Faretta hearing in Kentucky

2024“It is not enough to express dissatisfaction with counsel or to request different counsel; the defendant, rather, must unequivocally ask to proceed pro se.” Winstead, 283 S.W.3d at 683 (citing Deno, 177 S.W.3d at 758 ). “[O]nce a defendant invokes his right to proceed pro se, in whole or part, the trial court is required to hold the Faretta hearing and allow the defendant to exercise the right, if at all possible.” Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 93 (Ky. 2012) (citing Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Ky. 2004)).

2024“It is not enough to express dissatisfaction with counsel or to request different counsel; the defendant, rather, must unequivocally ask to proceed pro se.” Winstead, 283 S.W.3d at 683 (citing Deno, 177 S.W.3d at 758 ). “[O]nce a defendant invokes his right to proceed pro se, in whole or part, the trial court is required to hold the Faretta hearing and allow the defendant to exercise the right, if at all possible.” Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 93 (Ky. 2012) (citing Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Ky. 2004)).

2025“It is not enough to express dissatisfaction with counsel or to request different counsel; the defendant, rather, must unequivocally ask to proceed pro se.” Winstead, 283 S.W.3d at 683 (citations omitted). 4 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 16 Arguably, Delehanty unequivocally asked to proceed pro se. “[O]nce a defendant invokes his right to proceed pro se, in whole or part, the trial court is required to hold the Faretta hearing and allow the defendant to exercise the right, if at all possible.” Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 93 (Ky. 2012) (citations omitted).

2025“It is not enough to express dissatisfaction with counsel or to request different counsel; the defendant, rather, must unequivocally ask to proceed pro se.” Winstead, 283 S.W.3d at 683 (citations omitted). 4 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 16 Arguably, Delehanty unequivocally asked to proceed pro se. “[O]nce a defendant invokes his right to proceed pro se, in whole or part, the trial court is required to hold the Faretta hearing and allow the defendant to exercise the right, if at all possible.” Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 93 (Ky. 2012) (citations omitted).

2025Terry, 295 S.W.3d at 822 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 ). 19 The trial court’s earlier statement to Nelson that he would have to “obey the same rules” as an attorney should he “wind up representing [himself]” was insufficient to constitute an adequate Faretta hearing.

2025I present that line of questioning again today—not because each of these questions are required by the Constitution—but as a reminder that “a proper Faretta hearing can be brief enough to consume only a few minutes of a trial court’s time.” Id. at 825 . (a) Have you ever studied law? (b) Have you ever represented yourself or any other defendant in a criminal action? (c) You realize, do you not, that you are charged with these crimes: (Here state the crimes with which the defendant is charged.) (d) You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty of the crime charged in Count I the court .

2026And generally, “once a defendant invokes his right to proceed pro se, in whole or part, the trial court is required to hold the Faretta hearing and allow the defendant to exercise the right, if at all possible.” Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 93 (Ky. 2012).

2026And generally, “once a defendant invokes his right to proceed pro se, in whole or part, the trial court is required to hold the Faretta hearing and allow the defendant to exercise the right, if at all possible.” Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 93 (Ky. 2012).

2020Further, criminal defendants can request and shall be afforded the option of what is sometimes called “hybrid counsel,”8 which refers to a defendant’s proceeding unrepresented as to chosen, pre-defined aspects of a trial or proceeding, while counsel’s representation is confined to other aspects.9 Though under a “hybrid counsel” arrangement a defendant’s waiver of representation is confined only to specific parts of a trial or proceeding, the court still must hold a Faretta hearing.10 During the hearing, the court must find that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives his

2020Further, criminal defendants can request and shall be afforded the option of what is sometimes called “hybrid counsel,”8 which refers to a defendant’s proceeding unrepresented as to chosen, pre-defined aspects of a trial or proceeding, while counsel’s representation is confined to other aspects.9 Though under a “hybrid counsel” arrangement a defendant’s waiver of representation is confined only to specific parts of a trial or proceeding, the court still must hold a Faretta hearing.10 During the hearing, the court must find that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives his

2010Instead, relying on our holding in Depp, 278 S.W.3d at 620 , the Commonwealth concludes that, in light of Appellant's legal abilities and the totality of the circumstances, the trial court implicitly found that Appellant had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel at a Faretta hearing.

