Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 California opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gelbard v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2020(Id. at p. 2113; see also Gelbard v. United States (1972) 408 U.S. 41, 46 [“Title III authorizes the interception of private wire and oral communications, but only when law enforcement officials are investigating specified 6 The Senate Report also noted that wiretapping proponents and critics both “agree[d]” that current law had been “extremely unsatisfactory.” (Senate Report, supra, at p. 2154.) 11 serious crimes and receive prior judicial approval, an approval that may not be given except upon compliance with stringent conditions”].) As enforcement mechanisms, Title III provides criminal pen | 1 | 1 |
Opper v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press." The RTE, then, operates so as to ensure the admissibility of relevant evidence absent the existence of (a) a statutory exclusionary rule enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the California Legislature, or (b) some specifically denominated exception set forth within a California constitutional provision, or (c) some overriding principle of federal constitutional law. *374 Clearly, admissions and confessions constitute "relevant evidence." [2] (Indeed, as noted in the lea 1992Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press." The RTE, then, operates so as to ensure the admissibility of relevant evidence absent the existence of (a) a statutory exclusionary rule enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the California Legislature, or (b) some specifically denominated exception set forth within a California constitutional provision, or (c) some overriding principle of federal constitutional law. *374 Clearly, admissions and confessions constitute "relevant evidence." [2] (Indeed, as noted in the lea | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hutchinsongreen2 sentences1992Section 1150 then declares a statutory exclusionary rule: "No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined." I cannot agree with the majority's characterization of section 1150 as "delimiting the issues `upon an inquiry as to the validity of the verdict.'" (Italics added.) Section 1150 merely limits facts that may be proved to impeach a verdict. ( People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal.2d 342, 349 [ 78 Cal. Rptr. 1992Section 1150 then declares a statutory exclusionary rule: "No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined." I cannot agree with the majority's characterization of section 1150 as "delimiting the issues `upon an inquiry as to the validity of the verdict.'" (Italics added.) Section 1150 merely limits facts that may be proved to impeach a verdict. ( People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal.2d 342, 349 [ 78 Cal. Rptr. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lance W.red2 sentences1987The portions which are not altered are to be considered as having been the law from the time they were enacted ....’” (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 895 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ]; italics in the original; citation omitted.) This rule was invoked by counsel in In re Lance W., supra, as effecting the reenactment of a statutory exclusionary rule superseding section 28(d). 1987The portions which are not altered are to be considered as having been the law from the time they were enacted ....’” (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 895 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 694 P.2d 744 ]; italics in the original; citation omitted.) This rule was invoked by counsel in In re Lance W., supra, as effecting the reenactment of a statutory exclusionary rule superseding section 28(d). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2026The Jackson court noted that the United States Supreme Court had not yet recognized the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule at the time the federal wiretap statute was enacted, and thus Congress could not have contemplated such an exception. ( Jackson, supra, at p. 155 .) Here, the good faith exception was embedded in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence well before CalECPA’s enactment. 2026The court in Jackson stated the California wiretap law authorized “a good faith defense to a criminal or civil action for violation of the statute but not to a motion to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence,” demonstrating the Legislature was aware of the good faith exception “and deliberately chose not to incorporate a good faith exception 10 into the statutory exclusionary rule.” (Jackson, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 154 .) No such good faith defense to a criminal or civil action is specified in CalECPA. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Waltz v. Davis
green
2 sentences1992Section 1150 then declares a statutory exclusionary rule: "No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined." I cannot agree with the majority's characterization of section 1150 as "delimiting the issues `upon an inquiry as to the validity of the verdict.'" (Italics added.) Section 1150 merely limits facts that may be proved to impeach a verdict. ( People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal.2d 342, 349 [ 78 Cal. Rptr. 1992Section 1150 then declares a statutory exclusionary rule: "No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined." I cannot agree with the majority's characterization of section 1150 as "delimiting the issues `upon an inquiry as to the validity of the verdict.'" (Italics added.) Section 1150 merely limits facts that may be proved to impeach a verdict. ( People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal.2d 342, 349 [ 78 Cal. Rptr. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Hutchinson v. California
green
2 sentences1992(People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal.2d 342, 349 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 196 , 455 P.2d 132 ], cert. den. 396 U.S. 994 [ 24 L.Ed. 457 , 90 S.Ct. 491 ].) Evidence of “overt facts, objectively ascertainable” is admissible; evidence of “the subjective reasoning processes of the individual juror” is not. 1992Section 1150 then declares a statutory exclusionary rule: "No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined." I cannot agree with the majority's characterization of section 1150 as "delimiting the issues `upon an inquiry as to the validity of the verdict.'" (Italics added.) Section 1150 merely limits facts that may be proved to impeach a verdict. ( People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal.2d 342, 349 [ 78 Cal. Rptr. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Weeks v. United States
red
2 sentences1988(Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383 [ 58 L.Ed. 652 , 34 S.Ct. 341 ]; Silverman v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 505 [ 5 L.Ed.2d 734 , 81 S.Ct. 679 , 97 A.L.R.2d 1277 ].) Both rules seek to effectuate privacy rights, deter future violations and preserve judicial integrity by denying the wrongdoer the fruit of the illegally obtained evidence. 1988(Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383 [ 58 L.Ed. 652 , 34 S.Ct. 341 ]; Silverman v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 505 [ 5 L.Ed.2d 734 , 81 S.Ct. 679 , 97 A.L.R.2d 1277 ].) Both rules seek to effectuate privacy rights, deter future violations and preserve judicial integrity by denying the wrongdoer the fruit of the illegally obtained evidence. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Silverman v. United States
green
2 sentences1988(Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383 [ 58 L.Ed. 652 , 34 S.Ct. 341 ]; Silverman v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 505 [ 5 L.Ed.2d 734 , 81 S.Ct. 679 , 97 A.L.R.2d 1277 ].) Both rules seek to effectuate privacy rights, deter future violations and preserve judicial integrity by denying the wrongdoer the fruit of the illegally obtained evidence. 1988(Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383 [ 58 L.Ed. 652 , 34 S.Ct. 341 ]; Silverman v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 505 [ 5 L.Ed.2d 734 , 81 S.Ct. 679 , 97 A.L.R.2d 1277 ].) Both rules seek to effectuate privacy rights, deter future violations and preserve judicial integrity by denying the wrongdoer the fruit of the illegally obtained evidence. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.