Faretta hearing in Georgia

2026We disagree. 3 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 835–36(V) ( 95 SCt 2525 , 45 LE2d 562) (1975) (holding that if a defendant makes a pre-trial, unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation, the request must be followed by a hearing to ensure the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the “traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel” and understands the “disadvantages of self-representation so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open” (quotation marks omitted)). 4 The Faretta hearing was held on M

2026We disagree. 3 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 835–36(V) ( 95 SCt 2525 , 45 LE2d 562) (1975) (holding that if a defendant makes a pre-trial, unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation, the request must be followed by a hearing to ensure the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the “traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel” and understands the “disadvantages of self-representation so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open” (quotation marks omitted)). 4 The Faretta hearing was held on M

2026This case, then, is inapt to the facts and circumstances presented in Rivera, and the trial court here did not abuse its discretion in finding Freeman’s waiver of counsel to be knowing and voluntary.17 17 See State v. Evans, 285 Ga. 67, 69 ( 673 SE2d 243 ) (2009) (explaining that “a defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel is valid if the record reflects that the defendant was made aware of the dangers of self-representation and nevertheless made a knowing and intelligent waiver”); Wright v. State, 356 Ga. App. 597 , 605(2) ( 848 SE2d 467 ) (2020) (holding that defendant’s waiver of counsel

2026This case, then, is inapt to the facts and circumstances presented in Rivera, and the trial court here did not abuse its discretion in finding Freeman’s waiver of counsel to be knowing and voluntary.17 17 See State v. Evans, 285 Ga. 67, 69 ( 673 SE2d 243 ) (2009) (explaining that “a defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel is valid if the record reflects that the defendant was made aware of the dangers of self-representation and nevertheless made a knowing and intelligent waiver”); Wright v. State, 356 Ga. App. 597 , 605(2) ( 848 SE2d 467 ) (2020) (holding that defendant’s waiver of counsel

2026Accord Oliver v. State, 305 Ga. 678, 680 (2) ( 827 SE2d 639 ) (2019); Wiggins, 298 Ga. at 368 (2). 6 request should be followed by a Faretta hearing to ensure that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel and understands the disadvantages of self-representation.”5 Simply put, if the trial court “improperly denies a defendant his right to self-representation, this denial is a structural error that is not subject to a harmlessness analysis, and [it] requires automatic reversal.”6 Even so, if the assertion of the right to proceed without the benefit of counsel is “equ

2026Accord Oliver v. State, 305 Ga. 678, 680 (2) ( 827 SE2d 639 ) (2019); Wiggins, 298 Ga. at 368 (2). 6 request should be followed by a Faretta hearing to ensure that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel and understands the disadvantages of self-representation.”5 Simply put, if the trial court “improperly denies a defendant his right to self-representation, this denial is a structural error that is not subject to a harmlessness analysis, and [it] requires automatic reversal.”6 Even so, if the assertion of the right to proceed without the benefit of counsel is “equ

2026Accord Oliver v. State, 305 Ga. 678, 680 (2) ( 827 SE2d 639 ) (2019); Wiggins, 298 Ga. at 368 (2). 6 request should be followed by a Faretta hearing to ensure that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel and understands the disadvantages of self-representation.”5 Simply put, if the trial court “improperly denies a defendant his right to self-representation, this denial is a structural error that is not subject to a harmlessness analysis, and [it] requires automatic reversal.”6 Even so, if the assertion of the right to proceed without the benefit of counsel is “equ

2026Accord Oliver v. State, 305 Ga. 678, 680 (2) ( 827 SE2d 639 ) (2019); Wiggins, 298 Ga. at 368 (2). 6 request should be followed by a Faretta hearing to ensure that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel and understands the disadvantages of self-representation.”5 Simply put, if the trial court “improperly denies a defendant his right to self-representation, this denial is a structural error that is not subject to a harmlessness analysis, and [it] requires automatic reversal.”6 Even so, if the assertion of the right to proceed without the benefit of counsel is “equ

2016The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.”); Lamar v. State, 278 Ga. 150, 152 (1) (b) ( 598 SE2d 488 ) (2004) (reversing defendant’s convictions based on trial court’s failure to hold a proper Faretta hearing after assertion of right to self-representation); Sawyer v. State, 227 Ga. App. 493, 493-494 (1) ( 489 SE2d 518 ) (1997) (reversing defendant’s convictions where record failed to show proper waiver of right to counsel and that defendant was apprised of the dangers attendant to self-representation).

