by probable cause. 2004Dayton v. Erikson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 12 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 ; Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Whittgreen1 sentence2026State v. Whitt, 2018-Ohio-1257, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.). {¶ 25} Kepler was convicted of improper handling of a firearm in a vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(D)(1), which provides that "[n]o person shall knowingly transport or have a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle if, at the time of that transportation or possession. . . [t]he person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them." The plain language of this statute does not require the defendant to be convicted of a separate OVI charge to sustain a conviction under the improper handling of a firearm statute. {¶ 2 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wolfegreen2 sentences2025See State v. Wolfe, 2025-Ohio-866, ¶ 93-97 (2d Dist.) (sustaining trial court’s decision that overruled 9 a motion to suppress challenging the authenticity of videotape evidence because a motion to suppress was not the proper vehicle to challenge the authenticity of the evidence). 2025See State v. Wolfe, 2025-Ohio-866, ¶ 93-97 (2d Dist.) (sustaining trial court’s decision that overruled 9 a motion to suppress challenging the authenticity of videotape evidence because a motion to suppress was not the proper vehicle to challenge the authenticity of the evidence). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hubbsgreen1 sentence2025“Generally, motions to suppress are used to raise challenges to evidence that is alleged to have been obtained in violation of the Constitution, while motions in limine are used to raise challenges to evidence based on the Rules of Evidence.” State v. Hubbs, 2010-Ohio-4849, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Edwards, 2005-Ohio-6180 , ¶ 16 and State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 449 (1995). {¶ 29} This court has explained: “A ‘motion to suppress’ is defined as a ‘[d]evice used to eliminate from the trial of a criminal case evidence which has been secured illegally, generally in violation of the | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Bank of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2025However, Pekin did plead fraud in its Complaint. {¶77} Rule 9(B) provides that “the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” “The circumstances constituting fraud, as that phrase is used in Rule 9(B), include the time, place, and content of the false representation; the fact misrepresented; the identification of the individual giving the false representation; and the nature of what was obtained or given as a consequence of the fraud.” Wright v. Bank of New York, 2012-Ohio-2289, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.), quoting Hamblin v. Daugherty, 2007-Ohio- 5893, ¶ 20 (9th Di | 1 | 1 |
In Re D.D., 22740 (2-20-2009)green1 sentence2025Therefore, “[w]here the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant making that claim must prove that the basis of the suggested suppression claim is meritorious.” (Citations omitted.) In re D.D., 2009-Ohio-808, ¶ 3 (2d Dist.). {¶ 28} We find that a motion to suppress the evidence from Minter’s cell phone based on an alleged violation of Evid.R. 901(A) would not have been successful because a motion to suppress is not the proper vehicle to challenge the authenticity of the evidence. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Howellgreen2 sentences2023“When an officer witnesses a specific violation of the traffic code, a stop of the vehicle in which the violation is committed is supported 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS by probable cause.” State v. Howell, 2018-Ohio-591 , 106 N.E.3d 337, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Johnson, 1st Dist. 2023“When an officer witnesses a specific violation of the traffic code, a stop of the vehicle in which the violation is committed is supported 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS by probable cause.” State v. Howell, 2018-Ohio-591 , 106 N.E.3d 337, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Johnson, 1st Dist. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hohenbergergreen2 sentences2023State v. Hohenberger, 189 Ohio App.3d 346 , 2010-Ohio-4053 , 938 N.E.2d 419, ¶ 44-46 (6th Dist.) Thus, the alleged mechanical failure of the vehicle is not a defense to the essential elements of aggravated vehicular homicide. {¶ 23} Upon de novo review of the trial court’s application of the facts to the law, we find no due process violation and no error with the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to dismiss count Nos. one and two. 2023State v. Hohenberger, 189 Ohio App.3d 346 , 2010-Ohio-4053 , 938 N.E.2d 419, ¶ 44-46 (6th Dist.) Thus, the alleged mechanical failure of the vehicle is not a defense to the essential elements of aggravated vehicular homicide. {¶ 23} Upon de novo review of the trial court’s application of the facts to the law, we find no due process violation and no error with the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to dismiss count Nos. one and two. | 1 | 1 |
Chalmers v. HCR Manorcare, Inc.green2 sentences2022Chalmers v. HCR ManorCare, Inc., 2017-Ohio-5678 , 93 N.E.3d 1237, ¶ 19, 33, 50 (6th Dist.). 2022Chalmers v. HCR ManorCare, Inc., 2017-Ohio-5678 , 93 N.E.3d 1237, ¶ 19, 33, 50 (6th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Evansgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Fischergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rakas v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hamilton v. East Ohio Gas Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Thornton v. Salakgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Evans v. Graham Ford, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Connors, Unpublished Decision (5-27-2005)
