Faretta motion in California

2026(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 .) The timeliness element is necessary “to avoid unjustifiable delay or disruption of orderly court proceedings.” (People v. Ruiz (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 780, 791 .) A Faretta motion is timely if it is asserted “within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.” (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128 (Windham).) Because what constitutes “a reasonable time” before trial will vary, “timeliness for purposes of Faretta is based not on a fixed and arbitrary point in time, but upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances that exis

2011Our Supreme Court has “held on numerous occasions that Faretta motions made on the eve of trial are untimely.” (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 722 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 63 , 237 P.3d 416 ].) A motion made that close to the day set for trial is “extreme” (id. at p. 723) and now is disfavored (see id. at pp. 722-723 [collecting cases]; but see People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121 , 126-128 & fn. 5 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 8 , 560 P.2d 1187 ] [a “showing of reasonable cause” made the day before trial may justify granting a Faretta motion and ordering a continuance].) C.

2026In our prior opinion, we detailed the trial court’s second declaration of doubt as to Lightsey’s mental competence, which followed the trial court granting Lightsey’s motion to represent himself (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 ) and the appointment of advisory counsel: “[O]n April 11, 1994, the trial court, after a very lengthy discussion, granted defendant’s Faretta motion and relieved Attorneys [Edward] Brown and [James] Sorena.

2026Defense counsel made clear that unless they were removed as counsel, they would present a penalty phase defense “contrary to [Hronis’s] wishes and desires as expressed,” which presented a “very real conflict.” They added that Hronis’s Marsden motion sounded more like a Faretta motion.9 The court denied the Marsden motion, noting that counsel had discretion to present a penalty defense against a 9 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 at pp. 832-835 (Faretta) held that a defendant has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when the defendant voluntarily and intelligently elects t

2026(See People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 21 ; People v. Scott (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1205 [trial court properly denied Faretta motion as equivocal where defendant’s “comments 5 suggest he made the Faretta motion only because he wanted to rid himself of appointed counsel”]; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 99 [defendant’s reference to right of self-representation, made immediately following denial of Marsden motion, supports conclusion that defendant did not make an unequivocal Faretta motion]; see also Moon v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1529-1530 [Faretta reques

2025It was not “an insincere request or one made under the cloud of emotion” which “may be denied.” (People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 21 .) Further, defendant’s request was timely. “[A] trial court may consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a defendant’s pretrial Faretta motion is timely.” (People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 500 .) Defendant made an oral motion at a trial readiness conference, which the court further continued a week later.

2026(See People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 21 ; People v. Scott (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1205 [trial court properly denied Faretta motion as equivocal where defendant’s “comments 5 suggest he made the Faretta motion only because he wanted to rid himself of appointed counsel”]; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 99 [defendant’s reference to right of self-representation, made immediately following denial of Marsden motion, supports conclusion that defendant did not make an unequivocal Faretta motion]; see also Moon v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1529-1530 [Faretta reques

2025(See Johnson, at p. 500; Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 726 .) The Supreme Court in Johnson also observed California cases have held “‘on numerous occasions that Faretta motions made on the eve of trial are untimely.’” (Johnson, at pp. 499-500 [citing five Supreme Court cases, including Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 102 (“Faretta motion made ‘moments before jury selection was set to begin”’ was untimely) and People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1110 (Faretta motion made on the date scheduled for trial was untimely)].) In Herrera, the other case Tyner cites, the defendant’s motion, made

2026(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 .) The timeliness element is necessary “to avoid unjustifiable delay or disruption of orderly court proceedings.” (People v. Ruiz (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 780, 791 .) A Faretta motion is timely if it is asserted “within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.” (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128 (Windham).) Because what constitutes “a reasonable time” before trial will vary, “timeliness for purposes of Faretta is based not on a fixed and arbitrary point in time, but upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances that exis