2016The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless.”); Lamar v. State, 278 Ga. 150, 152 (1) (b) ( 598 SE2d 488 ) (2004) (reversing defendant’s convictions based on trial court’s failure to hold a proper Faretta hearing after assertion of right to self-representation); Sawyer v. State, 227 Ga. App. 493, 493-494 (1) ( 489 SE2d 518 ) (1997) (reversing defendant’s convictions where record failed to show proper waiver of right to counsel and that defendant was apprised of the dangers attendant to self-representation).

2021See Evans, 285 Ga. at 68, 69 (recognizing need for Faretta hearing on the record); Thaxton, 260 Ga. at 142 (2).

2019XII (“No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend, either in person or by an attorney, that person’s own cause in any of the courts of this state.”); Wiggins v. State, 298 Ga. 366, 368 (2) ( 782 SE2d 31 ) (2016) (It is well settled that both the federal and state constitutions “guarantee a criminal defendant both the right to counsel and the right to self-representation”); Taylor v. Ricketts, 239 Ga. 501, 502 ( 238 SE2d 52 ) (1977) (“A state may not force a lawyer upon an appellant when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense”). 11 to “clearly and unequivocally

2016When a defendant asserts the right to self-representation, it is the responsibility of the trial judge to ensure that the decision to dismiss counsel and proceed pro se has been knowingly and intelligently made and that the defendant has made the choice to proceed without the benefit of counsel with “eyes open.” See Faretta, 422 U. S. at 835 ; Clarke v. Zant, 247 Ga. 194, 197 ( 275 SE2d 49 ) (1981) (“the record should reflect a finding on the part of the trial court that the defendant has validly chosen to proceed pro se” and “that this choice was made after the defendant was made aware of his

2016When a defendant asserts the right to self-representation, it is the responsibility of the trial judge to ensure that the decision to dismiss counsel and proceed pro se has been knowingly and intelligently made and that the defendant has made the choice to proceed without the benefit of counsel with “eyes open.” See Faretta, 422 U. S. at 835 ; Clarke v. Zant, 247 Ga. 194, 197 ( 275 SE2d 49 ) (1981) (“the record should reflect a finding on the part of the trial court that the defendant has validly chosen to proceed pro se” and “that this choice was made after the defendant was made aware of his

2019XII (“No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend, either in person or by an attorney, that person’s own cause in any of the courts of this state.”); Wiggins v. State, 298 Ga. 366, 368 (2) ( 782 SE2d 31 ) (2016) (It is well settled that both the federal and state constitutions “guarantee a criminal defendant both the right to counsel and the right to self-representation”); Taylor v. Ricketts, 239 Ga. 501, 502 ( 238 SE2d 52 ) (1977) (“A state may not force a lawyer upon an appellant when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense”). 11 to “clearly and unequivocally

2019XII (“No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend, either in person or by an attorney, that person’s own cause in any of the courts of this state.”); Wiggins v. State, 298 Ga. 366, 368 (2) ( 782 SE2d 31 ) (2016) (It is well settled that both the federal and state constitutions “guarantee a criminal defendant both the right to counsel and the right to self-representation”); Taylor v. Ricketts, 239 Ga. 501, 502 ( 238 SE2d 52 ) (1977) (“A state may not force a lawyer upon an appellant when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense”). 11 to “clearly and unequivocally

2019When making a Faretta inquiry, "[t]he trial judge is not required to use any particular language in making the defendant aware of his right to counsel and the dangers of self-representation." Martin-Argaw v. State , 343 Ga. App. 864 , 867 (2), 806 S.E.2d 247 (2017).

