14 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2016–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty.green2 sentences2016ANALYSIS ¶22 We apply the test from Lassiter v. Department of Social Services and determine that L.E.S. had a federal due process right to counsel in the district court proceedings and that that right was erroneously denied. 452 U.S. 18 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). 4 L.E.S. correctly argues that “the tri al court erred by failing to consider the Eldridge factors” as applied by the United States Supreme Court in Lassiter. 5 In Lassi-ter, the Court considered whether indigent parents in parental-rights termination proceedings have a right to counsel. 2016ANALYSIS ¶22 We apply the test from Lassiter v. Department of Social Services and determine that L.E.S. had a federal due process right to counsel in the district court proceedings and that that right was erroneously denied. 452 U.S. 18 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). 4 L.E.S. correctly argues that “the tri al court erred by failing to consider the Eldridge factors” as applied by the United States Supreme Court in Lassiter. 5 In Lassi-ter, the Court considered whether indigent parents in parental-rights termination proceedings have a right to counsel. | 4 | 4 |
Danforth v. State Department of Health and Welfaregreen2 sentences2016Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St.2d 6 , 399 N.E.2d 66, 70 (1980) (same); In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983, 984-86 (Okla. 1978) (same); see also Danforth v. Maine Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 795 (Me. 1973) (ruling on appointed counsel issue before Eldridge created presumption against it); In re Friesz, 190 Neb. 347 , 208 N.W.2d 259, 260-61 (1973) (same); Crist v. Division of Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J.Super. 402 , 320 A.2d 203, 209-11 (1974) (same); In re Myricks, 85 Wash.2d 252 , 533 P.2d 841, 842 (1975) (same). 2016Heller v. Miller, 399 N.E.2d 66, 70 (Ohio 1980) (same); In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983 , 984–86 (Okla. 1978) (same); see also Danforth v. Maine Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 795 (Me. 1973) (ruling on appointed counsel issue before Eldridge created presumption against it); In re Friesz, 208 N.W.2d 259 , 260–61 (Neb. 1973) (same); Crist v. Division of Youth and Family Servs., 320 A.2d 203 , 209–11 (N.J. 1974) (same); In re Myricks, 533 P.2d 841, 842 (Wash. 1975) (same). | 3 | 3 |
In Re the Welfare of Myricksgreen2 sentences2016Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St.2d 6 , 399 N.E.2d 66, 70 (1980) (same); In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983, 984-86 (Okla. 1978) (same); see also Danforth v. Maine Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 795 (Me. 1973) (ruling on appointed counsel issue before Eldridge created presumption against it); In re Friesz, 190 Neb. 347 , 208 N.W.2d 259, 260-61 (1973) (same); Crist v. Division of Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J.Super. 402 , 320 A.2d 203, 209-11 (1974) (same); In re Myricks, 85 Wash.2d 252 , 533 P.2d 841, 842 (1975) (same). 2016Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St.2d 6 , 399 N.E.2d 66, 70 (1980) (same); In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983, 984-86 (Okla. 1978) (same); see also Danforth v. Maine Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 795 (Me. 1973) (ruling on appointed counsel issue before Eldridge created presumption against it); In re Friesz, 190 Neb. 347 , 208 N.W.2d 259, 260-61 (1973) (same); Crist v. Division of Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J.Super. 402 , 320 A.2d 203, 209-11 (1974) (same); In re Myricks, 85 Wash.2d 252 , 533 P.2d 841, 842 (1975) (same). | 3 | 3 |
State ex rel. Heller v. Millergreen2 sentences2016Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St.2d 6 , 399 N.E.2d 66, 70 (1980) (same); In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983, 984-86 (Okla. 1978) (same); see also Danforth v. Maine Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 795 (Me. 1973) (ruling on appointed counsel issue before Eldridge created presumption against it); In re Friesz, 190 Neb. 347 , 208 N.W.2d 259, 260-61 (1973) (same); Crist v. Division of Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J.Super. 402 , 320 A.2d 203, 209-11 (1974) (same); In re Myricks, 85 Wash.2d 252 , 533 P.2d 841, 842 (1975) (same). 2016Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St.2d 6 , 399 N.E.2d 66, 70 (1980) (same); In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983, 984-86 (Okla. 1978) (same); see also Danforth v. Maine Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 795 (Me. 1973) (ruling on appointed counsel issue before Eldridge created presumption against it); In re Friesz, 190 Neb. 347 , 208 N.W.2d 259, 260-61 (1973) (same); Crist v. Division of Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J.Super. 402 , 320 A.2d 203, 209-11 (1974) (same); In re Myricks, 85 Wash.2d 252 , 533 P.2d 841, 842 (1975) (same). | 3 | 3 |
