66 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2024 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harrell v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Harrell v. State, Nos. 07-06-0469-CR, 07-06- 0470-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6416 , at *2 (Tex.App.--Amarillo Aug. 13, 2007), rev'd, 286 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. 2009). 2 way of a motion to modify, correct or rescind the order. 2012See Harrell v. State, Nos. 07-06-0469-CR, 07-06- 0470-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6416 , at *2 (Tex.App.--Amarillo Aug. 13, 2007), rev'd, 286 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. 2009). 5 We interpret the substance of Appellant's Motion for New Trial as his challenge to the withdrawal notification. 4 Appellant received notice of the withdrawal via the Order to Withdraw Funds. | 6 | 31 |
In Re MSgreen2 sentences2022The Texas Supreme Court has explained that there are certain circumstances where failure to preserve “may very well rise to the level of a due process violation because ‘a different calibration of the [] Eldridge factors could require a court of appeals to review an unpreserved complaint of error to ensure that our procedures comport with due process.’” In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 546 (quoting In re B.L.D., 56 S.W.3d at 210–12) (discussing failure to preserve legal sufficiency complaint in the context of ineffective assistance claim). 2011See id. at 547 (net result of Eldridge factors must be balanced against presumption that procedural rules comport with constitutional due process requirements). | 5 | 11 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2022But, the supreme court also considered whether a fact-specific due process analysis controlled and conceded that “in a given parental rights termination case, a different calibration of the Eldridge factors could require a court of appeals to review an unpreserved complaint of error to ensure that our procedures comport with due process.” See id. at 354 . 2022The Court instructed that such decisions should be made by considering whether the competing interests set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (the “Eldridge factors”), weigh in favor of appointing counsel. | 4 | 31 |
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty.green2 sentences2022Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (parent who appears without counsel must overcome presumption that appointment of counsel is not required in civil cases using Eldridge factors, which include: (1) private interests at stake; 22 (2) government’s interest; and (3) risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous results). 2022Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (parent who appears without counsel must overcome presumption that appointment of counsel is not required in civil cases using Eldridge factors, which include: (1) private interests at stake; 22 (2) government’s interest; and (3) risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous results). | 4 | 11 |
In Re BLDgreen2 sentences2008The Court further suggested, however, that the failure to preserve a factual sufficiency question might very well rise to the level of a due process violation depending on a “different calibration of the [ Mathews v. ] Eldridge factors.” In re B.L.D. , 113 S.W.3d at 354 ; In re M.S. , 115 S.W.3d at 547-48 . 2002The Court further suggested, however, that the failure to preserve a factual sufficiency question might very well rise to the level of a due process violation depending on a “different calibration of the [ Mathews v. ] Eldridge factors.” In re B.L.D. , 113 S.W.3d at 354 ; In re M.S. , 115 S.W.3d at 547-48 . | 3 | 7 |
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrathgreen2 sentences2015A The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be "condemned to suffer grievous loss." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-263 (1970), quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 2015A The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be "condemned to suffer grievous loss." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-263 (1970), quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). | 3 | 3 |
Goldberg v. Kellygreen2 sentences2015A The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be "condemned to suffer grievous loss." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-263 (1970), quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 2015A The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be "condemned to suffer grievous loss." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-263 (1970), quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). | 3 | 3 |
In Re JFCgreen2 sentences2016Id. at 352 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); accord In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 303 (Tex. 2002). 2012Id. at 352 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); accord In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 303 (Tex. 2002). | 2 | 2 |
Turner v. Rogersgreen2 sentences2011Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ; see Turner, 131 S.Ct. at 2510 . 18 .Kerri’s citation is "TRCP 806.” The abbreviation TRCP generally refers to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 2011Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 ; see Turner, 131 S.Ct. at 2510 . 18 .Kerri’s citation is "TRCP 806.” The abbreviation TRCP generally refers to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. | 2 | 2 |
