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12 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Floresgreen2 sentences2014Similarly, we read words in context - “the meaning of a word may be indicated or controlled by a reference to associated words.” Gonzales Flores, 164 Wn.2d at 12 (explaining the statutory interpretation principle of. noscitur a sociis). 2014Statutory Construction fl5 Two statutory construction principles favor interpreting former RCW 9A.56.360(l)(b) as applying only to devices made specifically for the purpose of overcoming security systems and not to ordinary devices the defendant uses to overcome security systems. ¶16 First, we recognize that “specific words modify and restrict the meaning of general words when they occur in a sequence.” State v. Gonzales Flores, 164 Wn.2d 1, 13 , 186 P.3d 1038 (2008) (describing the statutory interpretation principle of ejusdem generis). 4 Here, the legislature specifically listed lined bags a | 4 | 4 |
State v. Floresgreen2 sentences2014First, we recognize that " specific words modify and restrict the meaning of general words when they occur in a sequence." State v. Gonzales Flores, 164 Wn.2d 1, 13 , 186 P. 3d 1038 2008 ) ( describing the statutory interpretation principle of ejusdem generis). 4 Here, the legislature specifically listed lined bags and tag removers as examples of an " item, article, implement, or device designed to overcome security systems." Former RCW 9A.56. 360( 1)( b). 2014Statutory Construction fl5 Two statutory construction principles favor interpreting former RCW 9A.56.360(l)(b) as applying only to devices made specifically for the purpose of overcoming security systems and not to ordinary devices the defendant uses to overcome security systems. ¶16 First, we recognize that “specific words modify and restrict the meaning of general words when they occur in a sequence.” State v. Gonzales Flores, 164 Wn.2d 1, 13 , 186 P.3d 1038 (2008) (describing the statutory interpretation principle of ejusdem generis). 4 Here, the legislature specifically listed lined bags a | 2 | 4 |
State v. Gamblegreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., State v. Flores, 164 Wash.2d 1, 13 , 186 P.3d 1038 (2008) cited in State v. Gamble, 168 Wash.2d 161, 191 , 225 P.3d 973 (2010). 2011See, e.g., State v. Gonzales Flores, 164 Wn.2d 1, 13 , 186 P.3d 1038 (2008), cited in State v. Gamble, 168 Wn.2d 161, 191 , 225 P.3d 973 (2010). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gamblegreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., State v. Flores, 164 Wash.2d 1, 13 , 186 P.3d 1038 (2008) cited in State v. Gamble, 168 Wash.2d 161, 191 , 225 P.3d 973 (2010). 2011See, e.g., State v. Gonzales Flores, 164 Wn.2d 1, 13 , 186 P.3d 1038 (2008), cited in State v. Gamble, 168 Wn.2d 161, 191 , 225 P.3d 973 (2010). | 2 | 2 |
Gray v. Suttell & Associatesgreen2 sentences2019See Gray v. Suttell & Assocs., 181 Wn.2d 329, 339 , 334 P.3d 14 (2014). 2019See Gray v. Suttell & Assocs., 181 Wn.2d 329, 339 , 334 P.3d 14 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2019See Jones, 168 Wn. 2d at 721 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Michielligreen1 sentence1997Merger is a doctrine of statutory interpretation "used to determine whether the Legislature intended to impose multiple punishments for a single act which violates several statutory provisions.” State v. Michielli 132 Wn.2d 229, 238 , 937 P.2d 587, 592 (1997) (quoting State v. Vladovic, 99 Wn.2d 413 , 419 n.2, 662 P.2d 853 (1983)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Recuenco
green
2 sentences2010This conclusion is incorrect because it fails to recognize Cruze's rights to due process and to a jury trial, pursuant to our decisions in State v. Recuenco, 163 Wash.2d 428 , 180 P.3d 1276 (2008), and State v. Williams-Walker, 167 Wash.2d 889 , 225 P.3d 913 (2010). ¶ 24 Key to this case is former RCW 9.94A.030(23)(t) (1996), recodified as RCW 9.94A.030(29)(t), which defines a "`[m]ost serious offense'" as "[a]ny ... felony with a deadly weapon verdict under [former] RCW 9.94A.125." (Emphasis added.) Cruze, the record shows, was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine, a felony, and the 2010This conclusion is incorrect because it fails to recognize Cruze’s rights to due process and to a jury trial, pursuant to our decisions in State v. Recuenco, 163 Wn.2d 428 , 180 P.3d 1276 (2008), and State v. Williams-Walker, 167 Wn.2d 889 , 225 P.3d 913 (2010). ¶24 Key to this case is former RCW 9.94A.030(23)(t) (1996), recodified as RCW 9.94A.030(29)(t), which defines a “ ‘[m]ost serious offense’ ” as “[a]ny ... felony with a deadly weapon verdict under [former] RCW 9.94A.125.” (Emphasis added.) Cruze, the record shows, was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine, a felony, and the jur | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Williams-Walker
green
