Eldridge test in New York

2009There, the court found that “Hamdi’s ‘private interest’ ... is the most elemental of liberty interests — the interest in being free from physical detention by one’s own government.” (Hamdi at 529 .) While the Government’s interests were found to be “substantial,” the Supreme Court found that “ ‘[i]n our society liberty is the norm,’ and detention without trial ‘is the carefully limited exception.’ ” (Hamdi at 529 , quoting United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 755 [1987].) Thus, “[w]e have always been careful not to minimize the importance and fundamental nature of the individual’s right to lib

2009There, the court found that “Hamdi’s ‘private interest’ ... is the most elemental of liberty interests — the interest in being free from physical detention by one’s own government.” (Hamdi at 529 .) While the Government’s interests were found to be “substantial,” the Supreme Court found that “ ‘[i]n our society liberty is the norm,’ and detention without trial ‘is the carefully limited exception.’ ” (Hamdi at 529 , quoting United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 755 [1987].) Thus, “[w]e have always been careful not to minimize the importance and fundamental nature of the individual’s right to lib

2009There, the court found that “Hamdi’s ‘private interest’ ... is the most elemental of liberty interests — the interest in being free from physical detention by one’s own government.” (Hamdi at 529 .) While the Government’s interests were found to be “substantial,” the Supreme Court found that “ ‘[i]n our society liberty is the norm,’ and detention without trial ‘is the carefully limited exception.’ ” (Hamdi at 529 , quoting United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 755 [1987].) Thus, “[w]e have always been careful not to minimize the importance and fundamental nature of the individual’s right to lib

2009There, the court found that “Hamdi’s ‘private interest’ ... is the most elemental of liberty interests — the interest in being free from physical detention by one’s own government.” (Hamdi at 529 .) While the Government’s interests were found to be “substantial,” the Supreme Court found that “ ‘[i]n our society liberty is the norm,’ and detention without trial ‘is the carefully limited exception.’ ” (Hamdi at 529 , quoting United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 755 [1987].) Thus, “[w]e have always been careful not to minimize the importance and fundamental nature of the individual’s right to lib

2009There, the court found that “Hamdi’s ‘private interest’ ... is the most elemental of liberty interests — the interest in being free from physical detention by one’s own government.” (Hamdi at 529 .) While the Government’s interests were found to be “substantial,” the Supreme Court found that “ ‘[i]n our society liberty is the norm,’ and detention without trial ‘is the carefully limited exception.’ ” (Hamdi at 529 , quoting United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 755 [1987].) Thus, “[w]e have always been careful not to minimize the importance and fundamental nature of the individual’s right to lib

2001Evaluation of the three Eldridge factors compels the conclusion that use of a ‘fair preponderance of the evidence’ standard in such proceedings is inconsistent with due process.” (Santosky v Kramer, supra at 758.) Echoing common sense and in accord with pronouncements of New York’s Court of Appeals the Supreme Court noted that once affirmed on appeal, a New York decision terminating parental rights is final and irrevocable and that “[flew forms of state action are both so severe and so irreversible” (at 759).

1998In Savastano v Nurnberg, the Court reviewed the regulatory criteria for a transfer under 14 NYCRR 517.4 (d) (1), and concluded that “the decision to transfer reflects primarily a medical judgment about the kind of facility that would best serve the patient’s therapeutic needs” (Savastano v Nurnberg, 77 NY2d 300, 308 [emphasis in original]).

1998Consequently, the decision to transfer Aliza K. is properly viewed as a medical decision, just as was the transfer at issue in Savastano . *510 Finally, as to the third prong of the Mathews v Eldridge inquiry, the government in this case has a strong interest in avoiding “the significant administrative and fiscal burdens which would result from the necessity of holding a prior judicial hearing each time an involuntary patient objects to being transferred” to a secure facility (Savastano v Nurnberg, supra, at 309).

1993(See, Matter of Fisher, 147 Misc 2d 329, 337 [the decision to appoint a conservator (now a guardian of the property) "has legal and practical impact on both property and liberty interests” requiring a full panoply of due process protections under a Mathews v Eldridge analysis].) Because the powers over the person sought here so clearly fall within previous cases requiring counsel, it is not necessary to consider whether publicly paid counsel is required for indigent AIPs in all article 81 proceedings. .