16 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Melaragreen2 sentences2026Accord People v. Berumen, 2025 COA 93, ¶ 33 ; see also People v. Melara, 2025 COA 48, ¶¶ 24-32 (holding 15 that a district court doesn’t commit structural error by failing to include “lack of evidence” language in the instruction). ¶ 39 Though Perez urges us to hold to the contrary, we conclude that Schlehuber is well reasoned and therefore follow it. 2025See People v. Melara, 2025 COA 48, ¶ 24 . | 2 | 2 |
People v. Estesgreen2 sentences2026See People v. Perea, 126 P.3d 241, 247 (Colo. App. 2005) (explaining that during closing remarks, prosecutors have wide latitude in the language and style they choose to employ, especially in responding to an argument by the defense); People v. Estes, 2012 COA 41, ¶ 28 (a prosecutor may comment on the strength of the defense’s theories and, in doing so, does not shift the burden to the defense). 25 ¶ 55 The prosecutor’s comment that Torreyson “wait[ed] cowardly” to contradict Nelson’s testimony is more troubling because prosecutors should avoid pejoratives and name calling. 2020People v. Serra, 2015 COA 130, ¶ 88 ; People v. Estes, 2012 COA 41, ¶ 28 . ¶ 110 On cross-examination, a prosecutor may ask “non-prejudicial questions that highlight the discrepancies and later emphasize any conflicting accounts by juxtaposing them in closing argument.” Liggett v. People, 135 P.3d 725, 732 (Colo. 2006). | 1 | 2 |
People v. ALVARADO-JUAREZgreen1 sentence2026See People v. Alvarado-Juarez, 252 P.3d 1135, 1137 (Colo. App. 2010) (“Colorado’s [old] instruction accurately describes proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see Johnson, ¶ 16 (holding that the court had properly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt when, in context of the entire record, the court used the exact language from the model jury instructions and properly instructed the jury on the prosecution’s burden and presumption of innocence); see also Tibbels, ¶ 25 (urging courts to adhere to “long-established [model] instructions”). 13 ¶ 27 Second, while Duran contends the use of two instr | 1 | 1 |
People v. Berumengreen1 sentence2026Accord People v. Berumen, 2025 COA 93, ¶ 33 ; see also People v. Melara, 2025 COA 48, ¶¶ 24-32 (holding 15 that a district court doesn’t commit structural error by failing to include “lack of evidence” language in the instruction). ¶ 39 Though Perez urges us to hold to the contrary, we conclude that Schlehuber is well reasoned and therefore follow it. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pereagreen1 sentence2026See People v. Perea, 126 P.3d 241, 247 (Colo. App. 2005) (explaining that during closing remarks, prosecutors have wide latitude in the language and style they choose to employ, especially in responding to an argument by the defense); People v. Estes, 2012 COA 41, ¶ 28 (a prosecutor may comment on the strength of the defense’s theories and, in doing so, does not shift the burden to the defense). 25 ¶ 55 The prosecutor’s comment that Torreyson “wait[ed] cowardly” to contradict Nelson’s testimony is more troubling because prosecutors should avoid pejoratives and name calling. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Phillipsgreen1 sentence2026See People v. Phillips, 91 P.3d 476, 484 (Colo. App. 2004) (The presumption that a jury understood and heeded instructions “is rebutted where a jury affirmatively indicates it has a fundamental misunderstanding of an instruction it was given.”). | 1 | 1 |
Estelle v. McGuiregreen2 sentences2025See id. 22 ¶ 45 Third, although Instruction No. 4 itself did not identify a burden or standard of proof, the balance of the instructions collectively made clear that the prosecution alone bore the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged crimes. 2025See id. | 1 | 1 |
Liggett v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2020People v. Serra, 2015 COA 130, ¶ 88 ; People v. Estes, 2012 COA 41, ¶ 28 . ¶ 110 On cross-examination, a prosecutor may ask “non-prejudicial questions that highlight the discrepancies and later emphasize any conflicting accounts by juxtaposing them in closing argument.” Liggett v. People, 135 P.3d 725, 732 (Colo. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
Snyder v. Industrial Claim Appeals Officegreen1 sentence2019See id. ¶ 31 Here, the ALJ found credible and persuasive the opinions of several physicians and health care providers who concurred that claimant had reached her pre-injury level of functioning and that 4 We also note that the burden and standard of proof remain the same whether a challenge to maintenance benefits is made as here, or in a reopening proceeding. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Reedgreen1 sentence2015See People v. Reed, 932 P.2d 842, 844 (Colo.App. 1996) (When an exception is found in a different clause from the statutory section defining the elements of am offense, it is the defendant’s burden to claim it as an affirmative defense.). . ¶ 46 The erroneous instruction effectively required the prosecution to establish an additional element of the offense: that the officer had been “called upon to make, and [did] make, a judgment ... that an arrest should, be made by [her] ” See § 18-8-103(2). | 1 | 1 |
Helm v. State of Wyominggreen1 sentence2011See United States v. Vazquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 87, 56-58 (1st Cir.2008) (concluding that because prosecutor's remark suggesting that defendants had the duty to present missing evidence did not "so poison[] the well," and were not "of a caliber that would inherently compel jurors to disregard their duty," no new trial was required); State v. Stevenson, 53 Conn.App. 551 , 733 A.2d 253, 265-67 (1990) (concluding that, in light of the record, the prosecutor's potentially burden-shifting comments did not deprive the defendant of due process); People v. Gant, 202 Ill.App.3d 218 , 147 Ill.Dec. 583 , 55 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stevensongreen2 sentences2011See United States v. Vazquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 87, 56-58 (1st Cir.2008) (concluding that because prosecutor's remark suggesting that defendants had the duty to present missing evidence did not "so poison[] the well," and were not "of a caliber that would inherently compel jurors to disregard their duty," no new trial was required); State v. Stevenson, 53 Conn.App. 551 , 733 A.2d 253, 265-67 (1990) (concluding that, in light of the record, the prosecutor's potentially burden-shifting comments did not deprive the defendant of due process); People v. Gant, 202 Ill.App.3d 218 , 147 Ill.Dec. 583 , 