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9 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1979–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Storygreen2 sentences2018Further, consistent with the principle that the beneficiary of the error bears the burden of establishing that the error caused no injury, supra at 5 n.3, the petitioning party in termination cases, including a county agency such as CYS, should [J-10-2018] [l\/lO: Donohue, J.] - 7 generally carry the requisite burden of persuading the appellate court that any trial error was harmless,~‘§'6 As to the exact harmless error test to apply in the termination context, l believe that a slightly modified version of the three areas of inquiry provided in Story in criminal cases offers a suitable framewo 2018See Story , 383 A.2d at 164 (stating that the "principle that an error is harmless if it did not contribute to the verdict only sets the stage for the harmless error inquiry"). | 2 | 2 |
Braig v. Field Communicationsgreen2 sentences2009Braig v. Field Communications, 310 Pa.Super. 569 , 456 A.2d 1366, 1372-1373 (1983), refers to Section 566 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), in pertinent part as follows: [W]e adopt Section 566 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), which states: “A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.” Comment b to Section 566 provides a suitable analysis regarding the types of opinion: “There are two kinds of exp 2009Braig v. Field Communications, 310 Pa.Super. 569 , 456 A.2d 1366, 1372-1373 (1983), refers to Section 566 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), in pertinent part as follows: [W]e adopt Section 566 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), which states: “A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.” Comment b to Section 566 provides a suitable analysis regarding the types of opinion: “There are two kinds of exp | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Duquesne Light Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
green
2 sentences2023Duquesne Light Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 507 A.2d 433 . 1994Duquesne Light Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 96 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 168 , 507 A.2d 433 (1986). | 3 | 1993–2023 |
REM Coal Co., Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co.
green
2 sentences2003The Pennsylvania Superior Court said that Pennsylvania’s breach of warranty protections provide a suitable framework for regulating and enforcing the expectations and obligations of the parties as to product performance and that to im pose tort liability in addition “would certainly erode the important distinctions between tort and contractual theories, including their differing objectives.” REM Coal, 386 Pa. Super. at 411 , 563 A.2d at 133 . 2003The Pennsylvania Superior Court said that Pennsylvania’s breach of warranty protections provide a suitable framework for regulating and enforcing the expectations and obligations of the parties as to product performance and that to im pose tort liability in addition “would certainly erode the important distinctions between tort and contractual theories, including their differing objectives.” REM Coal, 386 Pa. Super. at 411 , 563 A.2d at 133 . | 2 | 2003–2019 |
Etoll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Advertising, Inc.
green
1 sentence2003In 2002 in Etoll Inc. v. Elias/Savion Advertising, supra, the Pennsylvania Superior Court, in a case of first impression, ruled that the gist of the action doctrine applies to claims for fraud in the performance of a contract. 5 If the policy of protecting the allocation of risks is sufficiently important to defeat product liability and fraud claims, there is no apparent reason why contracts with providers of specialized services should not also be governed solely by contract law. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Commonwealth v. Turner
green
2 sentences1979We have continually condemned this type of amicus curiae brief, e. g., Commonwealth v. Bellamy, supra; Commonwealth v. Turner, 248 Pa.Super. 306 , 375 A.2d 110 (1977), and now reiterate that censure. 1979We have continually condemned this type of amicus curiae brief, e. g., Commonwealth v. Bellamy, supra; Commonwealth v. Turner, 248 Pa.Super. 306 , 375 A.2d 110 (1977), and now reiterate that censure. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.