statutory interpretation claim in Connecticut

2024With respect to the second amended petition, the petitioner asserted the following claims: (1) a so-called statutory interpretation claim challenging (a) the respondent’s interpretation of No. 13-3 of the 2013 Pub- lic Acts, § 59, which amended subsections (b) (2), (c), and (e) of General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 54-125a, and (b) the resulting calculation of the petitioner’s risk reduction earned credits (RREC) vis-à-vis his parole eligibility date (count one); (2) a so-called statutory interpretation claim challenging (a) the respondent’s interpretation of No. 13-247 of the 2013 Public Acts

2024With respect to the second amended petition, the petitioner asserted the following claims: (1) a so-called statutory interpretation claim challenging (a) the respondent’s interpretation of No. 13-3 of the 2013 Pub- lic Acts, § 59, which amended subsections (b) (2), (c), and (e) of General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 54-125a, and (b) the resulting calculation of the petitioner’s risk reduction earned credits (RREC) vis-à-vis his parole eligibility date (count one); (2) a so-called statutory interpretation claim challenging (a) the respondent’s interpretation of No. 13-247 of the 2013 Public Acts

2020According to that general principle, ‘‘[w]hen general and specific statutes conflict they should be harmoniously construed so the more specific statute controls.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Whitford, 260 Conn. 610 , 640–41, 799 A.2d 1034 (2002).

2020According to that general principle, ‘‘[w]hen general and specific statutes conflict they should be harmoniously construed so the more specific statute controls.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Whitford, 260 Conn. 610 , 640–41, 799 A.2d 1034 (2002).

2016The provisions of one statute which specifically focus on a particular problem will always, in the absence of express contrary legislative intent, be held to prevail over provisions of a different statute more general in its coverage." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268 , 302, 21 A.3d 759 (2011).

2016The provisions of one statute which specifically focus on a particular problem will always, in the absence of express contrary legislative intent, be held to prevail over provisions of a different statute more general in its coverage." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268 , 302, 21 A.3d 759 (2011).

2014In Salmon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 259 Conn. 288, 305 , 788 A.2d 1199 (2002), we reviewed the plain- tiff’s statutory interpretation claim involving the term ‘‘resident abuse,’’ despite the fact that she had not explicitly framed the issue that way in the administra- tive and trial court proceedings, because ‘‘the basis of her claim at both the [administrative] and trial court levels was that, in order to constitute resident abuse, there had to be some intentional or wilful conduct by the plaintiff-caregiver toward the victim that resulted in harm.’’ In State v. Munoz, 2

2014In Salmon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 259 Conn. 288, 305 , 788 A.2d 1199 (2002), we reviewed the plain- tiff’s statutory interpretation claim involving the term ‘‘resident abuse,’’ despite the fact that she had not explicitly framed the issue that way in the administra- tive and trial court proceedings, because ‘‘the basis of her claim at both the [administrative] and trial court levels was that, in order to constitute resident abuse, there had to be some intentional or wilful conduct by the plaintiff-caregiver toward the victim that resulted in harm.’’ In State v. Munoz, 2

2014In Salmon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 259 Conn. 288, 305 , 788 A.2d 1199 (2002), we reviewed the plain- tiff’s statutory interpretation claim involving the term ‘‘resident abuse,’’ despite the fact that she had not explicitly framed the issue that way in the administra- tive and trial court proceedings, because ‘‘the basis of her claim at both the [administrative] and trial court levels was that, in order to constitute resident abuse, there had to be some intentional or wilful conduct by the plaintiff-caregiver toward the victim that resulted in harm.’’ In State v. Munoz, 2

2014In Salmon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 259 Conn. 288, 305 , 788 A.2d 1199 (2002), we reviewed the plain- tiff’s statutory interpretation claim involving the term ‘‘resident abuse,’’ despite the fact that she had not explicitly framed the issue that way in the administra- tive and trial court proceedings, because ‘‘the basis of her claim at both the [administrative] and trial court levels was that, in order to constitute resident abuse, there had to be some intentional or wilful conduct by the plaintiff-caregiver toward the victim that resulted in harm.’’ In State v. Munoz, 2

1995In order to avoid confusion with our opinion in State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183 , 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 1133 , 130 L.

1995In order to avoid confusion with our opinion in State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183 , 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 1133 , 130 L.

1995In order to avoid confusion with our opinion in State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183 , 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 1133 , 130 L.