municipality immunity in Illinois

1999Lawson, 278 Ill.App.3d at 635 , 215 Ill.Dec. 237 , 662 N.E.2d 1377 .

1999Lawson, 278 Ill.

2004The court disagreed, concluding, "[e]ven willful and wanton conduct cannot deprive a municipality of immunity granted by the Act. [Citation.] Discretionary acts such as those of the firefighters in this case are subject to immunity under section 2-201 of the Act." Crowley , 306 Ill.

2004The court disagreed, concluding, “[e]ven willful and wanton conduct cannot deprive a municipality of immunity granted by the Act. [Citation.] Discretionary acts such as those of the firefighters in this case are subject to immunity under section 2 — 201 of the Act.” Crowley, 306 Ill.

2002Therefore, the appellate majority concluded that the sections of the Municipal Code that specifically grant a right of cross-examination to those property owners within 250 feet of a special use in a municipality of more than 500,000 persons (see 65 ILCS 5/11–13–7, 11–13–7a (West 1998)) may be impliedly read into the remaining sections of the Code that cover the municipality at bar (see 65 ILCS 5/11–13–1.1 (West 1998)). 316 Ill.

2002Therefore, the appellate majority concluded that the sections of the Municipal Code that specifically grant a right of cross-examination to those property owners within 250 feet of a special use in a municipality of more than 500,000 persons (see 65 ILCS 5/11 — 13—7, 11 — 13—7a (West 1998)) may be impliedly read into the remaining sections of the Code that cover the municipality at bar (see 65 ILCS 5/11 — 13—1.1 (West 1998)). 316 Ill.

1998Marx v. Illinois, 165 Ill.

1994Marx v. State (1988), 165 Ill.

1996(See Village of Riverwoods v. Department of Transportation (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 130, 136 , 395 N.E.2d 555 .) Whether the municipality can claim a denial of equal protection is a more difficult question.

1996(See Village of Riverwoods v. Department of Transportation (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 130, 136 , 395 N.E.2d 555 .) Whether the municipality can claim a denial of equal protection is a more difficult question.

1996Franciscan Hospital v. Town of Canoe Creek (1979), 79 Ill.App.3d 490 , 34 Ill.Dec. 738 , 398 N.E.2d 413 .

1996Franciscan Hospital v. Town of Canoe Creek (1979), 79 Ill.

2021Id. “ ‘Educational institutions *** are tax free as a matter of paramount State policy which cannot be thwarted by exclusionary zoning.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting Township Committee of the Township of Denville v. Board of Education of the Vocational School in the County of Morris, 279 A.2d 842, 846 (N.J. 1971)). ¶ 74 Here, while the Village at least arguably represents the residents or taxpayers of the Village for public policy purposes, it does not represent the public as embodied in other public bodies that receive property tax revenue, such as the county and the school district

2021Id. “ ‘Educational institutions *** are tax free as a matter of paramount State policy which cannot be thwarted by exclusionary zoning.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting Township Committee of the Township of Denville v. Board of Education of the Vocational School in the County of Morris, 279 A.2d 842, 846 (N.J. 1971)). ¶ 74 Here, while the Village at least arguably represents the residents or taxpayers of the Village for public policy purposes, it does not represent the public as embodied in other public bodies that receive property tax revenue, such as the county and the school district

1995As the court in Palladini noted: "[Under contributory negligence], plaintiff’s fault only relieved defendant from the consequences of his own negligence; it did not obviate defendant’s duty to exercise reasonable care.” Palladini, 134 Ill.

1995App. 2d 272, 275-76 , 192 N.E.2d 263 , explained section 23 as follows: "Section 23 provides, in brief, that: anyone who furnishes material or labor to a contractor who has a contract for public improvements, shall have a lien on the money due such contractor, provided, before payment has been made to the contractor, he notifies the municipality of his claim and within sixty [now ninety] days thereafter files a complaint for an accounting making the contractor a party defendant, and serves a copy of the complaint upon the proper public officials.

1993In City of Hickory Hills v. Village of Bridgeview (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 399, 403 , 367 N.E.2d 1305, 1307 , the supreme court held that a municipality could challenge the zoning ordinance of a neighboring municipality.

1993In City of Hickory Hills v. Village of Bridgeview (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 399, 403 , 367 N.E.2d 1305, 1307 , the supreme court held that a municipality could challenge the zoning ordinance of a neighboring municipality.

1993App. 3d at 266); (4) under the annexation statute, as long as the tracts are contiguous one to another, even extreme irregularity of boundaries resulting in the relative remoteness of some tracts in the annexation area from those on the border of the municipality will not bar annexation (Village of North Barrington, 144 Ill. 2d at 367 ); (5) the tracts in this case are contiguous one to another; and (6) the owner of record of all the tracts is the same so that the disconnection property can be seen as constituting a single tract rendering the contiguity argument moot.

