Eldridge factors in California

10 California opinions name it 1 courts 1989–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

Case	Followed	Cited
Mcclelland v. Massingagreen ca4 · 1986 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006The Supreme Court held, “We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits and that the present administrative procedures fully comport with due process.” (Id. at p. 349; see McClelland v. Massinga (4th Cir. 1986) 786 F.2d 1205 , 1212.) The United States Supreme Court applied the three-part Eldridge test in five other cases involving challenges to hearing procedures which were provided only after the government agencies took adverse administrative actions. 2006The Supreme Court held, “We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits and that the present administrative procedures fully comport with due process.” (Id. at p. 349; see McClelland v. Massinga (4th Cir. 1986) 786 F.2d 1205 , 1212.) The United States Supreme Court applied the three-part Eldridge test in five other cases involving challenges to hearing procedures which were provided only after the government agencies took adverse administrative actions.	2	2
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty.green scotus · 1981 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1995–1999 2 sentences 1999First, the court must apply the three factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319 [ 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 ], i.e., “the private interests at stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions.” (Lassiter, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 27 [ 101 S.Ct. at p. 2159 ].) Second, the court must balance the “net weight” of the three Eldridge factors “against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom.” {Ibid.) 1506 The first prong of Lassit 1999First, the court must apply the three factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319 [ 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 ], i.e., “the private interests at stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions.” (Lassiter, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 27 [ 101 S.Ct. at p. 2159 ].) Second, the court must balance the “net weight” of the three Eldridge factors “against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom.” {Ibid.) 1506 The first prong of Lassit	1	3
In Re Ronald R.green calctapp · 1995 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2001–2011 2 sentences 2011(Id. at pp. 26, 31-32; Angelica V., supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013 ; In re Christina P. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 115, 129 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 525 ]; In re Ronald R., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1195 .) 1. 2011(Id. at pp. 26, 31-32; Angelica V., supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013 ; In re Christina P. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 115, 129 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 525 ]; In re Ronald R., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1195 .) 1.	1	2
Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc.green scotus · 2001 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006Applying the Eldridge factors, the Supreme Court concluded, “We thus conclude that the 90-day period is not so long that it will always violate due process.” (Id. at p. 243.) In Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers (2001) 532 U.S. 189, 191-192 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 391 , 121 S.Ct. 1446 ], the Supreme Court upheld California Labor Code provisions that allowed a public entity to withhold moneys due a contractor in the face of violations of a prevailing wage law. 2006Applying the Eldridge factors, the Supreme Court concluded, “We thus conclude that the 90-day period is not so long that it will always violate due process.” (Id. at p. 243.) In Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers (2001) 532 U.S. 189, 191-192 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 391 , 121 S.Ct. 1446 ], the Supreme Court upheld California Labor Code provisions that allowed a public entity to withhold moneys due a contractor in the face of violations of a prevailing wage law.	1	2
Dixon v. Lovegreen scotus · 1977 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006In Dixon v. Love (1977) 431 U.S. 105, 114 [ 52 L.Ed.2d 172 , 97 S.Ct. 1723 ], the Supreme Court upheld a state statute that suspended a driver’s license when the driver incurred a specified number of convictions but offered no presuspension right to a hearing. 2006In Dixon v. Love (1977) 431 U.S. 105, 114 [ 52 L.Ed.2d 172 , 97 S.Ct. 1723 ], the Supreme Court upheld a state statute that suspended a driver’s license when the driver incurred a specified number of convictions but offered no presuspension right to a hearing.	1	2
In Re Christina P.green calctapp · 1985 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011(Id. at pp. 26, 31-32; Angelica V., supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013 ; In re Christina P. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 115, 129 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 525 ]; In re Ronald R., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1195 .) 1. 2011(Id. at pp. 26, 31-32; Angelica V., supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013 ; In re Christina P. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 115, 129 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 525 ]; In re Ronald R., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1195 .) 1.	1	1
