7 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 2008–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pete v. Stategreen2 sentences2023In doing so, we read the plain meaning of the language of the statute ‘as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’” Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14 , 25–26 (2013)). “[A]ll statutory interpretation begins, and usually ends, with the statutory text itself for the legislative intent of a statute primarily reveals itself through the statute’s very words.” Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 57 (2004) (quoting Price v. State, 378 Md. 378 , 387–88 (2003)). 2023In doing so, we read the plain meaning of the language of the statute ‘as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’” Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14 , 25–26 (2013)). “[A]ll statutory interpretation begins, and usually ends, with the statutory text itself for the legislative intent of a statute primarily reveals itself through the statute’s very words.” Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 57 (2004) (quoting Price v. State, 378 Md. 378 , 387–88 (2003)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Beygreen2 sentences2018See State v. Bey , 452 Md. 255 , 265, 156 A.3d 873 (2017). 2018See State v. Bey , 452 Md. 255 , 265, 156 A.3d 873 (2017). | 2 | 2 |
Chow v. Stategreen1 sentence2021Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443 (2006) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sinclair & Sinwellan Corp.green2 sentences2008Tribbitt’s final argument rests on the ejusdem generis doctrine of statutory interpretation. “[W]here the general words in a statute ... follow the designation of particular things or classes of subjects, ... the general words in the statute will usually be construed to include only those things of the same class or general nature as those specifically antecedently mentioned.” State v. Sinclair, 274 Md. 646, 658 , 337 A.2d 703, 711 (1975). *657 The doctrine of ejusdem generis applies when the following conditions exist: (1) the statute contains an enumeration by-specific words; (2) the members 2008Tribbitt’s final argument rests on the ejusdem generis doctrine of statutory interpretation. “[W]here the general words in a statute ... follow the designation of particular things or classes of subjects, ... the general words in the statute will usually be construed to include only those things of the same class or general nature as those specifically antecedently mentioned.” State v. Sinclair, 274 Md. 646, 658 , 337 A.2d 703, 711 (1975). *657 The doctrine of ejusdem generis applies when the following conditions exist: (1) the statute contains an enumeration by-specific words; (2) the members | 1 | 1 |
In Re Wallace W.green2 sentences2008In re Wallace W., 333 Md. 186, 190 , 634 A.2d 53, 55-56 (1993). 2008In re Wallace W., 333 Md. 186, 190 , 634 A.2d 53, 55-56 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Price v. State
green
2 sentences2023In doing so, we read the plain meaning of the language of the statute ‘as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’” Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14 , 25–26 (2013)). “[A]ll statutory interpretation begins, and usually ends, with the statutory text itself for the legislative intent of a statute primarily reveals itself through the statute’s very words.” Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 57 (2004) (quoting Price v. State, 378 Md. 378 , 387–88 (2003)). 2023In doing so, we read the plain meaning of the language of the statute ‘as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’” Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14 , 25–26 (2013)). “[A]ll statutory interpretation begins, and usually ends, with the statutory text itself for the legislative intent of a statute primarily reveals itself through the statute’s very words.” Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 57 (2004) (quoting Price v. State, 378 Md. 378 , 387–88 (2003)). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Koste v. Town of Oxford
green
2 sentences2023In doing so, we read the plain meaning of the language of the statute ‘as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’” Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14 , 25–26 (2013)). “[A]ll statutory interpretation begins, and usually ends, with the statutory text itself for the legislative intent of a statute primarily reveals itself through the statute’s very words.” Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 57 (2004) (quoting Price v. State, 378 Md. 378 , 387–88 (2003)). 2023In doing so, we read the plain meaning of the language of the statute ‘as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’” Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14 , 25–26 (2013)). “[A]ll statutory interpretation begins, and usually ends, with the statutory text itself for the legislative intent of a statute primarily reveals itself through the statute’s very words.” Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 57 (2004) (quoting Price v. State, 378 Md. 378 , 387–88 (2003)). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Lockshin v. Semsker
green
2 sentences2023In doing so, we read the plain meaning of the language of the statute ‘as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’” Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14 , 25–26 (2013)). “[A]ll statutory interpretation begins, and usually ends, with the statutory text itself for the legislative intent of a statute primarily reveals itself through the statute’s very words.” Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 57 (2004) (quoting Price v. State, 378 Md. 378 , 387–88 (2003)). 2023In doing so, we read the plain meaning of the language of the statute ‘as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.’” Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14 , 25–26 (2013)). “[A]ll statutory interpretation begins, and usually ends, with the statutory text itself for the legislative intent of a statute primarily reveals itself through the statute’s very words.” Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 57 (2004) (quoting Price v. State, 378 Md. 378 , 387–88 (2003)). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Kranz v. State
green
2 sentences2018The meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears." To that end, "we may find useful the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant enactments." Kranz v. State , 459 Md. 456 , 474-75, 187 A.3d 66 , 76-77 (2018) (internal citations omitted). 2018The meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears." To that end, "we may find useful the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant enactments." Kranz v. State , 459 Md. 456 , 474-75, 187 A.3d 66 , 76-77 (2018) (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.