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9 Mississippi opinions name it 1 courts 1961–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Leflore v. Stategreen2 sentences2014However, we believe the sounder rule requires that there be some proof that the animal has exhibited some dangerous propensity or disposition prior to the attack complained of, and, moreover, it must be shown that the owner knew or reasonably should have known of this propensity or disposition and reasonably should have foreseen that the animal was likely to attack someone. 33 Id. at 494 . 1994In Poy v. Grayson, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that "the sounder rule requires that there be some proof that the animal has exhibited some dangerous propensity or disposition prior to the attack complained of, and, moreover, it must be shown that the owner knew or reasonably should have known of this propensity or disposition and reasonably should have foreseen that the animal was likely to attack someone." Poy v. Grayson, 273 So. 2d 491, 494 (Miss. 1973). | 1 | 3 |
Stewart v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Id. at 259 . 2014Id. at 259. | 1 | 1 |
Sullens v. Stategreen2 sentences1961Sullens v. State, 191 Miss. 856, 867, 873 , 4 So. 2d 356 (1941), mentions in an obiter dictum that constructive contempt is not restricted to a pending case, to so confine it would be to prohibit its application where the evidence shows that the machinery of the court is hampered in the future after the case has been decided. 1961Sullens v. State, 191 Miss. 856, 867, 873 , 4 So. 2d 356 (1941), mentions in an obiter dictum that constructive contempt is not restricted to a pending case, to so confine it would be to prohibit its application where the evidence shows that the machinery of the court is hampered in the future after the case has been decided. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mississippi Public Service Commission v. Chambers
green
2 sentences1987We further hold that this case is distinguishable from Mississippi Public Service Commission v. Chambers, 235 Miss. 133 , 108 So.2d 550 (1959). 1987We further hold that this case is distinguishable from Mississippi Public Service Commission v. Chambers, 235 Miss. 133 , 108 So.2d 550 (1959). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Trunzler v. Trunzler
green
1 sentence1984In Trunzler v. Trunzler, 431 So.2d 1115 (Miss.1983), a case involving the status of a mother in regard to child support payments, we stated: We are persuaded the sounder principle of law is followed by those jurisdictions which hold the divorced wife may be required to account for child support payments, but the cause must arise by or on behalf of the children, to whom the monies belong, rather than the divorced husband. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Glenn v. Glenn
neutral
1 sentence1983Tyndall v. Tyndall, 270 N.C. 106 , 153 S.E.2d 819 (1967); Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N.C. 374 , 126 S.E.2d 113 (1962); Glenn v. Glenn, 281 S.E.2d 83 (N.C. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Tyndall v. Tyndall
neutral
2 sentences1983Tyndall v. Tyndall, 270 N.C. 106 , 153 S.E.2d 819 (1967); Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N.C. 374 , 126 S.E.2d 113 (1962); Glenn v. Glenn, 281 S.E.2d 83 (N.C. 1983Tyndall v. Tyndall, 270 N.C. 106 , 153 S.E.2d 819 (1967); Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N.C. 374 , 126 S.E.2d 113 (1962); Glenn v. Glenn, 281 S.E.2d 83 (N.C. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Goodyear v. Goodyear
green
2 sentences1983Tyndall v. Tyndall, 270 N.C. 106 , 153 S.E.2d 819 (1967); Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N.C. 374 , 126 S.E.2d 113 (1962); Glenn v. Glenn, 281 S.E.2d 83 (N.C. 1983Tyndall v. Tyndall, 270 N.C. 106 , 153 S.E.2d 819 (1967); Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N.C. 374 , 126 S.E.2d 113 (1962); Glenn v. Glenn, 281 S.E.2d 83 (N.C. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Proctor v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp.
neutral
1 sentence1971In Proctor v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Coporation, 254 Miss. 907 , 183 So.2d 483 (1966), we said, among other things: This is a new question in Mississippi; but, regardless of the majority of opinions, if such be true, we are of opinion the sounder rule is to prevent re-litigation * * *. ****** * * * If the employee does not die as a result of an injury arising out of and in the course of employment, they (dependents) do not recover. ( 183 So.2d at 485 ) Second: Assuming that the dependents of a deceased workman have an independent action for workmen’s compensation benefits on facts not previously | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Bass v. State
green
2 sentences1971In Proctor v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Coporation, 254 Miss. 907 , 183 So.2d 483 (1966), we said, among other things: This is a new question in Mississippi; but, regardless of the majority of opinions, if such be true, we are of opinion the sounder rule is to prevent re-litigation * * *. ****** * * * If the employee does not die as a result of an injury arising out of and in the course of employment, they (dependents) do not recover. ( 183 So.2d at 485 ) Second: Assuming that the dependents of a deceased workman have an independent action for workmen’s compensation benefits on facts not previously 1971In Proctor v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Coporation, 254 Miss. 907 , 183 So.2d 483 (1966), we said, among other things: This is a new question in Mississippi; but, regardless of the majority of opinions, if such be true, we are of opinion the sounder rule is to prevent re-litigation * * *. ****** * * * If the employee does not die as a result of an injury arising out of and in the course of employment, they (dependents) do not recover. ( 183 So.2d at 485 ) Second: Assuming that the dependents of a deceased workman have an independent action for workmen’s compensation benefits on facts not previously | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.