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133 California opinions name it 2 courts 1907–2026 27 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1982(Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 893, 899 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 113 , 458 P.2d 57 ].) Some of the factors involved in this balancing process include the relative availability of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one place rather than another; the interest of a state in providing a forum for its residents; *137 the ease of access to an alternative forum; the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudications; and the extent to which the cause of action arose out of defendant’s local activities. {Cornelison v. Chaney, supra, 16 Cal.3d 143,151 ; 1982(Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 893, 899 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 113 , 458 P.2d 57 ].) Some of the factors involved in this balancing process include the relative availability of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one place rather than another; the interest of a state in providing a forum for its residents; *137 the ease of access to an alternative forum; the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudications; and the extent to which the cause of action arose out of defendant’s local activities. {Cornelison v. Chaney, supra, 16 Cal.3d 143,151 ; | 9 | 11 |
Residents of Beverly Glen, Inc. v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1979It is the defendant’s burden to rule out all possible merit.’’'’ (Residents of Beverly Glen, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 117, 127 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 724 ], paraphrasing Swaffield v. Universal Ecsco Corp. (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 147, 171-172 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 680 ].) “In examining the sufficiency of affidavits filed in connection with the motion [for summary judgment], the affidavits of the moving party are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the mot 1979It is the defendant’s burden to rule out all possible merit.’’'’ (Residents of Beverly Glen, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 117, 127 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 724 ], paraphrasing Swaffield v. Universal Ecsco Corp. (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 147, 171-172 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 680 ].) “In examining the sufficiency of affidavits filed in connection with the motion [for summary judgment], the affidavits of the moving party are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the mot | 5 | 5 |
People v. Hartleygreen2 sentences2016“The Vournazos court professed to acknowledge the rule, adopted in an earlier case, that the defendant ‘bears the burden of proving that the amount of restitution claimed by the victim exceeds repair or replacement cost of lost or damaged property.’ ( 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 959 , citing People v. Hartley (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 126, 130 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 131 ].) In fact the Hartley decision stated an even broader rule: ‘ “Since a defendant will learn of the amount of restitution recommended when he reviews the probation report prior to sentencing, the defendant bears the burden at the hearing of pro 2016“The Vournazos court professed to acknowledge the rule, adopted in an earlier case, that the defendant ‘bears the burden of proving that the amount of restitution claimed by the victim exceeds repair or replacement cost of lost or damaged property.’ ( 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 959 , citing People v. Hartley (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 126, 130 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 131 ].) In fact the Hartley decision stated an even broader rule: ‘ “Since a defendant will learn of the amount of restitution recommended when he reviews the probation report prior to sentencing, the defendant bears the burden at the hearing of pro | 4 | 5 |
People v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2018"An 'abstract assertion' regarding the burden on defense counsel 'cannot be used as a substitute for a showing of genuine need.' " ( People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434 , 447, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 , 11 P.3d 968 ; see People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264 , 287, 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 [no abuse of discretion where denied application for cocounsel made no "factual assertions," instead relying generally on the " 'circumstances surrounding the case' "]; People v. Verdugo , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 278 , 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 803 , 236 P.3d 1035 [application for second counsel insufficient b 2010The request shall be supported by an *278 affidavit of the first attorney setting forth in detail the reasons why a second attorney should be appointed." Even assuming without deciding that section 987, subdivision (d), authorized the trial court here to appoint second counsel, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Defense Counsel Hernandez's declaration insufficient to justify such an appointment. (1) "`The initial burden . . . is on the defendant to present a specific factual showing as to why the appointment of a second attorney is necessary to his defense against the capi | 4 | 4 |
