53 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1915–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sandholm v. Kueckergreen2 sentences2014Sandholm reformulated the movant’s burden under the test in the following terms: “In light of the clear legislative intent expressed in the statute to subject only meritless, retaliatory SLAPP suits to dismissal, we construe the phrase ‘based on, relates to, or is in response to’ in section 15 to mean solely based on, relating to, or in response to ‘any act or acts of the moving party in furtherance of the moving party’s rights of petition, speech, association, or to otherwise participate in government.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Sandholm, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 45 (quoting 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 20 2014Sandholm reformulated the movant’s burden under the test in the following terms: “In light of the clear legislative intent expressed in the statute to subject only meritless, retaliatory SLAPP suits to dismissal, we construe the phrase ‘based on, relates to, or is in response to’ in section 15 to mean solely based on, relating to, or in response to ‘any act or acts of the moving party in furtherance of the moving party’s rights of petition, speech, association, or to otherwise participate in government.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Sandholm, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 45 (quoting 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 20 | 2 | 2 |
Morrison v. Flowersgreen2 sentences2012See Morrison v. Flowers, 308 Ill. 189, 195 , 139 N.E. 10 (1923) ("A prima facie case is one * * * established by evidence adduced by the plaintiff in support of his case * * *."); Getto v. City of Chicago, 392 Ill.App.3d 232, 239-40 , 332 Ill.Dec. 596 , 913 N.E.2d 528 (2009) (circuit court erred in shifting the burden of proof to the defendant at the conclusion of the trial); Tepper v. County of Lake, 233 Ill.App.3d 80, 81 , 174 Ill.Dec. 164 , 598 N.E.2d 361 (1992) (circuit court erred in granting the defendant's motion for a directed finding when the plaintiff presented a prima facie case). ¶ 2012See Morrison v. Flowers, 308 Ill. 189, 195 , 139 N.E. 10 (1923) ("A prima facie case is one * * * established by evidence adduced by the plaintiff in support of his case * * *."); Getto v. City of Chicago, 392 Ill.App.3d 232, 239-40 , 332 Ill.Dec. 596 , 913 N.E.2d 528 (2009) (circuit court erred in shifting the burden of proof to the defendant at the conclusion of the trial); Tepper v. County of Lake, 233 Ill.App.3d 80, 81 , 174 Ill.Dec. 164 , 598 N.E.2d 361 (1992) (circuit court erred in granting the defendant's motion for a directed finding when the plaintiff presented a prima facie case). ¶ | 2 | 2 |
People v. Lindgreen2 sentences2002See People v. Lind , 307 Ill. 2002See People v. Lind, 307 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Pontiac Lodge No. 294 v. Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences1998See Pontiac Lodge, 243 Ill. 1998See Pontiac Lodge , 243 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Wilson v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2019The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination." Under Rule 705, the burden is on the defense " 'during cross-examination to elicit the facts underlying the expert opinion.' " Negron , 2012 IL App (1st) 101194 , ¶ 42, 368 Ill.Dec. 545 , 984 N.E.2d 491 (quoting Wilson v. Clark , 84 Ill. 2d 186 , 194, 417 N.E.2d 1322 , 1327, 49 Ill.Dec. 308 (1981) ). 2019The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination." Under Rule 705, the burden is on the defense " 'during cross-examination to elicit the facts underlying the expert opinion.' " Negron , 2012 IL App (1st) 101194 , ¶ 42, 368 Ill.Dec. 545 , 984 N.E.2d 491 (quoting Wilson v. Clark , 84 Ill. 2d 186 , 194, 417 N.E.2d 1322 , 1327, 49 Ill.Dec. 308 (1981) ). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Negrongreen2 sentences2019The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination." Under Rule 705, the burden is on the defense " 'during cross-examination to elicit the facts underlying the expert opinion.' " Negron , 2012 IL App (1st) 101194 , ¶ 42, 368 Ill.Dec. 545 , 984 N.E.2d 491 (quoting Wilson v. Clark , 84 Ill. 2d 186 , 194, 417 N.E.2d 1322 , 1327, 49 Ill.Dec. 308 (1981) ). 2019The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination." Under Rule 705, the burden is on the defense " 'during cross-examination to elicit the facts underlying the expert opinion.' " Negron , 2012 IL App (1st) 101194 , ¶ 42, 368 Ill.Dec. 545 , 984 N.E.2d 491 (quoting Wilson v. Clark , 84 Ill. 2d 186 , 194, 417 N.E.2d 1322 , 1327, 49 Ill.Dec. 308 (1981) ). | 1 | 2 |