55 2011See United States v. Vazquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 87, 56-58 (1st Cir.2008) (concluding that because prosecutor's remark suggesting that defendants had the duty to present missing evidence did not "so poison[] the well," and were not "of a caliber that would inherently compel jurors to disregard their duty," no new trial was required); State v. Stevenson, 53 Conn.App. 551 , 733 A.2d 253, 265-67 (1990) (concluding that, in light of the record, the prosecutor's potentially burden-shifting comments did not deprive the defendant of due process); People v. Gant, 202 Ill.App.3d 218 , 147 Ill.Dec. 583 , 55 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gantgreen2 sentences2011See United States v. Vazquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 87, 56-58 (1st Cir.2008) (concluding that because prosecutor's remark suggesting that defendants had the duty to present missing evidence did not "so poison[] the well," and were not "of a caliber that would inherently compel jurors to disregard their duty," no new trial was required); State v. Stevenson, 53 Conn.App. 551 , 733 A.2d 253, 265-67 (1990) (concluding that, in light of the record, the prosecutor's potentially burden-shifting comments did not deprive the defendant of due process); People v. Gant, 202 Ill.App.3d 218 , 147 Ill.Dec. 583 , 55 2011See United States v. Vazquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 87, 56-58 (1st Cir.2008) (concluding that because prosecutor's remark suggesting that defendants had the duty to present missing evidence did not "so poison[] the well," and were not "of a caliber that would inherently compel jurors to disregard their duty," no new trial was required); State v. Stevenson, 53 Conn.App. 551 , 733 A.2d 253, 265-67 (1990) (concluding that, in light of the record, the prosecutor's potentially burden-shifting comments did not deprive the defendant of due process); People v. Gant, 202 Ill.App.3d 218 , 147 Ill.Dec. 583 , 55 | 1 | 1 |
Nikkal Industries, Ltd. v. Salton, Inc.green1 sentence1999See, e.g., Nikkal Industries v. Salton, Inc., 689 F.Supp. 187, 191-92 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (meeting with consultant constituted “employment style interview,” and dealt with information “essentially technical” in nature). | 1 | 1 |
Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1972Co., supra ; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, Office of Unemployment Compensation, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 ; Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, supra ; see also Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456 , 448 P.2d 783 . 1972Co., supra ; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, Office of Unemployment Compensation, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 ; Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, supra ; see also Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456 , 448 P.2d 783 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Schlehuber
green
1 sentence2026Third, the “real possibility” language in the instruction was too confusing for jurors and shifted the burden to the defense. ¶ 38 In Schlehuber, 2025 COA 50 , a division of this court thoroughly considered materially identical arguments and held that the modified 2022 version of the reasonable doubt instruction doesn’t lower the prosecution’s burden of proof or undermine the presumption of innocence. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. McBride
green
1 sentence2026McBride, 228 P.3d at 222-23 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Serra
green
1 sentence2020People v. Serra, 2015 COA 130, ¶ 88 ; People v. Estes, 2012 COA 41, ¶ 28 . ¶ 110 On cross-examination, a prosecutor may ask “non-prejudicial questions that highlight the discrepancies and later emphasize any conflicting accounts by juxtaposing them in closing argument.” Liggett v. People, 135 P.3d 725, 732 (Colo. 2006). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Vega v. People
green
1 sentence2019A. Reasonable Doubt ¶10 In criminal cases, the prosecution is required to "prove every factual element necessary to constitute the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." Vega v. People , 893 P.2d 107 , 111 (Colo. 1995). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Johnson v. People
green
1 sentence2019Johnson v. People, 2019 CO 17 , ¶ 17 & n.2. 5 We do not believe that every comment made by a trial court to the jury panel during voir dire is automatically an instruction. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Medina
green
1 sentence2012Tallitsch, 926 P.2d at 149 . 1 61 In denying plaintiffs' request for expedited discovery concerning Nash Finch's attorney fees and expenses, the trial court relied on the following considerations: e The parties' experts had already finalized their reports without the assistance of defendant's billing records, and the parties had already exchanged those reports. ® The evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of attorney fees was scheduled for one day, and, given the limited amount of time for each side's presentation, the extensive costs for defendant to produce the information would yield onl | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Converse v. Zinke
green
2 sentences1983Converse v. Zinke, 635 P.2d 882 (Colo.1981). 1983Converse v. Zinke, 635 P.2d 882 (Colo.1981). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
People v. Roybal
green
1 sentence1981People v. DeLeon, supra; Roybal II, supra; Roybal I, supra. A prima facie showing in this context means evidence which, when considered in a light most favorable to the defendant and all reasonable inferences therefrom are drawn in his favor, would permit the court to find that one or more of the traffic offense convictions essential to the order of revocation was not obtained in accordance with the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel or due process of law. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
People v. DeLeon
green
1 sentence1981People v. DeLeon, supra; Roybal II, supra; Roybal I, supra. A prima facie showing in this context means evidence which, when considered in a light most favorable to the defendant and all reasonable inferences therefrom are drawn in his favor, would permit the court to find that one or more of the traffic offense convictions essential to the order of revocation was not obtained in accordance with the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel or due process of law. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Plum v. Tampax, Inc.
