Jones v. Jones (1953)

Thus, notwithstanding the lack of acknowledgment of receipt of the as yet unissued summons, Mr. Bonner "could have expressed an intention to waive service of summons when later issued, [but] the acknowledgment document did not contain a waiver of service of summons, or process, or a general waiver of all further service. [Cit.]" Stamps v. Bank South, 221 Ga.App. 406, 409 (1), 471 S.E.2d 323 (1996). "[S]ervice of a petition to which no [summons] is attached where [summons] ha…

“The defendant may acknowledge service or waive process by a writing signed by the defendant or someone authorized by him.” OCGA § 9-10-73. “[Acknowledgment of service and waiver of process . . . [put] the party in precisely the same situation as though process were annexed and service effected by the proper officer.” Jackson v. Hitchcock, 48 Ga. 491, 494-495 (2) (1873). “[T]he sole purpose of waiver of service is to avoid formal service.” Jones v. Jones, 209 Ga. 861, 863 (1…

OCGA § 9-11-4 (d); Stamps v. Bank South, N.A., 221 Ga. App. 406, 409 ( 471 SE2d 323 ) (1996) (holding that the acknowledgment of receipt of a complaint does not constitute sufficient service of summons or waiver of such service under OCGA § 9-11-4 or § 9-10-73); Jones v. Jones, 209 Ga. 861, 863 ( 76 SE2d 801 ) (1953). “[S]ervice of summons, unless waived, is required to notify a defendant of an impending action and his duty to respond within a specified time or incur judgmen…

Jones v. Jones, 209 Ga. 861, 863 ( 76 SE2d 801 ) (1953).

Jones v. Jones, 209 Ga. 861, 862-863 ( 76 SE2d 801 ) (1953); OCGA § 9-11-4 (b).

Jones v. Jones, 209 Ga. 861, 862 ( 76 SE2d 801 ) (1953).

Jones v. Jones, 209 Ga. 861, 862-863 (76 SE2d-801); Nelson v. Nelson, supra; Phillips v. Phillips, supra. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err by refusing to dismiss the garnishment.

Jones v. Jones, 209 Ga. 861, 863 ( 76 SE2d 801 ).

In Jones v. Jones, 209 Ga. 861, 865 ( 76 SE2d 801 ); Wetherington v. Wetherington, 216 Ga. 325 ( 116 SE2d 234 ); and Grayson v. Grayson, 217 Ga. 133, 135 ( 121 SE2d 34 ); cited by counsel for the mother, the question before the court was the *695 validity of the judgment sought to be set aside, and no ruling was made in those cases on the plenary power of a trial judge to modify a judgment -during the term of court at which it was rendered.

In Jones v. Jones, 209 Ga. 861, 863 ( 76 S. E. 2d 801 ), where the opinion was prepared for this Court by Chief Justice Duckworth, it was said with respect to service of legal process: “Courts are not too naive to perceive that the sole purpose of waiver of service is to avoid formal service, and they should unhesitatingly hold that, when a defendant executes such waiver of service, he is thereby precluded from thereafter complaining because of the absence of service.

See generally Jones v. Jones, 209 Ga. 861, 865 (1) ( 76 SE2d 801 ) (1953) (acknowledgment constitutes waiver of service).

See also Jones v. Jones, 209 Ga. 861, 862 ( 76 SE2d 801 ) (1953); Heffner v. Dutton, 106 Ga. App. 786, 787 ( 128 SE2d 337 ) (1962).

See Jones v. Jones, 209 Ga. 861 (1) ( 76 SE2d 801 ); Georgia Creosoting Co. v. Moody, 41 Ga. App. 701 (1) ( 154 SE 294 ); see also Rawlins v. Busbee, 169 Ga. App. 658 (1) (b) ( 315 SE2d 1 ) (court may acquire jurisdiction of the person by acknowledgment of service); OCGA §§ 9-11-12 (h); 15-1-2 (jurisdiction over the person may be waived).

See Jones v. Jones, 209 Ga. 861, 862 ( 76 SE2d 801 ) (1953).

See also Jones v. Jones, 209 Ga. 861 (2) ( 76 SE2d 801 ).