8 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty.green2 sentences2018The court went on to state that once the trial court evaluates the Eldridge factors, it then must balance those factors "against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom." Lassiter at 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153 . {¶ 39} Here, appellant did not seek court-appointed counsel in the trial court and she did not raise the due process argument she now raises in her second assignment of error. 2018The court went on to state that once the trial court evaluates the Eldridge factors, it then must balance those factors "against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom." Lassiter at 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153 . {¶ 39} Here, appellant did not seek court-appointed counsel in the trial court and she did not raise the due process argument she now raises in her second assignment of error. | 2 | 4 |
Liming v. Damosgreen2 sentences2017Asberry v. Payne, 82 Ohio St.3d 44 , 693 N.E.2d 794 (1998); see Liming v. Damos, 133 Ohio St.3d 509 , 2012-Ohio-4783 , 979 N.E.2d 297, 28 (evaluating claimed due process right to counsel during purge hearing of contempt proceeding using Eldridge test). {¶ 26} The United States Supreme Court has not recognized a federal due process right to appointed counsel for indigent parents in all parental rights termination proceedings. 2017Asberry v. Payne, 82 Ohio St.3d 44 , 693 N.E.2d 794 (1998); see Liming v. Damos, 133 Ohio St.3d 509 , 2012-Ohio-4783 , 979 N.E.2d 297, 28 (evaluating claimed due process right to counsel during purge hearing of contempt proceeding using Eldridge test). {¶ 26} The United States Supreme Court has not recognized a federal due process right to appointed counsel for indigent parents in all parental rights termination proceedings. | 2 | 2 |
State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Dupuisgreen2 sentences2017Cincinnati Enquirer, 98 Ohio St.3d 126 , 2002-Ohio-7041 , 781 N.E.2d 163, ¶21 (explaining that “[a] fundamental principle of the constitutional separation of powers among the three branches of government is that the legislative branch is ‘the ultimate arbiter of public policy’”); see SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 137 7 We point out that nothing appears to prohibit the trial court from reconsidering appellant’s request for appointed counsel at some future point in the proceedings, if later factual developments show that the Eldridge factors tilt in favor o 2017Cincinnati Enquirer, 98 Ohio St.3d 126 , 2002-Ohio-7041 , 781 N.E.2d 163, ¶21 (explaining that “[a] fundamental principle of the constitutional separation of powers among the three branches of government is that the legislative branch is ‘the ultimate arbiter of public policy’”); see SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 137 7 We point out that nothing appears to prohibit the trial court from reconsidering appellant’s request for appointed counsel at some future point in the proceedings, if later factual developments show that the Eldridge factors tilt in favor o | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences2014N. Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981) admittedly does not mandate a right to counsel in all parentage actions, the Supreme Court just as clearly implied that such a right might arise in some cases based upon a balancing of the due process factors of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): If, in a given case, the parent's interests were at their strongest, the State's interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak, it could not be said that the Eldridge factors did not overcome the presumption against the right to appointed counsel, and that due process did not t 2014N. Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981) admittedly does not mandate a right to counsel in all parentage actions, the Supreme Court just as clearly implied that such a right might arise in some cases based upon a balancing of the due process factors of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): If, in a given case, the parent's interests were at their strongest, the State's interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak, it could not be said that the Eldridge factors did not overcome the presumption against the right to appointed counsel, and that due process did not t | 3 | 1981–2014 |
