16 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gardner v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Osbey, 425 S.C. at 620, 825 S.E.2d at 51 ; see also Gardner v. State, 351 S.C. 407, 413 , 570 S.E.2d 184, 187 (2002) (holding petitioner, who was repeatedly advised of his right to a public defender and still proceeded pro se, did not knowingly waive his right to counsel where he was not warned of the dangers of self-representation). 2026Osbey, 425 S.C. at 620, 825 S.E.2d at 51 ; see also Gardner v. State, 351 S.C. 407, 413 , 570 S.E.2d 184, 187 (2002) (holding petitioner, who was repeatedly advised of his right to a public defender and still proceeded pro se, did not knowingly waive his right to counsel where he was not warned of the dangers of self-representation). | 2 | 3 |
Osbey v. Stategreen2 sentences2026The South Carolina Supreme Court has explicitly stated, however, that Faretta warnings are required whether the defendant's waiver of counsel is by "affirmative, verbal request" or "by conduct." Osbey, 425 S.C. at 620, 825 S.E.2d at 51 ; see also Boykin, 324 S.C. at 558 , 478 S.E.2d at 692 (holding the defendant could not have waived his right to counsel "either expressly or by his conduct" where he was not warned of the dangers of self-representation); Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1102-03 (finding that "any claim that [defendant] waived his right to counsel by conduct is precluded" by the court's fai 2026Our supreme court has held that Faretta warnings are required whether the waiver of counsel is by "an affirmative, verbal request" or "by conduct." Osbey v. State, 425 S.C. 615 , 619, 825 S.E.2d 48, 50 (2019) (quoting State v. Roberson, 382 S.C. 185, 187 , 675 S.E.2d 732, 733 (2009)). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2024A waiver is an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known right."); Osbey v. State, 425 S.C. 615 , 620, 825 S.E.2d 48, 50 (2019) ("For a waiver to be 'knowing and intelligent,' the defendant 'should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.'" (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 )); Thompson, 355 S.C. at 262 , 584 S.E.2d at 134-35 ("To effectuate a valid waiver of the right to counsel, the two-pronged Faretta test must be met in which the accused is (1) advised of his right to counsel and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation."); id. at 2024A waiver is an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known right."); Osbey v. State, 425 S.C. 615 , 620, 825 S.E.2d 48, 50 (2019) ("For a waiver to be 'knowing and intelligent,' the defendant 'should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.'" (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 )); Thompson, 355 S.C. at 262 , 584 S.E.2d at 134-35 ("To effectuate a valid waiver of the right to counsel, the two-pronged Faretta test must be met in which the accused is (1) advised of his right to counsel and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation."); id. at | 2 | 3 |
Prince v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Thompson 355 S.C. at 262 , 584 S.E.2d at 134 (citing Prince v. State , 301 S.C. 422, 423-24 , 392 S.E.2d 462, 463 (1990)). 2007Thompson 355 S.C. at 262 , 584 S.E.2d at 134 (citing Prince v. State , 301 S.C. 422, 423-24 , 392 S.E.2d 462, 463 (1990)). | 2 | 2 |
Faretta v. Californiagreen2 sentences2024A waiver is an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known right."); Osbey v. State, 425 S.C. 615 , 620, 825 S.E.2d 48, 50 (2019) ("For a waiver to be 'knowing and intelligent,' the defendant 'should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.'" (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 )); Thompson, 355 S.C. at 262 , 584 S.E.2d at 134-35 ("To effectuate a valid waiver of the right to counsel, the two-pronged Faretta test must be met in which the accused is (1) advised of his right to counsel and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation."); id. at 2024A waiver is an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known right."); Osbey v. State, 425 S.C. 615 , 620, 825 S.E.2d 48, 50 (2019) ("For a waiver to be 'knowing and intelligent,' the defendant 'should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.'" (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 )); Thompson, 355 S.C. at 262 , 584 S.E.2d at 134-35 ("To effectuate a valid waiver of the right to counsel, the two-pronged Faretta test must be met in which the accused is (1) advised of his right to counsel and (2) adequately warned of the dangers of self-representation."); id. at | 1 | 4 |
