spontaneous utterance exception in Connecticut

1995The majority’s reliance on State v. Stange, 212 Conn. 612 , 563 A.2d 681 (1989), as supporting its application and interpretation of the spontaneous utterance exception, is misplaced.

1995The majority’s reliance on State v. Stange, 212 Conn. 612 , 563 A.2d 681 (1989), as supporting its application and interpretation of the spontaneous utterance exception, is misplaced.

2015John, 282 Conn. 260, 270 , 919 A.2d 452 (2007). ‘‘[W]hether a statement is truly spontaneous as to fall within the spontaneous utterance exception will be reviewed with the utmost deference to the court’s deter- mination.’’ State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 219 , 926 A.2d 633 (2007). ‘‘In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court . . . reasonably [could have] conclude[d] as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 298 Conn. 1, 11 , 1 A.3d 76 (2010). ‘‘An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter

2015John, 282 Conn. 260, 270 , 919 A.2d 452 (2007). ‘‘[W]hether a statement is truly spontaneous as to fall within the spontaneous utterance exception will be reviewed with the utmost deference to the court’s deter- mination.’’ State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 219 , 926 A.2d 633 (2007). ‘‘In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court . . . reasonably [could have] conclude[d] as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 298 Conn. 1, 11 , 1 A.3d 76 (2010). ‘‘An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter

2021Under § 8-3 (2) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, a spontaneous utterance is an exception to the rule against hearsay and is defined as ‘‘[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.’’ ‘‘A statement properly is admitted as a spontaneous utterance when (1) the declaration follows a startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to that occurrence, (3) the declarant observed the occurrence, and (4) the declaration is made under circumstances that negate the opportunity for deliberation

2021Under § 8-3 (2) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, a spontaneous utterance is an exception to the rule against hearsay and is defined as ‘‘[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.’’ ‘‘A statement properly is admitted as a spontaneous utterance when (1) the declaration follows a startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to that occurrence, (3) the declarant observed the occurrence, and (4) the declaration is made under circumstances that negate the opportunity for deliberation

2018In reviewing the defendant's claim, we bear in mind that whether a statement is truly spontaneous as to fall within the spontaneous utterance exception [is] ... reviewed with the utmost deference to the trial court's determination." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pugh , 176 Conn. App. 518 , 523-24, 170 A.3d 710 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 985 , 175 A.3d 43 (2017).

2018In reviewing the defendant's claim, we bear in mind that whether a statement is truly spontaneous as to fall within the spontaneous utterance exception [is] ... reviewed with the utmost deference to the trial court's determination." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pugh , 176 Conn. App. 518 , 523-24, 170 A.3d 710 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 985 , 175 A.3d 43 (2017).

2018In reviewing the defendant's claim, we bear in mind that whether a statement is truly spontaneous as to fall within the spontaneous utterance exception [is] ... reviewed with the utmost deference to the trial court's determination." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pugh , 176 Conn. App. 518 , 523-24, 170 A.3d 710 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 985 , 175 A.3d 43 (2017).

2018In reviewing the defendant's claim, we bear in mind that whether a statement is truly spontaneous as to fall within the spontaneous utterance exception [is] ... reviewed with the utmost deference to the trial court's determination." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pugh , 176 Conn. App. 518 , 523-24, 170 A.3d 710 , cert. denied, 327 Conn. 985 , 175 A.3d 43 (2017).

1974Under these circumstances, the court was not in error in allowing this testimony as within the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule under the authority of Perry v. Haritos, supra. See Cummings v. General Motors Corporation, 146 Conn. 443, 450 , 151 A.2d 884 ; Rockhill v. White Line Bus Co., 109 Conn. 706, 708-10 , 145 A. 504 .

1974Under these circumstances, the court was not in error in allowing this testimony as within the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule under the authority of Perry v. Haritos, supra. See Cummings v. General Motors Corporation, 146 Conn. 443, 450 , 151 A.2d 884 ; Rockhill v. White Line Bus Co., 109 Conn. 706, 708-10 , 145 A. 504 .

2018Id., at 805 , 692 A.2d 849 .

2018Id., at 805 , 692 A.2d 849 .

2018Id.