Eldridge v. Johndrowgreen2 sentences2018We've since summarized the Eldridge test as prohibiting us from "overrul[ing] our precedents unless they've proven to be unpersuasive and unworkable, create more harm than good, and haven't created reliance interests." Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole , 2017 UT 89 , ¶ 57, 416 P.3d 663 (citing Eldridge , 2015 UT 21 , ¶ 22, 345 P.3d 553 , and Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp. , 2011 UT 62 , ¶¶ 16-17, 275 P.3d 208 ). ¶11 The court of appeals correctly relied on the Eldridge factors when deciding to overrule Warner and Allen . 2018We've since summarized the Eldridge test as prohibiting us from "overrul[ing] our precedents unless they've proven to be unpersuasive and unworkable, create more harm than good, and haven't created reliance interests." Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole , 2017 UT 89 , ¶ 57, 416 P.3d 663 (citing Eldridge , 2015 UT 21 , ¶ 22, 345 P.3d 553 , and Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp. , 2011 UT 62 , ¶¶ 16-17, 275 P.3d 208 ). ¶11 The court of appeals correctly relied on the Eldridge factors when deciding to overrule Warner and Allen . | 2 | 8 |
Crist v. NJ Div. Youth and Family Serv.green2 sentences2016Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St.2d 6 , 399 N.E.2d 66, 70 (1980) (same); In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983, 984-86 (Okla. 1978) (same); see also Danforth v. Maine Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 795 (Me. 1973) (ruling on appointed counsel issue before Eldridge created presumption against it); In re Friesz, 190 Neb. 347 , 208 N.W.2d 259, 260-61 (1973) (same); Crist v. Division of Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J.Super. 402 , 320 A.2d 203, 209-11 (1974) (same); In re Myricks, 85 Wash.2d 252 , 533 P.2d 841, 842 (1975) (same). 2016Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St.2d 6 , 399 N.E.2d 66, 70 (1980) (same); In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983, 984-86 (Okla. 1978) (same); see also Danforth v. Maine Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 795 (Me. 1973) (ruling on appointed counsel issue before Eldridge created presumption against it); In re Friesz, 190 Neb. 347 , 208 N.W.2d 259, 260-61 (1973) (same); Crist v. Division of Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J.Super. 402 , 320 A.2d 203, 209-11 (1974) (same); In re Myricks, 85 Wash.2d 252 , 533 P.2d 841, 842 (1975) (same). | 2 | 3 |
Matter of Chad S.green2 sentences2016Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St.2d 6 , 399 N.E.2d 66, 70 (1980) (same); In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983, 984-86 (Okla. 1978) (same); see also Danforth v. Maine Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 795 (Me. 1973) (ruling on appointed counsel issue before Eldridge created presumption against it); In re Friesz, 190 Neb. 347 , 208 N.W.2d 259, 260-61 (1973) (same); Crist v. Division of Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J.Super. 402 , 320 A.2d 203, 209-11 (1974) (same); In re Myricks, 85 Wash.2d 252 , 533 P.2d 841, 842 (1975) (same). 2016Heller v. Miller, 399 N.E.2d 66, 70 (Ohio 1980) (same); In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983 , 984–86 (Okla. 1978) (same); see also Danforth v. Maine Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 795 (Me. 1973) (ruling on appointed counsel issue before Eldridge created presumption against it); In re Friesz, 208 N.W.2d 259 , 260–61 (Neb. 1973) (same); Crist v. Division of Youth and Family Servs., 320 A.2d 203 , 209–11 (N.J. 1974) (same); In re Myricks, 533 P.2d 841, 842 (Wash. 1975) (same). | 2 | 3 |
