change standard in Tennessee

2013See State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516 , 570 n. 52 (Tenn.2000) (recognizing that the comparison pool was small after the death penalty was first reinstated but had grown by the time of Bland such that pool size was no longer a concern); Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 666 n. 17.

2013The majority opinion held that a death sentence could be found disproportionate only when “the case, taken as a whole, is plainly lacking in circumstances consistent with those in similar cases in which the death penalty has been imposed.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 665 (emphasis added). 12 This change prevents the reviewing courts from determining whether the case under review exhibits the same level of shocking despicability that characterizes the bulk of our death penalty cases or, instead, whether it more closely resembles cases that resulted in lesser sentences.

2017See Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266, 284-85 (Tenn. 2011) (determining strategic decision not to present promised testimony of defendant based, in part, on more-favorable-than-anticipated testimony of victims was not deficient); Derek T.

2017King, 989 S.W.2d at 331 ; see also Felts, 354 S.W.3d at 285 .

2013See id. at 332 . “[A]ssuming counsel does not know at the time of the opening statements that he will not produce the promised evidence, an informed change of strategy in the midst of trial is ‘virtually unchallengeable.’” Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266, 285 (Tenn. 2011)(quoting Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872, 904 (4th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by O’Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214 , 1222 (4th Cir. 1996)).

1999The appellant relies on State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 220, 224-26 (Tenn.Crim.App.1991), to argue that the change in the defense theory constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

2013See State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516 , 570 n.52 (Tenn. 2000) (recognizing that the comparison pool was small after the death penalty was first reinstated but had grown by the time of Bland such that pool size was no longer a concern); Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 666 n.17.

2013See State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516 , 570 n. 52 (Tenn.2000) (recognizing that the comparison pool was small after the death penalty was first reinstated but had grown by the time of Bland such that pool size was no longer a concern); Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 666 n. 17.

2026In addition, we have heard no argument on whether there should be different standards for different categories of documents, whether there should be different standards for documents at different stages of the proceedings (filed discovery, attached to motions, etc.), or any other of the highly nuanced questions inherent in sealing decisions. “[O]ur adversarial system of justice . . . is premised on the well-tested principle that truth—as well as fairness—is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question.” Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (citation modified) (quoted

2017D. “‘[T]he public policy of Tennessee is to be found in its constitution, statutes, judicial decisions and applicable rules of common law.’” In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 823 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Tenn. 1996)).

2017D. “‘[T]he public policy of Tennessee is to be found in its constitution, statutes, judicial decisions and applicable rules of common law.’” In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 823 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting Cary v. Cary, 937 S.W.2d 777, 781 (Tenn. 1996)).

2013See id. at 332 . “[A]ssuming counsel does not know at the time of the opening statements that he will not produce the promised evidence, an informed change of strategy in the midst of trial is ‘virtually unchallengeable.’” Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266, 285 (Tenn. 2011)(quoting Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872, 904 (4th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by O’Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214 , 1222 (4th Cir. 1996)).

2013See id. at 332 . “[A]ssuming counsel does not know at the time of the opening statements that he will not produce the promised evidence, an informed change of strategy in the midst of trial is ‘virtually unchallengeable.’” Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266, 285 (Tenn. 2011)(quoting Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872, 904 (4th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by O’Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214 , 1222 (4th Cir. 1996)).

2013State v. Fields, 40 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Tenn. 2001).

2002Thus the natural [parent] who is seeking a modification of the consent judgment must show a material change in circumstances and that a change in custody is in the best interests of the child.” Id. (citing and quoting Hill v. Hill, 602 So.2d 287, 289 (La.Ct.App.1992)). 2 As these cases demonstrate, parents in the initial custody proceedings enjoy a strong presumption that they are entitled to the physical custody of their children.