People v. Statengreen2 sentences2018"An 'abstract assertion' regarding the burden on defense counsel 'cannot be used as a substitute for a showing of genuine need.' " ( People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434 , 447, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 , 11 P.3d 968 ; see People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264 , 287, 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 [no abuse of discretion where denied application for cocounsel made no "factual assertions," instead relying generally on the " 'circumstances surrounding the case' "]; People v. Verdugo , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 278 , 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 803 , 236 P.3d 1035 [application for second counsel insufficient b 2018"An 'abstract assertion' regarding the burden on defense counsel 'cannot be used as a substitute for a showing of genuine need.' " ( People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434 , 447, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 , 11 P.3d 968 ; see People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264 , 287, 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 [no abuse of discretion where denied application for cocounsel made no "factual assertions," instead relying generally on the " 'circumstances surrounding the case' "]; People v. Verdugo , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 278 , 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 803 , 236 P.3d 1035 [application for second counsel insufficient b | 3 | 4 |
People v. Luckygreen2 sentences2010The request shall be supported by an *278 affidavit of the first attorney setting forth in detail the reasons why a second attorney should be appointed." Even assuming without deciding that section 987, subdivision (d), authorized the trial court here to appoint second counsel, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Defense Counsel Hernandez's declaration insufficient to justify such an appointment. (1) "`The initial burden . . . is on the defendant to present a specific factual showing as to why the appointment of a second attorney is necessary to his defense against the capi 2010The request shall be supported by an *278 affidavit of the first attorney setting forth in detail the reasons why a second attorney should be appointed." Even assuming without deciding that section 987, subdivision (d), authorized the trial court here to appoint second counsel, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Defense Counsel Hernandez's declaration insufficient to justify such an appointment. (1) "`The initial burden . . . is on the defendant to present a specific factual showing as to why the appointment of a second attorney is necessary to his defense against the capi | 3 | 3 |
Cornelison v. Chaneygreen2 sentences2002(Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 899 .) The factors involved in the balancing process include the following: “the relative availability of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one place rather than another; the interest of a state in providing a forum for its residents or regulating the business involved; the ease of access to an alternative forum; the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudications; and the extent to which the cause of action arose out of defendant’s local activities.” (Cornelison v. Chaney, supra, 16 Cal.3d at 1996We weigh the following factors: “[T]he relative availability of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one place rather than another; the interest of a state in providing a forum for its residents or regulating the business involved; the ease of access to an alternative forum; the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudications; and the extent to which the cause of action arose out of defendant’s local activities.” 18 (Cornelison v. Chaney, supra, 16 Cal.3d 143, 151 .) The evidence supporting and refuting AYS’s claims and the experts needed to testify regardin | 2 | 5 |
Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2002(Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 899 .) The factors involved in the balancing process include the following: “the relative availability of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one place rather than another; the interest of a state in providing a forum for its residents or regulating the business involved; the ease of access to an alternative forum; the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudications; and the extent to which the cause of action arose out of defendant’s local activities.” (Cornelison v. Chaney, supra, 16 Cal.3d at 1989(Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 893, 899 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 113 , 458 P.2d 57 ].) Some of the factors involved in this balancing process include the relative availability of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one place rather than another; the interest of a state in providing a forum for its residents; the ease of access to an alternative forum; the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudications; and the extent to which the cause of action arose out of defendant’s local activities. | 2 | 4 |
People v. Esmailigreen2 sentences2025“Whether an issue is ‘identical’ to a previously adjudicated issue for purposes of collateral estoppel depends on the burden and standard of proof applicable in each proceeding or action in relation to the party who obtained a favorable finding in the prior action and who then invokes collateral estoppel in the subsequent proceeding with regard to that finding.” (Bennett v. Rancho California Water Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 908, 919 .) Thus, “collateral estoppel does not apply where the two proceedings at issue have different burdens of proof [citations] or where the burden of proof falls on 2019In The Grubb Co., Inc. v. Department of Real Estate (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1503 , the appellate court stated: “[C]ollateral estoppel does not apply when the factual finding in the prior proceeding was arrived at based on a lower standard 11 of proof than the one required in the subsequent proceeding.” (See People v. Esmaili (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1463 [“collateral estoppel does not apply where the two proceedings at issue have different burdens of proof [citations] or where the burden of proof falls on a different party in each proceeding”].) In Holt v. Department of Food & Agricul | 2 | 3 |