In Interest of Frieszgreen2 sentences2016Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St.2d 6 , 399 N.E.2d 66, 70 (1980) (same); In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983, 984-86 (Okla. 1978) (same); see also Danforth v. Maine Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 795 (Me. 1973) (ruling on appointed counsel issue before Eldridge created presumption against it); In re Friesz, 190 Neb. 347 , 208 N.W.2d 259, 260-61 (1973) (same); Crist v. Division of Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J.Super. 402 , 320 A.2d 203, 209-11 (1974) (same); In re Myricks, 85 Wash.2d 252 , 533 P.2d 841, 842 (1975) (same). 2016Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St.2d 6 , 399 N.E.2d 66, 70 (1980) (same); In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983, 984-86 (Okla. 1978) (same); see also Danforth v. Maine Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 795 (Me. 1973) (ruling on appointed counsel issue before Eldridge created presumption against it); In re Friesz, 190 Neb. 347 , 208 N.W.2d 259, 260-61 (1973) (same); Crist v. Division of Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J.Super. 402 , 320 A.2d 203, 209-11 (1974) (same); In re Myricks, 85 Wash.2d 252 , 533 P.2d 841, 842 (1975) (same). | 2 | 3 |
Department of Public Welfare v. J. K. B.green2 sentences2016Welfare v. J.K.B., 379 Mass. 1 , 393 N.E.2d 406, 407-09 (1979) (failing to acknowledge the presumption or the Eldridge factors); State ex rel. 2016Welfare v. J.K.B., 379 Mass. 1 , 393 N.E.2d 406, 407-09 (1979) (failing to acknowledge the presumption or the Eldridge factors); State ex rel. | 2 | 3 |
Jones v. Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp.green2 sentences2016But we conclude that there is at least a “reasonable likelihood” that the failure to apply the Eldridge standard “affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Jones, 944 P.2d at 360 . 2016But we conclude that there is at least a “reasonable likelihood” that the failure to apply the Eldridge standard “affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Jones, 944 P.2d at 360 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Goinsgreen2 sentences2025See Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶ 45 (explaining that “our precedent must yield when it conflicts with a validly enacted statute” or “a constitutional amendment” (cleaned up)). 22 Cite as: 2025 UT 12 Opinion of the Court new legal theory at a second hearing, a judge may infer that the new evidence or theory was withheld for the purpose of harassing a defendant through “repeated filings of groundless claims.” See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ¶ 13 . 2025See Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶ 45 (explaining that “our precedent must yield when it conflicts with a validly enacted statute” or “a constitutional amendment” (cleaned up)). 22 Cite as: 2025 UT 12 Opinion of the Court new legal theory at a second hearing, a judge may infer that the new evidence or theory was withheld for the purpose of harassing a defendant through “repeated filings of groundless claims.” See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ¶ 13 . | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Carlsongreen2 sentences2025See Baker v. Carlson, 2018 UT 59 , ¶ 16 n.3, 437 P.3d 333 (deeming appellants’ failure to address the Eldridge factors “fatal” to their call to overturn precedent). 2025See Baker v. Carlson, 2018 UT 59 , ¶ 16 n.3, 437 P.3d 333 (deeming appellants’ failure to address the Eldridge factors “fatal” to their call to overturn precedent). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Randolphgreen1 sentence2024Randolph, 2022 UT 34, ¶ 66 (cleaned up) (citing Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 23 , 345 P.3d 553 ). | 1 | 1 |
OPC v. Bowengreen2 sentences2022See In re Discipline of Bowen, 2021 UT 53 , ¶ 84 n.20, 500 P.3d 788 (stating that, where “one of the Eldridge factors is not met, we need not discuss the other”). 2022See In re Discipline of Bowen, 2021 UT 53 , ¶ 84 n.20, 500 P.3d 788 (stating that, where “one of the Eldridge factors is not met, we need not discuss the other”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Guardgreen1 sentence2021Our pursuit of because ―[u]ltimately, we are concerned with whether overruling our precedent would upend broad swaths of the legal landscape‖); Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21 , ¶ 35–36, 345 P.3d 553 (explaining only that people ―ought not . . . have‖ ―their legal rights . . . as defined by judicial precedent‖ ―swept away by judicial fiat‖ after ―having conducted their affairs in reliance on such rights‖ (citations omitted)); Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶ 60 (noting that ―the State‘s [reliance] interests are certainly important‖ but explaining that ―they are not the type of public reliance interests w | 1 | 1 |
