42 Pennsylvania opinions name it 11 courts 1908–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
House v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen2 sentences2000In rendering his decision, the WCJ stressed that this matter concerned a claim petition rather than a reinstatement petition. 4 Citing Inglis House v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Reedy), 535 Pa. 135, 141 , 634 A.2d 592, 595 (1993), the WCJ noted that, in a claim petition, “the Claimant [bears] ‘... the burden of establishing a right to compensation and of proving all necessary elements to support an award.’ ” (See WCJ’s decision at 10.) While this statement of an employee’s burden in a claim petition is accurate, the WCJ erred in further stating, inter alia, that “[b]ecause this was a 2000In rendering his decision, the WCJ stressed that this matter concerned a claim petition rather than a reinstatement petition. 4 Citing Inglis House v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Reedy), 535 Pa. 135, 141 , 634 A.2d 592, 595 (1993), the WCJ noted that, in a claim petition, “the Claimant [bears] ‘... the burden of establishing a right to compensation and of proving all necessary elements to support an award.’ ” (See WCJ’s decision at 10.) While this statement of an employee’s burden in a claim petition is accurate, the WCJ erred in further stating, inter alia, that “[b]ecause this was a | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Mealsgreen2 sentences2017The Commonwealth meets its burden by submitting evidence that is “so clear, direct, weighty, - 10 - J-S04004-17 and convincing as to enable the [trier of fact] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts at issue.” Commonwealth v. Meals, 912 A.2d 213, 219 (Pa. 2006). 2016The Commonwealth meets its burden by submitting evidence that is “so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the [trier of fact] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts at issue.” Commonwealth v. Meals, 912 A.2d 213, 219 (Pa.2006). | 2 | 2 |
Reyes v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Boardgreen2 sentences2016Amandeo v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Conagra Foods), 37 A.3d 72 , 75-76 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012); Reyes v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (AMTEC), 967 A.2d 1071, 1077 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (en banc). 2016Inglis House v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Reedy), 634 A.2d 592, 595 (Pa. 1993); Potere v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Kemcorp), 21 A.3d 684, 689-90 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011); Reyes v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (AMTEC), 967 A.2d 1071, 1077 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (en banc). | 2 | 2 |
Anstine v. Zoning Board of Adjustmentgreen2 sentences1967A case in point is Eller v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 1 , 198 A. 2d 863 (1964), wherein the majority stated: “The principles which govern a constitutional attack upon a zoning ordinance once again have been recited in the recent case of Anstine v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 411 Pa. 33, 36-37 , 190 A. 2d 712, 714-15 (1963), from which we quote: ‘The burden of proving clearly and unmistakably the unconstitutionality of a legislative enactment is upon the person so asserting. [Citing cases.] Accompanying this burden is the rule that “. . . where the constitutionality of zoning ordinances has 1967A case in point is Eller v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 1 , 198 A. 2d 863 (1964), wherein the majority stated: “The principles which govern a constitutional attack upon a zoning ordinance once again have been recited in the recent case of Anstine v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 411 Pa. 33, 36-37 , 190 A. 2d 712, 714-15 (1963), from which we quote: ‘The burden of proving clearly and unmistakably the unconstitutionality of a legislative enactment is upon the person so asserting. [Citing cases.] Accompanying this burden is the rule that “. . . where the constitutionality of zoning ordinances has | 2 | 2 |
Rowles v. Rowlesgreen2 sentences2006Rowles, 668 A.2d at 128 (emphasis in original). 1997Adopting the rationale as set forth in the concurring opinion of Ellerbe , authored by Justice Flaherty, the Rowles court abandoned the presumption that a natural parent has a prima facie right to custody as against third parties, and instead followed the rule as stated in the concurring opinion of Ellerbe as follows: “By clearly eliminating the presumption [in favor of a natural parent] per se, and mandating that custody be determined by a preponderance of evidence, weighing parenthood as a strong factor for consideration, custody proceedings would be disentangled from the burden of applying | 1 | 2 |