| People v. Roldangreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Lancastergreen | 2 | 2 |
| Jacobs v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1222green | 2 | 2 |
| Swaffield v. Universal Ecsco Corp.green | 2 | 2 |
| Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| Harry Gill Co. v. Superior Courtgreen | 2 | 2 |
| H. Liebes & Co. v. Erica Shoes, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| McGee v. International Life Insurancegreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. Braesekegreen2 sentences2018"An 'abstract assertion' regarding the burden on defense counsel 'cannot be used as a substitute for a showing of genuine need.' " ( People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434 , 447, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 , 11 P.3d 968 ; see People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264 , 287, 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 [no abuse of discretion where denied application for cocounsel made no "factual assertions," instead relying generally on the " 'circumstances surrounding the case' "]; People v. Verdugo , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 278 , 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 803 , 236 P.3d 1035 [application for second counsel insufficient b 2018"An 'abstract assertion' regarding the burden on defense counsel 'cannot be used as a substitute for a showing of genuine need.' " ( People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434 , 447, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213 , 11 P.3d 968 ; see People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264 , 287, 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 [no abuse of discretion where denied application for cocounsel made no "factual assertions," instead relying generally on the " 'circumstances surrounding the case' "]; People v. Verdugo , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 278 , 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 803 , 236 P.3d 1035 [application for second counsel insufficient b | 1 | 4 |
People v. Skinnergreen2 sentences2016(Chavez, at p. 891; see also People v. Mercer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 463 , 466–467 [the “credibility of the experts and their conclusions” are matters for determination by the jury].) Ultimately, “[b]ecause the burden was on the defense to show by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant was insane, before we can overturn the [jury’s] finding to the contrary, we must find as a matter of law that the [jury] could not reasonably reject the evidence of insanity.” (People v. Skinner (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1050, 1059 ; see also People v. Drew (1978) 22 statutory use of “and,” the intent in enac 2014Although this was strong evidence, “the question on appeal is not so much the substantiality of the evidence favoring the jury’s finding as whether the evidence contrary to that finding is of such weight and character that the jury could not reasonably reject it.” (People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 351 .) “Because the burden was on the defense to show by a preponderance of the evidence that [Keller] was insane, before we can overturn the trier of fact’s finding to the contrary, we must find as a matter of law that the [jury] could not reasonably reject the evidence of insanity.” (People v. | 1 | 4 |
People v. Drewgreen2 sentences2014Although this was strong evidence, “the question on appeal is not so much the substantiality of the evidence favoring the jury’s finding as whether the evidence contrary to that finding is of such weight and character that the jury could not reasonably reject it.” (People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 351 .) “Because the burden was on the defense to show by a preponderance of the evidence that [Keller] was insane, before we can overturn the trier of fact’s finding to the contrary, we must find as a matter of law that the [jury] could not reasonably reject the evidence of insanity.” (People v. 2013Although this was strong evidence, “the question on appeal is not so much the substantiality of the evidence favoring the jury’s finding as whether the evidence contrary to that finding is of such weight and character that the jury could not reasonably reject it.” (People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 351 .) “Because the burden was on the defense to show by a preponderance of the evidence that [Keller] was insane, before we can overturn the trier of fact’s finding to the contrary, we must find as a matter of law that the [jury] could not reasonably reject the evidence of insanity.” (People v. | 1 | 4 |
Grubb Co. v. Department of Real Estategreen2 sentences2025“Whether an issue is ‘identical’ to a previously adjudicated issue for purposes of collateral estoppel depends on the burden and standard of proof applicable in each proceeding or action in relation to the party who obtained a favorable finding in the prior action and who then invokes collateral estoppel in the subsequent proceeding with regard to that finding.” (Bennett v. Rancho California Water Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 908, 919 .) Thus, “collateral estoppel does not apply where the two proceedings at issue have different burdens of proof [citations] or where the burden of proof falls on 2019In The Grubb Co., Inc. v. Department of Real Estate (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1503 , the appellate court stated: “[C]ollateral estoppel does not apply when the factual finding in the prior proceeding was arrived at based on a lower standard 11 of proof than the one required in the subsequent proceeding.” (See People v. Esmaili (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1463 [“collateral estoppel does not apply where the two proceedings at issue have different burdens of proof [citations] or where the burden of proof falls on a different party in each proceeding”].) In Holt v. Department of Food & Agricul | 1 | 3 |