Rutherford v. Talisker Canyons Fin., Co.green2 sentences2021See, e.g., Rutherford v. Talisker Canyons Fin., Co., 2019 UT 27 , ¶¶ 31–74, 445 P.3d 474 (going through persuasiveness in depth, before turning to our ―firmly established‖ factors and analyzing them); State v. Sanders, 2019 UT 25, ¶ 38 , 445 P.3d 453 (noting the interplay between the Eldridge factors); id. ¶¶ 36–42 (analyzing the Eldridge factors); C.R. 2021See, e.g., Rutherford v. Talisker Canyons Fin., Co., 2019 UT 27 , ¶¶ 31–74, 445 P.3d 474 (going through persuasiveness in depth, before turning to our ―firmly established‖ factors and analyzing them); State v. Sanders, 2019 UT 25, ¶ 38 , 445 P.3d 453 (noting the interplay between the Eldridge factors); id. ¶¶ 36–42 (analyzing the Eldridge factors); C.R. | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. Universal Sales, Inc.green2 sentences2021Our pursuit of because ―[u]ltimately, we are concerned with whether overruling our precedent would upend broad swaths of the legal landscape‖); Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21 , ¶ 35–36, 345 P.3d 553 (explaining only that people ―ought not . . . have‖ ―their legal rights . . . as defined by judicial precedent‖ ―swept away by judicial fiat‖ after ―having conducted their affairs in reliance on such rights‖ (citations omitted)); Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶ 60 (noting that ―the State‘s [reliance] interests are certainly important‖ but explaining that ―they are not the type of public reliance interests w 2021Our pursuit of because ―[u]ltimately, we are concerned with whether overruling our precedent would upend broad swaths of the legal landscape‖); Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21 , ¶ 35–36, 345 P.3d 553 (explaining only that people ―ought not . . . have‖ ―their legal rights . . . as defined by judicial precedent‖ ―swept away by judicial fiat‖ after ―having conducted their affairs in reliance on such rights‖ (citations omitted)); Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶ 60 (noting that ―the State‘s [reliance] interests are certainly important‖ but explaining that ―they are not the type of public reliance interests w | 1 | 1 |
Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardonsgreen2 sentences2016See Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 914 (Utah 1993) (noting that "considerations of judicial integrity require us to extend the benefit of our decision to petitioner and any [party] who currently has a claim pending in the district court or on appeal"). *1243 25 And under Eidridge there was legal error in the district court's decision denying the motion for new trial on SIRQ's intentional interference claim. 2016See Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 914 (Utah 1993) (noting that "considerations of judicial integrity require us to extend the benefit of our decision to petitioner and any [party] who currently has a claim pending in the district court or on appeal"). *1243 25 And under Eidridge there was legal error in the district court's decision denying the motion for new trial on SIRQ's intentional interference claim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences2016It held that the factors in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)—“the private interests at stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions”—may weigh “against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom.” Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 . ¶64 The Lassiter opinion assessed the relevant Eldridge factors as follows: “[T]he parent’s interest is an extremely important one (and may be supplemented by the dan 2016It held that the factors in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)—“the private interests at stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions”—may weigh “against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom.” Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 . ¶64 The Lassiter opinion assessed the relevant Eldridge factors as follows: “[T]he parent’s interest is an extremely important one (and may be supplemented by the dan | 3 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Labrum
neutral