2018Id., 771 , 893 A.2d 912 .

2025This testimony, without some additional evidence connecting it to the victim’s state of mind or manifestation of extreme agitation, would not, in our view, have sufficed to establish that the victim made the statements while under the continued influence of the sexual assault. 6 In support of this argument, the state cites to Love v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 432 , 219 N.W.2d 294 (1974).

2025This testimony, without some additional evidence connecting it to the victim’s state of mind or manifestation of extreme agitation, would not, in our view, have sufficed to establish that the victim made the statements while under the continued influence of the sexual assault. 6 In support of this argument, the state cites to Love v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 432 , 219 N.W.2d 294 (1974).

2017Although this court has previously suggested that certain events lack the "trauma necessary to negate the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication"; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. McNair , 54 Conn.App. 807 , 813, 738 A.2d 689 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 913 , 739 A.2d 1249 (1999) ; "the application of the exception entails a uniquely fact bound inquiry." State v. Westberry , 68 Conn.App. 622 , 628, 792 A.2d 154 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 923 , 797 A.2d 519 (2002).

2017Although this court has previously suggested that certain events lack the "trauma necessary to negate the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication"; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. McNair , 54 Conn.App. 807 , 813, 738 A.2d 689 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 913 , 739 A.2d 1249 (1999) ; "the application of the exception entails a uniquely fact bound inquiry." State v. Westberry , 68 Conn.App. 622 , 628, 792 A.2d 154 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 923 , 797 A.2d 519 (2002).

2017Although this court has previously suggested that certain events lack the "trauma necessary to negate the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication"; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. McNair , 54 Conn.App. 807 , 813, 738 A.2d 689 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 913 , 739 A.2d 1249 (1999) ; "the application of the exception entails a uniquely fact bound inquiry." State v. Westberry , 68 Conn.App. 622 , 628, 792 A.2d 154 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 923 , 797 A.2d 519 (2002).

2017Although this court has previously suggested that certain events lack the "trauma necessary to negate the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication"; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. McNair , 54 Conn.App. 807 , 813, 738 A.2d 689 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 913 , 739 A.2d 1249 (1999) ; "the application of the exception entails a uniquely fact bound inquiry." State v. Westberry , 68 Conn.App. 622 , 628, 792 A.2d 154 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 923 , 797 A.2d 519 (2002).

2016Therefore, it is not clear that Quinones' statement was admissible under the spontaneous utterance exception, as it must have been made under such circumstances as to negate the "opportunity for deliberation and fabrication by the declarant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2015John, 282 Conn. 260, 270 , 919 A.2d 452 (2007). ‘‘[W]hether a statement is truly spontaneous as to fall within the spontaneous utterance exception will be reviewed with the utmost deference to the court’s deter- mination.’’ State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 219 , 926 A.2d 633 (2007). ‘‘In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court . . . reasonably [could have] conclude[d] as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 298 Conn. 1, 11 , 1 A.3d 76 (2010). ‘‘An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter

2015John, 282 Conn. 260, 270 , 919 A.2d 452 (2007). ‘‘[W]hether a statement is truly spontaneous as to fall within the spontaneous utterance exception will be reviewed with the utmost deference to the court’s deter- mination.’’ State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 219 , 926 A.2d 633 (2007). ‘‘In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court . . . reasonably [could have] conclude[d] as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 298 Conn. 1, 11 , 1 A.3d 76 (2010). ‘‘An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter

2015John, 282 Conn. 260, 270 , 919 A.2d 452 (2007). ‘‘[W]hether a statement is truly spontaneous as to fall within the spontaneous utterance exception will be reviewed with the utmost deference to the court’s deter- mination.’’ State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 219 , 926 A.2d 633 (2007). ‘‘In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court . . . reasonably [could have] conclude[d] as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 298 Conn. 1, 11 , 1 A.3d 76 (2010). ‘‘An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter

2015John, 282 Conn. 260, 270 , 919 A.2d 452 (2007). ‘‘[W]hether a statement is truly spontaneous as to fall within the spontaneous utterance exception will be reviewed with the utmost deference to the court’s deter- mination.’’ State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 219 , 926 A.2d 633 (2007). ‘‘In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court . . . reasonably [could have] conclude[d] as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 298 Conn. 1, 11 , 1 A.3d 76 (2010). ‘‘An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter

2011Accordingly, the court concluded that because the defendant was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the victim, Topa’s testimony as to what the victim recounted to him on the *625 night of the assault was inadmissible as a violation of the defendant’s sixth amendment right of confrontation pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L.