United States v. Ronald J. Goldberggreen2 sentences2026The South Carolina Supreme Court has explicitly stated, however, that Faretta warnings are required whether the defendant's waiver of counsel is by "affirmative, verbal request" or "by conduct." Osbey, 425 S.C. at 620, 825 S.E.2d at 51 ; see also Boykin, 324 S.C. at 558 , 478 S.E.2d at 692 (holding the defendant could not have waived his right to counsel "either expressly or by his conduct" where he was not warned of the dangers of self-representation); Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1102-03 (finding that "any claim that [defendant] waived his right to counsel by conduct is precluded" by the court's fai 2007Moreover, to the extent that the defendants [conduct is] examined under the doctrine of waiver, there can be no valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel unless the defendant also receives Faretta warnings. Goldberg , 67 F.3d at 1100 (citing United States v. Bauer , 956 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1992; United States v. Allen , 895 F.2d 1577 (10th Cir. 1990)). The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct | 1 | 3 |
State v. Boykingreen2 sentences2026The South Carolina Supreme Court has explicitly stated, however, that Faretta warnings are required whether the defendant's waiver of counsel is by "affirmative, verbal request" or "by conduct." Osbey, 425 S.C. at 620, 825 S.E.2d at 51 ; see also Boykin, 324 S.C. at 558 , 478 S.E.2d at 692 (holding the defendant could not have waived his right to counsel "either expressly or by his conduct" where he was not warned of the dangers of self-representation); Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1102-03 (finding that "any claim that [defendant] waived his right to counsel by conduct is precluded" by the court's fai 2026The South Carolina Supreme Court has explicitly stated, however, that Faretta warnings are required whether the defendant's waiver of counsel is by "affirmative, verbal request" or "by conduct." Osbey, 425 S.C. at 620, 825 S.E.2d at 51 ; see also Boykin, 324 S.C. at 558 , 478 S.E.2d at 692 (holding the defendant could not have waived his right to counsel "either expressly or by his conduct" where he was not warned of the dangers of self-representation); Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1102-03 (finding that "any claim that [defendant] waived his right to counsel by conduct is precluded" by the court's fai | 1 | 2 |
James Edward Wilks v. Thomas Israel, Warden, Wisconsin State Prisongreen1 sentence2026The South Carolina Supreme Court has explicitly stated, however, that Faretta warnings are required whether the defendant's waiver of counsel is by "affirmative, verbal request" or "by conduct." Osbey, 425 S.C. at 620, 825 S.E.2d at 51 ; see also Boykin, 324 S.C. at 558 , 478 S.E.2d at 692 (holding the defendant could not have waived his right to counsel "either expressly or by his conduct" where he was not warned of the dangers of self-representation); Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1102-03 (finding that "any claim that [defendant] waived his right to counsel by conduct is precluded" by the court's fai | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Herman Padillagreen1 sentence2026The South Carolina Supreme Court has explicitly stated, however, that Faretta warnings are required whether the defendant's waiver of counsel is by "affirmative, verbal request" or "by conduct." Osbey, 425 S.C. at 620, 825 S.E.2d at 51 ; see also Boykin, 324 S.C. at 558 , 478 S.E.2d at 692 (holding the defendant could not have waived his right to counsel "either expressly or by his conduct" where he was not warned of the dangers of self-representation); Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1102-03 (finding that "any claim that [defendant] waived his right to counsel by conduct is precluded" by the court's fai | 1 | 1 |
State v. Robersongreen2 sentences2026Our supreme court has held that Faretta warnings are required whether the waiver of counsel is by "an affirmative, verbal request" or "by conduct." Osbey v. State, 425 S.C. 615 , 619, 825 S.E.2d 48, 50 (2019) (quoting State v. Roberson, 382 S.C. 185, 187 , 675 S.E.2d 732, 733 (2009)). 2026Our supreme court has held that Faretta warnings are required whether the waiver of counsel is by "an affirmative, verbal request" or "by conduct." Osbey v. State, 425 S.C. 615 , 619, 825 S.E.2d 48, 50 (2019) (quoting State v. Roberson, 382 S.C. 185, 187 , 675 S.E.2d 732, 733 (2009)). | 1 | 1 |
Hilton v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Nonetheless, I join the majority because it is necessary once again to remind the State, opposing counsel, and the circuit court of the need for orders that contain specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. 3 See, e.g., Hilton v. State, 422 S.C. 204, 208 , 810 S.E.2d 852, 854 (2018) (noting the Prince and Faretta framework apply in a PCR setting where the applicant sought to waive his statutory right to counsel). 2019Nonetheless, I join the majority because it is necessary once again to remind the State, opposing counsel, and the circuit court of the need for orders that contain specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. 3 See, e.g., Hilton v. State, 422 S.C. 204, 208 , 810 S.E.2d 852, 854 (2018) (noting the Prince and Faretta framework apply in a PCR setting where the applicant sought to waive his statutory right to counsel). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2018See People v. Lewis , 39 Cal.4th 970 , 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467 , 140 P.3d 775 , 803 (2006) (observing criminal defendants sometimes assert the right of self-representation for the purpose of "plant[ing] reversible error in the record). 