1993In Village of Barrington Hills v. Village of Hoffman Estates (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 392, 398 , 410 N.E.2d 37, 40 , the supreme court restated its holding of City of Hickory Hills and defined the scope of injury which must be alleged by a municipality to challenge an extraterritorial zoning ordinance.

1993In Village of Barrington Hills v. Village of Hoffman Estates (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 392, 398 , 410 N.E.2d 37, 40 , the supreme court restated its holding of City of Hickory Hills and defined the scope of injury which must be alleged by a municipality to challenge an extraterritorial zoning ordinance.

1991This action challenged the validity of an ordinance which granting a special use. ( Geneva, 77 Ill.App.3d 744 , 34 Ill.Dec. 177 , 397 N.E.2d 849 .) We find that there is a fundamental difference between sustaining a challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance by interested parties with interests in land adjacent to the subject property, and permitting a municipality to claim that its own ordinance is invalid.

1991This action challenged the validity of an ordinance which granting a special use. ( Geneva, 77 Ill.App.3d 744 , 34 Ill.Dec. 177 , 397 N.E.2d 849 .) We find that there is a fundamental difference between sustaining a challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance by interested parties with interests in land adjacent to the subject property, and permitting a municipality to claim that its own ordinance is invalid.

1991(Smith v. County of White (1989), 191 Ill.

1990(Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513 , 69 L.

1990(Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513 , 69 L.

1988App. 3d at 346 , 515 N.E.2d at 442-43 .) Such priority jurisdiction over a particular parcel of property, if not abandoned through unnecessary and unreasonable delay, will confer standing to a municipality to challenge in quo warranto the subsequent annexation of the same parcel by another municipality. 162 Ill.

1988App. 3d at 346 , 515 N.E.2d at 442-43 .) Such priority jurisdiction over a particular parcel of property, if not abandoned through unnecessary and unreasonable delay, will confer standing to a municipality to challenge in quo warranto the subsequent annexation of the same parcel by another municipality. 162 Ill.

1978(Daley v. Resnick (1972), 5 Ill.

1969Defendant cites the cases of People v. Stringfield, 37 Ill App2d 344, 185 NE2d 381 , and City of Chicago v. Berg, 48 Ill App2d 251, 199 NE2d 49 , as standing for the proposition that a complaint is void if it is brought in the name of a municipality for the violation of a State statute.

1969Defendant cites the cases of People v. Stringfield, 37 Ill App2d 344, 185 NE2d 381 , and City of Chicago v. Berg, 48 Ill App2d 251, 199 NE2d 49 , as standing for the proposition that a complaint is void if it is brought in the name of a municipality for the violation of a State statute.

1969People v. City of Peoria, 166 Ill 517, 526, 46 NE 1075 (1897); People v. City of LeRoy, 293 Ill 278, 281, 127 NE 695 (1920); People ex rel.

1963A similar contention was advanced in Village of Spillertown v. Prewitt, 21 Ill.2d 228 , where we affirmed a decree granting an injunction against the operation of a strip mine.

1930(City of Chicago v. Gunning System, 214 Ill. 628 .) It is likewise true that if this ordinance is to be justified under the general powers granted to a municipality under clause 9 above referred' to, wherein the city is given power to regulate the use of its streets, the same test of reasonableness must be applied.

1927(Klever Karpet Kleaners v. City of Chicago, 323 Ill. 368 .) Where an ordinance is passed in the exercise of a power conferred upon a municipality the presumption is in favor of its validity, and it is incumbent upon the party attacking it as an unreasonable and oppressive exercise of the power to show affirmatively and clearly its unreasonableness.

1927(People v. Village of Oak Park, 266 Ill. 365 ; Standard Oil Co. v. City of Danville, 199 id. 50; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 47 Sup. Ct. 114; City of DesMoines v. Manhattan Oil Co. 193 Iowa, 1096 , 184 N. W. 823 .) While the lots immediately adjacent to Ogden avenue are less desirable for family dwellings than those farther removed from the noise of the traffic, it is evident that the only businesses which can thrive in such a location are filling stations and refreshments stands, which cater to the traveling public.

1927(People v. Village of Oak Park, 266 Ill. 365 ; Standard Oil Co. v. City of Danville, 199 id. 50; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 47 Sup. Ct. 114; City of DesMoines v. Manhattan Oil Co. 193 Iowa, 1096 , 184 N. W. 823 .) While the lots immediately adjacent to Ogden avenue are less desirable for family dwellings than those farther removed from the noise of the traffic, it is evident that the only businesses which can thrive in such a location are filling stations and refreshments stands, which cater to the traveling public.