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7 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Jack Warledo, Johnson Warledo, Thomas Lee Ahaisse, Gary Larney and Meredith Malcolm Quinngreen2 sentences2022And, relatedly, our cases have repeatedly stressed that the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver of the right to counsel turns on the “totality of the circumstances, including the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant.” John Williamson, 806 F.2d at 220 ; see Vann, 776 F.3d at 763 (“We reflect on the totality of the circumstances to decide whether a defendant has knowingly [and intelligently] decided to proceed pro se.”); Padilla, 819 F.2d at 958 (recognizing that “the question of an intelligent waiver turns not only on the state of the record [including presumably the co 2022And, relatedly, our cases have repeatedly stressed that the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver of the right to counsel turns on the “totality of the circumstances, including the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant.” John Williamson, 806 F.2d at 220 ; see Vann, 776 F.3d at 763 (“We reflect on the totality of the circumstances to decide whether a defendant has knowingly [and intelligently] decided to proceed pro se.”); Padilla, 819 F.2d at 958 (recognizing that “the question of an intelligent waiver turns not only on the state of the record [including presumably the co | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Sean Lamont Cromergreen2 sentences2022Obermiller at ¶ 30 , citing United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 682-83 (6th Cir.2004). 2022Obermiller at ¶ 30 , citing United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 682-83 (6th Cir.2004). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. John Morgan Williamsongreen2 sentences2022And, relatedly, our cases have repeatedly stressed that the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver of the right to counsel turns on the “totality of the circumstances, including the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant.” John Williamson, 806 F.2d at 220 ; see Vann, 776 F.3d at 763 (“We reflect on the totality of the circumstances to decide whether a defendant has knowingly [and intelligently] decided to proceed pro se.”); Padilla, 819 F.2d at 958 (recognizing that “the question of an intelligent waiver turns not only on the state of the record [including presumably the co 2022And, relatedly, our cases have repeatedly stressed that the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver of the right to counsel turns on the “totality of the circumstances, including the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant.” John Williamson, 806 F.2d at 220 ; see Vann, 776 F.3d at 763 (“We reflect on the totality of the circumstances to decide whether a defendant has knowingly [and intelligently] decided to proceed pro se.”); Padilla, 819 F.2d at 958 (recognizing that “the question of an intelligent waiver turns not only on the state of the record [including presumably the co | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Herman Padillagreen2 sentences2022And, relatedly, our cases have repeatedly stressed that the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver of the right to counsel turns on the “totality of the circumstances, including the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant.” John Williamson, 806 F.2d at 220 ; see Vann, 776 F.3d at 763 (“We reflect on the totality of the circumstances to decide whether a defendant has knowingly [and intelligently] decided to proceed pro se.”); Padilla, 819 F.2d at 958 (recognizing that “the question of an intelligent waiver turns not only on the state of the record [including presumably the co 2022And, relatedly, our cases have repeatedly stressed that the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver of the right to counsel turns on the “totality of the circumstances, including the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant.” John Williamson, 806 F.2d at 220 ; see Vann, 776 F.3d at 763 (“We reflect on the totality of the circumstances to decide whether a defendant has knowingly [and intelligently] decided to proceed pro se.”); Padilla, 819 F.2d at 958 (recognizing that “the question of an intelligent waiver turns not only on the state of the record [including presumably the co | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Vanngreen2 sentences2022And, relatedly, our cases have repeatedly stressed that the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver of the right to counsel turns on the “totality of the circumstances, including the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant.” John Williamson, 806 F.2d at 220 ; see Vann, 776 F.3d at 763 (“We reflect on the totality of the circumstances to decide whether a defendant has knowingly [and intelligently] decided