Mejia v. Ruiz (2008)

See, e.g., Pollizzi v. Paulshock, 52 So.3d 786, 789-90 (Fla. 5th Dist.Ct.App.2010) (upholding judgment in proceeding supplementary where judgment creditor proved fraudulent transfer under the UFTA); Mejia u Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 3d Dist.Ct.App.2008) (“Whether a defendant’s actions are made or contrived to ‘delay, hinder, or defraud’ must be determined with reference to [the UFTA].”); Nationsbank, N.A. v. Coastal Utils., Inc., 814 So.2d 1227, 1229 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct…

Whether a debtor’s transfers are made or contrived to “delay, hinder, or USCA11 Case: 23-13506 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 09/26/2024 Page: 5 of 8 defraud” under either statute is governed by section 726.105, Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), which provides a non-exhaustive list of indicia of fraud, Fla. Stat. § 726.105 (2).

“Whether a defendant’s actions are made or contrived to “delay, hinder, or defraud” can be determined with reference to section 726.105(1)” of the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. Dist.

Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2008).

In other words, the shareholder’s wrongdoing prevented them from invoking the dissolution’s shield against lawsuits, See id. (“Shareholders and directors that follow the procedures set forth in section 607.1406 are given limited immunity.

After receipt of this evidence, the burden shifts to the debtor or transferor to show the transfer was made without intent to “delay, hinder or defraud creditors.” See Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

“The proof required to show that a transfer is fraudulent is the preponderance of the evidence standard.” Mejia, 985 So. 2d at 1113 (citation omitted); see also Wieczoreck v. H & H Builders, Inc., 475 So. 2d 227, 228 (Fla. 1985).

Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Proceedings Supplementary and Fraudulent Transfer Claim “Proceedings supplementary are equitable in nature and should be liberally construed.” Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (citing Ferguson v. State Exch.

Co. v. Chuly Intern., LLC, 118 So. 3d 325, 327 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013); Johnson v. Dowell, 592 So. 2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)). 246 Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So. 2d 1109, 1113 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (citing United States v. Fernon, 640 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 1981)). 247 Gen.

See Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So. 2d 1109, 1113 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) ("The proof required to show that a transfer is fraudulent is the preponderance of the evidence standard.").

Fla. Highway Patrol v. Jackson, 288 So. 3d 1179 , 1183 (Fla. 2020) (“‘[W]hen judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its judicial 5 See, e.g., Biel Reo, LLC, 156 So. 3d at 509 n.2 (recognizing a money judgment could be entered to remedy a fraudulent transfer); Pollizzi v. Paulshock, 52 So. 3d 786, 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (“T…

Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the party defending the transfer to show that it was made without intent to “delay, hinder or defraud creditors.” Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So. 2d 1109, 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Co., LLC, 156 So. 3d 506, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (citing Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (setting forth the jurisdictional prerequisites for proceedings supplementary under a prior version of the statute)).

Otherwise, the motion is DENIED. (4) Plaintiff is granted leave to file a second amended interpleader complaint by March 10, 2020. 4 “The statute governing proceedings supplementary is ‘equitable in nature and should be liberally construed.’” Longo v. Associated Limousine Services, Inc., 236 So.3d 1115, 1118 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)(quoting Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)).

Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

The statute governing proceedings supplementary is “equitable in nature and should be liberally construed.” Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Impleader of a third party in proceedings supplementary “does not in and of itself imply liability on the part of the impleaded third parties.” Instead, it provides the party “with an opportunity to raise them defenses and protect their interests consistent with genuine due process.” Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1112-13 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (recognizing that an insurance company may pi-esent defenses at the proceedings supplementary).

“While a single badge of fraud may amount only to a suspicious circumstance, a combination of badges will justify a finding of fraud.” Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Electric Capital Corp., 727 F.3d 1127, 1137 (11th Cir.2013) (citing Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)).

The procedural requirements of section 56.29 have been referred to as “jurisdictional prerequisites for proceedings supplementary.” See Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); In re XYZ Options, Inc., 154 F.3d 1262, 1271 (11th Cir.1998). 127 .

See § 56.29, Fla. Stat. (2008); Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). 2 . 4111 Lejeune Road, Ahern-Plummer, and Addition Acquisitions are joint venture partners in River Property. 3 .

Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Fla.App.2008); See also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 , 111 S.Ct. 654 , 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991)(stating, “because the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between litigants, we presume that this standard is applicable in civil actions between private litigants unless ‘particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.’ ”) “[B]ecause of the difficulty of pro…

See Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“The existence of badges of fraud create a prima facie case and raise a rebuttable presumption that the transaction is void.” (citation omitted)).

See also Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (recognizing that the burden of proof had shifted to the defendant).' Here too, it was not RREF’s burden to satisfy the court that the McAlpin’s share transfer was improper in the proceeding below.

See Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Wieczoreck v. H & H Builders, Inc., 450 So.2d 867 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Neff v. Adler, 416 So.2d 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

See Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

CONCLUSION This question must be resolved in a limited evidentiary hearing aimed at determining Edoarda’s executable interest in the Miami artwork, if any.8 Id.; see also Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So. 2d 1109 , 1112–14 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (explaining method of determining whether a conveyance of personal property is void); WH Smith, PLC v Benages & Assocs., 51 So. 3d 577, 581 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) ("[T]he procedure for determining long-arm jurisdiction 7 In its response in opposition t…

See Mejia v. Ruiz, 985 So.2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).