Barthuli v. Board of Trusteesgreen cal · 1977 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006We realize the United States Supreme Court has in various circumstances expressed a preference for pre-administrative action hearings. ( U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993) 510 U.S. 43, 53 , 114 S.Ct. 492 , 126 L.Ed.2d 490 [real property forfeiture]; Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 [prejudgment replevin of household chattels].) Applying United States Supreme Court analysis, our Supreme Court has held that state employees are entitled to certain due process rights prior to being disciplined. ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 2006We realize the United States Supreme Court has in various circumstances expressed a preference for pre-administrative action hearings. ( U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993) 510 U.S. 43, 53 , 114 S.Ct. 492 , 126 L.Ed.2d 490 [real property forfeiture]; Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 [prejudgment replevin of household chattels].) Applying United States Supreme Court analysis, our Supreme Court has held that state employees are entitled to certain due process rights prior to being disciplined. ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d	1	1
Love v. City of Montereygreen calctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006We realize the United States Supreme Court has in various circumstances expressed a preference for pre-administrative action hearings. ( U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993) 510 U.S. 43, 53 , 114 S.Ct. 492 , 126 L.Ed.2d 490 [real property forfeiture]; Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 [prejudgment replevin of household chattels].) Applying United States Supreme Court analysis, our Supreme Court has held that state employees are entitled to certain due process rights prior to being disciplined. ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 2006We realize the United States Supreme Court has in various circumstances expressed a preference for pre-administrative action hearings. ( U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993) 510 U.S. 43, 53 , 114 S.Ct. 492 , 126 L.Ed.2d 490 [real property forfeiture]; Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 [prejudgment replevin of household chattels].) Applying United States Supreme Court analysis, our Supreme Court has held that state employees are entitled to certain due process rights prior to being disciplined. ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d	1	1
MacKey v. Montrymgreen scotus · 1979 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006We realize the United States Supreme Court has in various circumstances expressed a preference for pre-administrative action hearings. ( U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993) 510 U.S. 43, 53 , 114 S.Ct. 492 , 126 L.Ed.2d 490 [real property forfeiture]; Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 [prejudgment replevin of household chattels].) Applying United States Supreme Court analysis, our Supreme Court has held that state employees are entitled to certain due process rights prior to being disciplined. ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 2006We realize the United States Supreme Court has in various circumstances expressed a preference for pre-administrative action hearings. ( U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993) 510 U.S. 43, 53 , 114 S.Ct. 492 , 126 L.Ed.2d 490 [real property forfeiture]; Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 [prejudgment replevin of household chattels].) Applying United States Supreme Court analysis, our Supreme Court has held that state employees are entitled to certain due process rights prior to being disciplined. ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d	1	1
People v. Ramirezgreen cal · 1979 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989 2 sentences 1989(People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 268 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 316 , 599 P.2d 622 ].) “ ‘For government to dispose of a person’s significant interests without offering him a chance to be heard is to risk treating him as a nonperson, an object, rather than a respected, participating citizen.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 267-268.) Applying the Eldridge analysis, it is clear that AFDC benefits “are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them” and termination of those benefits involves “important rights.” (Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 262 [ 25 L.Ed.2d at p. 296 ] 1989(People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 268 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 316 , 599 P.2d 622 ].) “ ‘For government to dispose of a person’s significant interests without offering him a chance to be heard is to risk treating him as a nonperson, an object, rather than a respected, participating citizen.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 267-268.) Applying the Eldridge analysis, it is clear that AFDC benefits “are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them” and termination of those benefits involves “important rights.” (Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 262 [ 25 L.Ed.2d at p. 296 ]	1	1