to proceed pro se.”); Padilla, 819 F.2d at 958 (recognizing that “the question of an intelligent waiver turns not only on the state of the record [including presumably the co 2022And, relatedly, our cases have repeatedly stressed that the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver of the right to counsel turns on the “totality of the circumstances, including the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant.” John Williamson, 806 F.2d at 220 ; see Vann, 776 F.3d at 763 (“We reflect on the totality of the circumstances to decide whether a defendant has knowingly [and intelligently] decided to proceed pro se.”); Padilla, 819 F.2d at 958 (recognizing that “the question of an intelligent waiver turns not only on the state of the record [including presumably the co | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Clinton Bernard Frazier-Elgreen2 sentences2002“The constitutional right of self-representation is waived if it is not timely and unequivocally asserted.” Jackson v. Ylst (C.A.9, 1990), 921 F.2d 882, 888 .’ See, e.g., Reese v. Nix (C.A.8, 1991), 942 F.2d 1276, 1281 (“I don’t want no counsel then” was not a clear and unequivocal pro se demand requiring Faretta inquiry); United States v. Frazier-El (C.A.4, 2000), 204 F.3d 553, 558 (assertion of the right of self-representation “must be * * * clear and unequivocal”). {¶ 39} We find that Cassano’s April 23, 1999 statement was not an explicit and unequivocal demand for self-representation. 2002See, e.g., Reese v. Nix (C.A.8, 1991), 942 F.2d 1276, 1281 (“I don’t want no counsel then” was not a clear and unequivocal pro se demand requiring Faretta inquiry); United States v. Frazier-El (C.A.4, 2000), 204 F.3d 553, 558 (assertion of the right of self-representation “must be * * * clear and unequivocal”). {¶39} We find that Cassano’s April 23, 1999 statement was not an explicit and unequivocal demand for self-representation. | 2 | 2 |
Charles O. Reese v. Crispus C. Nixgreen2 sentences2002“The constitutional right of self-representation is waived if it is not timely and unequivocally asserted.” Jackson v. Ylst (C.A.9, 1990), 921 F.2d 882, 888 .’ See, e.g., Reese v. Nix (C.A.8, 1991), 942 F.2d 1276, 1281 (“I don’t want no counsel then” was not a clear and unequivocal pro se demand requiring Faretta inquiry); United States v. Frazier-El (C.A.4, 2000), 204 F.3d 553, 558 (assertion of the right of self-representation “must be * * * clear and unequivocal”). {¶ 39} We find that Cassano’s April 23, 1999 statement was not an explicit and unequivocal demand for self-representation. 2002See, e.g., Reese v. Nix (C.A.8, 1991), 942 F.2d 1276, 1281 (“I don’t want no counsel then” was not a clear and unequivocal pro se demand requiring Faretta inquiry); United States v. Frazier-El (C.A.4, 2000), 204 F.3d 553, 558 (assertion of the right of self-representation “must be * * * clear and unequivocal”). {¶39} We find that Cassano’s April 23, 1999 statement was not an explicit and unequivocal demand for self-representation. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Leegreen1 sentence2026State v. Walker, 2025-Ohio-975, ¶ 40 (1st Dist.); State v. Simon, 2021-Ohio-3090, ¶ 48 (4th Dist.); State v. Lee, 2025-Ohio-875, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.); State v. Williams, 2019-Ohio-2335 , ¶ 44 (8th Dist.); State v. Spencer, 2017-Ohio-1140 , ¶ 16 (10th Dist.); State v. Payne, 2014-Ohio-4304, ¶ 36 (11th Dist.). {¶22} Our review of the record indicates that the trial court conducted an appropriately thorough Faretta hearing that properly apprised Ginyard of what self- representation would entail. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Walkergreen1 sentence2026State v. Walker, 2025-Ohio-975, ¶ 40 (1st Dist.); State v. Simon, 2021-Ohio-3090, ¶ 48 (4th Dist.); State v. Lee, 2025-Ohio-875, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.); State v. Williams, 2019-Ohio-2335 , ¶ 44 (8th Dist.); State v. Spencer, 2017-Ohio-1140 , ¶ 16 (10th Dist.); State v. Payne, 2014-Ohio-4304, ¶ 36 (11th Dist.). {¶22} Our review of the record indicates that the trial court conducted an appropriately thorough Faretta hearing that properly apprised Ginyard of what self- representation would entail. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Paynegreen1 sentence2026State v. Walker, 2025-Ohio-975, ¶ 40 (1st Dist.); State v. Simon, 2021-Ohio-3090, ¶ 48 (4th Dist.); State v. Lee, 2025-Ohio-875, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.); State v. Williams, 2019-Ohio-2335 , ¶ 44 (8th Dist.); State v. Spencer, 2017-Ohio-1140 , ¶ 16 (10th Dist.); State v. Payne, 2014-Ohio-4304, ¶ 36 (11th Dist.). {¶22} Our review of the record indicates that the trial court conducted an appropriately thorough Faretta hearing that properly apprised Ginyard of what self- representation would entail. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dingmangreen2 sentences2026“This colloquy, known as a Faretta hearing, must include a review of the pending charges, the advantages of having counsel, and the pitfalls of self-representation, so that the defendant’s choice is made with his ‘eyes open.’” Id., quoting State v. Obermiller, 2016-Ohio-1594, ¶ 30 . {¶16} “Courts are to indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right including the right to be represented by counsel.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Dingman, 2024-Ohio-3327, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Dyer, 117 Ohio App.3d 92, 95 (2d Dist. 1996). 2026“This colloquy, known as a Faretta hearing, must include a review of the pending charges, the advantages of having counsel, and the pitfalls of self-representation, so that the defendant’s choice is made with his ‘eyes open.’” Id., quoting State v. Obermiller, 2016-Ohio-1594, ¶ 30 . {¶16} “Courts are to indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right including the right to be represented by counsel.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Dingman, 2024-Ohio-3327, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Dyer, 117 Ohio App.3d 92, 95 (2d Dist. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dyergreen2 sentences2026“This colloquy, known as a Faretta hearing, must include a review of the pending charges, the advantages of having counsel, and the pitfalls of self-representation, so that the defendant’s choice is made with his ‘eyes open.’” Id., quoting State v. Obermiller, 2016-Ohio-1594, ¶ 30 . {¶16} “Courts are to indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right including the right to be represented by counsel.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Dingman, 2024-Ohio-3327, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Dyer, 117 Ohio App.3d 92, 95 (2d Dist. 1996). 2026“This colloquy, known as a Faretta hearing, must include a review of the pending charges, the advantages of having counsel, and the pitfalls of self-representation, so that the defendant’s choice is made with his ‘eyes open.’” Id., quoting State v. Obermiller, 2016-Ohio-1594, ¶ 30 . {¶16} “Courts are to indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right including the right to be represented by counsel.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Dingman, 2024-Ohio-3327, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Dyer, 117 Ohio App.3d 92, 95 (2d Dist. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Simongreen1 sentence2026State v. Walker, 2025-Ohio-975, ¶ 40 (1st Dist.); State v. Simon, 2021-Ohio-3090, ¶ 48 (4th Dist.); State v. Lee, 2025-Ohio-875, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.); State v. Williams, 2019-Ohio-2335 , ¶ 44 (8th Dist.); State v. Spencer, 2017-Ohio-1140 , ¶ 16 (10th Dist.); State v. Payne, 2014-Ohio-4304, ¶ 36 (11th Dist.). {¶22} Our review of the record indicates that the trial court conducted an appropriately thorough Faretta hearing that properly apprised Ginyard of what self- representation would entail. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Obermiller (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2026“This colloquy, known as a Faretta hearing, must include a review of the pending charges, the advantages of having counsel, and the pitfalls of self-representation, so that the defendant’s choice is made with his ‘eyes open.’” Id., quoting State v. Obermiller, 2016-Ohio-1594, ¶ 30 . {¶16} “Courts are to indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right including the right to be represented by counsel.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Dingman, 2024-Ohio-3327, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Dyer, 117 Ohio App.3d 92, 95 (2d Dist. 1996). 2026“This colloquy, known as a Faretta hearing, must include a review of the pending charges, the advantages of having counsel, and the pitfalls of self-representation, so that the defendant’s choice is made with his ‘eyes open.’” Id., quoting State v. Obermiller, 2016-Ohio-1594, ¶ 30 . {¶16} “Courts are to indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right including the right to be represented by counsel.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Dingman, 2024-Ohio-3327, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Dyer, 117 Ohio App.3d 92, 95 (2d Dist. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Phillip Ductan
green