green
2 sentences1972Among the relevant factors which a court should consider in reaching its determination are: the relative availability of sources of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one forum rather than another, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 ; Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, supra ; the relative availability and accessibility of an alternative forum Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 , 71 S.Ct. 980 , 95 L.Ed. 1212 ; Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 402 Pa. 616 , 168 A. 2d 315 ; the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling wi 1972Among the relevant factors which a court should consider in reaching its determination are: the relative availability of sources of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one forum rather than another, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 ; Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, supra ; the relative availability and accessibility of an alternative forum Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 , 71 S.Ct. 980 , 95 L.Ed. 1212 ; Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 402 Pa. 616 , 168 A. 2d 315 ; the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling wi | 1 | 1972–1972 |
McGee v. International Life Insurance
green
2 sentences1972Among the relevant factors which a court should consider in reaching its determination are: the relative availability of sources of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one forum rather than another, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 ; Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, supra ; the relative availability and accessibility of an alternative forum Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 , 71 S.Ct. 980 , 95 L.Ed. 1212 ; Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 402 Pa. 616 , 168 A. 2d 315 ; the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling wi 1972Among the relevant factors which a court should consider in reaching its determination are: the relative availability of sources of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one forum rather than another, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 ; Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, supra ; the relative availability and accessibility of an alternative forum Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 , 71 S.Ct. 980 , 95 L.Ed. 1212 ; Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 402 Pa. 616 , 168 A. 2d 315 ; the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling wi | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Hughes v. Fetter
green
2 sentences1972Among the relevant factors which a court should consider in reaching its determination are: the relative availability of sources of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one forum rather than another, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 ; Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, supra ; the relative availability and accessibility of an alternative forum Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 , 71 S.Ct. 980 , 95 L.Ed. 1212 ; Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 402 Pa. 616 , 168 A. 2d 315 ; the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling wi 1972Among the relevant factors which a court should consider in reaching its determination are: the relative availability of sources of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one forum rather than another, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 ; Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, supra ; the relative availability and accessibility of an alternative forum Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 , 71 S.Ct. 980 , 95 L.Ed. 1212 ; Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 402 Pa. 616 , 168 A. 2d 315 ; the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling wi | 1 | 1972–1972 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
green
2 sentences1972Co., supra ; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, Office of Unemployment Compensation, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 ; Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, supra ; see also Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456 , 448 P.2d 783 . 1972Co., supra ; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, Office of Unemployment Compensation, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 ; Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, supra ; see also Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456 , 448 P.2d 783 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1972Among the relevant factors which a court should consider in reaching its determination are: the relative availability of sources of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one forum rather than another, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 ; Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, supra ; the relative availability and accessibility of an alternative forum Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 , 71 S.Ct. 980 , 95 L.Ed. 1212 ; Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 402 Pa. 616 , 168 A. 2d 315 ; the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling wi 1972Among the relevant factors which a court should consider in reaching its determination are: the relative availability of sources of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one forum rather than another, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 ; Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, supra ; the relative availability and accessibility of an alternative forum Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 , 71 S.Ct. 980 , 95 L.Ed. 1212 ; Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 402 Pa. 616 , 168 A. 2d 315 ; the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling wi | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Thomson v. Continental Insurance
green
2 sentences1972Among the relevant factors which a court should consider in reaching its determination are: the relative availability of sources of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one forum rather than another, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 ; Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, supra ; the relative availability and accessibility of an alternative forum Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 , 71 S.Ct. 980 , 95 L.Ed. 1212 ; Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 402 Pa. 616 , 168 A. 2d 315 ; the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling wi 1972Among the relevant factors which a court should consider in reaching its determination are: the relative availability of sources of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one forum rather than another, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 ; Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, supra ; the relative availability and accessibility of an alternative forum Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 , 71 S.Ct. 980 , 95 L.Ed. 1212 ; Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 402 Pa. 616 , 168 A. 2d 315 ; the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling wi | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.