Goldberg v. Kellygreen scotus · 1970 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989 2 sentences 1989(People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 268 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 316 , 599 P.2d 622 ].) “ ‘For government to dispose of a person’s significant interests without offering him a chance to be heard is to risk treating him as a nonperson, an object, rather than a respected, participating citizen.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 267-268.) Applying the Eldridge analysis, it is clear that AFDC benefits “are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them” and termination of those benefits involves “important rights.” (Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 262 [ 25 L.Ed.2d at p. 296 ] 1989(People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 268 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 316 , 599 P.2d 622 ].) “ ‘For government to dispose of a person’s significant interests without offering him a chance to be heard is to risk treating him as a nonperson, an object, rather than a respected, participating citizen.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 267-268.) Applying the Eldridge analysis, it is clear that AFDC benefits “are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them” and termination of those benefits involves “important rights.” (Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 262 [ 25 L.Ed.2d at p. 296 ]	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (12)

Case	Cited	Years
Mathews v. Eldridge green scotus · 1976 2 sentences 2006The Supreme Court held, "We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits and that the present administrative procedures fully comport with due process." ( Id. at p. 349, 96 S.Ct. 893 ; see McClelland v. Massinga (4th Cir.1986) 786 F.2d 1205 , 1212.) The United States Supreme Court applied the three-part Eldridge test in five other cases involving challenges to hearing procedures which were provided only after the government agencies took adverse administrative actions. 2006The Supreme Court held, "We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability benefits and that the present administrative procedures fully comport with due process." ( Id. at p. 349, 96 S.Ct. 893 ; see McClelland v. Massinga (4th Cir.1986) 786 F.2d 1205 , 1212.) The United States Supreme Court applied the three-part Eldridge test in five other cases involving challenges to hearing procedures which were provided only after the government agencies took adverse administrative actions.	4	1995–2006
Gagnon v. Scarpelli red scotus · 1973 2 sentences 1999However, the court noted that the Eldridge factors might overcome the presumption against the right to appointed counsel “[i]f, in a given case, the parent’s interests were at their strongest, the State’s interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak.” (Lassiter, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 31 [ 101 S.Ct. at p. 2162 ].) “[S]ince the Eldridge factors will not always be so distributed, and since ‘due process is not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in informality, flexibility and economy must always be sacrificed,’ Gagnon v. Scarpelli [(1973)] 411 U.S. 1999However, the court noted that the Eldridge factors might overcome the presumption against the right to appointed counsel “[i]f, in a given case, the parent’s interests were at their strongest, the State’s interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak.” (Lassiter, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 31 [ 101 S.Ct. at p. 2162 ].) “[S]ince the Eldridge factors will not always be so distributed, and since ‘due process is not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in informality, flexibility and economy must always be sacrificed,’ Gagnon v. Scarpelli [(1973)] 411 U.S.	4	1995–2001
Hyduke's Valley Motors v. Lobel Financial Corp. green calctapp · 2010 1 sentence 2015(Hyduke’s Valley Motors v. Lobel Financial Corp. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 430, 435-436 .) Eldridge’s motion premised her right to attorney’s fees on her lease, and on appeal, she insists that the “underlying action involved [her] right to remain a tenant under her lease.” 4 Looking at Eldridge’s complaint however, and at the evidence adduced at trial, there is no question but that her declaratory relief action was on the McNama settlement and not on the lease.	1	2015–2015
In Re Angelica green calctapp · 1995 2 sentences 2011(Id. at pp. 26, 31-32; Angelica V., supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013 ; In re Christina P. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 115, 129 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 525 ]; In re Ronald R., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1195 .) 1. 2011(Id. at pp. 26, 31-32; Angelica V., supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013 ; In re Christina P. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 115, 129 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 525 ]; In re Ronald R., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1195 .) 1.	1	2011–2011
