statutory interpretation principle in California

2015(Los Alamitos, supra, at pp. 1224, 1229 .) We agree with the statutory interpretation that the exception to competitive bidding in section 17406(a)(1) is not limited to site leases.

2015(Los Alamitos, supra, at pp. 1224, 1229 .) We agree with the statutory interpretation that the exception to competitive bidding in section 17406(a)(1) is not limited to site leases.

2022Standard of Review and Rules of Statutory Interpretation Our analysis of the September 2020 Order in which the court concluded the PSP was automatically exempt from levy depends on our interpretation of relevant sections in the Code of Civil Procedure, addressing the enforcement of money judgments, as well as portions of ERISA itself. “‘We review de novo the issues of the application of a statutory exemption to undisputed facts [citation], and interpretation of the statutes.’” (Kilker v. Stillman (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 320, 329 (Kilker).) “‘[O]ur fundamental task in construing a statute is to

2020(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“the appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an *See footnote, ante, page 1. 7. important legal issue”].) Accordingly, we have allowed Gabriel to respond to the claim in a supplemental brief.

2015To conclude otherwise would violate the statutory interpretation principle that every word in a statute must be given operative effect.” (Sevidal v. Target Corp. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 905, 924 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 66 ].) Plaintiffs also cite this broad language from Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 328 : “Simply stated: labels matter.

2015To conclude otherwise would violate the statutory interpretation principle that every word in a statute must be given operative effect.” (Sevidal v. Target Corp. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 905, 924 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 66 ].) Plaintiffs also cite this broad language from Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 328 : “Simply stated: labels matter.

2014(People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 509 ; see also In re Smith (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1251, 1269 [“Our common practice is to ‘construe[ ] statutes, when reasonable, to avoid difficult constitutional questions.’ [Citation.]”]; People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 259 [“if reasonably possible the courts must construe a statute to avoid doubts as to its constitutionality”].) F. Petitioners’ Additional Arguments Regarding Section 832.7(a) Petitioners contend that interpreting Section 832.7(a) to permit the prosecutor to access officer personnel files would render superfluous the

2014The court found that the recent amendments which eliminated the right of rescission for mislabeling of government fees implicitly reinforced the mandatory nature of the statute’s other requirements:' *615 “Under the long-standing statutory interpretation principle ‘expressio unius exlcusius alterius esf (to express one thing is to exclude others), the Legislature’s declaration that a sales contract remains enforceable if its only erroneous nondisclosure involves certain governmental fees [citation], means that rescission remains available for the contract’s noncompliance with other disclosure

2014The court found that the recent amendments which eliminated the right of rescission for mislabeling of government fees implicitly reinforced the mandatory nature of the statute’s other requirements:' *615 “Under the long-standing statutory interpretation principle ‘expressio unius exlcusius alterius esf (to express one thing is to exclude others), the Legislature’s declaration that a sales contract remains enforceable if its only erroneous nondisclosure involves certain governmental fees [citation], means that rescission remains available for the contract’s noncompliance with other disclosure

2014(People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 509 ; see also In re Smith (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1251, 1269 [“Our common practice is to ‘construe[ ] statutes, when reasonable, to avoid difficult constitutional questions.’ [Citation.]”]; People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 259 [“if reasonably possible the courts must construe a statute to avoid doubts as to its constitutionality”].) F. Petitioners’ Additional Arguments Regarding Section 832.7(a) Petitioners contend that interpreting Section 832.7(a) to permit the prosecutor to access officer personnel files would render superfluous the

2010A Court of Appeal recently interpreted Tobacco II in this precise manner. ( Pfizer, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 622 .) In that case, the plaintiff alleged Pfizer advertised and promoted its mouthwash product, Listerine, in a misleading manner by indicating that Listerine can replace dental floss in reducing plaque and gingivitis. ( Id. at p. 625.) The plaintiff brought a class action and asserted numerous claims, including violations of the UCL and FAL. ( 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 625 .) The trial court certified a class of "`all persons who purchased Listerine, in California, from June 2004 through Ja

2010A Court of Appeal recently interpreted Tobacco II in this precise manner. ( Pfizer, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 622 .) In that case, the plaintiff alleged Pfizer advertised and promoted its mouthwash product, Listerine, in a misleading manner by indicating that Listerine can replace dental floss in reducing plaque and gingivitis. ( Id. at p. 625.) The plaintiff brought a class action and asserted numerous claims, including violations of the UCL and FAL. ( 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 625 .) The trial court certified a class of "`all persons who purchased Listerine, in California, from June 2004 through Ja

2006(See In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 273 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 , 95 P.3d 906 ]; In re Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900, 907 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 48 , 87 P.3d 797 ].) However, this statutory interpretation rule is merely an aid to inferring legislative intent from ambiguous language absent evidence of a contrary intent.

2006(See In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 273 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 , 95 P.3d 906 ]; In re Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900, 907 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 48 , 87 P.3d 797 ].) However, this statutory interpretation rule is merely an aid to inferring legislative intent from ambiguous language absent evidence of a contrary intent.

2006(See In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 273 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 , 95 P.3d 906 ]; In re Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900, 907 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 48 , 87 P.3d 797 ].) However, this statutory interpretation rule is merely an aid to inferring legislative intent from ambiguous language absent evidence of a contrary intent.

2006(See In re Jennings (2004) 34 Cal.4th 254, 273 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 645 , 95 P.3d 906 ]; In re Young (2004) 32 Cal.4th 900, 907 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 48 , 87 P.3d 797 ].) However, this statutory interpretation rule is merely an aid to inferring legislative intent from ambiguous language absent evidence of a contrary intent.

2006“The statutory construction doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius means 1 “the expression of certain things in a statute necessarily involves exclusion of other things not expressed.” ’ ” (United Farm Workers of America v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 303, 316 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 ].) “ ‘[W]here exceptions to a general rule are specified by statute, other exceptions are not to be implied or presumed.’ ” (Mutual Life Ins.

2006“The statutory construction doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius means 1 “the expression of certain things in a statute necessarily involves exclusion of other things not expressed.” ’ ” (United Farm Workers of America v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 303, 316 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 ].) “ ‘[W]here exceptions to a general rule are specified by statute, other exceptions are not to be implied or presumed.’ ” (Mutual Life Ins.