statutory exclusionary rule in Texas

1996Following the lead of this Court’s plurality opinion in Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), the Second Court of Appeals in this cause declined to recognize an inevitable discovery exception to the statutory exclusionary rule embodied in Article 38.23, V.A.C.C.P. 1 Daugherty v. State, 876 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1994).

1996Following the lead of this Court's plurality opinion in Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), the Second Court of Appeals in this cause declined to recognize an inevitable discovery exception to the statutory exclusionary rule embodied in Article 38.23, V.A.C.C.P. [1] Daugherty v. State, 876 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1994).

2015App. 2013) (citing State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268 , 269–73 (Tex. Crim.

1997Cf. State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 269-70 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (a plurality held the doctrine of inevitable discovery is incompatible with the statutory exclusionary rule found in Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure). 6 .

2016“Because the independent source doctrine is applicable only to situations in which there is no causal link between the illegal conduct and the discovery or seizure of evidence, application of that doctrine is entirely consistent with the statutory exclusionary rule’s requirement that evidence ‘obtained’ in violation of the law is subject to suppression.” Id. (citing TEX.

2015The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has specifically determined that the “‘inevitable discovery’ doctrine is inapplicable in Texas based on that doctrine’s inconsistency with the plain language of the statutory exclusionary rule.” Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 471 (Tex. Crim.

1993See Brown, 657 S.W.2d at 804 (Clinton, J., concurring).

1986As stated by Judge Clinton in his concurring opinion in Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Crim.App.1983): As originally introduced the bill that became Article 727a excluded evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas and, concomitantly, its emergency clause declared “that there has been used against citizens of this state evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution of the State of Texas and that there is now no statute expressly forbiding the same ...” By amendment after “Texas” was inserted the words “or of the United States of America.” Thus, as

2005Gonzales v. State, 67 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Roquemore v. State, *59 60 S.W.3d 862, 870 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Chavez v. State, 9 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

2004Gonzales v. State , 67 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex. Crim.

2019Id.

2019See McClintock v. State, 541 S.W.3d 63, 67 (Tex. Crim.

2015Article 38.22 is a procedural evidentiary rule, independent of the statutory exclusionary rule set out in Article 38.23.” Nguyen v. State, 292 S.W.3d 671, 677 (Tex. Crim.

2013See id. § 3(e)(1),(2); see also Thai Ngoc Nguyen v. State, 292 S.W.3d 671, 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“[W]e hold that the express language of Article 38.22 does not include an exception for statements that are not confessional in nature, do not implicate the accused for the offense prosecuted, or constitute an offense.”). 6 This case reveals some tension between the long-standing doctrine known as “opening the door” and a statutory exclusionary rule.

2025Unlike the Fourth Amendment, this statutory exclusionary rule “applies to searches and seizures by private citizens.” Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d at 11 n.3; see State v. Johnson, 939 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex. Crim.

2015See State v. Mazuca, 375 S.W.3d 294, 300 (Tex. Crim.

2013See Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim.

2008See id. art. 38.23(a).

2005Gonzales v. State, 67 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Roquemore v. State, *59 60 S.W.3d 862, 870 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Chavez v. State, 9 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

2005Gonzales v. State, 67 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Roquemore v. State, *59 60 S.W.3d 862, 870 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Chavez v. State, 9 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

1999See Lalande v. State, 676 S.W.2d 115 , 117 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); Peterson v. State, 727 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, no pet.). 6 .

1999See Lalande v. State, 676 S.W.2d 115 , 117 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); Peterson v. State, 727 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, no pet.). 6 .

1996Roy v. State , 608 S.W.2d 645, 651 (Tex. Crim.

1994Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); see also Oliver v. State, 711 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1986, no pet.) (judicial exception of “inevitable discovery” does not apply to exclusionary rule of Article 38.23).

1991Crowell, 180 S.W.2d at 346 . [3] As an example the Court stated that Texas provided for a statutory exclusionary rule, Art. 38.23, V.A.C.C.P., and its predecessor, well in advance of the Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). [4] See also Gauldin v. State, 683 S.W.2d 411 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984), wherein the appellant successfully challenged the inventory search of his car.

1991See also Gauldin v. State, 683 S.W.2d 411 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), wherein the appellant successfully challenged the inventory search of his car.