City of Los Angeles v. David green scotus · 2003 2 sentences 2006As noted, the first Eldridge factor is an evaluation of the private interest affected by the governmental action. ( City of Los Angeles v. David, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 717 , 123 S.Ct. 1895 ; Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 .) We agree with plaintiffs that the private interest at issue, the financial stability of a nonpublic, nonsectarian school providing educational services to disabled children, is a serious matter. 2006As noted, the first Eldridge factor is an evaluation of the private interest affected by the governmental action. ( City of Los Angeles v. David, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 717 , 123 S.Ct. 1895 ; Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 .) We agree with plaintiffs that the private interest at issue, the financial stability of a nonpublic, nonsectarian school providing educational services to disabled children, is a serious matter.	1	2006–2006
Skelly v. State Personnel Board green cal · 1975 2 sentences 2006We realize the United States Supreme Court has in various circumstances expressed a preference for pre-administrative action hearings. ( U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993) 510 U.S. 43, 53 , 114 S.Ct. 492 , 126 L.Ed.2d 490 [real property forfeiture]; Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 [prejudgment replevin of household chattels].) Applying United States Supreme Court analysis, our Supreme Court has held that state employees are entitled to certain due process rights prior to being disciplined. ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 2006We realize the United States Supreme Court has in various circumstances expressed a preference for pre-administrative action hearings. ( U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993) 510 U.S. 43, 53 , 114 S.Ct. 492 , 126 L.Ed.2d 490 [real property forfeiture]; Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 [prejudgment replevin of household chattels].) Applying United States Supreme Court analysis, our Supreme Court has held that state employees are entitled to certain due process rights prior to being disciplined. ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d	1	2006–2006
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property green scotus · 1993 2 sentences 2006We realize the United States Supreme Court has in various circumstances expressed a preference for pre-administrative action hearings. ( U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993) 510 U.S. 43, 53 , 114 S.Ct. 492 , 126 L.Ed.2d 490 [real property forfeiture]; Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 [prejudgment replevin of household chattels].) Applying United States Supreme Court analysis, our Supreme Court has held that state employees are entitled to certain due process rights prior to being disciplined. ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 2006We realize the United States Supreme Court has in various circumstances expressed a preference for pre-administrative action hearings. ( U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993) 510 U.S. 43, 53 , 114 S.Ct. 492 , 126 L.Ed.2d 490 [real property forfeiture]; Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 [prejudgment replevin of household chattels].) Applying United States Supreme Court analysis, our Supreme Court has held that state employees are entitled to certain due process rights prior to being disciplined. ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d	1	2006–2006
Fuentes v. Shevin green scotus · 1972 2 sentences 2006We realize the United States Supreme Court has in various circumstances expressed a preference for pre-administrative action hearings. ( U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993) 510 U.S. 43, 53 , 114 S.Ct. 492 , 126 L.Ed.2d 490 [real property forfeiture]; Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 [prejudgment replevin of household chattels].) Applying United States Supreme Court analysis, our Supreme Court has held that state employees are entitled to certain due process rights prior to being disciplined. ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 2006We realize the United States Supreme Court has in various circumstances expressed a preference for pre-administrative action hearings. ( U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993) 510 U.S. 43, 53 , 114 S.Ct. 492 , 126 L.Ed.2d 490 [real property forfeiture]; Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 [prejudgment replevin of household chattels].) Applying United States Supreme Court analysis, our Supreme Court has held that state employees are entitled to certain due process rights prior to being disciplined. ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d	1	2006–2006