People v. Gentilered2 sentences2022(See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959-960; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843 .) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing under section 1170.95, the trial court is required to issue an order to show cause and to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the conviction, recall the sentence, and resentence the petitioner. (§ 1170.95, subds. (c), (d).) The burden at that hearing rests with the prosecution “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder . . . under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective 2022(See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959-960; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843 .) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing under section 1170.95, the trial court is required to issue an order to show cause and to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the conviction, recall the sentence, and resentence the petitioner. (§ 1170.95, subds. (c), (d).) The burden at that hearing rests with the prosecution “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder . . . under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective | 1 | 2 |
People v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2022(Id., subds. (c), (d)(1).) The People have the burden at the hearing held pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) to establish that the petitioner is not entitled to resentencing by proving that the petitioner is guilty of murder under a currently valid theory. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see Lewis, supra, 11 10 Cal.5th at p. 960 .) The parties may present additional evidence, beyond the record of conviction, for the trial court to consider in making its ruling. 2022(See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959-960; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843 .) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing under section 1170.95, the trial court is required to issue an order to show cause and to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the conviction, recall the sentence, and resentence the petitioner. (§ 1170.95, subds. (c), (d).) The burden at that hearing rests with the prosecution “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder . . . under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Medinagreen | 1 | 2 |
| Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia Ex Rel. State Corporation Comm'ngreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Romerogreen | 1 | 1 |
| America Online, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Stronggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Global Packaging, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Verdugo v. Alliantgroup, L.P.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hong Liu v. Mooregreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Romero and Selfgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Dworakgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blum v. Stensongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Quiles v. Parentgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Giordanogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hoffard
green
2 sentences2025(People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1174 .) Section 1192.5 imposes on trial courts the burden of inquiry into a factual basis for a guilty plea for negotiated pleas specifying the punishment to be imposed. (§ 1192.5; see Hoffard, at p. 1174.) 10 The People concede these deficiencies in the plea agreement go to the validity of the plea but are not cognizable on appeal without a certificate of probable cause. 2016"Section 1192.5 … imposes on trial courts the burden of inquiry into a factual basis for a guilty plea only for negotiated pleas specifying the punishment to be imposed." (People v. Hoffard (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1170, 1174 , italics omitted.) The court has no such duty to inquire into the factual basis of the plea not conditioned upon receipt of a particular sentence. | 2 | 2016–2025 |
Cool v. United States
green
2 sentences2025(Id. at p. 101.) The trial court instructed the jury on accomplice testimony, in relevant part, as follows: “ ‘If the [accomplice] testimony carries conviction and you are convinced it is true beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury should give it the same effect as you would to a witness not in any respect implicated in the alleged crime and you are not only justified, but it is your duty, not to throw this testimony out because it comes from a tainted source.’ ” (Id. at p. 102.) The United States Supreme Court explained that the instruction clearly implied that the jury should disregard the acco 2013(Cool, supra, 409 U.S. at p. 103 .) Second, it was “fundamentally unfair in that it told the jury that it could convict solely on the basis of accomplice testimony without telling it that it could acquit on this basis.” (Ibid., fn. 4.) Defendant asserts that CALCRIM 371 is similarly unfair, because it told the jury that certain post-crime conduct could be used to convict, but did not tell the jury that post-crime conduct could also be used to acquit. | 2 | 2013–2025 |
