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18 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Faretta v. Californiagreen2 sentences2022The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, §13 of the Louisiana Constitution give a defendant the right to counsel as well as the right 1 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). 2 Relator mentions an alleged Faretta hearing held on November 15, 2021 and the “forced” Faretta hearing held on January 28, 2022. 2022The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, §13 of the Louisiana Constitution give a defendant the right to counsel as well as the right 1 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). 2 Relator mentions an alleged Faretta hearing held on November 15, 2021 and the “forced” Faretta hearing held on January 28, 2022. | 3 | 9 |
State v. Mathieugreen2 sentences2017However, to the extent a hybrid representation in which a defendant and his attorney “act, in effect, as co-counsel, with each speaking for the defense Uduring different phases of the trial,” results partially in pro-se representation, “allowing it without a proper Faretta inquiry can create constitutional difficulties.” Id. 2017However, to the extent a hybrid representation in which a defendant and his attorney “act, in effect, as co-counsel, with each speaking for the defense Uduring different phases of the trial,” results partially in pro-se representation, “allowing it without a proper Faretta inquiry can create constitutional difficulties.” Id. | 1 | 5 |
State v. Cartergreen2 sentences2016However, to the extent that hybrid representation in which defendant and counsel “act, in effect, as co-counsel, with each speaking for the defense during different phases of the trial,” results partially in pro se representation, “allowing it without a proper Faretta inquiry can create constitutional difficulties.” Mathieu , p. 8, 68 So.3d at 1020 (quoting 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 11.5(g), pp. 765-767); See also, State v. Carter, 2010-0614, p. 25 (La.1/24/12), 84 So.3d 499, 519-520 . 2016However, to the extent that hybrid representation in which defendant and counsel “act, in effect, as co-counsel, with each speaking for the defense during different phases of the trial,” results partially in pro se representation, “allowing it without a proper Faretta inquiry can create constitutional difficulties.” Mathieu , p. 8, 68 So.3d at 1020 (quoting 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 11.5(g), pp. 765-767); See also, State v. Carter, 2010-0614, p. 25 (La.1/24/12), 84 So.3d 499, 519-520 . | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Alvin O. Leggettgreen2 sentences2016In addressing the issue of standby counsel, this court has held that “[h]ybrid representation in which a defendant acts in tandem with counsel in questioning witnesses or in presenting closing argument does not implicate Faretta.” State v. Mathieu, 10-2421, pp. 7-8 (La. 7/1/11), 68 So.3d 1015, 1019 (citing United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 683 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Leggett, 81 F.3d 220, 222 (D.C. 2016In addressing the issue of standby counsel, this court has held that "[h]ybrid representation in which a defendant acts in tandem with counsel in questioning witnesses or in pre-. senting closing argument does not implicate Faretta.” State v. Mathieu, 10-2421, pp. 7-8 (La. 7/1/11), 68 So.3d 1015, 1019 (citing United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 683 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Leggett, 81 F.3d 220, 222 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Sean Lamont Cromergreen2 sentences2016In addressing the issue of standby counsel, this court has held that “[h]ybrid representation in which a defendant acts in tandem with counsel in questioning witnesses or in presenting closing argument does not implicate Faretta.” State v. Mathieu, 10-2421, pp. 7-8 (La. 7/1/11), 68 So.3d 1015, 1019 (citing United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 683 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Leggett, 81 F.3d 220, 222 (D.C. 2016In addressing the issue of standby counsel, this court has held that "[h]ybrid representation in which a defendant acts in tandem with counsel in questioning witnesses or in pre-. senting closing argument does not implicate Faretta.” State v. Mathieu, 10-2421, pp. 7-8 (La. 7/1/11), 68 So.3d 1015, 1019 (citing United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 683 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Leggett, 81 F.3d 220, 222 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Straingreen2 sentences2012Should a defendant wish to waive counsel and represent himself, “[t]he determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); see also State v. Strain, 585 So.2d 540, 542 (La.1991) (trial courts should inquire into the accused’s age, education, and mental condition in deciding, on a totality of the circumstances, whether accuse 2012Should a defendant wish to waive counsel and represent himself, “[t]he determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); see also State v. Strain, 585 So.2d 540, 542 (La.1991) (trial courts should inquire into the accused’s age, education, and mental condition in deciding, on a totality of the circumstances, whether accuse | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences2014The Supreme Court has further explained what trial courts must consider when a defendant asserts the right to self-representation: Should a defendant wish to waive counsel and represent himself, “[t]he determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances | ^surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) ... 2014The Supreme Court has further explained what trial courts must consider when a defendant asserts the right to self-representation: Should a defendant wish to waive counsel and represent himself, “[t]he determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances | ^surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) ... | 2 | 2012–2014 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2024State v. Brown, 03-897, p. 30 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So. 2d 1, 22 , cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1022 , 126 S. Ct. 1569 , 164 L. 2024State v. Brown, 03-897, p. 30 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So. 2d 1, 22 , cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1022 , 126 S. Ct. 1569 , 164 L. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Conner
green