Ellerbe v. Hooksgreen2 sentences1997Adopting the rationale as set forth in the concurring opinion of Ellerbe , authored by Justice Flaherty, the Rowles court abandoned the presumption that a natural parent has a prima facie right to custody as against third parties, and instead followed the rule as stated in the concurring opinion of Ellerbe as follows: “By clearly eliminating the presumption [in favor of a natural parent] per se, and mandating that custody be determined by a preponderance of evidence, weighing parenthood as a strong factor for consideration, custody proceedings would be disentangled from the burden of applying 1995Id., 490 Pa. at 372-74 , 416 A.2d at 516-17 (citation omitted, emphasis in original) (Flaherty, J., concurring). | 1 | 2 |
School District of Philadelphia v. Department of Educationgreen1 sentence2024School District of Philadelphia v. Department of Education, 45 A.3d 457, 460 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Mouzongreen2 sentences2023See generally Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738 , 743 (Pa. 2012) (“The overall principle that emerges from the High Court’s decisional law is that federal due process permits States to place a burden on the defendant to prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, so long as the defendant is not thereby required to negate an element of the offense.”). 2023See generally Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 743 (Pa. 2012) (“The overall principle that emerges from the High Court’s decisional law is that federal due process permits States to place a burden on the defendant to prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, so long as the defendant is not thereby required to negate an element of the offense.”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Waynegreen1 sentence2022See Commonwealth v. Wayne, 720 A.2d 456, 470-71 (Pa. 1998) (holding that to prove a claim of ineffectiveness for failing to request a trial continuance for the purpose of securing an expert rebuttal witness, a petitioner “must demonstrate that an expert witness was available who would have offered testimony designed to advance appellant’s cause;” “counsel - 13 - J-S36041-21 cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to request a continuance on an unsupported pretext”). | 1 | 1 |
Innovative Spaces v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen1 sentence2018Inglis House v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Reedy), 634 A.2d 592, 595 (Pa. 1993); Pennsylvania Uninsured Employers Guaranty Fund v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Bonner), 85 A.3d 1109, 1114-15 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014); Innovative Spaces v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (DeAngelis), 646 A.2d 51, 54 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania Uninsured Employers Guaranty Fund v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Boardgreen1 sentence2018Inglis House v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Reedy), 634 A.2d 592, 595 (Pa. 1993); Pennsylvania Uninsured Employers Guaranty Fund v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Bonner), 85 A.3d 1109, 1114-15 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014); Innovative Spaces v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (DeAngelis), 646 A.2d 51, 54 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Potere v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Boardgreen1 sentence2016Inglis House v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Reedy), 634 A.2d 592, 595 (Pa. 1993); Potere v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Kemcorp), 21 A.3d 684, 689-90 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011); Reyes v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (AMTEC), 967 A.2d 1071, 1077 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
Chester Community Charter School v. Commonwealth, Department of Educationgreen1 sentence2012Further, contrary to the District’s claim that this issue is one of first impression, this Court has previously held that: “The [CSL] ... contemplates that the school district has the burden to challenge the estimated withheld amount....” Chester Cmty. Charter Sch. v. Dep’t of Edue., 996 A.2d 68, 79 (Pa.Cmwlth.2010) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Banksgreen2 sentences2010Commonwealth v. Banks, 454 Pa. 401, 409 , 311 A.2d 576, 580 (Pa. 1973). 2010Commonwealth v. Banks, 454 Pa. 401, 409 , 311 A.2d 576, 580 (Pa. 1973). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Howardgreen2 sentences2004This Court addressed the difference in Commonwealth v. Howard, 538 Pa. 86 , 645 A.2d 1300, 1307 (1994): [A] defendant [raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel] is required to show actual prejudice; that is, that counsel’s ineffectiveness was of such magnitude that it “could have reasonably had an adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings.” Pierce, 515 Pa. at 162 , 527 A.2d at 977 . 2004This Court addressed the difference in Commonwealth v. Howard, 538 Pa. 86 , 645 A.2d 1300, 1307 (1994): [A] defendant [raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel] is required to show actual prejudice; that is, that counsel’s ineffectiveness was of such magnitude that it “could have reasonably had an adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings.” Pierce, 515 Pa. at 162 , 527 A.2d at 977 . | 1 | 1 |