2010Instead, relying on our holding in Depp, 278 S.W.3d at 620 , the Commonwealth concludes that, in light of Appellant's legal abilities and the totality of the circumstances, the trial court implicitly found that Appellant had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel at a Faretta hearing.

2025“It is not enough to express dissatisfaction with counsel or to request different counsel; the defendant, rather, must unequivocally ask to proceed pro se.” Winstead, 283 S.W.3d at 683 (citations omitted). 4 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 16 Arguably, Delehanty unequivocally asked to proceed pro se. “[O]nce a defendant invokes his right to proceed pro se, in whole or part, the trial court is required to hold the Faretta hearing and allow the defendant to exercise the right, if at all possible.” Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 93 (Ky. 2012) (citations omitted).

2025“It is not enough to express dissatisfaction with counsel or to request different counsel; the defendant, rather, must unequivocally ask to proceed pro se.” Winstead, 283 S.W.3d at 683 (citations omitted). 4 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 16 Arguably, Delehanty unequivocally asked to proceed pro se. “[O]nce a defendant invokes his right to proceed pro se, in whole or part, the trial court is required to hold the Faretta hearing and allow the defendant to exercise the right, if at all possible.” Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 93 (Ky. 2012) (citations omitted).

2020Further, criminal defendants can request and shall be afforded the option of what is sometimes called “hybrid counsel,”8 which refers to a defendant’s proceeding unrepresented as to chosen, pre-defined aspects of a trial or proceeding, while counsel’s representation is confined to other aspects.9 Though under a “hybrid counsel” arrangement a defendant’s waiver of representation is confined only to specific parts of a trial or proceeding, the court still must hold a Faretta hearing.10 During the hearing, the court must find that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives his

2020Further, criminal defendants can request and shall be afforded the option of what is sometimes called “hybrid counsel,”8 which refers to a defendant’s proceeding unrepresented as to chosen, pre-defined aspects of a trial or proceeding, while counsel’s representation is confined to other aspects.9 Though under a “hybrid counsel” arrangement a defendant’s waiver of representation is confined only to specific parts of a trial or proceeding, the court still must hold a Faretta hearing.10 During the hearing, the court must find that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives his

2016See Mitchell, 423 S.W.3d at 162 ; Hill, 125 S.W.3d at 229 . 1 This stands true whether the defendant wishes to proceed pro se or with hybrid counsel. 6 In the case at bar, just as in King, "the trial court asserted its opinion that Appellant didn't really want to represent himself, but instead that he wanted to be represented by someone other than appointed counsel." King, 374 S.W.3d at 294 .

2016See Mitchell, 423 S.W.3d at 162 ; Hill, 125 S.W.3d at 229 . 1 This stands true whether the defendant wishes to proceed pro se or with hybrid counsel. 6 In the case at bar, just as in King, "the trial court asserted its opinion that Appellant didn't really want to represent himself, but instead that he wanted to be represented by someone other than appointed counsel." King, 374 S.W.3d at 294 .

2016And that the reason a defendant desires to represent himself is not a material factor in deciding whether to conduct a Faretta hearing.' King, 374 S.W.3d at 292 ("Appellant's desire to represent himself may have been derived from frustration with appointed counsel, but that is irrelevant . . . .").

2016And that the reason a defendant desires to represent himself is not a material factor in deciding whether to conduct a Faretta hearing.' King, 374 S.W.3d at 292 ("Appellant's desire to represent himself may have been derived from frustration with appointed counsel, but that is irrelevant . . . .").

2024“It is not enough to express dissatisfaction with counsel or to request different counsel; the defendant, rather, must unequivocally ask to proceed pro se.” Winstead, 283 S.W.3d at 683 (citing Deno, 177 S.W.3d at 758 ). “[O]nce a defendant invokes his right to proceed pro se, in whole or part, the trial court is required to hold the Faretta hearing and allow the defendant to exercise the right, if at all possible.” Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 93 (Ky. 2012) (citing Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Ky. 2004)).