Waller v. Truck Insurance Exchange, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 31 .) Here, the trial court found plaintiffs had the burden of showing the waivers were invalid because they had “made the illegality of the waivers an element of their claims.” It clarified, plaintiffs’ “theory of liability is ‘the County illegally takes defendants’ DNA because the waiver is illegal.’” On appeal, the parties dispute which side has the burden on the waiver issue. 2023Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 31 .) Here, the trial court found plaintiffs had the burden of showing the waivers were invalid because they had “made the illegality of the waivers an element of their claims.” It clarified, plaintiffs’ “theory of liability is ‘the County illegally takes defendants’ DNA because the waiver is illegal.’” On appeal, the parties dispute which side has the burden on the waiver issue. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Clark
green
2 sentences2023“And the Court finds the Galvan Opinion and the reasoning of that Opinion more persuasive, explaining that if the issue about whether there’s sufficient evidence to support the special circumstance findings, the way it must be addressed now, in light of the change of the law after Banks[, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 ] and Clark[, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522 ], is that the burden is on the defense in a habeas corpus proceeding to establish that there is not sufficient evidence to support that special circumstance finding in light of the new case law. 2022“And the Court finds the Galvan Opinion and the reasoning of that Opinion more persuasive, explaining that if the issue about whether there’s sufficient evidence to support the special circumstance findings, the way it must be addressed now, in light of the change of the law after Banks[, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 ] and Clark[, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522 ], is that the burden is on the defense in a habeas corpus proceeding to establish that there is not sufficient evidence to support that special circumstance finding in light of the new case law. | 2 | 2022–2023 |
People v. Banks
green
2 sentences2023“And the Court finds the Galvan Opinion and the reasoning of that Opinion more persuasive, explaining that if the issue about whether there’s sufficient evidence to support the special circumstance findings, the way it must be addressed now, in light of the change of the law after Banks[, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 ] and Clark[, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522 ], is that the burden is on the defense in a habeas corpus proceeding to establish that there is not sufficient evidence to support that special circumstance finding in light of the new case law. 2022“And the Court finds the Galvan Opinion and the reasoning of that Opinion more persuasive, explaining that if the issue about whether there’s sufficient evidence to support the special circumstance findings, the way it must be addressed now, in light of the change of the law after Banks[, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 ] and Clark[, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522 ], is that the burden is on the defense in a habeas corpus proceeding to establish that there is not sufficient evidence to support that special circumstance finding in light of the new case law. | 2 | 2022–2023 |
People v. Hajek and Vo
green
2 sentences2022Code, § 987, subd. (d) [authorizing appointment of a second attorney in a capital case “upon a written request of the first attorney appointed”], undesignated statutory references are to this code.) A capital defendant has the burden to make “ ‘a specific factual showing of “genuine need” for the appointment of second counsel.’ ” (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1180 , abrogated on another point as stated in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192 .) “ ‘An “abstract assertion” regarding the burden on defense counsel “cannot be used as a substitute for a showing of genuine need.” 2015Viewing the instructions as a whole, as we must (People v. Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1220 ), we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood the jury would have assigned to the defense the burden of proving Zamora had no legal right to self-defense. 30 Zamora acknowledges that CALCRIM No. 3471 is silent on the issue of which party carried the burden of proof. | 2 | 2015–2022 |
People v. Watson
green
2 sentences2021Code, § 872.) ‘Sufficient cause’ or ‘probable cause’ means a state of facts that would lead a person of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. [Citation.] The burden that this standard places on the prosecution at the preliminary hearing is ‘quite distinct from that necessary to obtain a conviction before a judge or jury.’ [Citation.] To satisfy the standard of sufficient or probable cause, the evidence ‘need not be sufficient to support a conviction.’ ” (Cummiskey v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1018, 1041 , ita 2021Code, § 872.) ‘Sufficient cause’ or ‘probable cause’ means a state of facts that would lead a person of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. [Citation.] The burden that this standard places on the prosecution at the preliminary hearing is ‘quite distinct from that necessary to obtain a conviction before a judge or jury.’ [Citation.] To satisfy the standard of sufficient or probable cause, the evidence ‘need not be sufficient to support a conviction.’ ” (Cummiskey v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1018, 1041 , ita | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Holt v. Department of Food & Agriculture
green
