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7 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Detroit City Council v. Mayor of Detroitgreen1 sentence2020Expressio unius est exclusion alterius, or the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, is a doctrine of statutory interpretation that “characterizes the general practice that when people say one thing they do not mean something else.” Detroit City Council, 283 Mich App at 456 (quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. City of Lansinggreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Robinson, 486 Mich at 14-15 . 9 Petitioners also invite this Court to reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment by resorting to the absurd-results doctrine of statutory interpretation. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Heather Lynn Hannay v. Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2021STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION The issue presented in this case is one of pure statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de novo.12 This Court’s role in interpreting statutory language is to “ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in a statute.”13 “In doing so, courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that renders nugatory or surplusage any part of a statute.”14 “Unless statutorily defined, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its plai 2021STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION The issue presented in this case is one of pure statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de novo.12 This Court’s role in interpreting statutory language is to “ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in a statute.”13 “In doing so, courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that renders nugatory or surplusage any part of a statute.”14 “Unless statutorily defined, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its plai | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Spectrum Health Hospitals v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co of Michigan
green
2 sentences2021STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION The issue presented in this case is one of pure statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de novo.12 This Court’s role in interpreting statutory language is to “ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in a statute.”13 “In doing so, courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that renders nugatory or surplusage any part of a statute.”14 “Unless statutorily defined, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its plai 2021STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION The issue presented in this case is one of pure statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de novo.12 This Court’s role in interpreting statutory language is to “ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in a statute.”13 “In doing so, courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that renders nugatory or surplusage any part of a statute.”14 “Unless statutorily defined, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its plai | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Couzens
green
2 sentences2021STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION The issue presented in this case is one of pure statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de novo.12 This Court’s role in interpreting statutory language is to “ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in a statute.”13 “In doing so, courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that renders nugatory or surplusage any part of a statute.”14 “Unless statutorily defined, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its plai 2021STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION The issue presented in this case is one of pure statutory interpretation, which this Court reviews de novo.12 This Court’s role in interpreting statutory language is to “ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in a statute.”13 “In doing so, courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that renders nugatory or surplusage any part of a statute.”14 “Unless statutorily defined, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its plai | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Velez v. Tuma
green
2 sentences2016“Our function in construing statutory language is to effectuate the Legislature’s intent.” Velez v Tuma, 492 Mich 1, 16 ; 821 NW2d 432 (2012). 2016“Our function in construing statutory language is to effectuate the Legislature’s intent.” Velez v Tuma, 492 Mich 1, 16 ; 821 NW2d 432 (2012). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Radtke v. Everett
green
2 sentences2004They were to prevent discrimination against a person because of that person’s membership in a certain class and “to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases.” Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 379 ; 501 NW2d 155 (1993), quoting Miller v C A Muer Corp, 420 Mich 355, 363 ; 362 NW2d 650 (1984). 2004They were to prevent discrimination against a person because of that person’s membership in a certain class and “to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases.” Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 379 ; 501 NW2d 155 (1993), quoting Miller v C A Muer Corp, 420 Mich 355, 363 ; 362 NW2d 650 (1984). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Miller v. C a Muer Corp.
green
2 sentences2004They were to prevent discrimination against a person because of that person’s membership in a certain class and “to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases.” Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 379 ; 501 NW2d 155 (1993), quoting Miller v C A Muer Corp, 420 Mich 355, 363 ; 362 NW2d 650 (1984). 2004They were to prevent discrimination against a person because of that person’s membership in a certain class and “to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and biases.” Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 379 ; 501 NW2d 155 (1993), quoting Miller v C A Muer Corp, 420 Mich 355, 363 ; 362 NW2d 650 (1984). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Omnicom of Michigan v. Giannetti Investment Co.
green
2 sentences1997Omnicom of Michigan v Giannetti Investment Co, 221 Mich App 341 ; 561 NW2d 138 (1997). *245 The statutory interpretation doctrine of ejusdem generis also dictates a finding the Legislature did not contemplate dogs as being “fur-bearing animals being raised in captivity.” Ejusdem generis provides when a statute contains general words following a designation of particular subjects, the meaning of the general words is presumed to be restricted by the particular “kind, class, character, or nature as those specifically enumerated.” Welch Foods, supra, p 464 . 1997Omnicom of Michigan v Giannetti Investment Co, 221 Mich App 341 ; 561 NW2d 138 (1997). *245 The statutory interpretation doctrine of ejusdem generis also dictates a finding the Legislature did not contemplate dogs as being “fur-bearing animals being raised in captivity.” Ejusdem generis provides when a statute contains general words following a designation of particular subjects, the meaning of the general words is presumed to be restricted by the particular “kind, class, character, or nature as those specifically enumerated.” Welch Foods, supra, p 464 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Welch Foods, Inc. v. Attorney General
green
1 sentence1997Omnicom of Michigan v Giannetti Investment Co, 221 Mich App 341 ; 561 NW2d 138 (1997). *245 The statutory interpretation doctrine of ejusdem generis also dictates a finding the Legislature did not contemplate dogs as being “fur-bearing animals being raised in captivity.” Ejusdem generis provides when a statute contains general words following a designation of particular subjects, the meaning of the general words is presumed to be restricted by the particular “kind, class, character, or nature as those specifically enumerated.” Welch Foods, supra, p 464 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.