sounder rule in Kansas

1950Although the early decisions of this and some other courts were that it was sufficient merely to plead earlier ignorance of the fraud than the date alleged the majority of the courts are now committed to *103 the sounder doctrine that in order to maintain such an action facts must be pleaded to show the fraud, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered earlier than two years before the action was filed. ( Schulte v. Westborough, Inc., 163 Kan. 111 , 180 P.2d 278 , 172 A.L.R. 259 .) See exhaustive annotation following the Schulte case in 172 A.L.R. 265 .

1950Although the early decisions of this and some other courts were that it was sufficient merely to plead earlier ignorance of the fraud than the date alleged the majority of the courts are now committed to *103 the sounder doctrine that in order to maintain such an action facts must be pleaded to show the fraud, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered earlier than two years before the action was filed. ( Schulte v. Westborough, Inc., 163 Kan. 111 , 180 P.2d 278 , 172 A.L.R. 259 .) See exhaustive annotation following the Schulte case in 172 A.L.R. 265 .

1991In Blake , the court stated: “We are persuaded that a case by case evaluation of the fair-trial effect of amnesia, adopted explicitly by the majority in Wilson and implicity by this court in [State t>.] Severns [ 184 Kan. 213 , 336 P.2d 447 (1959)], is the sounder rule; we again reject the per se approach.” 209 Kan. at 200 .

1991In Blake , the court stated: “We are persuaded that a case by case evaluation of the fair-trial effect of amnesia, adopted explicitly by the majority in Wilson and implicity by this court in [State t>.] Severns [ 184 Kan. 213 , 336 P.2d 447 (1959)], is the sounder rule; we again reject the per se approach.” 209 Kan. at 200 .

1991In Blake , the court stated: “We are persuaded that a case by case evaluation of the fair-trial effect of amnesia, adopted explicitly by the majority in Wilson and implicity by this court in [State t>.] Severns [ 184 Kan. 213 , 336 P.2d 447 (1959)], is the sounder rule; we again reject the per se approach.” 209 Kan. at 200 .

1972He found the effect of the amnesia to be “very much as though he were tried in absentia notwithstanding his physical presence at the time of trial.” ( 391 F. 2d, at 466 .) We are persuaded that a case by case evaluation of the fair-trial effect of amnesia, adopted explicitly by the majority in Wilson and implicitly by this court in Sevens, is the sounder rule; we again reject the per se approach.

1926Cas. 256, the annotator says:' “The decided weight of American authority, and apparently the sounder rule, is that a transferee from the party accommodated, taking accommodation paper after maturity, though he gives a valuable consideration therefor, takes only his transferor’s title, and has no higher right against the accommodation party than he would have in the case of the purchase of ordinary commercial paper under similar circumstances.” (See, also, Altoona Bank v. Dunn, 151 Pa. St. 228; Bowman v. Van Kuren, 29 Wis. 209 ; Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn. 388 ; Rylee v. Wilkerson, 134 Miss. 66

1926Cas. 256, the annotator says:' “The decided weight of American authority, and apparently the sounder rule, is that a transferee from the party accommodated, taking accommodation paper after maturity, though he gives a valuable consideration therefor, takes only his transferor’s title, and has no higher right against the accommodation party than he would have in the case of the purchase of ordinary commercial paper under similar circumstances.” (See, also, Altoona Bank v. Dunn, 151 Pa. St. 228; Bowman v. Van Kuren, 29 Wis. 209 ; Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn. 388 ; Rylee v. Wilkerson, 134 Miss. 66

1926Cas. 256, the annotator says:' “The decided weight of American authority, and apparently the sounder rule, is that a transferee from the party accommodated, taking accommodation paper after maturity, though he gives a valuable consideration therefor, takes only his transferor’s title, and has no higher right against the accommodation party than he would have in the case of the purchase of ordinary commercial paper under similar circumstances.” (See, also, Altoona Bank v. Dunn, 151 Pa. St. 228; Bowman v. Van Kuren, 29 Wis. 209 ; Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn. 388 ; Rylee v. Wilkerson, 134 Miss. 66

1926Cas. 256, the annotator says:' “The decided weight of American authority, and apparently the sounder rule, is that a transferee from the party accommodated, taking accommodation paper after maturity, though he gives a valuable consideration therefor, takes only his transferor’s title, and has no higher right against the accommodation party than he would have in the case of the purchase of ordinary commercial paper under similar circumstances.” (See, also, Altoona Bank v. Dunn, 151 Pa. St. 228; Bowman v. Van Kuren, 29 Wis. 209 ; Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn. 388 ; Rylee v. Wilkerson, 134 Miss. 66

1926Encyc. of L., 2d ed., 393.]” (Naef et al. v. Potter, 226 Ill. 628 .) The note here in controversy was not only accommodation paper and negotiated after maturity, but it was negotiated in violation of the agreement made when it was given.