| Cronan v. Castle Gas Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Volk v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Ernstgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reiver's Estategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gaudenzia, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustmentgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Cogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Whitpain Township v. Bodine
green
2 sentences1971Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 71 , 141 A. 2d 851 ; Liggett’s Petition, 291 Pa. 109 , 139 A. 619 ; Whitpain Township v. Bodine, 372 Pa. 509 , 94 A. 2d 737 . 1971Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 71 , 141 A. 2d 851 ; Liggett’s Petition, 291 Pa. 109 , 139 A. 619 ; Whitpain Township v. Bodine, 372 Pa. 509 , 94 A. 2d 737 . | 4 | 1963–1971 |
Bilbar Construction Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment
green
2 sentences1971Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 71 , 141 A. 2d 851 ; Liggett’s Petition, 291 Pa. 109 , 139 A. 619 ; Whitpain Township v. Bodine, 372 Pa. 509 , 94 A. 2d 737 . 1971Even though appellants have this heavy burden, the courts are still bound to inquire as to whether or not a particular zoning classification bears a substantial relationship to the general welfare: Bilbar Construction Company v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62 . | 4 | 1963–1971 |
Liggett's Petition
green
2 sentences1971Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 71 , 141 A. 2d 851 ; Liggett’s Petition, 291 Pa. 109 , 139 A. 619 ; Whitpain Township v. Bodine, 372 Pa. 509 , 94 A. 2d 737 . 1971Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 71 , 141 A. 2d 851 ; Liggett’s Petition, 291 Pa. 109 , 139 A. 619 ; Whitpain Township v. Bodine, 372 Pa. 509 , 94 A. 2d 737 . | 3 | 1963–1971 |
Braunfeld v. Brown
green
2 sentences2024Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 . . . (1961).” Id. 2024Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 . . . (1961).” Id. | 2 | 2007–2024 |
Lord Appeal
green
2 sentences1967In Archbishop O’Hara’s Appeal [ 389 Pa. 35 , 131 A. 2d 587 (1957)], quoting from Lord Appeal, 368 Pa. 121 , 81 A. 2d 533 and White’s Appeal, 287 Pa. 259 , 134 A. 409 , it was stated [ 389 Pa. at 57-58 ] : “ ‘ “. . . all property is held in subordination to the right of its reasonable regulation by the government clearly necessary to preserve the health, safety or morals (or general welfare) of the people. . . . 1967In Archbishop O’Hara’s Appeal [ 389 Pa. 35 , 131 A. 2d 587 (1957)], quoting from Lord Appeal, 368 Pa. 121 , 81 A. 2d 533 and White’s Appeal, 287 Pa. 259 , 134 A. 409 , it was stated [ 389 Pa. at 57-58 ] : “ ‘ “. . . all property is held in subordination to the right of its reasonable regulation by the government clearly necessary to preserve the health, safety or morals (or general welfare) of the people. . . . | 2 | 1965–1967 |
City of Philadelphia v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Reed)
green
1 sentence2023Id. 8 A. Medical Evidence of Causation The claimant’s burden in a claim petition proceeding includes establishing a causal relationship between a work-related incident and an injury resulting in disability. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
BouSamra, G. v. Excela Health
green
2 sentences2019Id. (citing Pa.R.C.P. 4003.3, Explanatory Comment-1978). 2019Id. (citing Pa.R.C.P. 4003.3, Explanatory Comment-1978). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In Re: Adoption of: G.L.L., a minor Appeal of CYF
green
2 sentences2016Recently, in In Re Adoption of G.L.L., 124 A.3d 344 (Pa. Super. 2015), the Superior Court reiterated the burden and standard of proof necessary to terminate parental rights: In a proceeding to terminate parental rights involuntarily, the burden of proof is on the party seeking termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for doing so. 2016The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so "clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." It is well established that a court must examine the individual circumstances of each and every case and consider all explanations offered by the parent to determine if the evidence in light of the totality of the circumstances clearly warrants termination. 9 Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Amandeo v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
green
1 sentence2016Amandeo v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Conagra Foods), 37 A.3d 72 , 75-76 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012); Reyes v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (AMTEC), 967 A.2d 1071, 1077 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (en banc). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Cruz v. Beto
green
2 sentences2013As the United States Supreme Court has stated, “[a] special chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard to the extent of the demand.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 , 322 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 1079 , 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). 2013As the United States Supreme Court has stated, “[a] special chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard to the extent of the demand.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 , 322 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 1079 , 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Commonwealth v. Pierce
