change doctrine in Indiana

1968Lines, Inc. v. City of Harlan, Ky., 313 S. W. 2d 573 , criticized the doctrine and quoted with approval certain language from the opinion of the Florida Court, but nevertheless concluded: ‘We must make a choice as to whether the change in such a rule should be made by the legislature or by us.

1968Lines, Inc. v. City of Harlan, Ky., 313 S.W. 2d 573 , criticized the doctrine and quoted with approval certain language from the opinion of the Florida Court, but nevertheless concluded: ‘We must make a choice as to whether the change in such a rule should be made by the legislature or by us.

2018Mother argues that "a Trial Court may not consider a change in permanent physical custody upon evidence of changes in a child's condition occurring during the period in which the physical custody of that child has been transferred to the noncustodial parent pursuant to an emergency petition." Appellant's Br. at 11-12 (citing Joe v. Lebow , 670 N.E.2d 9 , 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ). [20] In Joe , this court held that evidence of a child's improving condition, while under the temporary emergency custody of the noncustodial parent, was admissible. 670 N.E.2d at 23 .

2018Mother argues that "a Trial Court may not consider a change in permanent physical custody upon evidence of changes in a child's condition occurring during the period in which the physical custody of that child has been transferred to the noncustodial parent pursuant to an emergency petition." Appellant's Br. at 11-12 (citing Joe v. Lebow , 670 N.E.2d 9 , 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ). [20] In Joe , this court held that evidence of a child's improving condition, while under the temporary emergency custody of the noncustodial parent, was admissible. 670 N.E.2d at 23 .

2016Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A04-1502-JP-79 | February 10, 2016 Page 20 of 24 In re Paternity of C.J.A., 3 N.E.3d at 1031 . [19] Here, the parties both agree that a substantial change in these factors exists, and the trial court also found a “continuing and substantial change in circumstances” since the entry of the Second Provisional Order.

2011Membres, 889 N.E.2d at 274 .

2010Indiana Code section 31-17-2-21(c) provides that "[the court shall not hear evidence on a matter occurring before the last custody proceeding between the parties unless the matter relates to a change in the factors relating to the best interests of the child as described by section 8 ... of this chapter." A panel of this court addressed a similar issue in Hanson v. Spolnik, 685 N.E.2d 71 (Ind.Ct.App.1997).

2003Nonetheless, we recognized that a change in that principle may have been effectuated by our Supreme Court in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind.1991).

2003Nonetheless, we recognized that a change in that principle may have been effectuated by our Supreme Court in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992 (Ind.1991).

1997Defendants now have a reason to argue that double jeopardy claims under the state constitution should be analyzed differently than their federal counterpart because of the change in the analysis of federal double jeopardy claims brought about by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 , 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993), as interpreted and made binding by our supreme court in Games .

1997Defendants now have a reason to argue that double jeopardy claims under the state constitution should be analyzed differently than their federal counterpart because of the change in the analysis of federal double jeopardy claims brought about by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 , 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993), as interpreted and made binding by our supreme court in Games .

1995DECISION Indiana Code 31-1-11.5-22 reads in pertinent part as follows: (d) The court may not modify a child eus-tody order unless: (1) it is in the best interests of the child; and (2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors which the court may consider under [Ind.Code 31-1-11.5-21(2) ]. (e) In making its determination, the court shall consider the factors listed under [LI.C. 1. (£) The court shall not hear evidence on a matter occurring before the last custody proceeding between the parties unless the matter relates to a change in the factors relating to the best inter

1995DECISION Indiana Code 31-1-11.5-22 reads in pertinent part as follows: (d) The court may not modify a child eus-tody order unless: (1) it is in the best interests of the child; and (2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors which the court may consider under [Ind.Code 31-1-11.5-21(2) ]. (e) In making its determination, the court shall consider the factors listed under [LI.C. 1. (£) The court shall not hear evidence on a matter occurring before the last custody proceeding between the parties unless the matter relates to a change in the factors relating to the best inter

1995Id. at 958 .

1993Such decisions, culminating in Simons v. Simons (Ind.App.1991) 566 N.E.2d 551 , focus on substantial change.

1993Such decisions, culminating in Simons v. Simons (Ind. App. 1991) 566 N.E.2d 551 , focus on substantial change.

1993Babinchak v. Town of Chesterton (1992), Ind.App., 598 N.E.2d 1099, 1101 , reh. denied.