2024“It is not enough to express dissatisfaction with counsel or to request different counsel; the defendant, rather, must unequivocally ask to proceed pro se.” Winstead, 283 S.W.3d at 683 (citing Deno, 177 S.W.3d at 758 ). “[O]nce a defendant invokes his right to proceed pro se, in whole or part, the trial court is required to hold the Faretta hearing and allow the defendant to exercise the right, if at all possible.” Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 93 (Ky. 2012) (citing Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Ky. 2004)).

2026Commonwealth v. Martin, 410 S.W.3d 119 , 122 n.1 (Ky. 2013). -4- Campbell next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for discovery.2 As noted above, Campbell made several requests for the Commonwealth to produce the dates of the drug buys testified to in the affidavit for the search warrant, as well as the corresponding field test results.

2026Commonwealth v. Martin, 410 S.W.3d 119 , 122 n.1 (Ky. 2013). -4- Campbell next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for discovery.2 As noted above, Campbell made several requests for the Commonwealth to produce the dates of the drug buys testified to in the affidavit for the search warrant, as well as the corresponding field test results.

2026This appeal followed. -3- ANALYSIS Campbell first argues the trial court erred in failing to hold a Faretta hearing following his request to act as hybrid counsel.1 Matthews v. Commonwealth, 168 S.W.3d 14, 23 (Ky. 2005) is instructive.

2026This appeal followed. -3- ANALYSIS Campbell first argues the trial court erred in failing to hold a Faretta hearing following his request to act as hybrid counsel.1 Matthews v. Commonwealth, 168 S.W.3d 14, 23 (Ky. 2005) is instructive.

2013In Stone v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 233 (Ky.2007), the trial court granted the defendant’s request to represent himself for a period of thirteen months prior to trial before holding a Faretta hearing.

2013In Stone v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 233 (Ky.2007), the trial court granted the defendant’s request to represent himself for a period of thirteen months prior to trial before holding a Faretta hearing.

2025However, the request can also be abandoned or waived “through subsequent conduct after an initial request[.]” Id. (quoting Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir. 1982)).

2025However, the request can also be abandoned or waived “through subsequent conduct after an initial request[.]” Id. (quoting Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir. 1982)).

2021As stated in Tinsley v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 668, 675 (Ky. App. 2006), even “if the findings do not support indigency, and the defendant persists in not employing counsel, he shall be deemed to have waived counsel, whereupon he is entitled to the protections of Faretta.” Specifically, [i]n Kentucky, a trial court is under an affirmative duty to hold a Faretta hearing when an accused attempts to make an absolute or limited waiver of the right to counsel.

2021As stated in Tinsley v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 668, 675 (Ky. App. 2006), even “if the findings do not support indigency, and the defendant persists in not employing counsel, he shall be deemed to have waived counsel, whereupon he is entitled to the protections of Faretta.” Specifically, [i]n Kentucky, a trial court is under an affirmative duty to hold a Faretta hearing when an accused attempts to make an absolute or limited waiver of the right to counsel.

2020Further, criminal defendants can request and shall be afforded the option of what is sometimes called “hybrid counsel,”8 which refers to a defendant’s proceeding unrepresented as to chosen, pre-defined aspects of a trial or proceeding, while counsel’s representation is confined to other aspects.9 Though under a “hybrid counsel” arrangement a defendant’s waiver of representation is confined only to specific parts of a trial or proceeding, the court still must hold a Faretta hearing.10 During the hearing, the court must find that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives his

2020Further, criminal defendants can request and shall be afforded the option of what is sometimes called “hybrid counsel,”8 which refers to a defendant’s proceeding unrepresented as to chosen, pre-defined aspects of a trial or proceeding, while counsel’s representation is confined to other aspects.9 Though under a “hybrid counsel” arrangement a defendant’s waiver of representation is confined only to specific parts of a trial or proceeding, the court still must hold a Faretta hearing.10 During the hearing, the court must find that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives his

2025Accordingly, the practical implications of the Faretta hearing requirement create a “Janus-faced quandary for trial judges.” Commonwealth v. Ayers, 435 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Ky. 2013).

2025Accordingly, the practical implications of the Faretta hearing requirement create a “Janus-faced quandary for trial judges.” Commonwealth v. Ayers, 435 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Ky. 2013).