2018See People v. Lewis , 39 Cal.4th 970 , 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467 , 140 P.3d 775 , 803 (2006) (observing criminal defendants sometimes assert the right of self-representation for the purpose of "plant[ing] reversible error in the record). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fullergreen2 sentences2017United States v. Lorick, 753 F.2d 1295, 1298 (4th Cir. 1985); State v. Fuller, 337 S.C. 236, 241 , 523 S.E.2d 168, 170 (1999). 2017United States v. Lorick, 753 F.2d 1295, 1298 (4th Cir. 1985); State v. Fuller, 337 S.C. 236, 241 , 523 S.E.2d 168, 170 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 447544green2 sentences2017United States v. Lorick, 753 F.2d 1295, 1298 (4th Cir. 1985); State v. Fuller, 337 S.C. 236, 241 , 523 S.E.2d 168, 170 (1999). 2017United States v. Lorick, 753 F.2d 1295, 1298 (4th Cir. 1985); State v. Fuller, 337 S.C. 236, 241 , 523 S.E.2d 168, 170 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dorcegreen2 sentences2015See State v. Dorce, 320 S.C. 480, 483 , 465 S.E.2d 772, 773 (Ct.App.1995) (“The trial judge was presented with contradicting testimony, and it was within his province, as the trier of fact, to weigh the credibility of the evidence presented to determine which witnesses he deemed credible.”). 2015See State v. Dorce, 320 S.C. 480, 483 , 465 S.E.2d 772, 773 (Ct.App.1995) (“The trial judge was presented with contradicting testimony, and it was within his province, as the trier of fact, to weigh the credibility of the evidence presented to determine which witnesses he deemed credible.”). | 1 | 1 |
David Larry Nelson v. State of Alabamagreen1 sentence2014Alabama, 292 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002) ("The Supreme Court in Faretta did not set out any fixed time frame for the holding of the Faretta hearing . . . ."); United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating "the Faretta right to self-representation is not absolute, and 'the government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer'" (quoting Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 162 , 120 S. Ct. 684, 691 (2000))); Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 94-95 (Ky. 20 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Holmesgreen2 sentences2014See State v. Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 586 , 698 S.E.2d 596, 602 (2010) (stating "[t]he request to proceed pro se must be clearly asserted"); see also Raulerson v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 966, 970-71 , 105 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("If a request [for self-representation] is ambiguous, the trial judge need not respond, because there has been no clear indication of a desire to waive a right to counsel."); United States v. Holmes, 376 F. App'x 346, 348-49 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding defendant "did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to self- repr 2014See State v. Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 586 , 698 S.E.2d 596, 602 (2010) (stating "[t]he request to proceed pro se must be clearly asserted"); see also Raulerson v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 966, 970-71 , 105 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("If a request [for self-representation] is ambiguous, the trial judge need not respond, because there has been no clear indication of a desire to waive a right to counsel."); United States v. Holmes, 376 F. App'x 346, 348-49 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding defendant "did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to self- repr | 1 | 1 |
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate Districtgreen2 sentences2014Alabama, 292 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002) ("The Supreme Court in Faretta did not set out any fixed time frame for the holding of the Faretta hearing . . . ."); United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating "the Faretta right to self-representation is not absolute, and 'the government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer'" (quoting Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 162 , 120 S. Ct. 684, 691 (2000))); Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 94-95 (Ky. 20 2014Alabama, 292 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002) ("The Supreme Court in Faretta did not set out any fixed time frame for the holding of the Faretta hearing . . . ."); United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating "the Faretta right to self-representation is not absolute, and 'the government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer'" (quoting Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 162 , 120 S. Ct. 684, 691 (2000))); Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 94-95 (Ky. 20 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Simsgreen2 sentences2014See State v. Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 586 , 698 S.E.2d 596, 602 (2010) (stating "[t]he request to proceed pro se must be clearly asserted"); see also Raulerson v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 966, 970-71 , 105 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("If a request [for self-representation] is ambiguous, the trial judge need not respond, because there has been no clear indication of a desire to waive a right to counsel."); United States v. Holmes, 376 F. App'x 346, 348-49 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding defendant "did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to self- repr 2014See State v. Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 586 , 698 S.E.2d 596, 602 (2010) (stating "[t]he request to proceed pro se must be clearly asserted"); see also Raulerson v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 966, 970-71 , 105 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("If a request [for self-representation] is ambiguous, the trial judge need not respond, because there has been no clear indication of a desire to waive a right to counsel."); United States v. Holmes, 376 F. App'x 346, 348-49 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding defendant "did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to self- repr | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Dennogreen2 sentences2014See Nelson v. 1 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964). 2 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S. Ct. 375 (1972). 2014See Nelson v. 1 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964). 2 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S. Ct. 375 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Winklergreen2 sentences2014See State v. Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 586 , 698 S.E.2d 596, 602 (2010) (stating "[t]he request to proceed pro se must be clearly asserted"); see also Raulerson v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 966, 970-71 , 105 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("If a request [for self-representation] is ambiguous, the trial judge need not respond, because there has been no clear indication of a desire to waive a right to counsel."); United States v. Holmes, 376 F. App'x 346, 348-49 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding defendant "did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to self- repr 2014See State v. Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 586 , 698 S.E.2d 596, 602 (2010) (stating "[t]he request to proceed pro se must be clearly asserted"); see also Raulerson v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 966, 970-71 , 105 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("If a request [for self-representation] is ambiguous, the trial judge need not respond, because there has been no clear indication of a desire to waive a right to counsel."); United States v. Holmes, 376 F. App'x 346, 348-49 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding defendant "did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to self- repr | 1 | 1 |
Swan v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2014Alabama, 292 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002) ("The Supreme Court in Faretta did not set out any fixed time frame for the holding of the Faretta hearing . . . ."); United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating "the Faretta right to self-representation is not absolute, and 'the government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer'" (quoting Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 162 , 120 S. Ct. 684, 691 (2000))); Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 94-95 (Ky. 20 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Madsengreen2 sentences2014But the law does not require such empty process."); 384 S.W.2d at 95 ("[W]hile the right is a structural right, it must still be applied in the real world, which sometimes requires a practical approach, not an absolute and unbending one."); State v. Madsen, 229 P.3d 714, 717 (Wash. 2010) ("Even if a request is unequivocal, timely, voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, a court may defer ruling if the court is reasonably unprepared to immediately respond to the request."); 229 P.3d at 718 ("The trial court was within the bounds of proper discretion to delay ruling on the matter until it could pro 2014But the law does not require such empty process."); 384 S.W.2d at 95 ("[W]hile the right is a structural right, it must still be applied in the real world, which sometimes requires a practical approach, not an absolute and unbending one."); State v. Madsen, 229 P.3d 714, 717 (Wash. 2010) ("Even if a request is unequivocal, timely, voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, a court may defer ruling if the court is reasonably unprepared to immediately respond to the request."); 229 P.3d at 718 ("The trial court was within the bounds of proper discretion to delay ruling on the matter until it could pro | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Clinton Bernard Frazier-Elgreen1 sentence2014Alabama, 292 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002) ("The Supreme Court in Faretta did not set out any fixed time frame for the holding of the Faretta hearing . . . ."); United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating "the Faretta right to self-representation is not absolute, and 'the government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer'" (quoting Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 162 , 120 S. Ct. 684, 691 (2000))); Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 94-95 (Ky. 20 | 1 | 1 |