2 sentences2025See Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶ 45 (explaining that “our precedent must yield when it conflicts with a validly enacted statute” or “a constitutional amendment” (cleaned up)). 22 Cite as: 2025 UT 12 Opinion of the Court new legal theory at a second hearing, a judge may infer that the new evidence or theory was withheld for the purpose of harassing a defendant through “repeated filings of groundless claims.” See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ¶ 13 . 2025See Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶ 45 (explaining that “our precedent must yield when it conflicts with a validly enacted statute” or “a constitutional amendment” (cleaned up)). 22 Cite as: 2025 UT 12 Opinion of the Court new legal theory at a second hearing, a judge may infer that the new evidence or theory was withheld for the purpose of harassing a defendant through “repeated filings of groundless claims.” See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ¶ 13 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Morgan
green
2 sentences2025See Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶ 45 (explaining that “our precedent must yield when it conflicts with a validly enacted statute” or “a constitutional amendment” (cleaned up)). 22 Cite as: 2025 UT 12 Opinion of the Court new legal theory at a second hearing, a judge may infer that the new evidence or theory was withheld for the purpose of harassing a defendant through “repeated filings of groundless claims.” See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ¶ 13 . 2025See Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶ 45 (explaining that “our precedent must yield when it conflicts with a validly enacted statute” or “a constitutional amendment” (cleaned up)). 22 Cite as: 2025 UT 12 Opinion of the Court new legal theory at a second hearing, a judge may infer that the new evidence or theory was withheld for the purpose of harassing a defendant through “repeated filings of groundless claims.” See Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ¶ 13 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Cope v. Utah Valley State College
green
2 sentences2023This is important because we are wary of disrupting the reliance that our precedents may have created. ¶56 “As we have noted, people should know what their legal rights are as defined by judicial precedent, and having conducted their affairs in reliance on such rights, ought not to have them swept away by judicial fiat.” Cope v. Utah Valley State Coll., 2014 UT 53 , ¶ 19, 342 P.3d 243 (cleaned up). 2023This is important because we are wary of disrupting the reliance that our precedents may have created. ¶56 “As we have noted, people should know what their legal rights are as defined by judicial precedent, and having conducted their affairs in reliance on such rights, ought not to have them swept away by judicial fiat.” Cope v. Utah Valley State Coll., 2014 UT 53 , ¶ 19, 342 P.3d 243 (cleaned up). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
C.R. Eng. v. Swift Transp. Co.
green
2 sentences2021Co., 2019 UT 8 , ¶¶ 28–39, 437 P.3d 343 (analyzing the Eldridge factors in the same order and in some depth). 2021Co., 2019 UT 8 , ¶¶ 28–39, 437 P.3d 343 (analyzing the Eldridge factors in the same order and in some depth). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
C.R. England v. Swift Transportation
green
2 sentences2021Co., 2019 UT 8 , ¶¶ 28–39, 437 P.3d 343 (analyzing the Eldridge factors in the same order and in some depth). 2021Co., 2019 UT 8 , ¶¶ 28–39, 437 P.3d 343 (analyzing the Eldridge factors in the same order and in some depth). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Sanders
green
2 sentences2021See, e.g., Rutherford v. Talisker Canyons Fin., Co., 2019 UT 27 , ¶¶ 31–74, 445 P.3d 474 (going through persuasiveness in depth, before turning to our ―firmly established‖ factors and analyzing them); State v. Sanders, 2019 UT 25, ¶ 38 , 445 P.3d 453 (noting the interplay between the Eldridge factors); id. ¶¶ 36–42 (analyzing the Eldridge factors); C.R. 2021See, e.g., Rutherford v. Talisker Canyons Fin., Co., 2019 UT 27 , ¶¶ 31–74, 445 P.3d 474 (going through persuasiveness in depth, before turning to our ―firmly established‖ factors and analyzing them); State v. Sanders, 2019 UT 25, ¶ 38 , 445 P.3d 453 (noting the interplay between the Eldridge factors); id. ¶¶ 36–42 (analyzing the Eldridge factors); C.R. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Utah Department of Transportation v. Admiral Beverage Corp.
