change rule in Missouri

2018Id. ; see also Moore v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co. , 329 S.W.2d 14 , 24 (Mo. banc 1959).

2001Finally, defense counsel chose not to cross-examine any of the character witnesses in this case, and there is no indication that an earlier disclosure would have prompted a change in this defense strategy. ‘Where counsel is surprised by opposing evidence at trial, but deals with that evidence in precisely the same manner as if he had been fully prepared, there is no reason to exclude that evidence, however significant, based on a discovery violation.” Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d at 66 . *908 c.

2000The appellants argue that it is obvious that the change in the instruction came about because of the need to differentiate the respective standards of proof as to compensatory awards and punitive damages after the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. banc 1996).

1990In Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387 (Mo.App., E.D.1981), this court stated that "we are unable to see ... why a product dangerous because of an absence of warning, should receive different treatment than a product manufactured with the greatest of care which contains a defect unknown to the manufacturer ... we find it more useful to recognize that strict liability is not a traditional cause of action as it now exists and that knowledge, fault or conduct of the defendant is simply no longer relevant." Racer, 629 S.W.2d at 395 .

1990In Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387 (Mo.App., E.D.1981), this court stated that "we are unable to see ... why a product dangerous because of an absence of warning, should receive different treatment than a product manufactured with the greatest of care which contains a defect unknown to the manufacturer ... we find it more useful to recognize that strict liability is not a traditional cause of action as it now exists and that knowledge, fault or conduct of the defendant is simply no longer relevant." Racer, 629 S.W.2d at 395 .

1975In City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 , 93 S.Ct. 2222 , 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973), the Supreme Court reviewed the decision of a three judge panel in the district court which held that due process constitutionally required notice and an adversary type hearing prior to denial of an application for renewal of a one year liquor license.

1975In City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 , 93 S.Ct. 2222 , 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973), the Supreme Court reviewed the decision of a three judge panel in the district court which held that due process constitutionally required notice and an adversary type hearing prior to denial of an application for renewal of a one year liquor license.

1973But note that in Bird v. Bilby, 202 Mo.App. 212 , 215 S.W. 909 (1919), it was said that the writer of Aylor misconceived the scope and meaning of the Reigart case (supra) as to a change in the rule that full performance of a contract not to be performed within a year will remove the contract from the operation of the statute of frauds.

1971Smith v. Consolidated School District No. 2, Mo., 408 S.W.2d 50 .

1931While liberality in allowing amendments to pleadings is accorded under our Code of Civil Procedure, in furtherance of justice, such amendments are properly allowable under our statute only "when the amendment does not change substantially the claim or defense." [Sec. 1274, R.S. 1919.] Such has been our uniform and consistent holding under the statute. [Joyce v. Growney, 154 Mo. 253 , 263; Little River Drainage District v. Railroad Co., 236 Mo. 94 , 113; State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 277 Mo. 14 , 21.] Our own rulings upon the subject are in entire accord with the prevailing rule of practice in equ

1931While liberality in allowing amendments to pleadings is accorded under our Code of Civil Procedure, in furtherance of justice, such amendments are properly allowable under our statute only "when the amendment does not change substantially the claim or defense." [Sec. 1274, R.S. 1919.] Such has been our uniform and consistent holding under the statute. [Joyce v. Growney, 154 Mo. 253 , 263; Little River Drainage District v. Railroad Co., 236 Mo. 94 , 113; State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 277 Mo. 14 , 21.] Our own rulings upon the subject are in entire accord with the prevailing rule of practice in equ

1931While liberality in allowing amendments to pleadings is accorded under our Code of Civil Procedure, in furtherance of justice, such amendments are properly allowable under our statute only "when the amendment does not change substantially the claim or defense." [Sec. 1274, R.S. 1919.] Such has been our uniform and consistent holding under the statute. [Joyce v. Growney, 154 Mo. 253 , 263; Little River Drainage District v. Railroad Co., 236 Mo. 94 , 113; State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 277 Mo. 14 , 21.] Our own rulings upon the subject are in entire accord with the prevailing rule of practice in equ

1919The writer hereof, in Aylor v. McInturf, 184 Mo. App. 691 , misconceived the scope and meaning of the Reigart case, mistakenly thinking that it indicated a change in the rule of full performance within the year.

1908Besides the cases above mentioned with which it was thought the decision of the Court of Appeals was in conflict, are Acton v. Dooley, 74 Mo. 63 ; Blodgett v. Perry, 97 Mo. 263 ; Moss v. Railroad, 85 Mo. 86 ; and Harrelson v. Railroad, 151 Mo. 482 .

1908Besides the cases above mentioned with which it was thought the decision of the Court of Appeals was in conflict, are Acton v. Dooley, 74 Mo. 63 ; Blodgett v. Perry, 97 Mo. 263 ; Moss v. Railroad, 85 Mo. 86 ; and Harrelson v. Railroad, 151 Mo. 482 .

1908Besides the cases above mentioned with which it was thought the decision of the Court of Appeals was in conflict, are Acton v. Dooley, 74 Mo. 63 ; Blodgett v. Perry, 97 Mo. 263 ; Moss v. Railroad, 85 Mo. 86 ; and Harrelson v. Railroad, 151 Mo. 482 .

1908Besides the cases above mentioned with which it was thought the decision of the Court of Appeals was in conflict, are Acton v. Dooley, 74 Mo. 63 ; Blodgett v. Perry, 97 Mo. 263 ; Moss v. Railroad, 85 Mo. 86 ; and Harrelson v. Railroad, 151 Mo. 482 .

1901Extreme as the rulings often were in favor of the widow’s dower' in realty despite devises, which policy of the courts probably induced the change of the rule by statute, there are authorities which render it uncertain, at least, whether the plaintiff would not be barred of dower in her deceased husband’s personal estate by accepting the provisions of his will Pemberton v. Pemberton, supra; Stewart v. Stewart, 31 N. L Eq. 398; Chambers v. Storil, 2 Ves. & R. 221; Dickson v. Robinson, Jac. 503.

1876There is no question here of the right of the City Council, in a proper case, to change the grade of a street, but the citation of Goszler v. Georgetown, 6 Wheat. 593 , does not establish that an injunction may not issue to prevent a change of grade when the change is in violation of the charter of a municipality.