Gagnon v. Scarpellired2 sentences2003See id. (noting that “ ‘due process is not so rigid as to require that the significant factors in informality, flexibility and economy must always be sacrificed’ ”) (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973)); cf. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 757 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 (“Retrospective case-by-case review cannot preserve fundamental fairness when a class of proceedings is governed by a constitutionally defective evidentiary standard.”). 2003See id. (noting that “ ‘due process is not so rigid as to require that the significant factors in informality, flexibility and economy must always be sacrificed’ ”) (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973)); cf. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 757 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 (“Retrospective case-by-case review cannot preserve fundamental fairness when a class of proceedings is governed by a constitutionally defective evidentiary standard.”). | 2 | 2 |
Mlb v. Sljgreen2 sentences2023Id. at 31; see M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123 (1996) (“When deprivation of parental status is at stake, however, counsel is sometimes part of the process that is due.”). 2023Id. at 31; see M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123 (1996) (“When deprivation of parental status is at stake, however, counsel is sometimes part of the process that is due.”). | 1 | 1 |
in the Interest of L.N.C & K.N.M., Childrengreen2 sentences2022See In re L.N.C., 573 S.W.3d at 322 ; In re A.J., 559 S.W.3d at 720 . 2022See In re L.N.C., 573 S.W.3d at 322 ; In re A.J., 559 S.W.3d at 720 . | 1 | 1 |
In Re Rmtgreen2 sentences2019Id. at 18, 20 . 2019Id. at 18, 20 . | 1 | 1 |
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inmangreen2 sentences2019In other words, demonstrating that Peterson’s putatively proposed procedures are unduly burdensome and more than the amount of process due does not meet the Department’s burden to 17 The Department also argued that Peterson lacks standing because he testified in his deposition that the Department never denied his transfer permit and therefore his alleged injury is not “concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, not hypothetical.” See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008). 2019In other words, demonstrating that Peterson’s putatively proposed procedures are unduly burdensome and more than the amount of process due does not meet the Department’s burden to 17 The Department also argued that Peterson lacks standing because he testified in his deposition that the Department never denied his transfer permit and therefore his alleged injury is not “concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, not hypothetical.” See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008). | 1 | 1 |
Aviles v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2015Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754 , 102 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982); see also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32 , 101 S.Ct. 1388 ;Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 ; S.Ct. 2153 ("[C]hi1d-custody litigation must be concluded Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 . as rapidly as is consistent with fair'ncss...."). | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Service Commissiongreen1 sentence2008Eldridge’s motion for summary judgment was based on the theory that the general contractor Clayco, not the premises owner, had “provided” the insurance. -7- 04-08-00006-CV a contrary intention is apparent from the context, Taylor v. Firemen’s & Policemen’s Civil Service Comm’n of City of Lubbock, 616 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. 1981), or unless such a construction leads to absurd results. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences2024Private Interests Affected by the Proceeding Parental rights are “far more precious than any property right” and, when the State initiates a termination proceeding, “it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 . 2024Private Interests Affected by the Proceeding Parental rights are “far more precious than any property right” and, when the State initiates a termination proceeding, “it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 . | 11 | 2002–2024 |
Boddie v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences2024See Eldridge, 424 U.S. 335 ; Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377 . 2024See Eldridge, 424 U.S. 335 ; Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
in the Interest of A. J., a Child
green
2 sentences2022See In re L.N.C., 573 S.W.3d at 322 ; In re A.J., 559 S.W.3d at 720 . 2022See In re L.N.C., 573 S.W.3d at 322 ; In re A.J., 559 S.W.3d at 720 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Landon v. Plasencia
green
1 sentence2019To determine the amount of process due, three Eldridge factors are balanced: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 319–20 (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Lehman Ex Rel. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency
green
1 sentence2015But this must be balanced against the net Lehman v.Lycomr'r1g County Cliildre/1's Sen/r'ce.r weight of the three Eldridge factors to determine if the Agency, 458 US. 502, 513-14, 102 S.Ct. 3231 , 73 presumption is overcome. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Safety National Casualty Corp. v. State
green
1 sentence2010Id. at 319-20 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 ). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
In Re MLB
green
2 sentences2009Id. at 761-62 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). 2009Id. at 761-62 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.