Mlb v. Slj
green
2 sentences2017In examining the private interest at stake, the court observed that “[a] parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is * * * a commanding one.” Id. 2017In examining the private interest at stake, the court observed that “[a] parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is * * * a commanding one.” Id. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne
green
2 sentences2017Asberry v. Payne, 82 Ohio St.3d 44 , 693 N.E.2d 794 (1998); see Liming v. Damos, 133 Ohio St.3d 509 , 2012-Ohio-4783 , 979 N.E.2d 297, 28 (evaluating claimed due process right to counsel during purge hearing of contempt proceeding using Eldridge test). {¶ 26} The United States Supreme Court has not recognized a federal due process right to appointed counsel for indigent parents in all parental rights termination proceedings. 2017Asberry v. Payne, 82 Ohio St.3d 44 , 693 N.E.2d 794 (1998); see Liming v. Damos, 133 Ohio St.3d 509 , 2012-Ohio-4783 , 979 N.E.2d 297, 28 (evaluating claimed due process right to counsel during purge hearing of contempt proceeding using Eldridge test). {¶ 26} The United States Supreme Court has not recognized a federal due process right to appointed counsel for indigent parents in all parental rights termination proceedings. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Doyle v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences2006The Ohio Supreme Court in Doyle stated: {¶ 35} "`We emphasize that an operator's license in the state of Ohio is a privilege and is not a property right.' Id. at 52 . {¶ 36} "More particularly, the Supreme Court of the United States has found the driver's interest to be the continued possession of a driver's license pending the outcome of a hearing, and that interest to be a substantial one. 2006The Ohio Supreme Court in Doyle stated: {¶ 35} "`We emphasize that an operator's license in the state of Ohio is a privilege and is not a property right.' Id. at 52 . {¶ 36} "More particularly, the Supreme Court of the United States has found the driver's interest to be the continued possession of a driver's license pending the outcome of a hearing, and that interest to be a substantial one. | 2 | 1996–2006 |
MacKey v. Montrym
green
2 sentences2006The Eldridge test requires three distinct factors to be weighed to determine whether the process granted by the state is constitutionally adequate: {¶ 32} "`First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.' Eldridge 2006The Eldridge test requires three distinct factors to be weighed to determine whether the process granted by the state is constitutionally adequate: {¶ 32} "`First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.' Eldridge | 2 | 1990–2006 |
Dept. of Natural Resources v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2018No. CT2016-0030, 2017-Ohio-61 , 2017 WL 90636 , ¶ 13, appeal not allowed , 148 Ohio St.3d 1446 , 2017-Ohio-1427 , 72 N.E.3d 658 ("[W]e decline to recognize on appeal an ineffective assistance claim by a biological parent opposing a private adoption petition."). {¶ 40} The Fourth District Court of Appeals in both In re J.R.F. and In re J.M.P. concluded that applying the Eldridge factors in those cases did not obviously lead to a conclusion that due process requires appellant to have appointed counsel in this adoption proceeding. 2018No. CT2016-0030, 2017-Ohio-61 , 2017 WL 90636 , ¶ 13, appeal not allowed , 148 Ohio St.3d 1446 , 2017-Ohio-1427 , 72 N.E.3d 658 ("[W]e decline to recognize on appeal an ineffective assistance claim by a biological parent opposing a private adoption petition."). {¶ 40} The Fourth District Court of Appeals in both In re J.R.F. and In re J.M.P. concluded that applying the Eldridge factors in those cases did not obviously lead to a conclusion that due process requires appellant to have appointed counsel in this adoption proceeding. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Castagnola
green
