municipality violation in Pennsylvania

1968See Commonwealth v. Ashenfelder, 413 Pa. 517 , 198 A. 2d 514 (1964); York v. Baynes, 188 Pa. Superior Ct. 581 , 149 A. 2d 681 (1959).

1968See Commonwealth v. Ashenfelder, 413 Pa. 517 , 198 A. 2d 514 (1964); York v. Baynes, 188 Pa. Superior Ct. 581 , 149 A. 2d 681 (1959).

2022The statutorily-mandated “written and verified claim” requirement’s purpose, 72 P.S. § 5566b(a), is “to notify a municipality that a claim may be pending against it[.]” Malvern, 570 A.2d at 636 .

2009See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(c)(5) (deleted 2008) (prescribing that “questions relating to an alleged defect in the process of enactment or adoption of any ordinance ... shall be raised by appeal or challenge commenced within 30 days after the intended effective date of the ordinance....”); Borough of Nanty Glo v. Fatula, 826 A.2d 58 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (holding that a municipality could not challenge the validity of the enactment of ordinances relating to pension benefits for retired police officers insofar as more than thirty days had passed since the ordinances had been enacted).

2009See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(c)(5) (deleted 2008) (prescribing that "questions relating to an alleged defect in the process of enactment or adoption of any ordinance... shall be raised by appeal or challenge commenced within 30 days after the intended effective date of the ordinance...."); Borough of Nanty Glo v. Fatula, 826 A.2d 58 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (holding that a municipality could not challenge the validity of the enactment of ordinances relating to pension benefits for retired police officers insofar as more than thirty days had passed since the ordinances had been enacted).

2008Similarly, Objector argues the trial court erred in determining Applicant was entitled to a deemed approval where: the application was incomplete when filed under the terms of the Ordinance; Applicant tacitly agreed to an extension of the 60-day period for a hearing; and, Applicant’s delay in submitting documents it knew were necessary amounted to an attempt to manipulate the process in the Ordinance and frustrate the purpose of Section 908(9) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC). 3 See Philomeno & Salamone v. Bd. of Supervisors of U. Merion Twp., 882 A.2d 1044 (Pa.Cmwlth.200

2008Similarly, Objector argues the trial court erred in determining Applicant was entitled to a deemed approval where: the application was incomplete when filed under the terms of the Ordinance; Applicant tacitly agreed to an extension of the 60-day period for a hearing; and, Applicant’s delay in submitting documents it knew were necessary amounted to an attempt to manipulate the process in the Ordinance and frustrate the purpose of Section 908(9) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC). 3 See Philomeno & Salamone v. Bd. of Supervisors of U. Merion Twp., 882 A.2d 1044 (Pa.Cmwlth.200

2008Similarly, Objector argues the trial court erred in determining Applicant was entitled to a deemed approval where: the application was incomplete when filed under the terms of the Ordinance; Applicant tacitly agreed to an extension of the 60-day period for a hearing; and, Applicant’s delay in submitting documents it knew were necessary amounted to an attempt to manipulate the process in the Ordinance and frustrate the purpose of Section 908(9) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC). 3 See Philomeno & Salamone v. Bd. of Supervisors of U. Merion Twp., 882 A.2d 1044 (Pa.Cmwlth.200

1999The Court noted that when a nonconforming building has become so destroyed or deteriorated that complete reconstruction is necessary, a municipality may bar such reconstruction in a zoning ordinance, citing Also Builders, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Township of Upper Darby, 12 Pa.Cmwlth. 100 , 314 A.2d 860 (1974).

1999The Court noted that when a nonconforming building has become so destroyed or deteriorated that complete reconstruction is necessary, a municipality may bar such reconstruction in a zoning ordinance, citing Also Builders, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Township of Upper Darby, 12 Pa.Cmwlth. 100 , 314 A.2d 860 (1974).

1993The Appellants rely specifically on the Montana Supreme Court Case of Crowell v. School District No. 7 of Gallatin County, 247 Mont. 38 , 805 P.2d 522 .(1991), which held that the school district waived its immunity, under a statute similar to the statute in the instant case, by purchasing liability insurance.

1993The Appellants rely specifically on the Montana Supreme Court Case of Crowell v. School District No. 7 of Gallatin County, 247 Mont. 38 , 805 P.2d 522 .(1991), which held that the school district waived its immunity, under a statute similar to the statute in the instant case, by purchasing liability insurance.

1986In Piekarski v. Club Overlook Estates, Inc., 281 Pa.Super. 162 , 421 A.2d 1198 (1980), this Court held that transfer of an improvement by a developer to a municipality provided a defense under section 5536(b)(2) to liability despite the fact that the developer continued ownership through which the improvement (drainage gully) passed.

1986In Piekarski v. Club Overlook Estates, Inc., 281 Pa.Super. 162 , 421 A.2d 1198 (1980), this Court held that transfer of an improvement by a developer to a municipality provided a defense under section 5536(b)(2) to liability despite the fact that the developer continued ownership through which the improvement (drainage gully) passed.

1972Credits, Inc., 385 Pa. 370 , 123 A. 2d 686 (1956), wherein Justice Chidsey stated that a taxing statute must be strictly construed and any doubt or uncertainty as to the imposition of the tax must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer, and words imposing a tax should be clear and unambiguous and words cannot be extended by implication.

1972Credits, Inc., 385 Pa. 370 , 123 A. 2d 686 (1956), wherein Justice Chidsey stated that a taxing statute must be strictly construed and any doubt or uncertainty as to the imposition of the tax must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer, and words imposing a tax should be clear and unambiguous and words cannot be extended by implication.

1972In construing tax statutes, we must be mindful of the principle set forth in Fischer v. Pittsburgh, 178 Pa. Superior Ct. 16 , 112 A. 2d 814 (1955), at page 22 wherein Judge Woodside wrote, in part, that: . . . where a statute authorizing the imposition of a tax contains a clause limiting the authority of a municipality to impose the tax conferred by act, such clause [is] to be strictly construed against . . . the municipality under the rule that acts authorizing municipalities to impose taxes must be strictly construed." The foregoing principle is in conformity with the Statutory Construction

1972In construing tax statutes, we must be mindful of the principle set forth in Fischer v. Pittsburgh, 178 Pa. Superior Ct. 16 , 112 A. 2d 814 (1955), at page 22 wherein Judge Woodside wrote, in part, that: . . . where a statute authorizing the imposition of a tax contains a clause limiting the authority of a municipality to impose the tax conferred by act, such clause [is] to be strictly construed against . . . the municipality under the rule that acts authorizing municipalities to impose taxes must be strictly construed." The foregoing principle is in conformity with the Statutory Construction

1964There, in the Fischer case, as here, the question boiled down to this, page 22: “[W]here a statute authorizing the imposition of a tax contains a clause limiting the authority of a municipality to impose the tax conferred by the act, is such clause to be strictly construed against the taxpayer under the rule that exemptions from taxation are strictly construed, or is it to be strictly construed against the municipality under the rule that acts authorizing municipalities to impose taxes must be strictly construed?” Citing Murray v. Philadelphia, 364 Pa. 157 (1950), the Superior Court held that

1954Nor does it dispute that a zoning ordinance must be enacted in strict conformity with the requirements of the relevant enabling legislation: Kline v. Harrisburg, 382 Pa. 438 , 68 A. 2d 182 .