sounder rule in Tennessee

1956An unusually well reasoned case so holding is State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418 , 211 P. 676 , 30 A.L.R. 1443 .

1956An unusually well reasoned case so holding is State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nev. 418 , 211 P. 676 , 30 A.L.R. 1443 .

1951A case [Dowding v. Dowding, 152 Neb. 61 , 40 N. W. (2d) 245 ] which has come to light since the delivery of the opinion by the Court of Appeals, and which considers many of the authorities on both sides of the question, is so nearly identical with the facts presented by the present record, and so clearly 'presents our view, that we copy from that opinion at some length: “Action by Roy P. Dowding and Harold A. Dowding against William T.

1951A case [Dowding v. Dowding, 152 Neb. 61 , 40 N. W. (2d) 245 ] which has come to light since the delivery of the opinion by the Court of Appeals, and which considers many of the authorities on both sides of the question, is so nearly identical with the facts presented by the present record, and so clearly 'presents our view, that we copy from that opinion at some length: “Action by Roy P. Dowding and Harold A. Dowding against William T.

1917On this point it was said in Chappel v. Theus, 3 Tenn. Cas., 460 : “In this state the executor would have two years within which to settle the estate, and it would seem the sounder rule that interest should accrue according to the exigencies of the estate in regard to its debts and the situation of.its assets.” In this State the rule has not been conformed to as applicable in every situation.

1897It is true the limitation contended for by counsel for plaintiff in. error obtains in some of the States, but we think the sounder rule discards the qualification in respect of bad faith. ‘' The rule is bottomed on the ground that the justification is placed on the record and will remain there as .a continual reiteration of the charge against the plain tiff, and that therefore a trifling verdict vvonld not show that such a charge was unfounded.” 2 Sedg. on Dam., Sec. 640; Kniffin v. McConnell, 30 N. Y., 285 ; Harris v. Doyle, 27 Mo., 600 ; Thorn v. Knapp, 42 N. Y., 474 .

1897It is true the limitation contended for by counsel for plaintiff in. error obtains in some of the States, but we think the sounder rule discards the qualification in respect of bad faith. ‘' The rule is bottomed on the ground that the justification is placed on the record and will remain there as .a continual reiteration of the charge against the plain tiff, and that therefore a trifling verdict vvonld not show that such a charge was unfounded.” 2 Sedg. on Dam., Sec. 640; Kniffin v. McConnell, 30 N. Y., 285 ; Harris v. Doyle, 27 Mo., 600 ; Thorn v. Knapp, 42 N. Y., 474 .

1897It is true the limitation contended for by counsel for plaintiff in. error obtains in some of the States, but we think the sounder rule discards the qualification in respect of bad faith. ‘' The rule is bottomed on the ground that the justification is placed on the record and will remain there as .a continual reiteration of the charge against the plain tiff, and that therefore a trifling verdict vvonld not show that such a charge was unfounded.” 2 Sedg. on Dam., Sec. 640; Kniffin v. McConnell, 30 N. Y., 285 ; Harris v. Doyle, 27 Mo., 600 ; Thorn v. Knapp, 42 N. Y., 474 .

1884In Attorney-General v. Continental Life Insurance Company, 71 N. Y., 325 , Church, C.

1879Unchaste character has been considered admissible in one State (Evans v. Smith, 5 Mon., 363 ), and inadmissible in another, (Spears v. Forrest, 15 Verm., 435 .) The sounder rule is to confine the impeaching. examination in chief to the general interrogatories,, leaving the other party to inquire into the witness’ means of knowledge and grounds of opinion, if he-sees proper.

1877The sounder rule was expressed by the court in Suggs v. Suggs, 1 Tenn. 3 , the earliest case in our books on the subject, in the following language: “After the appeal is entered in the court below, the authority of that court over that cause ceases.” And even this language should be modified by adding, unless the appeal be set aside during the term at which it is granted.