Getto v. City of Chicagogreen2 sentences2012See Morrison v. Flowers, 308 Ill. 189, 195 , 139 N.E. 10 (1923) ("A prima facie case is one * * * established by evidence adduced by the plaintiff in support of his case * * *."); Getto v. City of Chicago, 392 Ill.App.3d 232, 239-40 , 332 Ill.Dec. 596 , 913 N.E.2d 528 (2009) (circuit court erred in shifting the burden of proof to the defendant at the conclusion of the trial); Tepper v. County of Lake, 233 Ill.App.3d 80, 81 , 174 Ill.Dec. 164 , 598 N.E.2d 361 (1992) (circuit court erred in granting the defendant's motion for a directed finding when the plaintiff presented a prima facie case). ¶ 2012See Morrison v. Flowers, 308 Ill. 189, 195 , 139 N.E. 10 (1923) ("A prima facie case is one * * * established by evidence adduced by the plaintiff in support of his case * * *."); Getto v. City of Chicago, 392 Ill.App.3d 232, 239-40 , 332 Ill.Dec. 596 , 913 N.E.2d 528 (2009) (circuit court erred in shifting the burden of proof to the defendant at the conclusion of the trial); Tepper v. County of Lake, 233 Ill.App.3d 80, 81 , 174 Ill.Dec. 164 , 598 N.E.2d 361 (1992) (circuit court erred in granting the defendant's motion for a directed finding when the plaintiff presented a prima facie case). ¶ | 1 | 2 |
Peguero v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001It is irrelevant whether one characterizes this burden as a requirement to allege deficient performance or prejudice because the principle remains the same: the pro se defendant cannot be expected "`to specify the grounds for [his] appeal and show that they have some merit.'" Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 486 , 120 S.Ct. at 1040 , 145 L.Ed.2d at 1001 , quoting Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 30 , 119 S.Ct. 961, 966 , 143 L.Ed.2d 18, 25-26 (1999) (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.). 2001It is irrelevant whether one characterizes this burden as a requirement to allege deficient performance or prejudice because the principle remains the same: the pro se defendant cannot be expected "`to specify the grounds for [his] appeal and show that they have some merit.'" Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 486 , 120 S.Ct. at 1040 , 145 L.Ed.2d at 1001 , quoting Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 30 , 119 S.Ct. 961, 966 , 143 L.Ed.2d 18, 25-26 (1999) (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Devinegreen1 sentence2025In People v. Devine, 295 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Maryland v. Shatzergreen1 sentence2025Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 104 (2010); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986); People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 505 (2003); 725 ILCS 5/114-11(d) (West 2024). ¶ 85 We recognize that the statute here only mentions the State’s burden to show that the minor’s statement was “voluntarily given,” without mention of “knowingly” or “intelligently.” But you cannot have a voluntary waiver without a knowing and intelligent one; you cannot make a “free and deliberate” choice to waive your rights, and thus a “voluntary” waiver (Moran, 475 - 23 - No. 1-22-1601 U.S. at 421), unless you first unde | 1 | 1 |
People v. Braggsgreen1 sentence2025Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 104 (2010); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986); People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 505 (2003); 725 ILCS 5/114-11(d) (West 2024). ¶ 85 We recognize that the statute here only mentions the State’s burden to show that the minor’s statement was “voluntarily given,” without mention of “knowingly” or “intelligently.” But you cannot have a voluntary waiver without a knowing and intelligent one; you cannot make a “free and deliberate” choice to waive your rights, and thus a “voluntary” waiver (Moran, 475 - 23 - No. 1-22-1601 U.S. at 421), unless you first unde | 1 | 1 |
Moran v. Burbinegreen1 sentence2025Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 104 (2010); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986); People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 505 (2003); 725 ILCS 5/114-11(d) (West 2024). ¶ 85 We recognize that the statute here only mentions the State’s burden to show that the minor’s statement was “voluntarily given,” without mention of “knowingly” or “intelligently.” But you cannot have a voluntary waiver without a knowing and intelligent one; you cannot make a “free and deliberate” choice to waive your rights, and thus a “voluntary” waiver (Moran, 475 - 23 - No. 1-22-1601 U.S. at 421), unless you first unde | 1 | 1 |
People v. Berggreen1 sentence2021People v. Brooks, 2017 IL 121413, ¶ 22 ; see People v. Berg, 67 Ill. 2d 65, 68 (1977) (“Where the basis for the motion is an allegedly illegal search, it is incumbent upon the defendant in the first instance to establish both components: that there was a search, and that it was illegal.”). ¶ 55 But we need not dwell on these failures (they are documented in enough detail above) or the issue of counsel’s deficiency. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of Wanstreetgreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wanstreet, 364 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdinegreen1 sentence2020Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259-60 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Board of Managers of Chestnut Hills Condominium Ass'n v. Pasquinelli, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Paschall v. Reedgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Petersen v. Hubschman Construction Co.