2026(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 .) The timeliness element is necessary “to avoid unjustifiable delay or disruption of orderly court proceedings.” (People v. Ruiz (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 780, 791 .) A Faretta motion is timely if it is asserted “within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.” (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128 (Windham).) Because what constitutes “a reasonable time” before trial will vary, “timeliness for purposes of Faretta is based not on a fixed and arbitrary point in time, but upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances that exis

2026(See People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 21 ; People v. Scott (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1205 [trial court properly denied Faretta motion as equivocal where defendant’s “comments 5 suggest he made the Faretta motion only because he wanted to rid himself of appointed counsel”]; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 99 [defendant’s reference to right of self-representation, made immediately following denial of Marsden motion, supports conclusion that defendant did not make an unequivocal Faretta motion]; see also Moon v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1529-1530 [Faretta reques

2026We note here that, in assessing whether a defendant’s Faretta motion was untimely and equivocal, the court in People v. Scott (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1197 , stated: “[T]he motion was not unequivocal.

2026(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 .) The timeliness element is necessary “to avoid unjustifiable delay or disruption of orderly court proceedings.” (People v. Ruiz (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 780, 791 .) A Faretta motion is timely if it is asserted “within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.” (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128 (Windham).) Because what constitutes “a reasonable time” before trial will vary, “timeliness for purposes of Faretta is based not on a fixed and arbitrary point in time, but upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances that exis

2026First, the defendant must be mentally competent, and must make his request 9 knowingly and intelligently, having been apprised of the dangers of self-representation. [Citations.] Second, he must make his request unequivocally. [Citations.] Third, he must make his request within a reasonable time before trial. [Citations.]” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 ; accord, People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327 , 397.) “[T]he Faretta right, once asserted, may be waived or abandoned[, however].” (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 909 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin

2026Whereas the erroneous denial of a timely Faretta motion is reversible per se (People v. Joseph (1983) 34 Cal.3d 936, 948 ), the erroneous denial of an untimely Faretta motion is reviewed for harmless error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).

2021(People v. Kirvin (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1515 (Kirvin).) “The primary motivation for the Faretta rule is respect for the accused’s freedom of choice to personally conduct his own defense. [Citations.]” (People v. Joseph (1983) 34 Cal.3d 936, 946 .) When an unequivocal request to proceed in propria persona (pro per) is timely interposed, a trial court “ ‘ “must permit a defendant to represent himself upon ascertaining that he has voluntarily and intelligently elected to do so, irrespective of how unwise such a choice might appear to be.” ’ ” (People v. Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th 814, 824 .)

2026(See People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 221 .) Since defendant’s Faretta motion was untimely, we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying it.

2026(People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 217 (Dent).) “[R]ecent case law has established that criminal defendants may fall into a ‘gray- area’ between competence to stand trial and competence to represent themselves at trial. [Citation.] Even if a defendant is competent to stand trial, a trial court may deny self-representation if ‘the defendant suffers from a severe mental illness to the point where he or she cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to present the defense without the help of counsel.’ ” (People v. Best (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 747 , 757 (Best), quoting People v. Johnson (2012) 53 C

2025(People v. Leonard (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 776 , 787 8 (Leonard).) A defendant’s Faretta motion for self-representation differs from a Marsden motion for substitution of counsel, “one raising the question of defendant’s competency to waive his right to counsel, and the other raising the question of existing counsel’s competency.” (People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 855 (Burton).) A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to choose self-representation instead of representation by counsel. ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 807, 819-821.) However, a request for self-representation does no

2024(See id. at p. 853 [identifying factors trial courts consider in determining whether to grant a Faretta motion after trial has commenced].) In so ruling, the court advised Maury that he had the right to tell the jury the penalty he preferred, regardless of whether he was represented by counsel.

2026(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 .) The timeliness element is necessary “to avoid unjustifiable delay or disruption of orderly court proceedings.” (People v. Ruiz (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 780, 791 .) A Faretta motion is timely if it is asserted “within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.” (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128 (Windham).) Because what constitutes “a reasonable time” before trial will vary, “timeliness for purposes of Faretta is based not on a fixed and arbitrary point in time, but upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances that exis

2023(See People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 102 [Faretta motion made before jury selection untimely]; People v. Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 502 [motion brought two weeks before scheduled trial date was untimely]; People v. Ruiz (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 780 , 8 791 [Faretta motion made six days before trial was untimely]; People v. Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 690 [Faretta motion untimely when made after “a full day of voir dire” and at the end of preliminary jury instructions].) Whether to grant appellant’s motion was therefore in the trial court’s discretion.

