5 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blomeyer v. State Ex Rel. Morrisongreen1 sentence2002See Blomeyer, 22 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re the Marriage of Talkington
green
1 sentence2025Relying on the statutory interpretation principle that a more specific statute controls over a general one unless it appears the Legislature intended otherwise, we found that in child custody hearings the provisions of K.S.A. 60-1615 governing admissibility of reports supplanted the evidentiary rules in the hearsay statute, K.S.A. 60-460. 13 Kan. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Arnett
green
1 sentence2021In State v. Arnett, 314 Kan. 183 , 496 P.3d 928 (2021), our Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of portions of the criminal restitution statutes in Kansas. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In re the Marriage of Traster
green
2 sentences2014Instead, it simply decided that a postnuptial agreement entered under such circumstances would not qualify as a separation agreement under K.S.A. 60-1610(b)(3) “because the statute governing separation agreements is part of the Kansas statutory scheme controlling dissolution of marriage.” 48 Kan. 2014Instead, it simply decided that a postnuptial agreement entered under such circumstances would not qualify as a separation agreement under K.S.A. 60-1610(b)(3) "because the statute governing separation agreements is part of the Kansas statutory scheme controlling dissolution of marriage." 48 Kan. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Bandy
green
1 sentence1999App. 2d 696 , 971 P.2d 749 (1999), although relating to the offense of driving with a suspended license, requires a “prior conviction” to be construed as one which occurred prior to sentencing in the current case regardless of the time that the offense that led to the conviction occurred. *407 We commence our analysis with the basic statutory interpretation rule that " ‘[i]n construing statutes, the legislative intention is to be determined from a general consideration of the entire act. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.