2019When making a Faretta inquiry, "[t]he trial judge is not required to use any particular language in making the defendant aware of his right to counsel and the dangers of self-representation." Martin-Argaw v. State , 343 Ga. App. 864 , 867 (2), 806 S.E.2d 247 (2017).

2024See, e.g., Danenberg v. State, 291 Ga. 439, 440-441 (2) ( 729 SE2d 315 ) (2012) (defendant’s note to court asking to dismiss trial counsel and replace them with retained counsel, a public defender, or himself, was not an unequivocal assertion of right to self-representation).

2024See, e.g., Danenberg v. State, 291 Ga. 439, 440-441 (2) ( 729 SE2d 315 ) (2012) (defendant’s note to court asking to dismiss trial counsel and replace them with retained counsel, a public defender, or himself, was not an unequivocal assertion of right to self-representation).

2015See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819-820 (III) (A), 835-836 (V); Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (III) ( 128 SCt 2379 , 171 LE2d 345) (2008); Lamar v. State, 278 Ga. 150, 152 (1) (b) ( 598 SE2d 488 ) (2004); Bettis v. State, 328 Ga. App. 167, 168-169 (1) ( 761 SE2d 570 ) (2014). 9 Here, although Smith made several unequivocal assertions of his right to represent himself before the trial commenced, the trial court did not conduct a Faretta hearing and apprise Smith of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.

2015See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819-820 (III) (A), 835-836 (V); Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (III) ( 128 SCt 2379 , 171 LE2d 345) (2008); Lamar v. State, 278 Ga. 150, 152 (1) (b) ( 598 SE2d 488 ) (2004); Bettis v. State, 328 Ga. App. 167, 168-169 (1) ( 761 SE2d 570 ) (2014). 9 Here, although Smith made several unequivocal assertions of his right to represent himself before the trial commenced, the trial court did not conduct a Faretta hearing and apprise Smith of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.

2009See, e.g., Parks v. McClung, 271 Ga. 795, 798 ( 524 SE2d 718 ) (1999) (“a Faretta inquiry is addressed to a defendant’s understanding of courtroom procedure and his ability to conduct a defense”), overruled on other grounds by Barnes v. State, 275 Ga. 499, 502, n. 19 ( 570 SE2d 277 ) (2002); United States v. Jones, 452 F3d 223, 228-229 (3rd Cir. 2006) (issue of later revoking request for pro se representation not included in long list of model questions for conducting the “penetrating and comprehensive” Faretta examination required in the Third Circuit). 2 Moreover, this Court has repeatedly h

2009See, e.g., Parks v. McClung, 271 Ga. 795, 798 ( 524 SE2d 718 ) (1999) (“a Faretta inquiry is addressed to a defendant’s understanding of courtroom procedure and his ability to conduct a defense”), overruled on other grounds by Barnes v. State, 275 Ga. 499, 502, n. 19 ( 570 SE2d 277 ) (2002); United States v. Jones, 452 F3d 223, 228-229 (3rd Cir. 2006) (issue of later revoking request for pro se representation not included in long list of model questions for conducting the “penetrating and comprehensive” Faretta examination required in the Third Circuit). 2 Moreover, this Court has repeatedly h

2019Cf. Smith, 332 Ga. App. at 852-54 (2) (holding that trial court erred in failing to conduct a Faretta hearing when defendant reiterated several times to the trial court that he wished to represent himself and did not want his appointed counsel to try the case on his behalf); Bettis v. State, 328 Ga. App. 167, 169-71 (1) ( 761 SE2d 570 ) (2014) (holding that trial court erred in failing to conduct a Faretta hearing when defendant flatly requested that the court allow him to represent himself). 24

