change rule in Alabama

2018As we have previously explained, "[e]ven if we would be amenable to such a request [to overrule existing caselaw], we are not inclined to abandon precedent without a specific invitation to do so. 'Stare decisis commands, at a minimum, a degree of respect from this Court that makes it disinclined to overrule controlling precedent when it is not invited to do so.' Moore [v. Prudential Residential Servs. ], 849 So.2d [914,] 926 [ (Ala. 2002) ]." Clay Kilgore Constr., Inc. v. Buchalter/Grant, L.L.C. , 949 So.2d 893 , 898 (Ala. 2006). *225 Warrior Coal has not distinguished its case from Managed He

2018As we have previously explained, "[e]ven if we would be amenable to such a request [to overrule existing caselaw], we are not inclined to abandon precedent without a specific invitation to do so. 'Stare decisis commands, at a minimum, a degree of respect from this Court that makes it disinclined to overrule controlling precedent when it is not invited to do so.' Moore [v. Prudential Residential Servs. ], 849 So.2d [914,] 926 [ (Ala. 2002) ]." Clay Kilgore Constr., Inc. v. Buchalter/Grant, L.L.C. , 949 So.2d 893 , 898 (Ala. 2006). *225 Warrior Coal has not distinguished its case from Managed He

1992"The Blakes argue, however, that the change in the standard of review from arbitrary and capricious to de novo , made by Firestone Tire Rubber Co. v. Bruch , 489 U.S. 101 , 109 S.Ct. 948 , 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989), converts the claim from an equitable claim to a breach of contract action, which entitles them to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.

1992"The Blakes argue, however, that the change in the standard of review from arbitrary and capricious to de novo , made by Firestone Tire Rubber Co. v. Bruch , 489 U.S. 101 , 109 S.Ct. 948 , 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989), converts the claim from an equitable claim to a breach of contract action, which entitles them to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.

1991In regard to whether the change in the eviden-tiary standard has resulted in a change in the rule that the record must indicate that the arresting officer or any other witness was qualified to state his opinion that the inmate was under the influence of alcohol, Ex parte Hawkins, 475 So.2d at 492 , compare Whitson v. State, 513 So.2d 38 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (wherein the court followed Hawkins even though the evidentiary standard had changed, but was not explicitly recognized by the Whitson court) with Martin v. State, 562 So.2d 294 (Ala.Cr.App.1990) (wherein the court, under the Thompson standard

1991In regard to whether the change in the eviden-tiary standard has resulted in a change in the rule that the record must indicate that the arresting officer or any other witness was qualified to state his opinion that the inmate was under the influence of alcohol, Ex parte Hawkins, 475 So.2d at 492 , compare Whitson v. State, 513 So.2d 38 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (wherein the court followed Hawkins even though the evidentiary standard had changed, but was not explicitly recognized by the Whitson court) with Martin v. State, 562 So.2d 294 (Ala.Cr.App.1990) (wherein the court, under the Thompson standard

1991In regard to whether the change in the eviden-tiary standard has resulted in a change in the rule that the record must indicate that the arresting officer or any other witness was qualified to state his opinion that the inmate was under the influence of alcohol, Ex parte Hawkins, 475 So.2d at 492 , compare Whitson v. State, 513 So.2d 38 (Ala.Cr.App.1987) (wherein the court followed Hawkins even though the evidentiary standard had changed, but was not explicitly recognized by the Whitson court) with Martin v. State, 562 So.2d 294 (Ala.Cr.App.1990) (wherein the court, under the Thompson standard

1970As pointed out in Maya Corp. v. Smith, 240 Ala. 371 , 199 So. 549 , Section 804 made a change in the rule theretofore existing that an appeal had to be sued out in the name of all the parties against whom a joint judment was rendered.

1970As pointed out in Maya Corp. v. Smith, 240 Ala. 371 , 199 So. 549 , Section 804 made a change in the rule theretofore existing that an appeal had to be sued out in the name of all the parties against whom a joint judment was rendered.

1952While section 153, Title 7, supra, may have direct application only to a court of law in this respect, it was a statement of a common law rule as pointed out in the case of Stoer v. Ocklawaha River Farms Co., 223 Ala. 690 , 138 So. 270 ; Long v. Kansas City, Memphis and Birmingham R.

1952While section 153, Title 7, supra, may have direct application only to a court of law in this respect, it was a statement of a common law rule as pointed out in the case of Stoer v. Ocklawaha River Farms Co., 223 Ala. 690 , 138 So. 270 ; Long v. Kansas City, Memphis and Birmingham R.

1950It was there observed “The provisions for suggestions ■of claim of a third party in an action pending on any contract for the payment of ■money at any time before issue joined ■(Code § 10386 [Code 1940, Tit. 7, § 1179]) has no application to the instant action, which -is in the nature of interpleader touching the two parties in interest in the fund .■and the disinterested stakeholder.” 240 Ala. 460 (3), 199 So. 691 , citing the text of 33 C.