green
2 sentences2004This Court addressed the difference in Commonwealth v. Howard, 538 Pa. 86 , 645 A.2d 1300, 1307 (1994): [A] defendant [raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel] is required to show actual prejudice; that is, that counsel’s ineffectiveness was of such magnitude that it “could have reasonably had an adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings.” Pierce, 515 Pa. at 162 , 527 A.2d at 977 . 2004This Court addressed the difference in Commonwealth v. Howard, 538 Pa. 86 , 645 A.2d 1300, 1307 (1994): [A] defendant [raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel] is required to show actual prejudice; that is, that counsel’s ineffectiveness was of such magnitude that it “could have reasonably had an adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings.” Pierce, 515 Pa. at 162 , 527 A.2d at 977 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Commonwealth v. Mulholland
green
1 sentence2002Mulholland, 702 A.2d at 1034 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Vista International Hotel v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Daniels)
green
2 sentences2002Id. at 59 , 742 A.2d 649 (citations omitted). 2002Id. at 59 , 742 A.2d 649 (citations omitted). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Macan v. Scandinavia Belting Co. green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz
green
2 sentences2001Cronan v. Castle Gas Co., 354 Pa.Super. 381 , 512 A.2d 1, 5 (1986), citing Gordon v. Trovato, 234 Pa.Super. 279 , 338 A.2d 653 (1975); Macan v. Scandinavia Belting Company, 264 Pa. 384 , 107 A. 750 (1919); Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92 , 444 A.2d 674 (1982); and Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561 , 421 A.2d 1027 (1980). ¶ 16 Furthermore, review of the case law makes clear that, for purposes of causation and damages, there is no difference between the burden and standard of proof in design defect and manufacturing defect cases. 2001Cronan v. Castle Gas Co., 354 Pa.Super. 381 , 512 A.2d 1, 5 (1986), citing Gordon v. Trovato, 234 Pa.Super. 279 , 338 A.2d 653 (1975); Macan v. Scandinavia Belting Company, 264 Pa. 384 , 107 A. 750 (1919); Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92 , 444 A.2d 674 (1982); and Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561 , 421 A.2d 1027 (1980). ¶ 16 Furthermore, review of the case law makes clear that, for purposes of causation and damages, there is no difference between the burden and standard of proof in design defect and manufacturing defect cases. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Pratt v. Stein green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Gordon v. Trovato
green
2 sentences2001Cronan v. Castle Gas Co., 354 Pa.Super. 381 , 512 A.2d 1, 5 (1986), citing Gordon v. Trovato, 234 Pa.Super. 279 , 338 A.2d 653 (1975); Macan v. Scandinavia Belting Company, 264 Pa. 384 , 107 A. 750 (1919); Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92 , 444 A.2d 674 (1982); and Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561 , 421 A.2d 1027 (1980). ¶ 16 Furthermore, review of the case law makes clear that, for purposes of causation and damages, there is no difference between the burden and standard of proof in design defect and manufacturing defect cases. 2001Cronan v. Castle Gas Co., 354 Pa.Super. 381 , 512 A.2d 1, 5 (1986), citing Gordon v. Trovato, 234 Pa.Super. 279 , 338 A.2d 653 (1975); Macan v. Scandinavia Belting Company, 264 Pa. 384 , 107 A. 750 (1919); Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92 , 444 A.2d 674 (1982); and Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561 , 421 A.2d 1027 (1980). ¶ 16 Furthermore, review of the case law makes clear that, for purposes of causation and damages, there is no difference between the burden and standard of proof in design defect and manufacturing defect cases. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Fox v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Kempf v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Campbell v. Campbell green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Commonwealth Ex Rel. Spriggs v. Carson green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Commissioner v. Shapiro green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Phillips v. Commissioner green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Sullivan v. New Jersey green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Blue Cross Appeal neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Eller v. Board of Adjustment green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Archbishop O'Hara's Appeal green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| White's Appeal green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Gausman v. R. T. Pearson Co. green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Burkhart v. North American Co. green | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.