green
2 sentences2012A knowing waiver of this protection will not be readily implied.’ *** [Citation.]” (Emphasis omitted.) Petersen, 76 Ill. 2d at 43 . ¶ 29 Cases subsequent to Petersen, continue to follow this high standard and hold that the burden for waiver of an implied warranty by way of a disclaimer will be met only where: “(1) [the disclaimer] is a conspicuous provision (2) which fully discloses the consequences of its inclusion (3) that was, in fact, the agreement of the parties.” Board of Managers of Chestnut Hills Condominium Ass’n v. Pasquinelli, Inc., 354 Ill. 2012Since the public policy behind the implied warranty of habitability is to protect homeowners and to construe disclaimers strictly against builders-vendors (Petersen, 76 Ill. 2d at 43 ), we see no reason why, under the plain language of the aforementioned disclaimer provision, we should attempt to circumvent the clear and unambiguous intent of the parties and extend the disclaimer to include parties other than the seller, Wayne (Thompson, 241 Ill. 2d at 441 ). | 3 | 2004–2012 |
Badillo v. DeVivo
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 599 , 113 Ill.Dec. 696 , 515 N.E.2d 681 . ¶ 62 However, there are exceptions to the general rule that a bar owner's duty to protect its patrons from criminal acts of third parties ends at the bar's property line. 2018Id. at 599 , 113 Ill.Dec. 696 , 515 N.E.2d 681 . ¶ 62 However, there are exceptions to the general rule that a bar owner's duty to protect its patrons from criminal acts of third parties ends at the bar's property line. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Zehr
green
2 sentences2013Our decision was cast as an effort to effectuate the principles established in People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472 (1984), and recognized that a general or broad statement of law that the burden of proof in a criminal case is beyond a reasonable doubt did not adequately inform jurors of the law when the insanity defense is raised. 2013Our decision was cast as an effort to effectuate the principles established in People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472 (1984), and recognized that a general or broad statement of law that the burden of proof in a criminal case is beyond a reasonable doubt did not adequately inform jurors of the law when the insanity defense is raised. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Northern Illinois Emergency Physicians v. Landau, Omahana & Kopka, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2008The plaintiff's burden in a defense-type legal malpractice case is generally addressed in Northern Illinois Emergency Physicians, 216 Ill. 2d 294 . 2008The plaintiff’s burden in a defense-type legal malpractice case is generally addressed in Northern Illinois Emergency Physicians, 216 Ill. 2d 294 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Walker v. American River Transportation
green
2 sentences2002Furthermore, a "defendant seeking transfer from a forum that bears no practical connection to the litigation still shoulders the responsibility of meeting this burden under the doctrine." Walker , 277 Ill. 2002Furthermore, a “defendant seeking transfer from a forum that bears no practical connection to the litigation still shoulders the responsibility of meeting this burden under the doctrine.” Walker, 277 Ill. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Roe v. Flores-Ortega
green
2 sentences2001It is irrelevant whether one characterizes this burden as a requirement to allege deficient performance or prejudice because the principle remains the same: the pro se defendant cannot be expected “ ‘to specify the grounds for [his] appeal and show that they have some merit.’ ” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 486 , 145 L. 2001It is irrelevant whether one characterizes this burden as a requirement to allege deficient performance or prejudice because the principle remains the same: the pro se defendant cannot be expected “ ‘to specify the grounds for [his] appeal and show that they have some merit.’ ” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 486 , 145 L. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Scott
green
2 sentences2000This court has previously held that the provisions imposing this burden on the defense do not violate due process under the federal or state constitutions (Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 540-43 ), and the defendant has not presented us with any reason that would warrant our reaching a different result under the eighth amendment. 2000This court has previously held that the provisions imposing this burden on the defense do not violate due process under the federal or state constitutions ( Scott, 148 Ill.2d at 540-43 , 171 Ill.Dec. 365 , 594 N.E.2d 217 ), and the defendant has not presented us with any reason that would warrant our reaching a different result under the eighth amendment. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
In Interest of KG
green
2 sentences2000The first question in the hearing, whether or not the petition has been sustained by the evidence, my conclusion for the reasons I have indicated, the court's observations, the K.G. [ 288 Ill.App.3d 728 , 224 Ill.Dec. 534 , 682 N.E.2d 95 ] case, every case must be determined on its own facts. 2000The first question in the hearing, whether or not the petition has been sustained by the evidence, my conclusion for the reasons I have indicated, the court's observations, the K.G. [ 288 Ill.App.3d 728 , 224 Ill.Dec. 534 , 682 N.E.2d 95 ] case, every case must be determined on its own facts. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
O'Connor v. Harris Bank Barrington, N.A.