2025It concluded Earley had problems with rigidity and inflexible thinking, “above and beyond just the severe mental illness that he suffers from.” The trial court was well within its discretion to conclude Earley “is and will remain so disruptive, obstreperous, disobedient, disrespectful or obstructionist in his or her actions or words as to preclude the exercise of the right to self-representation.” (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 735 .) By contrast, in Best the court stated that, based on the record in that case, “[w]e might hesitate to find that the evidence here supported a denial of the Fare

2025As noted, Faretta requires that a defendant both “knowingly and intelligently forgoes his right to counsel” and be “able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.” ( McKaskle, supra, 465 U.S. at pp. 173-174.) The California Supreme Court has held that denial of a motion for self-representation at trial is appropriate “when a defendant’s conduct prior to the Faretta motion gives the trial court a reasonable basis for believing that his self-representation will create disruption.” (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 734 .) In Welch, the high court concluded the trial court d

2024It is true that the “[e]rroneous denial of a Faretta motion is reversible per se.” (People v. Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th 814, 824 ; see also People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 363-364 [denial of self-representation constitutes structural error].) Here, however, defendant’s Faretta motion was not denied, erroneously or otherwise; it was granted, and he was permitted to represent himself.

2024(Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 26 ; accord People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 502 (Johnson); Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 721-722; People v. Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th 814, 825 (Butler); see also People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 271 (Gomez) [“a trial court may directly deny a Faretta request when it is designed ‘to frustrate the orderly administration of justice’ ”].) Further, a court may deny a Faretta motion when a defendant’s conduct prior to the Faretta motion “gives the trial court a reasonable basis for believing that his self-representation will create disruption.” (See P

2022“We have long held that a Faretta motion is timely if it is made ‘within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.’ ” (People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 499 (Johnson).) “[T]he ‘reasonable time’ requirement ‘must not be used as a means of limiting a defendant’s constitutional right of self-representation,’ but rather to prevent the defendant from ‘misus[ing] the Faretta mandate as a means to unjustifiably delay a scheduled trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ ” (Ibid.) We have routinely declined to identify a specific period in time at which a self-repr

2021“We have long held that a Faretta motion is timely if it is made ‘within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial.’ ” (People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 499 (Johnson).) “[T]he ‘reasonable time’ requirement ‘must not be used as a means of limiting a defendant’s constitutional right of self-representation,’ but rather to prevent the defendant from ‘misus[ing] the Faretta mandate as a means to unjustifiably delay a scheduled trial or to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.’ ” (Ibid.) We have routinely declined to identify a specific period in time at which a self-repr

2026(See, e.g., Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 932 [a Faretta motion made out of a temporary whim, annoyance, or frustration is not unequivocal even if defendant has said he seeks self-representation]; Danks, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 296 [“defendant’s references to self-representation were equivocal, born primarily of frustration regarding the granting of [defense] counsel’s requests for continuances and his desire to avoid further psychiatric examination”]; People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367 , 407-410 [expression of dissatisfaction with attorney in conjunction with other statements about bein

2026First, the defendant must be mentally competent, and must make his request 9 knowingly and intelligently, having been apprised of the dangers of self-representation. [Citations.] Second, he must make his request unequivocally. [Citations.] Third, he must make his request within a reasonable time before trial. [Citations.]” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 ; accord, People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327 , 397.) “[T]he Faretta right, once asserted, may be waived or abandoned[, however].” (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 909 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin

2022In determining whether to permit a Faretta waiver, we have suggested “the court provide advisements falling into three general categories: (1) ensuring the defendant’s awareness of the ‘ “dangers and disadvantages” ’ [citation] associated with self-representation; (2) inquiring into the defendant’s intellectual capacity; and (3) informing the defendant that he or she cannot later claim inadequacy of representation.” (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 978; see People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568 , 572-574.) McClain now argues his failure to graduate from high school and his work as a brick l

2017(People v. Hall (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1102, 1108-1109 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 494 ]; People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568, 570-571 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 36 ].) 15 Defendant contends a Faretta error involves “choice of counsel,” which is necessarily unquantifiable, and therefore unquestionably qualifies as structural error, citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, 548 U.S. at p. 149 (both denial of counsel and denial of right of self-representation are structural errors).

2026(See, e.g., People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1038 [court warned the defendant that a request for a continuance would be a basis for denying Faretta motion, and the defendant accepted pro se status on the understanding that no additional time would be granted]; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41 , 110 10 [court granted Faretta motion only after the defendant “expressly represented he was able to proceed without a continuance”], overruled on other grounds in People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 462 ; People v. Rudd (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 620, 626 [Faretta motion granted only after th

2025(See, e.g., People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 109 (Clark) [explaining that the requirement of a timely request is designed to serve the efficient administration of justice rather than to protect a defendant from the defendant’s own decision].) The Attorney General also argues that the Faretta request was equivocal not unequivocal, which also weighs against a finding that a valid Faretta motion was made 7 and that the trial court granted it.

2026First, the defendant must be mentally competent, and must make his request 9 knowingly and intelligently, having been apprised of the dangers of self-representation. [Citations.] Second, he must make his request unequivocally. [Citations.] Third, he must make his request within a reasonable time before trial. [Citations.]” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729 ; accord, People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327 , 397.) “[T]he Faretta right, once asserted, may be waived or abandoned[, however].” (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 909 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin

2022Otherwise, requests for self-representation are addressed to the trial court’s sound discretion. [Citation.] Moreover, whether timely or untimely, a request for self-representation must be unequivocal.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 453 .) The requirement that a Faretta motion be unequivocal helps to ensure that the motion is knowingly and voluntarily made, that the defendant “truly desires” to represent himself, and that the defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, which secures the protection of many of the defendant’s other constitutional rights, will

2025(See Johnson, at p. 500; Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 726 .) The Supreme Court in Johnson also observed California cases have held “‘on numerous occasions that Faretta motions made on the eve of trial are untimely.’” (Johnson, at pp. 499-500 [citing five Supreme Court cases, including Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 102 (“Faretta motion made ‘moments before jury selection was set to begin”’ was untimely) and People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1110 (Faretta motion made on the date scheduled for trial was untimely)].) In Herrera, the other case Tyner cites, the defendant’s motion, made

2024(People v. Wright, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 432, 437-439 [Faretta motion made two days before the first day of trial was untimely]; People v. Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 722 [“we have held on numerous occasions that Faretta motions made on the eve of trial are untimely”]; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 102 [Faretta motion made “moments before jury selection was set to begin” deemed untimely]; People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1110 [self-representation motion made on the date scheduled for trial untimely].) We see no reason a different measure of timeliness would apply in this

2026(See People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 433, fn. 15 [appellate court may affirm denial of Faretta motion as untimely even if trial court denied it on other grounds].) The denial of an untimely Faretta motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

2025(People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 433, fn. 15 [“[e]ven when the trial court does not state it is denying a Faretta motion on the ground of untimeliness, we independently review the record to determine whether the motion would properly have been denied on this ground”], citing People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 218 ; People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 703 ; Best, at p. 773 & fn. 5 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.); People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1295, fn. 12 [“ ‘[W]e review the ruling, not the court’s reasoning, and, if . . . correct on any ground, we affirm’ ”].) A Faretta mot

2025In Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th 475 the 19 California Supreme Court acknowledged that “most federal courts have concluded that a Faretta motion is timely as a matter of law if it is made before trial, unless the motion is made for the purpose of delay,” but the Supreme Court in Johnson rejected any such “bright-line rule” for California, observing many states have adopted a timeliness test consistent with Lynch.