green
2 sentences2007Id. {¶ 10} Appellant failed to establish the applicability of an exception that would allow the trial court to consider his untimely petition. 2007Id. {¶ 11} Appellant failed to establish the applicability of an exception that would allow the trial court to consider his untimely petitions. | 4 | 2007–2007 |
Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Services
green
2 sentences2020Chapter 119] hearing rights." Ohio Adm.Code 5101:6- 50-01(C)(9). {¶ 81} Furthermore, "when an agency's decision is discretionary and, by statute, not subject to direct appeal, a writ of mandamus is the sole vehicle to challenge the decision." Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 114 Ohio St.3d 14 , 2007-Ohio-2620 , ¶ 23. 2018The court explained that the Supreme Court of Ohio " 'has repeatedly determined in a long line of cases in varying contexts that when an agency's decision is discretionary and, by statute, not subject to direct appeal, a writ of mandamus is the sole vehicle to challenge the decision, by attempting to show that the agency abused its discretion.' " Id. at ¶ 42, quoting Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs. , 114 Ohio St.3d 14 , 2007-Ohio-2620 , 867 N.E.2d 400 , ¶ 23. | 3 | 2015–2020 |
State v. McNamara
green
2 sentences2020“Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997). {¶10} “When an officer stops a vehicle for a violation of a traffic law, an investigatory stop occurs.” State v. Bramley, 9th Dist. 2020“Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997). {¶8} When an officer stops a vehicle for a violation of a traffic law, an investigatory stop occurs. | 3 | 2017–2020 |
State v. Cleary
green
2 sentences1992In State v. Cleary (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 198, 199 , 22 OBR 351, 352, 490 N.E.2d 574, 575 , the Ohio Supreme Court stated that: “Operation of a motor vehicle within contemplation of the statute is a broader term than mere driving and a person in the driver’s position in the front seat with the ignition key in his possession indicating either his actual or potential movement of the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug of abuse can be found in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1).” (Footnote omitted.) Also, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that “[a]n intoxicated person who is in the 1992In State v. Cleary (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 198, 199 , 22 OBR 351, 352, 490 N.E.2d 574, 575 , the Ohio Supreme Court stated that: “Operation of a motor vehicle within contemplation of the statute is a broader term than mere driving and a person in the driver’s position in the front seat with the ignition key in his possession indicating either his actual or potential movement of the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug of abuse can be found in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1).” (Footnote omitted.) Also, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that “[a]n intoxicated person who is in the | 3 | 1992–1994 |
State v. White
neutral
2 sentences2019Lorain No. 11CA010005, 2011-Ohio-6748, ¶ 7 , quoting State v. Redding, 9th Dist. 2013Lorain No. 11CA010005, 2011-Ohio-6748, ¶ 7 , citing State v. Carter, 69 Ohio St.3d 57, 63 (1994). | 2 | 2013–2019 |
United States v. Leon
green
2 sentences2014The court stated at ¶ 30: Given that, at the time [the officer] attached the GPS device to Johnson's vehicle, the United States Supreme Court had sanctioned the use of beeper technology without a warrant in Knotts, at least one circuit court had applied the rationale expressed in Knotts and determined that the warrantless placement and subsequent monitoring of a GPS device on a vehicle was not a violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and [the officer] acted only after consulting with fellow officers, other law enforcement agencies, and a prosecutor, we find that the [officer] acte 2013United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C.Cir.2010). {¶ 30} Given that, at the time Hackney attached the GPS device to Johnson's car, the United States Supreme Court had sanctioned the use of beeper technology without a warrant in Knotts, at least one circuit court had applied the rationale expressed in Knotts and determined that the warrantless placement and subsequent monitoring of a GPS device on a vehicle was not a violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and Hackney acted only after consulting with fellow officers, other law enforcement agencies, and a prosecutor, we find tha | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Davis v. United States
green
2 sentences2014The court stated at ¶ 30: Given that, at the time [the officer] attached the GPS device to Johnson's vehicle, the United States Supreme Court had sanctioned the use of beeper technology without a warrant in Knotts, at least one circuit court had applied the rationale expressed in Knotts and determined that the warrantless placement and subsequent monitoring of a GPS device on a vehicle was not a violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and [the officer] acted only after consulting with fellow officers, other law enforcement agencies, and a prosecutor, we find that the [officer] acte 2013United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C.Cir.2010). {¶ 30} Given that, at the time Hackney attached the GPS device to Johnson's car, the United States Supreme Court had sanctioned the use of beeper technology without a warrant in Knotts, at least one circuit court had applied the rationale expressed in Knotts and determined that the warrantless placement and subsequent monitoring of a GPS device on a vehicle was not a violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and Hackney acted only after consulting with fellow officers, other law enforcement agencies, and a prosecutor, we find tha | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Alderman v. United States