2020Of course, criminal defendants have a right to competent legal representation in criminal proceedings under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution3 and under Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution.4 But criminal defendants also have the right to proceed unrepresented if they properly waive their right to counsel and are guaranteed procedural safeguards in that process.5 The primary safeguard is a Faretta hearing, which is mandated whenever a defendant timely and unequivocally6 3 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 4 Ky. Const. § 11 guarantees a criminal defendant the rig

2020Of course, criminal defendants have a right to competent legal representation in criminal proceedings under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution3 and under Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution.4 But criminal defendants also have the right to proceed unrepresented if they properly waive their right to counsel and are guaranteed procedural safeguards in that process.5 The primary safeguard is a Faretta hearing, which is mandated whenever a defendant timely and unequivocally6 3 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 4 Ky. Const. § 11 guarantees a criminal defendant the rig

2020While noting that “no script is always required or always sufficient for a Faretta hearing,” Jackson heavily relies on the trial court’s failure to ask the model questions set out in Commonwealth v. Terry, 295 S.W.3d 819, 824-25 (Ky. 2009) (quoting United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1987)).

2020While noting that “no script is always required or always sufficient for a Faretta hearing,” Jackson heavily relies on the trial court’s failure to ask the model questions set out in Commonwealth v. Terry, 295 S.W.3d 819, 824-25 (Ky. 2009) (quoting United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1987)).

2020See Deno, at 758. 6 Deno, at 758 (citing Moore v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Ky. 1982)). 4 requests to proceed unrepresented to any extent.7 Under Faretta, to deny this hearing after a defendant properly requests it amounts to a violation of the federal constitution.

2020See Deno, at 758. 6 Deno, at 758 (citing Moore v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Ky. 1982)). 4 requests to proceed unrepresented to any extent.7 Under Faretta, to deny this hearing after a defendant properly requests it amounts to a violation of the federal constitution.

2020Otherwise, the Commonwealth committed 52 See is. at 255 (citing Sterling v. State of Texas, 791 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. App. 1990) (“The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding, stating: ‘[a] person who is familiar with a substance may identify it.

2020Otherwise, the Commonwealth committed 52 See is. at 255 (citing Sterling v. State of Texas, 791 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. App. 1990) (“The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding, stating: ‘[a] person who is familiar with a substance may identify it.

2019On May 8, 2017, the trial court appointed the Department of Public Advocacy to represent Butts, and, about a month later, two public defenders entered their appearance on Butts’s behalf. 12 Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (citing Bowling v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. App. 1994)). 13 Robinson v. Commonwealth, 325 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Ky. 2010). 9 At an August 14, 2017, status conference, the Commonwealth informed the trial court that Butts informed his counsel that Butts wanted a Faretta hearing.14 The trial court instructed defense c

2019On May 8, 2017, the trial court appointed the Department of Public Advocacy to represent Butts, and, about a month later, two public defenders entered their appearance on Butts’s behalf. 12 Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (citing Bowling v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. App. 1994)). 13 Robinson v. Commonwealth, 325 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Ky. 2010). 9 At an August 14, 2017, status conference, the Commonwealth informed the trial court that Butts informed his counsel that Butts wanted a Faretta hearing.14 The trial court instructed defense c

2019On May 8, 2017, the trial court appointed the Department of Public Advocacy to represent Butts, and, about a month later, two public defenders entered their appearance on Butts’s behalf. 12 Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (citing Bowling v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. App. 1994)). 13 Robinson v. Commonwealth, 325 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Ky. 2010). 9 At an August 14, 2017, status conference, the Commonwealth informed the trial court that Butts informed his counsel that Butts wanted a Faretta hearing.14 The trial court instructed defense c

2019On May 8, 2017, the trial court appointed the Department of Public Advocacy to represent Butts, and, about a month later, two public defenders entered their appearance on Butts’s behalf. 12 Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (citing Bowling v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. App. 1994)). 13 Robinson v. Commonwealth, 325 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Ky. 2010). 9 At an August 14, 2017, status conference, the Commonwealth informed the trial court that Butts informed his counsel that Butts wanted a Faretta hearing.14 The trial court instructed defense c

2016See McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415 (Ky.1997).