2 sentences2020And, relatedly, our cases have repeatedly stressed that the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver of the right to counsel turns on the “totality of the circumstances, including the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant.” John Williamson, 806 F.2d at 220 ; see Vann, -37- 776 F.3d at 763 (“We reflect on the totality of the circumstances to decide whether a defendant has knowingly [and intelligently] decided to proceed pro se.”); Padilla, 819 F.2d at 958 (recognizing that “the question of an intelligent waiver turns not only on the state of the record [including presumably t 2020And, relatedly, our cases have repeatedly stressed that the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver of the right to counsel turns on the “totality of the circumstances, including the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant.” John Williamson, 806 F.2d at 220 ; see Vann, -37- 776 F.3d at 763 (“We reflect on the totality of the circumstances to decide whether a defendant has knowingly [and intelligently] decided to proceed pro se.”); Padilla, 819 F.2d at 958 (recognizing that “the question of an intelligent waiver turns not only on the state of the record [including presumably t | 2 | 2020–2022 |
Faretta v. California
green
2 sentences2022Such a formal inquiry typically takes place in the context of a waiver hearing, customarily referred to as a Faretta hearing, in recognition of the Supreme Court's seminal waiver case, [United States v. Faretta, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).] See id. 2022Such a formal inquiry typically takes place in the context of a waiver hearing, customarily referred to as a Faretta hearing, in recognition of the Supreme Court's seminal waiver case, [United States v. Faretta, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).] See id. | 2 | 2020–2022 |
Lacy v. Lewis
green
2 sentences2026“This colloquy, known as a Faretta hearing, must include a review of the pending charges, the advantages of having counsel, and the pitfalls of self-representation, so that the defendant’s choice is made with his ‘eyes open.’” Id., quoting State v. Obermiller, 2016-Ohio-1594, ¶ 30 . {¶16} “Courts are to indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right including the right to be represented by counsel.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Dingman, 2024-Ohio-3327, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Dyer, 117 Ohio App.3d 92, 95 (2d Dist. 1996). 2026“This colloquy, known as a Faretta hearing, must include a review of the pending charges, the advantages of having counsel, and the pitfalls of self-representation, so that the defendant’s choice is made with his ‘eyes open.’” Id., quoting State v. Obermiller, 2016-Ohio-1594, ¶ 30 . {¶16} “Courts are to indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right including the right to be represented by counsel.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Dingman, 2024-Ohio-3327, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Dyer, 117 Ohio App.3d 92, 95 (2d Dist. 1996). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Adams v. United States Ex Rel. McCann
green
2 sentences2020McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 , 63 S.Ct. 236 , 87 L.Ed.2d 268 (1942). 2020McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 , 63 S.Ct. 236 , 87 L.Ed.2d 268 (1942). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Brewer v. Williams
green
2 sentences2020Finally, though each right is constitutionally protected, the case law, again quite appropriately, assumes a defendant -53- is better served with counsel; thus, the waiver of counsel must be “unequivocal and explicit,” and, when making the waiver determination, a trial court is required to “indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. at ¶ 29, quoting Brewer, 430 U.S. 387, 404 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 . {¶ 72} Turning to the pending case, at the end of the lengthy, comprehensive Faretta hearing, Lee balked at signing the waiver of counsel form. 2020Finally, though each right is constitutionally protected, the case law, again quite appropriately, assumes a defendant -53- is better served with counsel; thus, the waiver of counsel must be “unequivocal and explicit,” and, when making the waiver determination, a trial court is required to “indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. at ¶ 29, quoting Brewer, 430 U.S. 387, 404 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 . {¶ 72} Turning to the pending case, at the end of the lengthy, comprehensive Faretta hearing, Lee balked at signing the waiver of counsel form. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Vernon Jackson v. Eddie Ylst
green
1 sentence2002“The constitutional right of self-representation is waived if it is not timely and unequivocally asserted.” Jackson v. Ylst (C.A.9, 1990), 921 F.2d 882, 888 .’ See, e.g., Reese v. Nix (C.A.8, 1991), 942 F.2d 1276, 1281 (“I don’t want no counsel then” was not a clear and unequivocal pro se demand requiring Faretta inquiry); United States v. Frazier-El (C.A.4, 2000), 204 F.3d 553, 558 (assertion of the right of self-representation “must be * * * clear and unequivocal”). {¶ 39} We find that Cassano’s April 23, 1999 statement was not an explicit and unequivocal demand for self-representation. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.