2 sentences2024App. 2 Cir. 11/19/14), 152 So. 3d 209, 216 , a proper Faretta inquiry is required to permit a defendant to proceed with pro se representation with the assistance of standby counsel.5 5 A criminal defendant does not have the constitutional right to act both as “represented and representative” due to the potential for disruption of the trial process. 2024App. 2 Cir. 11/19/14), 152 So. 3d 209, 216 , a proper Faretta inquiry is required to permit a defendant to proceed with pro se representation with the assistance of standby counsel.5 5 A criminal defendant does not have the constitutional right to act both as “represented and representative” due to the potential for disruption of the trial process. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Indiana v. Edwards
green
2 sentences2021Upon remand, if the trial court, after engaging in the necessary colloquy with defendant, determines that waiver of defendant’s right to counsel can be knowingly and intelligently exercised, the court should appoint, “even over objection by the accused . . . a standby counsel to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant’s self- representation is necessary.” See, Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 , 95 S. Ct. at 2541, fn. 46 ; Edwards v. Indiana, 554 U.S. 164, 177-78 , 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387-88 , 171 L 2021Upon remand, if the trial court, after engaging in the necessary colloquy with defendant, determines that waiver of defendant’s right to counsel can be knowingly and intelligently exercised, the court should appoint, “even over objection by the accused . . . a standby counsel to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant’s self- representation is necessary.” See, Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 , 95 S. Ct. at 2541, fn. 46 ; Edwards v. Indiana, 554 U.S. 164, 177-78 , 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2387-88 , 171 L | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. McCorvey
neutral
2 sentences2017State v. McCorvey, 15-0482 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/3/16) , 187 So.3d 41 . 2017State v. McCorvey, 15-0482 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/3/16) , 187 So.3d 41 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Witherspoon v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2016Witherspoon v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-23 , 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-77 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (“[A] State may not entrust the determination of whether a man should live or die to a tribunal organized to return a verdict of death. 2016Witherspoon v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-23 , 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-77 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (“[A] State may not entrust the determination of whether a man should live or die to a tribunal organized to return a verdict of death. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Godinez v. Moran
green
2 sentences2015Most importantly, the defendant in Santos clearly demonstrated his competence to make the decision to waive the right to counsel, which is the gravamen of a Faretta inquiry. 4 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 , 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2687 , 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993); State v. Santos, supra at 321. |17Unlike the defendant in Santos , Johnson did not make a request to represent himself until the morning of trial, after he refused to change from prison clothes to civilian clothes. 2015Most importantly, the defendant in Santos clearly demonstrated his competence to make the decision to waive the right to counsel, which is the gravamen of a Faretta inquiry. 4 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 , 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2687 , 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993); State v. Santos, supra at 321. |17Unlike the defendant in Santos , Johnson did not make a request to represent himself until the morning of trial, after he refused to change from prison clothes to civilian clothes. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
McKaskle v. Wiggins
green
2 sentences2011In the present case, it appears that defendant elected a form of hybrid representation in which his court-appointed attorney acted as more than stand-by counsel during trial “to ensure the defendant’s compliance with basic rules of courtroom protocol and procedure.” McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183 , 104 S.Ct. at 954 . 2011In the present case, it appears that defendant elected a form of hybrid representation in which his court-appointed attorney acted as more than stand-by counsel during trial “to ensure the defendant’s compliance with basic rules of courtroom protocol and procedure.” McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183 , 104 S.Ct. at 954 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
United States v. Cronic
green
2 sentences2010Although it does not merit lengthy discussion, Appel is a habeas corpus case in which it was claimed that the defendant was constructively denied counsel in violation of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), before the trial court accepted the defendant's waiver of counsel. 2010Although it does not merit lengthy discussion, Appel is a habeas corpus case in which it was claimed that the defendant was constructively denied counsel in violation of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), before the trial court accepted the defendant's waiver of counsel. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Appel v. Horn
green
2 sentences2010Second, Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203 (3d Cir.2001), which the defendant characterizes as supporting his claim that he was denied assistance of counsel at the Faretta hearing until the moment his motion was granted, is readily distinguishable. 2010Second, Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203 (3d Cir.2001), which the defendant characterizes as supporting his claim that he was denied assistance of counsel at the Faretta hearing until the moment his motion was granted, is readily distinguishable. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State Ex Rel. Davis v. Criminal District Court Parish of Orleans
green
2 sentences1992Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); State v. Dupre, 500 So.2d 873 (La.App. 1st Cir.1986), writ denied, 505 So.2d 55 (La.1987). 1992Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); State v. Dupre, 500 So.2d 873 (La.App. 1st Cir.1986), writ denied, 505 So.2d 55 (La.1987). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Dupre
green
2 sentences1992Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); State v. Dupre, 500 So.2d 873 (La.App. 1st Cir.1986), writ denied, 505 So.2d 55 (La.1987). 1992Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); State v. Dupre, 500 So.2d 873 (La.App. 1st Cir.1986), writ denied, 505 So.2d 55 (La.1987). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
City of Monroe v. Wyrick
green
1 sentence1987City of Monroe v. Wyrick, 393 So.2d 1273 (La.1981). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.