Boddie v. Connecticut green scotus · 1971 2 sentences 2006We realize the United States Supreme Court has in various circumstances expressed a preference for pre-administrative action hearings. ( U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993) 510 U.S. 43, 53 , 114 S.Ct. 492 , 126 L.Ed.2d 490 [real property forfeiture]; Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 [prejudgment replevin of household chattels].) Applying United States Supreme Court analysis, our Supreme Court has held that state employees are entitled to certain due process rights prior to being disciplined. ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 2006We realize the United States Supreme Court has in various circumstances expressed a preference for pre-administrative action hearings. ( U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property (1993) 510 U.S. 43, 53 , 114 S.Ct. 492 , 126 L.Ed.2d 490 [real property forfeiture]; Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 [prejudgment replevin of household chattels].) Applying United States Supreme Court analysis, our Supreme Court has held that state employees are entitled to certain due process rights prior to being disciplined. ( Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d	1	2006–2006
Federal Deposit Insurance v. Mallen green scotus · 1988 2 sentences 2006Applying the Eldridge factors, the Supreme Court concluded, "We thus conclude that the 90-day period is not so long that it will always violate due process." ( Id. at p. 243, 108 S.Ct. 1780 .) In Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers (2001) 532 U.S. 189, 191-192 , 121 S.Ct. 1446 , 149 L.Ed.2d 391 , the Supreme Court upheld California Labor Code provisions which allowed a public entity to withhold moneys due a contractor in the face of violations of a prevailing wage law. 2006Applying the Eldridge factors, the Supreme Court concluded, "We thus conclude that the 90-day period is not so long that it will always violate due process." ( Id. at p. 243, 108 S.Ct. 1780 .) In Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers (2001) 532 U.S. 189, 191-192 , 121 S.Ct. 1446 , 149 L.Ed.2d 391 , the Supreme Court upheld California Labor Code provisions which allowed a public entity to withhold moneys due a contractor in the face of violations of a prevailing wage law.	1	2006–2006
Day v. City of Fontana green cal · 2001 2 sentences 2002(E.g., Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457 , 19 P.3d 1196 ; Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1072 , 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 , 820 P.2d 262 .) [4] In light of our conclusion that section 778 cannot pinch hit for section 777, and considering the amendment to California Rules of Court, rule 1430(e) quoted above, the juvenile court's attempt to analogize section 788 to section 388 cannot be deemed persuasive. [5] We do note our puzzlement by Eldridge's claim that application of the version of section 777 amended by Proposition 21 violates constitutiona 2002(E.g., Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457 , 19 P.3d 1196 ; Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1072 , 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 , 820 P.2d 262 .) [4] In light of our conclusion that section 778 cannot pinch hit for section 777, and considering the amendment to California Rules of Court, rule 1430(e) quoted above, the juvenile court's attempt to analogize section 788 to section 388 cannot be deemed persuasive. [5] We do note our puzzlement by Eldridge's claim that application of the version of section 777 amended by Proposition 21 violates constitutiona	1	2002–2002
Whitman v. Superior Court green cal · 1991 2 sentences 2002(E.g., Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457 , 19 P.3d 1196 ; Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1072 , 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 , 820 P.2d 262 .) [4] In light of our conclusion that section 778 cannot pinch hit for section 777, and considering the amendment to California Rules of Court, rule 1430(e) quoted above, the juvenile court's attempt to analogize section 788 to section 388 cannot be deemed persuasive. [5] We do note our puzzlement by Eldridge's claim that application of the version of section 777 amended by Proposition 21 violates constitutiona 2002(E.g., Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457 , 19 P.3d 1196 ; Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1072 , 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 , 820 P.2d 262 .) [4] In light of our conclusion that section 778 cannot pinch hit for section 777, and considering the amendment to California Rules of Court, rule 1430(e) quoted above, the juvenile court's attempt to analogize section 788 to section 388 cannot be deemed persuasive. [5] We do note our puzzlement by Eldridge's claim that application of the version of section 777 amended by Proposition 21 violates constitutiona	1	2002–2002

Where else courts name it

TX 66 (2002–2024) UT 14 (2016–2025) CA 10 (1989–2015) ND 8 (1993–2016) NC 8 (1982–2022) OH 8 (1981–2018) MI 7 (1990–2023) IL 7 (1984–2000) ME 7 (1992–2021) DE 6 (1984–2025) LA 6 (1994–2007) KS 5 (1988–2020) WA 5 (1984–2004) NY 5 (1981–2009) AZ 4 (1982–2018) CO 4 (2013–2022) IN 4 (1994–2020) OR 3 (1982–1985) WI 3 (1986–2001) HI 3 (2008–2010) WY 3 (2002–2004) MO 2 (2014–2016) IA 2 (1982–1999) MT 2 (1982–1982) NJ 2 (2003–2023) OK 2 (2003–2003) NH 2 (1988–2007)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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