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5 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1958–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Eastern Shore Markets, Inc. v. J.D. Associates Ltd. Partnershipgreen2 sentences2010In Eastern Shore Markets, the federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland law and noting specifically this Court's opinion in Automatic Laundry, recognized similarly the potential for a claim based on an alleged breach of the implied covenant to refrain from engaging in destructive competition. 213 F.3d at 183-85. 2010In Eastern Shore Markets, the federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland law and noting specifically this Court’s opinion in Automatic Laundry, recognized similarly the potential for a claim based on an alleged breach of the implied covenant to refrain from engaging in destructive competition. 213 F.3d at 183-85. | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Automatic Laundry Service, Inc. v. Demas
green
2 sentences2010Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 3, § 568, pp. 200-201, states with regard to the doctrine of implication: "In any commercial agreement in which the compensation promised by one to the other is a percentage of profits or receipts, or is a royalty on goods sold, manufactured or mined, there will nearly always be found an implied promise of diligent and careful performance in good faith and of forbearance to make performance impossible by going out of business or otherwise." Id. at 549-50, 141 A.2d at 500 . 2010Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 3, § 568, pp. 200-201, states with regard to the doctrine of implication: “In any commer cial agreement in which the compensation promised by one to the other is a percentage of profits or receipts, or is a royalty on goods sold, manufactured or mined, there will nearly always be found an implied promise of diligent and careful performance in good faith and of forbearance to make performance impossible by going out of business or otherwise.” Id. at 549-50, 141 A.2d at 500 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Allen v. State
green
2 sentences2013There, we noted, however, that it was “quite clear” from the record that the defendant, Allen, “understood the implication of a waiver.” Id. at 544 , 551 A.2d 156 . 2013There, we noted, however, that it was “quite clear” from the record that the defendant, Allen, “understood the implication of a waiver.” Id. at 544 , 551 A.2d 156 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Grimes v. State
green
2 sentences1991Justice Brennan observed for the Court, at 412 U.S. 213 , at 93 S.Ct. 1998 : “Indeed, while we have never explicitly held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense, it is nevertheless clear that a construction of the Major Crimes Act to preclude such an instruction would raise difficult constitutional questions.” We placed our unequivocal imprimatur upon this principle in Johnson v. State, 38 Md.App. 100, 109 , 379 A.2d 436 (1977): “The clear weight of authority is that conviction of a necessa 1991Justice Brennan observed for the Court, at 412 U.S. 213 , at 93 S.Ct. 1998 : “Indeed, while we have never explicitly held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense, it is nevertheless clear that a construction of the Major Crimes Act to preclude such an instruction would raise difficult constitutional questions.” We placed our unequivocal imprimatur upon this principle in Johnson v. State, 38 Md.App. 100, 109 , 379 A.2d 436 (1977): “The clear weight of authority is that conviction of a necessa | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Keeble v. United States
green
2 sentences1991Indeed, Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 , 93 S.Ct. 1993 , 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973), raises the strong implication that this principle, beneficial to the defendant and the State alike, may be constitutionally mandated. 1991Indeed, Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205 , 93 S.Ct. 1993 , 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973), raises the strong implication that this principle, beneficial to the defendant and the State alike, may be constitutionally mandated. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Grimes v. State
green
2 sentences1991Justice Brennan observed for the Court, at 412 U.S. 213 , at 93 S.Ct. 1998 : “Indeed, while we have never explicitly held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense, it is nevertheless clear that a construction of the Major Crimes Act to preclude such an instruction would raise difficult constitutional questions.” We placed our unequivocal imprimatur upon this principle in Johnson v. State, 38 Md.App. 100, 109 , 379 A.2d 436 (1977): “The clear weight of authority is that conviction of a necessa 1991Justice Brennan observed for the Court, at 412 U.S. 213 , at 93 S.Ct. 1998 : “Indeed, while we have never explicitly held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense, it is nevertheless clear that a construction of the Major Crimes Act to preclude such an instruction would raise difficult constitutional questions.” We placed our unequivocal imprimatur upon this principle in Johnson v. State, 38 Md.App. 100, 109 , 379 A.2d 436 (1977): “The clear weight of