2 sentences2019In The Grubb Co., Inc. v. Department of Real Estate (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1503 , the appellate court stated: “[C]ollateral estoppel does not apply when the factual finding in the prior proceeding was arrived at based on a lower standard 11 of proof than the one required in the subsequent proceeding.” (See People v. Esmaili (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1463 [“collateral estoppel does not apply where the two proceedings at issue have different burdens of proof [citations] or where the burden of proof falls on a different party in each proceeding”].) In Holt v. Department of Food & Agricul 2019In The Grubb Co., Inc. v. Department of Real Estate (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1503 , the appellate court stated: “[C]ollateral estoppel does not apply when the factual finding in the prior proceeding was arrived at based on a lower standard 11 of proof than the one required in the subsequent proceeding.” (See People v. Esmaili (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1463 [“collateral estoppel does not apply where the two proceedings at issue have different burdens of proof [citations] or where the burden of proof falls on a different party in each proceeding”].) In Holt v. Department of Food & Agricul | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Hong Sang Mkt., Inc. v. Peng
green
2 sentences2019(Hong Sang Market, Inc. v. Peng (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 474, 489 .) Whether an issue is “identical” to a previously adjudicated issue for purposes of collateral estoppel depends on the burden and standard of proof applicable in each proceeding or action in relation to the party who obtained a favorable finding in the prior action and who then invokes collateral estoppel in the subsequent proceeding with regard to that finding. 2019(Hong Sang Market, Inc. v. Peng (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 474, 489 .) Whether an issue is “identical” to a previously adjudicated issue for purposes of collateral estoppel depends on the burden and standard of proof applicable in each proceeding or action in relation to the party who obtained a favorable finding in the prior action and who then invokes collateral estoppel in the subsequent proceeding with regard to that finding. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Vournazos
green
2 sentences2016“The Vournazos court professed to acknowledge the rule, adopted in an earlier case, that the defendant ‘bears the burden of proving that the amount of restitution claimed by the victim exceeds repair or replacement cost of lost or damaged property.’ ( 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 959 , citing People v. Hartley (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 126, 130 [ 209 Cal.Rptr. 131 ].) In fact the Hartley decision stated an even broader rule: ‘ “Since a defendant will learn of the amount of restitution recommended when he reviews the probation report prior to sentencing, the defendant bears the burden at the hearing of pro 2013(Id. at p. 952, fn. 2.) The court held that this document failed to show that the claimed values represented replacement costs, or that the claimed repair costs reflected ‘the actual cost of the repair.’ (Id. at p. 958.) “The Vournazos court professed to acknowledge the rule, adopted in an earlier case, that the defendant ‘bears the burden of proving that the amount of restitution claimed by the victim exceeds repair or replacement cost of lost or damaged property.’ ( 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 959 , citing People v. Hartley (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 126, 130 .) In fact the Hartley decision stated an ev | 2 | 2013–2016 |
People v. Baumann
green
2 sentences2015Due process is considered satisfied in the criminal law as long as a separate hearing is held to determine the value of the victim’s loss. [Citation.] As noted, however, there is no requirement that the order be limited to the exact amount of loss in which the individual is actually found culpable.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Baumann, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d, 67, 80 .) The “As noted” is an obvious incorporation of the preceding paragraph: “The requirements of due process are satisfied by providing the defendant a hearing on ability to pay as well as the extent of the loss occasioned by the *683 def 1989Due process is considered satisfied in the criminal law as long as a separate hearing is held to determine the value of the victim’s loss. [Citation.]” (176 Cal.App.3d at pp. 79-80.) In Baumann , we expressly rejected the defendant’s argument she was entitled to a jury trial on the amount of restitution as being “without merit.” ( 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 80 .) We further held the trial court was entitled to consider the probation report when determining the amount of restitution. “ ‘Due process does not require a judge to draw sentencing information through the narrow net of courtroom evidence ru | 2 | 1989–2015 |
Hasson v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2013It also ignores language in its own opinion that the presumption of prejudice is an “„“aid to those parties who are able to establish serious misconduct of a type likely to have had an effect on the verdict or which deprived the complaining party of thorough consideration of his case .…”‟” (Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 652 , quoting from Hasson, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 416 , italics added.) No one could reasonably argue that such influences are innocuous or do not matter. 2013It also ignores language in its own opinion that the presumption of prejudice is an “„“aid to those parties who are able to establish serious misconduct of a type likely to have had an effect on the verdict or which deprived the complaining party of thorough consideration of his case .…”‟” (Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 652 , quoting from Hasson, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 416 , italics added.) No one could reasonably argue that such influences are innocuous or do not matter. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Marshall
green