2019Cf. Smith, 332 Ga. App. at 852-54 (2) (holding that trial court erred in failing to conduct a Faretta hearing when defendant reiterated several times to the trial court that he wished to represent himself and did not want his appointed counsel to try the case on his behalf); Bettis v. State, 328 Ga. App. 167, 169-71 (1) ( 761 SE2d 570 ) (2014) (holding that trial court erred in failing to conduct a Faretta hearing when defendant flatly requested that the court allow him to represent himself). 24

2026We disagree. 3 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 835–36(V) ( 95 SCt 2525 , 45 LE2d 562) (1975) (holding that if a defendant makes a pre-trial, unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation, the request must be followed by a hearing to ensure the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the “traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel” and understands the “disadvantages of self-representation so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open” (quotation marks omitted)). 4 The Faretta hearing was held on M

2026We disagree. 3 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 835–36(V) ( 95 SCt 2525 , 45 LE2d 562) (1975) (holding that if a defendant makes a pre-trial, unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation, the request must be followed by a hearing to ensure the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the “traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel” and understands the “disadvantages of self-representation so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open” (quotation marks omitted)). 4 The Faretta hearing was held on M

2022See Stinson v. State, 352 Ga. App. 528 , 531-532 (1) (a) ( 835 SE2d 342 ) (2019) (defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel in trial proceedings; defendant informed court that he needed to “go pro se,” after which court conducted Faretta hearing, during which trial court advised defendant of potential consequences of proceeding pro se, including constitutional rights he would be giving up and that he would be responsible for preparing and making strategic decisions for trial and preserving trial record).

2022See Stinson v. State, 352 Ga. App. 528 , 531-532 (1) (a) ( 835 SE2d 342 ) (2019) (defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel in trial proceedings; defendant informed court that he needed to “go pro se,” after which court conducted Faretta hearing, during which trial court advised defendant of potential consequences of proceeding pro se, including constitutional rights he would be giving up and that he would be responsible for preparing and making strategic decisions for trial and preserving trial record).

2020Indeed, the defendant’s ‘technical legal knowledge’ is irrelevant to the question of whether [s]he validly waives [her] right to be represented by counsel.”13 “The test is not whether the accused is capable of good lawyering — but whether [s]he knowingly and intelligently waives [her] right to counsel.”14 Based on the foregoing, the trial court conducted a thorough Faretta hearing and permitted the Appellant to seek clarification and respond to the trial court’s questions.15 The trial court discussed the nature of the charges against the Appellant, 12 Wayne v. State, 269 Ga. 36, 38 (2) ( 495 S

2020Indeed, the defendant’s ‘technical legal knowledge’ is irrelevant to the question of whether [s]he validly waives [her] right to be represented by counsel.”13 “The test is not whether the accused is capable of good lawyering — but whether [s]he knowingly and intelligently waives [her] right to counsel.”14 Based on the foregoing, the trial court conducted a thorough Faretta hearing and permitted the Appellant to seek clarification and respond to the trial court’s questions.15 The trial court discussed the nature of the charges against the Appellant, 12 Wayne v. State, 269 Ga. 36, 38 (2) ( 495 S

2019Potts v. State , 259 Ga. 96 , 105 (28), 376 S.E.2d 851 (1989).

2019Potts v. State , 259 Ga. 96 , 105 (28), 376 S.E.2d 851 (1989).

2026Faretta hearing,” he maintains it is “not clear . . . that [he] did not subsequently invoke [that] right.” Indeed, Clay claims that immediately following the Faretta hearing, he filed a “convoluted” motion for “stand[-]by counsel.” And while Clay (rightly) concedes that he does not have a right to stand-by counsel,12 he nevertheless claims it “is not entirely clear [from his] filing that he meant ‘stand[-]by 11 Wilkerson, 286 Ga. at 204 (2)(b) (citations omitted). 12 See Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F3d 585, 597 (II)(B)(2) (7th Cir. 2006) (“The Faretta right and the appointment of standby counsel