1950It was there observed “The provisions for suggestions ■of claim of a third party in an action pending on any contract for the payment of ■money at any time before issue joined ■(Code § 10386 [Code 1940, Tit. 7, § 1179]) has no application to the instant action, which -is in the nature of interpleader touching the two parties in interest in the fund .■and the disinterested stakeholder.” 240 Ala. 460 (3), 199 So. 691 , citing the text of 33 C.

1950The only change in the rule originating in the statute and brought forward in said rule pertaining to the disinterestedness of the complainant, if any, was the provision,- — -“It -is not ground •of objection to the action * * * that the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in ■whole or in part to any or all of the claim ants." Since the adoption and effective date of •said rule, on the second appeal in Harden v. Barbaree, 240 Ala. 458 , 199 So. 689 , the istatement of the law as to the necessity of :the disinterestedness of the complainant as .a stakeholder was reaffirmed.

1950The only change in the rule originating in the statute and brought forward in said rule pertaining to the disinterestedness of the complainant, if any, was the provision,- — -“It -is not ground •of objection to the action * * * that the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in ■whole or in part to any or all of the claim ants." Since the adoption and effective date of •said rule, on the second appeal in Harden v. Barbaree, 240 Ala. 458 , 199 So. 689 , the istatement of the law as to the necessity of :the disinterestedness of the complainant as .a stakeholder was reaffirmed.

1932In the later case of Ex parte Bradshaw, 174 Ala. 243 , 57 So. 16 , the whole subject was again very carefully considered, and the additional conclusion stated that any attempt to extend the period when once prescribed, by action taken after its expiration, is null and void, and, further, that the discretion referred to in the Cheney Case, supra, was in respect to prescribing the time in which the security should be given; and, as a result, that, if the security is not given by plaintiff within the time fixed by the court in the exercise of such discretion, not extended within that time, the du

1932In the later case of Ex parte Bradshaw, 174 Ala. 243 , 57 So. 16 , the whole subject was again very carefully considered, and the additional conclusion stated that any attempt to extend the period when once prescribed, by action taken after its expiration, is null and void, and, further, that the discretion referred to in the Cheney Case, supra, was in respect to prescribing the time in which the security should be given; and, as a result, that, if the security is not given by plaintiff within the time fixed by the court in the exercise of such discretion, not extended within that time, the du

1932In the case of First National Bank v. Cheney, 120 Ala. 117 , 23 So. 733 , this court interpreted most clearly the effect of the act of February 17,1885 (now section 7249, Code), to mean that there was thereby created a change in the rule, so that the right to make such a motion was not lost by mere pleadings but could be made at any stage before the trial was entered upon, and that the whole matter was thereby largely placed in the discretion of the court.

1932In the case of First National Bank v. Cheney, 120 Ala. 117 , 23 So. 733 , this court interpreted most clearly the effect of the act of February 17, 1885 (now section 7249, Code), to mean that there was thereby created a change in the rule, so that the right to make such a motion was not lost by mere pleading, but could be made at any stage before the trial was entered upon, and that the whole matter was thereby largely placed in the discretion of the court.

1928Commercial Bank v. Hurt, 99 Ala. 130 , 141 , 12 So. 568 , 19 L.R.A. 101 , 42 Am.

1916This, however, is not the case. —Brake v. State, 8 Ala. App. 101 , 63 South. 11 , and cases there cited. (4) Other charges of like character, pretermitting the duty to retreat, were evidently framed to come within the language used in Storey’s Case, 71 Ala. 329 , wherein reference was made to an assault that was “manifestly felonious in its purpose and forcible in its nature,” and to the doctrine of retreat.

1916This, however, is not the case. —Brake v. State, 8 Ala. App. 101 , 63 South. 11 , and cases there cited. (4) Other charges of like character, pretermitting the duty to retreat, were evidently framed to come within the language used in Storey’s Case, 71 Ala. 329 , wherein reference was made to an assault that was “manifestly felonious in its purpose and forcible in its nature,” and to the doctrine of retreat.

1902PI. & Pr., in the article on “Joint Tenants and Tenants in Common,” the author after stating the rule as we have stated it with reference to the liability at common law of one joint tenant or tenant in common to another for rents and profits, says this (p. 769) : “The common law rule, as hereinbefore shown, not permitting one joint tenant or tenant in common to have an action ex contractu against his companion unless as bailiff, his only remedy was by bill in equity; but the change in the rule, giving an action, did not abridge the remedy in equity in proper cases, and where a case is presente

1902Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616 , and cases cited in 3 Bose’s Notes, p. 49.