2025In Johnson, supra, 8 Cal.5th 475 the 19 California Supreme Court acknowledged that “most federal courts have concluded that a Faretta motion is timely as a matter of law if it is made before trial, unless the motion is made for the purpose of delay,” but the Supreme Court in Johnson rejected any such “bright-line rule” for California, observing many states have adopted a timeliness test consistent with Lynch.

2025When a court doubts a defendant’s competence to stand trial, it ‘shall appoint a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist, and any other expert the court may deem appropriate, to examine the defendant.’ [Citation.] Similarly, when it doubts the defendant’s mental competence for self-representation, it may order a psychological or psychiatric examination to inquire into that question.” (People v. Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 530 ; see People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 208 [“when evaluating a Faretta motion,” a trial court need only inquire into a defendant’s mental competence “where it

2025Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when they knowingly and intelligently elect to do so. ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 835– 836.) “On appeal, we examine de novo the whole record—not merely the transcript of the hearing on the Faretta motion itself—to determine the validity of the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel.” (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1070 (Koontz).) “No particular form of words is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to waive counsel and elect self-representation; the test is whether the record as a whole demo

2026(See, e.g., People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1038 [court warned the defendant that a request for a continuance would be a basis for denying Faretta motion, and the defendant accepted pro se status on the understanding that no additional time would be granted]; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41 , 110 10 [court granted Faretta motion only after the defendant “expressly represented he was able to proceed without a continuance”], overruled on other grounds in People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 462 ; People v. Rudd (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 620, 626 [Faretta motion granted only after th

2026The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.’ ” (People v. Crovedi (1966) 65 Cal.2d 199, 207 , quoting Ungar v. Sarafite (1964) 376 U.S. 575, 589 .) Relying on People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744 , Mayes contends that once the trial court granted his Faretta motion, it was required to also grant his request for a reasonable continuance.

2024To be sure, a defendant may have sufficiently severe mental illness to warrant denying self-representation even if he does not engage in “bizarre, noncompliant, and disruptive behavior.” (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 525 ) In People v. Gardner (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 945 , there was no evidence of bad behavior by the defendant in court, but the trial court nevertheless denied his Faretta motion on the basis of a doctor’s report diagnosing him with “an ‘Expressive Language Disorder’ that prevented him from coherently communicating with the court or a jury. [The doctor] also reported that [th

2021The court decided that, in light of the high court’s then- recent decision in Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 (Edwards), it could not rule on defendant’s Faretta motion without an opinion from a mental health expert as to defendant’s competence to represent himself.

2026Whereas the erroneous denial of a timely Faretta motion is reversible per se (People v. Joseph (1983) 34 Cal.3d 936, 948 ), the erroneous denial of an untimely Faretta motion is reviewed for harmless error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).

2016Finally, even assuming the court erroneously denied his untimely Faretta motion, such a decision is reviewed under the harmless error test of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .

2026(See, e.g., People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1038 [court warned the defendant that a request for a continuance would be a basis for denying Faretta motion, and the defendant accepted pro se status on the understanding that no additional time would be granted]; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41 , 110 10 [court granted Faretta motion only after the defendant “expressly represented he was able to proceed without a continuance”], overruled on other grounds in People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 462 ; People v. Rudd (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 620, 626 [Faretta motion granted only after th

2023(Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 819 ; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 959 .) Here, Whitehurst initialed and signed a Faretta waiver form while still represented by counsel, and the trial court questioned Whitehurst on the record before granting his request.

2026(People v. Silfa (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1322 (Silfa).) In reviewing the denial of a Faretta motion, “we must defer largely to the trial court’s discretion.” (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 531 .) “The trial court’s determination regarding a defendant’s competence [to represent himself] must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” (Ibid.) III.

2026At the May 24 hearing, Judge Nathan Leedy, a different judge than the one who denied Torres’s prior Faretta motion,4 questioned Torres and then, rather than ruling on the motion outright, ordered that an expert evaluate Torres’s competence to represent himself under People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519 (Johnson).