2026Faretta hearing,” he maintains it is “not clear . . . that [he] did not subsequently invoke [that] right.” Indeed, Clay claims that immediately following the Faretta hearing, he filed a “convoluted” motion for “stand[-]by counsel.” And while Clay (rightly) concedes that he does not have a right to stand-by counsel,12 he nevertheless claims it “is not entirely clear [from his] filing that he meant ‘stand[-]by 11 Wilkerson, 286 Ga. at 204 (2)(b) (citations omitted). 12 See Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F3d 585, 597 (II)(B)(2) (7th Cir. 2006) (“The Faretta right and the appointment of standby counsel

2026Accord Wright, 356 Ga. App. at 600(2). 21 When a trial court fails to fully inform a defendant of his Faretta rights and makes a finding that his waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary, such failure is not harmless when the defendant “did not mount an able defense.” McDaniel v. State, 327 Ga. App. 673, 680 (1)(c) ( 761 SE2d 82 ) (2014).

2026Accord Wright, 356 Ga. App. at 600(2). 21 When a trial court fails to fully inform a defendant of his Faretta rights and makes a finding that his waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary, such failure is not harmless when the defendant “did not mount an able defense.” McDaniel v. State, 327 Ga. App. 673, 680 (1)(c) ( 761 SE2d 82 ) (2014).

2026Stinson v. State, 352 Ga. App. 528 , 530-31(1)(a) ( 835 SE2d 342 ) (2019); Prater v. State, 220 Ga. App. 506, 509 ( 469 SE2d 780 ) (1996).

2026Stinson v. State, 352 Ga. App. 528 , 530-31(1)(a) ( 835 SE2d 342 ) (2019); Prater v. State, 220 Ga. App. 506, 509 ( 469 SE2d 780 ) (1996).

2026Certainly there is no Supreme Court precedent clearly establishing such a right.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Beckton, 740 F3d 303, 307 (II) (4th Cir. 2004) (“[A] pro se defendant has no right to standby counsel when he chooses to proceed pro se.

2026Certainly there is no Supreme Court precedent clearly establishing such a right.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Beckton, 740 F3d 303, 307 (II) (4th Cir. 2004) (“[A] pro se defendant has no right to standby counsel when he chooses to proceed pro se.

2026Faretta hearing,” he maintains it is “not clear . . . that [he] did not subsequently invoke [that] right.” Indeed, Clay claims that immediately following the Faretta hearing, he filed a “convoluted” motion for “stand[-]by counsel.” And while Clay (rightly) concedes that he does not have a right to stand-by counsel,12 he nevertheless claims it “is not entirely clear [from his] filing that he meant ‘stand[-]by 11 Wilkerson, 286 Ga. at 204 (2)(b) (citations omitted). 12 See Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F3d 585, 597 (II)(B)(2) (7th Cir. 2006) (“The Faretta right and the appointment of standby counsel

2026Faretta hearing,” he maintains it is “not clear . . . that [he] did not subsequently invoke [that] right.” Indeed, Clay claims that immediately following the Faretta hearing, he filed a “convoluted” motion for “stand[-]by counsel.” And while Clay (rightly) concedes that he does not have a right to stand-by counsel,12 he nevertheless claims it “is not entirely clear [from his] filing that he meant ‘stand[-]by 11 Wilkerson, 286 Ga. at 204 (2)(b) (citations omitted). 12 See Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F3d 585, 597 (II)(B)(2) (7th Cir. 2006) (“The Faretta right and the appointment of standby counsel

2026See Smith, 266 Ga. at 687 (“A criminal defendant has no unqualified right to file a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered on a guilty plea.”), overruled by Collier, 307 Ga. at 377 ; Morrow v. State, 266 Ga. 3, 3 (1995) (“[A]n appeal will lie from a judgment entered on a guilty plea only if the issue on appeal can be resolved by facts appearing in the record.”).