2011Accordingly, the court concluded that because the defendant was not given an opportunity to cross-examine the victim, Topa’s testimony as to what the victim recounted to him on the *625 night of the assault was inadmissible as a violation of the defendant’s sixth amendment right of confrontation pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L.

2011With regard to the element of time, “there is no identifiable discrete time interval within which an utterance becomes spontaneous; [e]ach case must be decided on its particular circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361, 375 , 908 A.2d 506 (2006).

2011With regard to the element of time, “there is no identifiable discrete time interval within which an utterance becomes spontaneous; [e]ach case must be decided on its particular circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361, 375 , 908 A.2d 506 (2006).

2008“This court may sustain the admission of evidence on any proper ground that exists for its admission.” State v. Torelli, 103 Conn. App. 646, 662 , 931 A.2d 337 (2007).

2008“This court may sustain the admission of evidence on any proper ground that exists for its admission.” State v. Torelli, 103 Conn. App. 646, 662 , 931 A.2d 337 (2007).

2006See Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3 (2); State v. Arluk, 75 Conn. App. 181, 187 , 815 A.2d 694 (2003) (under the spontaneous utterance exception, “[hjearsay statements, otherwise inadmissible, may be admitted into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2006See Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3 (2); State v. Arluk, 75 Conn. App. 181, 187 , 815 A.2d 694 (2003) (under the spontaneous utterance exception, “[hjearsay statements, otherwise inadmissible, may be admitted into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2006The defendant further argues that “[ejmotion ... is no indicia of trustworthiness,” and adds that “the distorting power of shock, fear and excitement cannot be underestimated.” These arguments go, however, to the weight afforded to the complainant’s statements, and does not necessarily serve to undermine the trial court’s determination as to their admissibility. 14 The present case was briefed and argued prior to the June 19, 2006 release of the United States Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Washington, supra, 547 U.S. 813 .

1999This exception allows otherwise inadmissible statements into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted if it is proven that (1) the declaration follows some startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to the occurrence, (3) the declarant observed the occurrence, and (4) the declaration is made under circumstances that negate the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication by the declarant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Guess, 44 Conn. App. 790, 803 , 692 A.2d 849 (1997), aff'd, 244 Conn. 761 , 715 A.2d 643 (1998).

1999This exception allows otherwise inadmissible statements into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted if it is proven that (1) the declaration follows some startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to the occurrence, (3) the declarant observed the occurrence, and (4) the declaration is made under circumstances that negate the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication by the declarant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Guess, 44 Conn. App. 790, 803 , 692 A.2d 849 (1997), aff'd, 244 Conn. 761 , 715 A.2d 643 (1998).

1993Then Judge, now Justice Borden, in his concurring opinion to the petitioner's appeal recognized that this exception arguably applied to the facts of this case, State v. Bruens, supra, p. 462 ; and that the prosecution was basing its offer of admissibility on this exception, Ibid.

1993Then Judge, now Justice Borden, in his concurring opinion to the petitioner's appeal recognized that this exception arguably applied to the facts of this case, State v. Bruens, supra, p. 462 ; and that the prosecution was basing its offer of admissibility on this exception, Ibid.

1993The spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule "allows otherwise inadmissable statements into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted if it is proven that (1) the declaration follows some startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to the occurrence, (3) the declarant observed the occurrence, and (4) the declaration is made under circumstances that negate the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication by the declarant." State v. Cayouette, 25 Conn. App. 384 , 387 (1991).

1993The spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule "allows otherwise inadmissable statements into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted if it is proven that (1) the declaration follows some startling occurrence, (2) the declaration refers to the occurrence, (3) the declarant observed the occurrence, and (4) the declaration is made under circumstances that negate the opportunity for deliberation and fabrication by the declarant." State v. Cayouette, 25 Conn. App. 384 , 387 (1991).