2 sentences2013Presumption of Prejudice Carpenter renders the presumption of prejudice useless when the evidence of guilt is “„overwhelming.‟” (Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 655 .) A verdict should not stand if an objective view of the extraneous information leads to the conclusion that the extraneous information was substantially likely to have influenced the juror. ( Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 650-651.) Extraneous material can influence a juror in different ways: lowering the prosecutor‟s burden, shifting the burden to the defense, making the juror skeptical of defense evidence or theories, depr 2013Presumption of Prejudice Carpenter renders the presumption of prejudice useless when the evidence of guilt is “„overwhelming.‟” (Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 655 .) A verdict should not stand if an objective view of the extraneous information leads to the conclusion that the extraneous information was substantially likely to have influenced the juror. ( Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 650-651.) Extraneous material can influence a juror in different ways: lowering the prosecutor‟s burden, shifting the burden to the defense, making the juror skeptical of defense evidence or theories, depr | 2 | 2013–2013 |
In Re Carpenter
green
2 sentences2013Presumption of Prejudice Carpenter renders the presumption of prejudice useless when the evidence of guilt is “„overwhelming.‟” (Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 655 .) A verdict should not stand if an objective view of the extraneous information leads to the conclusion that the extraneous information was substantially likely to have influenced the juror. ( Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 650-651.) Extraneous material can influence a juror in different ways: lowering the prosecutor‟s burden, shifting the burden to the defense, making the juror skeptical of defense evidence or theories, depr 2013Presumption of Prejudice Carpenter renders the presumption of prejudice useless when the evidence of guilt is “„overwhelming.‟” (Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 655 .) A verdict should not stand if an objective view of the extraneous information leads to the conclusion that the extraneous information was substantially likely to have influenced the juror. ( Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 650-651.) Extraneous material can influence a juror in different ways: lowering the prosecutor‟s burden, shifting the burden to the defense, making the juror skeptical of defense evidence or theories, depr | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2011(People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 964 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 420 , 140 P.3d 736 ].) “ ‘Nothing in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 *154 [ 166 L.Ed.2d 856 , 127 S.Ct. 856 ], Apprendi v. New Jersey [(2000)] 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ], or Ring v. Arizona [(2002)] 536 U.S. 584 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 556 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 ], affects our conclusions in these regards.’ ” (People v. Curl (2009) 46 Cal.4th 339, 362 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 537 , 207 P.3d 2 ]; see also People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 506 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 , 247 P.3d 886 ].) The federal Constitution does no 2011(People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 964 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 420 , 140 P.3d 736 ].) “ ‘Nothing in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 *154 [ 166 L.Ed.2d 856 , 127 S.Ct. 856 ], Apprendi v. New Jersey [(2000)] 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ], or Ring v. Arizona [(2002)] 536 U.S. 584 [ 153 L.Ed.2d 556 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 ], affects our conclusions in these regards.’ ” (People v. Curl (2009) 46 Cal.4th 339, 362 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 537 , 207 P.3d 2 ]; see also People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 506 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 , 247 P.3d 886 ].) The federal Constitution does no | 2 | 2006–2011 |
| Ring v. Arizona green | 2 | 2006–2011 |
| People v. Hitch green | 2 | 1982–1986 |
| People v. Mitcham green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Clair green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Bennett v. Rancho Cal. Water Dist. green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Rusheen v. Cohen green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Ketchum v. Moses green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Lucas green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Gilbert v. Sykes green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Price red | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Gates v. Deukmejian green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Davis green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Alpha & Omega Development, LP v. Whillock Contracting, Inc. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Baral v. Schnitt green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Darden v. Wainwright green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Woodruff green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Cash green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Keenan v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Rangel green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Gonzales and Soliz green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Ashlee R. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| AO Alpha-Bank v. Yakovlev green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Gardner v. Commission on Professional Competence green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Bradford green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Cummiskey v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.