2026See Smith, 266 Ga. at 687 (“A criminal defendant has no unqualified right to file a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered on a guilty plea.”), overruled by Collier, 307 Ga. at 377 ; Morrow v. State, 266 Ga. 3, 3 (1995) (“[A]n appeal will lie from a judgment entered on a guilty plea only if the issue on appeal can be resolved by facts appearing in the record.”).

2026Even so, the Supreme Court of Georgia has concluded that, with limited exceptions, “once a defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense charged, he may not thereafter raise 24 See Hood, 315 Ga. at 812-13(1) ( 877 SE2d 178 ) (2022) (holding that trial court was within its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on defendant’s allegation plea counsel given that court found counsel’s testimony that she had fully informed defendant about parole ineligibility to be credible); Wright v. State, 314 Ga. 355 , 358-59 (concludi

2026Even so, the Supreme Court of Georgia has concluded that, with limited exceptions, “once a defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense charged, he may not thereafter raise 24 See Hood, 315 Ga. at 812-13(1) ( 877 SE2d 178 ) (2022) (holding that trial court was within its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on defendant’s allegation plea counsel given that court found counsel’s testimony that she had fully informed defendant about parole ineligibility to be credible); Wright v. State, 314 Ga. 355 , 358-59 (concludi

2026See Smith, 266 Ga. at 687 (“A criminal defendant has no unqualified right to file a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered on a guilty plea.”), overruled by Collier, 307 Ga. at 377 ; Morrow v. State, 266 Ga. 3, 3 (1995) (“[A]n appeal will lie from a judgment entered on a guilty plea only if the issue on appeal can be resolved by facts appearing in the record.”).

2026See Smith, 266 Ga. at 687 (“A criminal defendant has no unqualified right to file a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered on a guilty plea.”), overruled by Collier, 307 Ga. at 377 ; Morrow v. State, 266 Ga. 3, 3 (1995) (“[A]n appeal will lie from a judgment entered on a guilty plea only if the issue on appeal can be resolved by facts appearing in the record.”).

2026Accord Davis v. State, 304 Ga. App. 355, 362 (3) ( 696 SE2d 381 ) (2010). 5 Sixth Amendment violation and is not subject to a harmless error analysis on direct appeal.”13 Turning to this case, at the outset of the Faretta hearing, Freeman expressed dissatisfaction with his court-appointed attorney and informed the trial court that he would “continue representation, pro se for the defense.” Given his complaints about appointed counsel, the court asked Freeman if he intended to seek private counsel or represent himself; and he responded that he would “go pro se.” Freeman also told the court that

2026Accord Davis v. State, 304 Ga. App. 355, 362 (3) ( 696 SE2d 381 ) (2010). 5 Sixth Amendment violation and is not subject to a harmless error analysis on direct appeal.”13 Turning to this case, at the outset of the Faretta hearing, Freeman expressed dissatisfaction with his court-appointed attorney and informed the trial court that he would “continue representation, pro se for the defense.” Given his complaints about appointed counsel, the court asked Freeman if he intended to seek private counsel or represent himself; and he responded that he would “go pro se.” Freeman also told the court that

2026Even so, the Supreme Court of Georgia has concluded that, with limited exceptions, “once a defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense charged, he may not thereafter raise 24 See Hood, 315 Ga. at 812-13(1) ( 877 SE2d 178 ) (2022) (holding that trial court was within its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on defendant’s allegation plea counsel given that court found counsel’s testimony that she had fully informed defendant about parole ineligibility to be credible); Wright v. State, 314 Ga. 355 , 358-59 (concludi

2026Even so, the Supreme Court of Georgia has concluded that, with limited exceptions, “once a defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense charged, he may not thereafter raise 24 See Hood, 315 Ga. at 812-13(1) ( 877 SE2d 178 ) (2022) (holding that trial court was within its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on defendant’s allegation plea counsel given that court found counsel’s testimony that she had fully informed defendant about parole ineligibility to be credible); Wright v. State, 314 Ga. 355 , 358-59 (concludi