burden standard in Oregon

2026See State v. Purrier, 265 Or App 618, 621 , 336 P3d 574 (2014) (explaining that it is impermissible for a prosecutor to “describ[e] the jury’s task as choosing which of two versions of events the jury finds more believable [if that] description * * * omits the pos- sibility, among others, that the jury would find the state’s version more plausible, yet not be convinced beyond a rea- sonable doubt of [the] defendant’s guilt”).

2026See State v. Purrier, 265 Or App 618, 621 , 336 P3d 574 (2014) (explaining that it is impermissible for a prosecutor to “describ[e] the jury’s task as choosing which of two versions of events the jury finds more believable [if that] description * * * omits the pos- sibility, among others, that the jury would find the state’s version more plausible, yet not be convinced beyond a rea- sonable doubt of [the] defendant’s guilt”).

2021See Bellas Hess, 386 US at 755 (detailing Illinois’s requirements to collect tax, furnish receipts, remit tax, and maintain records); Quill, 504 US at 313 n 6 (6,000 report- ing jurisdictions nationwide); Capital One, 22 OTR at 339 (collection burden “looms large” because “a taxpayer must ensure that the appropriate amount (and not more or less) is collected from the customer and directed to the appro- priate taxing authority within the appropriate time”; tax- payer must be prepared to do so before making first sale into state).

2021See Bellas Hess, 386 US at 755 (detailing Illinois’s requirements to collect tax, furnish receipts, remit tax, and maintain records); Quill, 504 US at 313 n 6 (6,000 report- ing jurisdictions nationwide); Capital One, 22 OTR at 339 (collection burden “looms large” because “a taxpayer must ensure that the appropriate amount (and not more or less) is collected from the customer and directed to the appro- priate taxing authority within the appropriate time”; tax- payer must be prepared to do so before making first sale into state).

2007See Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 338 Or. at 465-66 , 111 P.3d 1123 .

2007See Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 338 Or. at 465-66 , 111 P.3d 1123 .

2004See 374 US at 404 (explaining that, if the purpose or effect of a law is to impede religious practice, the law is constitutionally invalid even though it has such effect only indirectly). 17 The court noted that, to the extent the meaning of the term “substantial” in RLUIPA was ambiguous, another provision of RLUIPA mandates that the act be construed “in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise.” Elsinore Christian Center, 291 F Supp 2d at 1091 (citing 42 USC § 2000cc-3(g) (quoted above)). 18 This court has considered, at least in passing, the substantial burden standard under RFRA.

1990NINTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Defendant argues that "[t]he trial court erred in failing to give defendant's requested penalty phase instruction No. 8 on the presumption of peacefulness." Defendant contends that "[i]n failing to instruct on the peacefulness presumption, the trial court did not adequately articulate the allocation of the burden and standard of proof." We reject defendant's argument, as we rejected the identical argument in the recent case of State v. Farrar, supra, 309 Or. at 178, 786 P.2d 161 .

1990NINTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR Defendant argues that "[t]he trial court erred in failing to give defendant's requested penalty phase instruction No. 8 on the presumption of peacefulness." Defendant contends that "[i]n failing to instruct on the peacefulness presumption, the trial court did not adequately articulate the allocation of the burden and standard of proof." We reject defendant's argument, as we rejected the identical argument in the recent case of State v. Farrar, supra, 309 Or. at 178, 786 P.2d 161 .