Neil v. Biggersgreen2 sentences2014See Nelson v. 1 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964). 2 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S. Ct. 375 (1972). 2014See Nelson v. 1 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964). 2 409 U.S. 188 , 93 S. Ct. 375 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Raulerson v. Wainwright, Secretary, Florida Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2014See State v. Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 586 , 698 S.E.2d 596, 602 (2010) (stating "[t]he request to proceed pro se must be clearly asserted"); see also Raulerson v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 966, 970-71 , 105 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("If a request [for self-representation] is ambiguous, the trial judge need not respond, because there has been no clear indication of a desire to waive a right to counsel."); United States v. Holmes, 376 F. App'x 346, 348-49 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding defendant "did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to self- repr 2014See State v. Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 586 , 698 S.E.2d 596, 602 (2010) (stating "[t]he request to proceed pro se must be clearly asserted"); see also Raulerson v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 966, 970-71 , 105 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("If a request [for self-representation] is ambiguous, the trial judge need not respond, because there has been no clear indication of a desire to waive a right to counsel."); United States v. Holmes, 376 F. App'x 346, 348-49 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding defendant "did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to self- repr | 1 | 1 |
Fleming v. Mooregreen2 sentences2014See State v. Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 586 , 698 S.E.2d 596, 602 (2010) (stating "[t]he request to proceed pro se must be clearly asserted"); see also Raulerson v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 966, 970-71 , 105 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("If a request [for self-representation] is ambiguous, the trial judge need not respond, because there has been no clear indication of a desire to waive a right to counsel."); United States v. Holmes, 376 F. App'x 346, 348-49 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding defendant "did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to self- repr 2014See State v. Winkler, 388 S.C. 574, 586 , 698 S.E.2d 596, 602 (2010) (stating "[t]he request to proceed pro se must be clearly asserted"); see also Raulerson v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 966, 970-71 , 105 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("If a request [for self-representation] is ambiguous, the trial judge need not respond, because there has been no clear indication of a desire to waive a right to counsel."); United States v. Holmes, 376 F. App'x 346, 348-49 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding defendant "did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to self- repr | 1 | 1 |
| Reed v. Ozmintgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Samuel
green
1 sentence2026"In doing so, [an appellate court] must consider the defendant's testimony, history, and the circumstances of his decision, as presented to the [trial court] at the time the defendant made his request [to waive his right to 2 Neither party argues on appeal that Brown was given Faretta warnings at the hearing in September of 2019, for which we do not have a record. counsel]." Id. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Jones
green
1 sentence2019The Faretta and Prince requirement applies to any waiver, whether the waiver is alleged to be by "affirmative, verbal request" or "by conduct." See Goldberg , 67 F.3d at 1100, 1101 (requiring Faretta warnings for a valid waiver by conduct); State v. Jones , 772 N.W.2d 496 , 505 (Minn. 2009) ("The same colloquy required for affirmative waivers must also be given before a defendant can be said to have waived his right to counsel by conduct." (citing Goldberg , 67 F.3d at 1100 )). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Carson
green
1 sentence2015Finally, the issue in People v. Carson, supra, was whether the trial court erred in terminating the defendant's self-representation because of the defendant's pre-trial out-of-court conduct. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Johnson v. Zerbst green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| United States v. Lewis D. Allen green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| United States v. Frederick W. Bauer green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Wroten v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.