authority is that conviction of a necessa | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences1991Justice Brennan observed for the Court, at 412 U.S. 213 , at 93 S.Ct. 1998 : “Indeed, while we have never explicitly held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense, it is nevertheless clear that a construction of the Major Crimes Act to preclude such an instruction would raise difficult constitutional questions.” We placed our unequivocal imprimatur upon this principle in Johnson v. State, 38 Md.App. 100, 109 , 379 A.2d 436 (1977): “The clear weight of authority is that conviction of a necessa 1991Justice Brennan observed for the Court, at 412 U.S. 213 , at 93 S.Ct. 1998 : “Indeed, while we have never explicitly held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense, it is nevertheless clear that a construction of the Major Crimes Act to preclude such an instruction would raise difficult constitutional questions.” We placed our unequivocal imprimatur upon this principle in Johnson v. State, 38 Md.App. 100, 109 , 379 A.2d 436 (1977): “The clear weight of authority is that conviction of a necessa | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Seggebruch v. Stosor
green
2 sentences1958App. 385 , 33 N. E. 2d 159 ; and Fox v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, 8 Ill. 2d 571 , 134 N. E. 2d 806 ; and we think that these cases support Automatic’s contention. 1958Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 3, § 568, pp. 200-201, states with regard to the doctrine of implication: “In any commercial agreement in which the compensation promised by one to the other is a percentage of profits or receipts, or is a royalty on goods sold, manufactured or mined, there will nearly always be found an implied promise of diligent and careful performance in good faith and of forbearance to make performance impossible by going out of business or otherwise.” The appellant also relies upon Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136 , 280 P. 2d 775 ; Wilson Sullivan Co. v. Internati | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Fox v. Fox Valley Trotting Club
green
2 sentences1958App. 385 , 33 N. E. 2d 159 ; and Fox v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, 8 Ill. 2d 571 , 134 N. E. 2d 806 ; and we think that these cases support Automatic’s contention. 1958App. 385 , 33 N. E. 2d 159 ; and Fox v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, 8 Ill. 2d 571 , 134 N. E. 2d 806 ; and we think that these cases support Automatic’s contention. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
green
2 sentences1958Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 3, § 568, pp. 200-201, states with regard to the doctrine of implication: “In any commercial agreement in which the compensation promised by one to the other is a percentage of profits or receipts, or is a royalty on goods sold, manufactured or mined, there will nearly always be found an implied promise of diligent and careful performance in good faith and of forbearance to make performance impossible by going out of business or otherwise.” The appellant also relies upon Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136 , 280 P. 2d 775 ; Wilson Sullivan Co. v. Internati 1958Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 3, § 568, pp. 200-201, states with regard to the doctrine of implication: “In any commercial agreement in which the compensation promised by one to the other is a percentage of profits or receipts, or is a royalty on goods sold, manufactured or mined, there will nearly always be found an implied promise of diligent and careful performance in good faith and of forbearance to make performance impossible by going out of business or otherwise.” The appellant also relies upon Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136 , 280 P. 2d 775 ; Wilson Sullivan Co. v. Internati | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Wilson Sullivan Co. v. International Paper Makers Realty Corp.
green
2 sentences1958Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 3, § 568, pp. 200-201, states with regard to the doctrine of implication: “In any commercial agreement in which the compensation promised by one to the other is a percentage of profits or receipts, or is a royalty on goods sold, manufactured or mined, there will nearly always be found an implied promise of diligent and careful performance in good faith and of forbearance to make performance impossible by going out of business or otherwise.” The appellant also relies upon Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136 , 280 P. 2d 775 ; Wilson Sullivan Co. v. Internati 1958Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 3, § 568, pp. 200-201, states with regard to the doctrine of implication: “In any commercial agreement in which the compensation promised by one to the other is a percentage of profits or receipts, or is a royalty on goods sold, manufactured or mined, there will nearly always be found an implied promise of diligent and careful performance in good faith and of forbearance to make performance impossible by going out of business or otherwise.” The appellant also relies upon Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal. 2d 136 , 280 P. 2d 775 ; Wilson Sullivan Co. v. Internati | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.