1989See Huffman v. State Sign Co. (1969), 145 Ind.App. 486 , 251 N.E.2d 489 ; Lewis v. Marhoefer Packing Co. (1969), 145 Ind.App. 225 , 250 N.E.2d 375 .

1989See Huffman v. State Sign Co. (1969), 145 Ind.App. 486 , 251 N.E.2d 489 ; Lewis v. Marhoefer Packing Co. (1969), 145 Ind.App. 225 , 250 N.E.2d 375 .

1986Duress is not a defense to homicide, Jefferson v. State (1985), Ind., 484 N.E.2d 22 , and we have not been persuaded of the wisdom of a change in that rule of common law.

1983The current standard in Indiana for review of the competency of counsel was set out in Cobbs v. State, (1982) Ind., 434 N.E.2d 883 .

1983The current standard in Indiana for review of the competency of counsel was set out in Cobbs v. State, (1982) Ind., 434 N.E.2d 883 .

1979This Court has held that: “Isolated poor strategy, bad tactics, a mistake, carelessness, or inexperience does not necessarily amount to ineffective counsel unless, taken as a whole, the trial was a mockery of justice." Blackburn v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 5, 22 , 291 N.E.2d 686, 696 ; Lowe v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 610, 612 , 298 N.E.2d 421, 422 .

1979This Court has held that: “Isolated poor strategy, bad tactics, a mistake, carelessness, or inexperience does not necessarily amount to ineffective counsel unless, taken as a whole, the trial was a mockery of justice." Blackburn v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 5, 22 , 291 N.E.2d 686, 696 ; Lowe v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 610, 612 , 298 N.E.2d 421, 422 .

1979This Court has held that: “Isolated poor strategy, bad tactics, a mistake, carelessness, or inexperience does not necessarily amount to ineffective counsel unless, taken as a whole, the trial was a mockery of justice." Blackburn v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 5, 22 , 291 N.E.2d 686, 696 ; Lowe v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 610, 612 , 298 N.E.2d 421, 422 .

1979This Court has held that: “Isolated poor strategy, bad tactics, a mistake, carelessness, or inexperience does not necessarily amount to ineffective counsel unless, taken as a whole, the trial was a mockery of justice." Blackburn v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 5, 22 , 291 N.E.2d 686, 696 ; Lowe v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 610, 612 , 298 N.E.2d 421, 422 .

1969The old form receives a new content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning which it has received.” The common law must keep pace with changes in our society, and in our opinion the change in the legal and social status of women in our society forces us to recognize a change in the doctrine with which we are concerned in this opinion. *291 The precedent for the appellee’s position in this state is based on Boden v. Del-Mar Garage (1933), 205 Ind. 59 , 185 N. E. 860 and Burk v. Anderson (1952), 232 Ind. 77 , 109 N. E. 2d 407 .

1969The old form receives a new content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning which it has received.” The common law must keep pace with changes in our society, and in our opinion the change in the legal and social status of women in our society forces us to recognize a change in the doctrine with which we are concerned in this opinion. *291 The precedent for the appellee’s position in this state is based on Boden v. Del-Mar Garage (1933), 205 Ind. 59 , 185 N. E. 860 and Burk v. Anderson (1952), 232 Ind. 77 , 109 N. E. 2d 407 .

1969The old form receives a new content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning which it has received.” The common law must keep pace with changes in our society, and in our opinion the change in the legal and social status of women in our society forces us to recognize a change in the doctrine with which we are concerned in this opinion. *291 The precedent for the appellee’s position in this state is based on Boden v. Del-Mar Garage (1933), 205 Ind. 59 , 185 N. E. 860 and Burk v. Anderson (1952), 232 Ind. 77 , 109 N. E. 2d 407 .

1969The old form receives a new content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit the meaning which it has received.” The common law must keep pace with changes in our society, and in our opinion the change in the legal and social status of women in our society forces us to recognize a change in the doctrine with which we are concerned in this opinion. *291 The precedent for the appellee’s position in this state is based on Boden v. Del-Mar Garage (1933), 205 Ind. 59 , 185 N. E. 860 and Burk v. Anderson (1952), 232 Ind. 77 , 109 N. E. 2d 407 .

1905This contention the court denied; affirming, in the course of its opinion, that there was nothing in State v. Sammons, supra, either changing or intimating a change in the rule which declares that the fixing of an impossible date vitiates an indictment.