2 sentences2010This conclusion is incorrect because it fails to recognize Cruze's rights to due process and to a jury trial, pursuant to our decisions in State v. Recuenco, 163 Wash.2d 428 , 180 P.3d 1276 (2008), and State v. Williams-Walker, 167 Wash.2d 889 , 225 P.3d 913 (2010). ¶ 24 Key to this case is former RCW 9.94A.030(23)(t) (1996), recodified as RCW 9.94A.030(29)(t), which defines a "`[m]ost serious offense'" as "[a]ny ... felony with a deadly weapon verdict under [former] RCW 9.94A.125." (Emphasis added.) Cruze, the record shows, was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine, a felony, and the 2010This conclusion is incorrect because it fails to recognize Cruze’s rights to due process and to a jury trial, pursuant to our decisions in State v. Recuenco, 163 Wn.2d 428 , 180 P.3d 1276 (2008), and State v. Williams-Walker, 167 Wn.2d 889 , 225 P.3d 913 (2010). ¶24 Key to this case is former RCW 9.94A.030(23)(t) (1996), recodified as RCW 9.94A.030(29)(t), which defines a “ ‘[m]ost serious offense’ ” as “[a]ny ... felony with a deadly weapon verdict under [former] RCW 9.94A.125.” (Emphasis added.) Cruze, the record shows, was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine, a felony, and the jur | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Williams-Walker
green
2 sentences2010This conclusion is incorrect because it fails to recognize Cruze's rights to due process and to a jury trial, pursuant to our decisions in State v. Recuenco, 163 Wash.2d 428 , 180 P.3d 1276 (2008), and State v. Williams-Walker, 167 Wash.2d 889 , 225 P.3d 913 (2010). ¶ 24 Key to this case is former RCW 9.94A.030(23)(t) (1996), recodified as RCW 9.94A.030(29)(t), which defines a "`[m]ost serious offense'" as "[a]ny ... felony with a deadly weapon verdict under [former] RCW 9.94A.125." (Emphasis added.) Cruze, the record shows, was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine, a felony, and the 2010This conclusion is incorrect because it fails to recognize Cruze’s rights to due process and to a jury trial, pursuant to our decisions in State v. Recuenco, 163 Wn.2d 428 , 180 P.3d 1276 (2008), and State v. Williams-Walker, 167 Wn.2d 889 , 225 P.3d 913 (2010). ¶24 Key to this case is former RCW 9.94A.030(23)(t) (1996), recodified as RCW 9.94A.030(29)(t), which defines a “ ‘[m]ost serious offense’ ” as “[a]ny ... felony with a deadly weapon verdict under [former] RCW 9.94A.125.” (Emphasis added.) Cruze, the record shows, was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine, a felony, and the jur | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Recuenco
green
2 sentences2010This conclusion is incorrect because it fails to recognize Cruze's rights to due process and to a jury trial, pursuant to our decisions in State v. Recuenco, 163 Wash.2d 428 , 180 P.3d 1276 (2008), and State v. Williams-Walker, 167 Wash.2d 889 , 225 P.3d 913 (2010). ¶ 24 Key to this case is former RCW 9.94A.030(23)(t) (1996), recodified as RCW 9.94A.030(29)(t), which defines a "`[m]ost serious offense'" as "[a]ny ... felony with a deadly weapon verdict under [former] RCW 9.94A.125." (Emphasis added.) Cruze, the record shows, was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine, a felony, and the 2010This conclusion is incorrect because it fails to recognize Cruze’s rights to due process and to a jury trial, pursuant to our decisions in State v. Recuenco, 163 Wn.2d 428 , 180 P.3d 1276 (2008), and State v. Williams-Walker, 167 Wn.2d 889 , 225 P.3d 913 (2010). ¶24 Key to this case is former RCW 9.94A.030(23)(t) (1996), recodified as RCW 9.94A.030(29)(t), which defines a “ ‘[m]ost serious offense’ ” as “[a]ny ... felony with a deadly weapon verdict under [former] RCW 9.94A.125.” (Emphasis added.) Cruze, the record shows, was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine, a felony, and the jur | 2 | 2010–2010 |
In Re the Personal Restraint of Fletcher
green
2 sentences2000In re Fletcher, 113 Wash.2d 42, 50 , 776 P.2d 114 (1989). 2000In re Fletcher, 113 Wash.2d 42, 50 , 776 P.2d 114 (1989). | 2 | 2000–2000 |
State, Dept. of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn
green
1 sentence2020Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10 , 43 P.3d 4 (2002). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Department of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C.
green
1 sentence2020Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10 , 43 P.3d 4 (2002). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Vladovic
green
2 sentences1997Merger is a doctrine of statutory interpretation "used to determine whether the Legislature intended to impose multiple punishments for a single act which violates several statutory provisions.” State v. Michielli 132 Wn.2d 229, 238 , 937 P.2d 587, 592 (1997) (quoting State v. Vladovic, 99 Wn.2d 413 , 419 n.2, 662 P.2d 853 (1983)). 1997Merger is a doctrine of statutory interpretation "used to determine whether the Legislature intended to impose multiple punishments for a single act which violates several statutory provisions.” State v. Michielli 132 Wn.2d 229, 238 , 937 P.2d 587, 592 (1997) (quoting State v. Vladovic, 99 Wn.2d 413 , 419 n.2, 662 P.2d 853 (1983)). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Michielli
green
1 sentence1997Merger is a doctrine of statutory interpretation "used to determine whether the Legislature intended to impose multiple punishments for a single act which violates several statutory provisions.” State v. Michielli 132 Wn.2d 229, 238 , 937 P.2d 587, 592 (1997) (quoting State v. Vladovic, 99 Wn.2d 413 , 419 n.2, 662 P.2d 853 (1983)). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.