2 sentences2018No. CT2016-0030, 2017-Ohio-61 , 2017 WL 90636 , ¶ 13, appeal not allowed , 148 Ohio St.3d 1446 , 2017-Ohio-1427 , 72 N.E.3d 658 ("[W]e decline to recognize on appeal an ineffective assistance claim by a biological parent opposing a private adoption petition."). {¶ 40} The Fourth District Court of Appeals in both In re J.R.F. and In re J.M.P. concluded that applying the Eldridge factors in those cases did not obviously lead to a conclusion that due process requires appellant to have appointed counsel in this adoption proceeding. 2018No. CT2016-0030, 2017-Ohio-61 , 2017 WL 90636 , ¶ 13, appeal not allowed , 148 Ohio St.3d 1446 , 2017-Ohio-1427 , 72 N.E.3d 658 ("[W]e decline to recognize on appeal an ineffective assistance claim by a biological parent opposing a private adoption petition."). {¶ 40} The Fourth District Court of Appeals in both In re J.R.F. and In re J.M.P. concluded that applying the Eldridge factors in those cases did not obviously lead to a conclusion that due process requires appellant to have appointed counsel in this adoption proceeding. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State ex rel. McCuller v. Eppinger
neutral
2 sentences2018No. CT2016-0030, 2017-Ohio-61 , 2017 WL 90636 , ¶ 13, appeal not allowed , 148 Ohio St.3d 1446 , 2017-Ohio-1427 , 72 N.E.3d 658 ("[W]e decline to recognize on appeal an ineffective assistance claim by a biological parent opposing a private adoption petition."). {¶ 40} The Fourth District Court of Appeals in both In re J.R.F. and In re J.M.P. concluded that applying the Eldridge factors in those cases did not obviously lead to a conclusion that due process requires appellant to have appointed counsel in this adoption proceeding. 2018No. CT2016-0030, 2017-Ohio-61 , 2017 WL 90636 , ¶ 13, appeal not allowed , 148 Ohio St.3d 1446 , 2017-Ohio-1427 , 72 N.E.3d 658 ("[W]e decline to recognize on appeal an ineffective assistance claim by a biological parent opposing a private adoption petition."). {¶ 40} The Fourth District Court of Appeals in both In re J.R.F. and In re J.M.P. concluded that applying the Eldridge factors in those cases did not obviously lead to a conclusion that due process requires appellant to have appointed counsel in this adoption proceeding. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In re Adoption of J.L.M-L.
green
2 sentences2018No. CT2016-0030, 2017-Ohio-61 , 2017 WL 90636 , ¶ 13, appeal not allowed , 148 Ohio St.3d 1446 , 2017-Ohio-1427 , 72 N.E.3d 658 ("[W]e decline to recognize on appeal an ineffective assistance claim by a biological parent opposing a private adoption petition."). {¶ 40} The Fourth District Court of Appeals in both In re J.R.F. and In re J.M.P. concluded that applying the Eldridge factors in those cases did not obviously lead to a conclusion that due process requires appellant to have appointed counsel in this adoption proceeding. 2018No. CT2016-0030, 2017-Ohio-61 , 2017 WL 90636 , ¶ 13, appeal not allowed , 148 Ohio St.3d 1446 , 2017-Ohio-1427 , 72 N.E.3d 658 ("[W]e decline to recognize on appeal an ineffective assistance claim by a biological parent opposing a private adoption petition."). {¶ 40} The Fourth District Court of Appeals in both In re J.R.F. and In re J.M.P. concluded that applying the Eldridge factors in those cases did not obviously lead to a conclusion that due process requires appellant to have appointed counsel in this adoption proceeding. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC
green
2 sentences2017VINTON, 16CA701 24 S.Ct. 954 , 967, 197 L.Ed.2d 292 (2017) (stating that court “cannot overrule Congress’s judgment based on [its] own policy views”). 2017VINTON, 16CA701 24 S.Ct. 954 , 967, 197 L.Ed.2d 292 (2017) (stating that court “cannot overrule Congress’s judgment based on [its] own policy views”). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Fusari v. Steinberg
green
2 sentences2006Fusari v. Steinberg (1975), 419 U.S. 379 , 389 . {¶ 41} "The final element of the Eldridge test concerns the government's interests. 2006Fusari v. Steinberg (1975), 419 U.S. 379 , 389 . {¶ 41} "The final element of the Eldridge test concerns the government's interests. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Little v. Streater
green
2 sentences1981The United States Supreme Court analyzed the due process claim in Little with reference to the three-pronged standard enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976), 424 U. S. 319 , at page 335: 8 “**** [identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, 1981The United States Supreme Court analyzed the due process claim in Little with reference to the three-pronged standard enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976), 424 U. S. 319 , at page 335: 8 “**** [identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.