green
2 sentences1995The petitioner bears the burden at the hearing of introducing evidence establishing reasonable grounds for removal. ( In re Estate of Kirk (1993), 242 Ill.App.3d 68, 73 , 183 Ill.Dec. 274 , 611 N.E.2d 537 .) If the petitioner meets her burden, the respondent then must prove his *778 fitness to retain office. 1995The petitioner bears the burden at the hearing of introducing evidence establishing reasonable grounds for removal. ( In re Estate of Kirk (1993), 242 Ill.App.3d 68, 73 , 183 Ill.Dec. 274 , 611 N.E.2d 537 .) If the petitioner meets her burden, the respondent then must prove his *778 fitness to retain office. | 2 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Harris
green
1 sentence2025Harris, 2025 IL 130351, ¶ 41 . - 17 - Nos. 1-22-1033, 1-22-1034, & 1-22-1035 cons. new trial?” The court found that in Mr. Harris’s original trials, the defense was “severely limited in impeaching the detectives involved in this investigation undermining the [defense’s] ability to fully and thoroughly attack the statements attributed to [Mr. Harris].” The court found that the defense was significantly and unfairly prejudiced by the lack of information of past misconduct attributed to the detectives involved in Mr. Harris’s interrogation, and new trials would allow the trier of fact to consider | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Mikusch
green
1 sentence2025This presumption of inadmissibility “may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was voluntarily given and is reliable, based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. § 103-2.1(f). ¶ 84 This framework, with one exception we will mention below, is little more than a restatement of the State’s burden on a claim of a garden-variety Miranda violation, where the State must show that the defendant’s decision to waive his rights and speak to the police was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Perez
green
1 sentence2024However, we need not address this argument because the record clearly shows that the court did not rely on this basis for revoking defendant’s release. - 11 - No. 1-24-0211B the denial of pretrial release under section 110-6.1 of the Code, not a revocation hearing under section 110-6(a). 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1; Perez, 2024 IL App (2d) 230504, ¶ 15 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Hughes
green
1 sentence2024Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 58 . 11 that defendant reasonably relied on that advice in making the decisions to plead guilty, means that counsel was ineffective. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Brooks
green
1 sentence2021People v. Brooks, 2017 IL 121413, ¶ 22 ; see People v. Berg, 67 Ill. 2d 65, 68 (1977) (“Where the basis for the motion is an allegedly illegal search, it is incumbent upon the defendant in the first instance to establish both components: that there was a search, and that it was illegal.”). ¶ 55 But we need not dwell on these failures (they are documented in enough detail above) or the issue of counsel’s deficiency. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Clark
green
1 sentence2019For example, in People v. Clark, 2015 IL App (3d) 140036, ¶ 24 , the appellate court took the defendant to task for failing to offer evidence that the gun was fake or some type of air rifle. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Knight green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Thompson v. Gordon green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Tepper v. County of Lake green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| People v. $1,124,905 U.S. Currency green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Griffith v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Powell v. Western Illinois Electric Cooperative green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Fierer green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Abramowitz v. Posner green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Casey v. Baseden green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Ogunsola green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. Housby neutral | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. Porter green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Shelton green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Carolina Veneer & Lumber Co. v. American Mutual Liability Insurance neutral | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Jans v. City of Evanston green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Goodkind v. Bartlett green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Bank of Montreal v. Griffin neutral | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Schneider v. Turner green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.