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7 Vermont opinions name it 1 courts 1980–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Westgreen2 sentences2007Many other jurisdictions similarly hold that "when an exception is found in a separate clause or is clearly disconnected from the definition of the offense, it is the defendant's burden to claim it as an affirmative defense." People v. Reed, 932 P.2d 842, 844 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., State v. West, 929 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) ("where the exception is found in a separate clause or part of the statute disconnected from the definition of the offense, the exception is not for the prosecution to negate, but for the defendant to claim as a matter of affir 2007Many other jurisdictions similarly hold that “when an exception is found in a separate clause or is clearly disconnected from the definition of the offense, it is the defendant’s burden to claim it as an affirmative defense.” People v. Reed, 932 P.2d 842, 844 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., State v. West, 929 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (“where the exception is found in a separate clause or part of the statute disconnected from the definition of the offense, the exception is not for the prosecution to negate, but for the defendant to claim as a matter of affir | 2 | 2 |
People v. Reedgreen2 sentences2007Many other jurisdictions similarly hold that "when an exception is found in a separate clause or is clearly disconnected from the definition of the offense, it is the defendant's burden to claim it as an affirmative defense." People v. Reed, 932 P.2d 842, 844 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., State v. West, 929 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) ("where the exception is found in a separate clause or part of the statute disconnected from the definition of the offense, the exception is not for the prosecution to negate, but for the defendant to claim as a matter of affir 2007Many other jurisdictions similarly hold that “when an exception is found in a separate clause or is clearly disconnected from the definition of the offense, it is the defendant’s burden to claim it as an affirmative defense.” People v. Reed, 932 P.2d 842, 844 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., State v. West, 929 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (“where the exception is found in a separate clause or part of the statute disconnected from the definition of the offense, the exception is not for the prosecution to negate, but for the defendant to claim as a matter of affir | 2 | 2 |
Fraser v. Sleepergreen2 sentences2013In State v. DeLaBruere, 154 Vt. 237 , 577 A.2d 254 (1990), we held that § 1127 must be read in pari materia with the compulsory attendance statute, 16 V.S.A. § 1121, and concluded that the exceptions from compulsory attendance set forth in the latter “are not part of the description of the offense but are instead affirmative defenses.” Id. at 271-72, 577 A.2d at 273 ; see also Fraser v. Sleeper, 2007 VT 78, ¶ 8 , 182 Vt. 206 , 933 A.2d 246 (noting general rule that “when an exception is found in a separate clause or is clearly disconnected from the definition of the offense, it is the defendan 2013The CHINS statute, in contrast, provides no separate catalogue of legal excuses from compulsory attendance, but rather makes the absence of “justification” a part of the violation itself. 33 V.S.A. § 5102(3)(D) (defining CHINS to mean a child who “is habitually and without justification truant from compulsory school attendance”); see Fraser, 2007 VT 78, ¶ 8 (observing that courts should look to “the language and structure of the statute” to determine whether provision constitutes an essential element of the offense). | 1 | 1 |
Fraser v. Sleepergreen2 sentences2013In State v. DeLaBruere, 154 Vt. 237 , 577 A.2d 254 (1990), we held that § 1127 must be read in pari materia with the compulsory attendance statute, 16 V.S.A. § 1121, and concluded that the exceptions from compulsory attendance set forth in the latter “are not part of the description of the offense but are instead affirmative defenses.” Id. at 271-72, 577 A.2d at 273 ; see also Fraser v. Sleeper, 2007 VT 78, ¶ 8 , 182 Vt. 206 , 933 A.2d 246 (noting general rule that “when an exception is found in a separate clause or is clearly disconnected from the definition of the offense, it is the defendan 2013In State v. DeLaBruere, 154 Vt. 237 , 577 A.2d 254 (1990), we held that § 1127 must be read in pari materia with the compulsory attendance statute, 16 V.S.A. § 1121, and concluded that the exceptions from compulsory attendance set forth in the latter “are not part of the description of the offense but are instead affirmative defenses.” Id. at 271-72, 577 A.2d at 273 ; see also Fraser v. Sleeper, 2007 VT 78, ¶ 8 , 182 Vt. 206 , 933 A.2d 246 (noting general rule that “when an exception is found in a separate clause or is clearly disconnected from the definition of the offense, it is the defendan | 1 | 1 |
State v. Duffgreen2 sentences1997The element that has traditionally distinguished murder from manslaughter is “malice.” State v. Duff, 150 Vt. 329, 331 , 554 A.2d 214, 215 (1988). 1997The element that has traditionally distinguished murder from manslaughter is “malice.” State v. Duff, 150 Vt. 329, 331 , 554 A.2d 214, 215 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Hurd v. Spencergreen1 sentence1980Hurd v. Spencer, 40 Vt. 581, 586 (1868). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. McCaffrey
green
2 sentences2007We came to a similar conclusion in State v. McCaffrey, 69 Vt. 85 , 37 A. 234 (1896). 2007We came to a similar conclusion in State v. McCaffrey, 69 Vt. 85 , 37 A. 234 (1896). | 2 | 2007–2007 |
State v. DeLaBruere
green
2 sentences2013In State v. DeLaBruere, 154 Vt. 237 , 577 A.2d 254 (1990), we held that § 1127 must be read in pari materia with the compulsory attendance statute, 16 V.S.A. § 1121, and concluded that the exceptions from compulsory attendance set forth in the latter “are not part of the description of the offense but are instead affirmative defenses.” Id. at 271-72, 577 A.2d at 273 ; see also Fraser v. Sleeper, 2007 VT 78, ¶ 8 , 182 Vt. 206 , 933 A.2d 246 (noting general rule that “when an exception is found in a separate clause or is clearly disconnected from the definition of the offense, it is the defendan 2013In State v. DeLaBruere, 154 Vt. 237 , 577 A.2d 254 (1990), we held that § 1127 must be read in pari materia with the compulsory attendance statute, 16 V.S.A. § 1121, and concluded that the exceptions from compulsory attendance set forth in the latter “are not part of the description of the offense but are instead affirmative defenses.” Id. at 271-72, 577 A.2d at 273 ; see also Fraser v. Sleeper, 2007 VT 78, ¶ 8 , 182 Vt. 206 , 933 A.2d 246 (noting general rule that “when an exception is found in a separate clause or is clearly disconnected from the definition of the offense, it is the defendan | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Mullin v. Phelps
green
2 sentences2011In Mullin v. Phelps, 162 Vt. 250 , 647 A.2d 714 (1994), this Court interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution to require the family court to make findings of sexual abuse by clear and convincing evidence before parent-child contact can be denied to the noncustodial parent. 2011In Mullin v. Phelps, 162 Vt. 250 , 647 A.2d 714 (1994), this Court interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution to require the family court to make findings of sexual abuse by clear and convincing evidence before parent-child contact can be denied to the noncustodial parent. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
red
1 sentence1992Id. at 246 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.