green
2 sentences2014Therefore, “suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself[.]” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 , 171–72 (1969). {¶11} “Both drivers and passengers in a vehicle may challenge the validity of a traffic stop.” White at ¶ 7, citing State v. Carter, 69 Ohio St.3d 57, 63 (1994). 2011Therefore, “suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself[.]” Alderman v. United States (1969), 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 . {¶7} Both drivers and passengers in a vehicle may challenge the validity of a traffic stop. | 2 | 2011–2014 |
City of Hamilton v. Lawson
green
2 sentences2006Hamilton v. Lawson (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 462 . 1996Hamilton v. Lawson (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 462 , 640 N.E.2d 1206 . | 2 | 1996–2006 |
State v. Stephens, Unpublished Decision (11-21-2003)
neutral
2 sentences2004State v. Stephens , Hamilton App. No. C-020683, 2003-Ohio-6193 ; State v. Calhoun , Franklin App. No. 03AP-16, 2003-Ohio-5080 ; see, also, Moore , supra (wherein concurring opinion observes that declaratory judgment action is "better tool to resolve these issues"). 2004State v. Harris, Cuyahoga App. No. 83251, 2004-Ohio-1116 ; State v. Stephens, Hamilton App. No. C-020683, 2003-Ohio-6193 ; State v. Calhoun, Franklin App. No. 03AP-16, 2003-Ohio-5080 ; see, also, State ex. rel. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Harris v. Nelson
green
2 sentences1994In so holding, we emphasize that the “ Very nature of the writ [of habeas corpus] demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.’ ” Mallory, supra, 17 Ohio St.3d at 36-37 ,17 OBR at 30, 476 N.E.2d at 1048 , citing Harris v. Nelson (1969), 394 U.S. 286, 291 , 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 , 22 L.Ed.2d 281, 286 . 1994In so holding, we emphasize that the “ Very nature of the writ [of habeas corpus] demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.’ ” Mallory, supra, 17 Ohio St.3d at 36-37 ,17 OBR at 30, 476 N.E.2d at 1048 , citing Harris v. Nelson (1969), 394 U.S. 286, 291 , 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 , 22 L.Ed.2d 281, 286 . | 2 | 1994–1994 |
Bennett v. Huber Investment Corp.
green
2 sentences1994In so holding, we emphasize that the "'very nature of the writ [of habeas corpus] demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.'" Mallory, supra, at 36-37 , 17 OBR at 30, 476 N.E.2d at 1048 , citing Harris v. Nelson (1969), 394 U.S. 286, 291 , 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 , 22 L.Ed.2d 281, 286 . 1994In so holding, we emphasize that the “ Very nature of the writ [of habeas corpus] demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.’ ” Mallory, supra, 17 Ohio St.3d at 36-37 ,17 OBR at 30, 476 N.E.2d at 1048 , citing Harris v. Nelson (1969), 394 U.S. 286, 291 , 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 , 22 L.Ed.2d 281, 286 . | 2 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Hill
green
1 sentence2026State v. Hill, 2023-Ohio-4486 (11th Dist.). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Byrd v. United States
green
1 sentence2024The agreement warned that “permitting an unauthorized driver to operate the vehicle is a violation of the rental agreement” which “may result in any and all coverage otherwise provided by the rental agreement being void” and the renter “being fully responsible for all loss or damage * * *.” Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Stave v. Beavers
neutral
1 sentence2023Ashtabula No. 2019-A-0028, 2020-Ohio-69, ¶ 15 ; see also State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 449-451 (1995); State v. Jones, 9th Dist. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Pennsylvania v. Mimms green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Evans green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Bramley neutral | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Dean, 2007-P-0025 (12-21-2007) neutral | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Lark green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Palmer green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State ex rel. Nese v. State Teachers Retirement Bd. of Ohio green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Johnson green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| United States v. Maynard green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Jackson v. Virginia red | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Beasley green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Jenks red | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Woods v. Telb green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Jordan green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Rose green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Wilson, 21738 (9-21-2007) neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State ex rel. Pirman v. Money green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Brown v. Rogers green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| City of Maumee v. Gabriel green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Murrell green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| New York v. Belton red | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes v. Ohio Department of Job & Family Services green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State ex rel. Portage Lakes Edn. Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State ex rel. Portage Lakes Education Ass'n v. State Employment Relations Board neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Lawhorn, Unpublished Decision (6-3-2004) neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.