green
2 sentences2018We've since summarized the Eldridge test as prohibiting us from "overrul[ing] our precedents unless they've proven to be unpersuasive and unworkable, create more harm than good, and haven't created reliance interests." Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole , 2017 UT 89 , ¶ 57, 416 P.3d 663 (citing Eldridge , 2015 UT 21 , ¶ 22, 345 P.3d 553 , and Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp. , 2011 UT 62 , ¶¶ 16-17, 275 P.3d 208 ). ¶11 The court of appeals correctly relied on the Eldridge factors when deciding to overrule Warner and Allen . 2018We've since summarized the Eldridge test as prohibiting us from "overrul[ing] our precedents unless they've proven to be unpersuasive and unworkable, create more harm than good, and haven't created reliance interests." Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole , 2017 UT 89 , ¶ 57, 416 P.3d 663 (citing Eldridge , 2015 UT 21 , ¶ 22, 345 P.3d 553 , and Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp. , 2011 UT 62 , ¶¶ 16-17, 275 P.3d 208 ). ¶11 The court of appeals correctly relied on the Eldridge factors when deciding to overrule Warner and Allen . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole
green
2 sentences2018We've since summarized the Eldridge test as prohibiting us from "overrul[ing] our precedents unless they've proven to be unpersuasive and unworkable, create more harm than good, and haven't created reliance interests." Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole , 2017 UT 89 , ¶ 57, 416 P.3d 663 (citing Eldridge , 2015 UT 21 , ¶ 22, 345 P.3d 553 , and Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp. , 2011 UT 62 , ¶¶ 16-17, 275 P.3d 208 ). ¶11 The court of appeals correctly relied on the Eldridge factors when deciding to overrule Warner and Allen . 2018We've since summarized the Eldridge test as prohibiting us from "overrul[ing] our precedents unless they've proven to be unpersuasive and unworkable, create more harm than good, and haven't created reliance interests." Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole , 2017 UT 89 , ¶ 57, 416 P.3d 663 (citing Eldridge , 2015 UT 21 , ¶ 22, 345 P.3d 553 , and Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp. , 2011 UT 62 , ¶¶ 16-17, 275 P.3d 208 ). ¶11 The court of appeals correctly relied on the Eldridge factors when deciding to overrule Warner and Allen . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In re K.A.S.
green
2 sentences2016Moreover, L.E.S. is without a meaningful malpractice action as that does not provide a vehicle for regaining his parental rights in K.A.S. 7 Cite as: 2016 UT 55 Opinion of the Court denied. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 4 L.E.S. correctly argues that “the trial court erred by failing to consider the Eldridge factors” as applied by the United States Supreme Court in Lassiter. 5 In Lassiter, the Court 4 Because we find that L.E.S. had a federal due process right to counsel, and as a matter of constitutional avoidance, we do not reach his other constitutional arguments for the right to counsel, namely the 2016Moreover, L.E.S. is without a meaningful malpractice action as that does not provide a vehicle for regaining his parental rights in K.A.S. 7 Cite as: 2016 UT 55 Opinion of the Court denied. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 4 L.E.S. correctly argues that “the trial court erred by failing to consider the Eldridge factors” as applied by the United States Supreme Court in Lassiter. 5 In Lassiter, the Court 4 Because we find that L.E.S. had a federal due process right to counsel, and as a matter of constitutional avoidance, we do not reach his other constitutional arguments for the right to counsel, namely the | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.