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5 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1927–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ambrosegreen2 sentences2000The commonsensical view is that “[i]f the offense which was the object of the conspiracy were some technical or unusually complex offense of which the trier of fact has no general impression, a suitable instruction explaining such an offense would be mandatory,” but not so where “[t]he jury as ordinary laymen have a general knowledge of what constitutes armed robbery [the target offense involved in the case] which is self-defining.” People v. Ambrose, 28 Ill. 2000Such a killing would be intentional, and thus done with malice aforethought.” What he complains of is that “the jury had no instructions defining when a killing is unlawful, nor when the objective of an agreement is unlawful (which makes the agreement conspiracy), nor when a killing might be justified or excused.” As stated in Commonwealth v. Stack, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 227, 236 (2000): “The commonsensical view is that ‘[i]f the offense which was the object of the conspiracy were some technical or unusually complex offense of which the trier of fact has no general impression, a suitable instructi | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Stackgreen1 sentence2000Such a killing would be intentional, and thus done with malice aforethought.” What he complains of is that “the jury had no instructions defining when a killing is unlawful, nor when the objective of an agreement is unlawful (which makes the agreement conspiracy), nor when a killing might be justified or excused.” As stated in Commonwealth v. Stack, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 227, 236 (2000): “The commonsensical view is that ‘[i]f the offense which was the object of the conspiracy were some technical or unusually complex offense of which the trier of fact has no general impression, a suitable instructi | 1 | 1 |
Casagrande v. FW Woolworth Co. Inc.green1 sentence1978Woolworth Co., 340 Mass. 552, 555 (1960). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Stokes
green
1 sentence2015He also correctly recognized, however, that after hearing the evidence a jury might find a single (merged) assault, and for that reason he stated that he could not “comfortably conclude that if properly instructed on the need to find separate assaults beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury nonetheless would have convicted the defendants of felony murder.” Put another way, he concluded that the evidence — principally, Codling’s testimony and the ballistics evidence — warranted a finding of separate assaults, but that such a finding was not inevitable. 13 Commonwealth v. Stokes, 440 Mass. 741 (2004 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Codman v. Deland
green
1 sentence1927Codman v. Deland, supra. If any loss ensued because of the delay to foreclose for nonpayment of taxes after Vorenberg, to whom the first extension was given, had parted with the equity, he is not entitled to have such loss considered in reduction of the debt. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.