municipality immunity in Alabama

1995In Boyette v. City of Mobile, 442 So.2d 61 (Ala.1983), this court held that notwithstanding Ala.Code 1975, § 11-47-190, which imposes municipal liability for injuries suffered through "neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness of some agent, officer or employee of the municipality engaged in work therefor and while acting in the line of his duty," a municipality has immunity from actions alleging unlawful arrest and imprisonment based on negligence on the part of city employees acting within the scope of their employment.

1995Specifically in Brooks this court stated: "In Boyette v. City of Mobile, 442 So.2d 61 (Ala.1983), we held that, pursuant to § 11-47-190, a municipality has immunity from actions alleging unlawful arrest and false imprisonment based on negligence on the part of city employees while acting within the scope of their employment.

1949Engelhardt v. State, 88 Ala. 100 , 7 So. 154 ; Mayor, [etc., of City of Mobile] v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400 ; Harris v. State, 128 Ala. 41 , 29 So. 581 ; Mayor [etc., of City of Talladega] v. Fitzpatrick, 133 Ala. [613], 616, 32 So. 252 ; Moses v. Mayor [etc., of City of Mobile], 52 Ala. [198] 207.

1917Engelhardt v. State, 88 Ala. 100 , 7 South. 154 ; Mayor v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400 ; Harris v. State, 128 Ala. 41 , 29 South. 581 ; Mayor v. Fitzpatrick, 133 Ala. 616 , 32 South. 252 ; Moses v. Mayor, 52 Ala. 207 .

1949Engelhardt v. State, 88 Ala. 100 , 7 So. 154 ; Mayor, [etc., of City of Mobile] v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400 ; Harris v. State, 128 Ala. 41 , 29 So. 581 ; Mayor [etc., of City of Talladega] v. Fitzpatrick, 133 Ala. [613], 616, 32 So. 252 ; Moses v. Mayor [etc., of City of Mobile], 52 Ala. [198] 207.

1917Engelhardt v. State, 88 Ala. 100 , 7 South. 154 ; Mayor v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400 ; Harris v. State, 128 Ala. 41 , 29 South. 581 ; Mayor v. Fitzpatrick, 133 Ala. 616 , 32 South. 252 ; Moses v. Mayor, 52 Ala. 207 .

1949Engelhardt v. State, 88 Ala. 100 , 7 So. 154 ; Mayor, [etc., of City of Mobile] v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400 ; Harris v. State, 128 Ala. 41 , 29 So. 581 ; Mayor [etc., of City of Talladega] v. Fitzpatrick, 133 Ala. [613], 616, 32 So. 252 ; Moses v. Mayor [etc., of City of Mobile], 52 Ala. [198] 207.

1917Engelhardt v. State, 88 Ala. 100 , 7 South. 154 ; Mayor v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400 ; Harris v. State, 128 Ala. 41 , 29 South. 581 ; Mayor v. Fitzpatrick, 133 Ala. 616 , 32 South. 252 ; Moses v. Mayor, 52 Ala. 207 .

2014Next, AMIC argues that the historical context of the 1994 amendment to § 11-47-190 and Benson v. City of Birmingham, 659 So.2d 82 , indicates that § 11-47-190 applies to reduce the collection of “any judgment.” First, we note that Benson involved a judgment where the peace officer was acting within the line of his duty for the purposes of imposing liability on the municipality under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

2014Next, AMIC argues that the historical context of the 1994 amendment to § 11-47-190 and Benson v. City of Birmingham, 659 So. 2d 82 , indicates that § 11-47-190 applies to reduce the collection of "any judgment." First, we note that Benson involved a judgment where the peace officer was acting within the line of his duty for the purposes of imposing liability on 26 1121006; 1121014; 1121038; 1121039 the municipality under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

2011In other words, the County alleges nothing more than an ‘anticipated controversy,’ for which ‘[declaratory judgment proceedings will not lie.’ Creola Land Dev. [, Inc. v. Bentbrooke Hous., L.L.C.,] 828 So.2d [285,] 288 [ (Ala.2002) ].” 854 So.2d at 46 . 3 However, I disagree with the conclusion that all the claims at issue in the underlying case involve anticipated conduct. 4 First, there appears to be no dispute that, under the plain language of the Declaratory Judgment Act, Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-220 et seq., a municipality may test the validity of an ordinance through a declaratory-judgment a

2011In other words, the County alleges nothing more than an ‘anticipated controversy,’ for which ‘[declaratory judgment proceedings will not lie.’ Creola Land Dev. [, Inc. v. Bentbrooke Hous., L.L.C.,] 828 So.2d [285,] 288 [ (Ala.2002) ].” 854 So.2d at 46 . 3 However, I disagree with the conclusion that all the claims at issue in the underlying case involve anticipated conduct. 4 First, there appears to be no dispute that, under the plain language of the Declaratory Judgment Act, Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-220 et seq., a municipality may test the validity of an ordinance through a declaratory-judgment a

2011In other words, the County alleges nothing more than an ‘anticipated controversy,’ for which ‘[declaratory judgment proceedings will not lie.’ Creola Land Dev. [, Inc. v. Bentbrooke Hous., L.L.C.,] 828 So.2d [285,] 288 [ (Ala.2002) ].” 854 So.2d at 46 . 3 However, I disagree with the conclusion that all the claims at issue in the underlying case involve anticipated conduct. 4 First, there appears to be no dispute that, under the plain language of the Declaratory Judgment Act, Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-220 et seq., a municipality may test the validity of an ordinance through a declaratory-judgment a

2005Borders, 875 So.2d at 1183 (quoting Ex parte City of Gadsden, 718 So.2d 716 , 721 (Ala. 1998)).

2005Borders, 875 So.2d at 1183 (quoting Ex parte City of Gadsden, 718 So.2d 716, 721 (Ala.1998)).

1995Although Franklin concedes that the malicious prosecution claim must fail as a matter of law, he contends, relying on Gore v. City of Hoover, 559 So.2d 163 (Ala. 1990), that his false arrest claim is premised on negligence and was not subject to the motion to dismiss.

1949The law in regard to separate prosecutions by a municipality and by the State for an act prohibited by both a municipal ordinance and the State law was clearly stated by Bricken, Judge, now Presiding Judge of this court in Bell v. State, 16 Ala. App. 36 , 75 So. 181 , certiorari denied 200 Ala. 364 , 76 So. 1 , as follows: “Prior to the adoption of the Code of 1907 (which, under section 1222 thereof, made an acquittal or conviction in municipal court for misdemeanor or for violation of an ordinance committed within the police jurisdiction of the municipality a bar to a prosecution for the same

1949The law in regard to separate prosecutions by a municipality and by the State for an act prohibited by both a municipal ordinance and the State law was clearly stated by Bricken, Judge, now Presiding Judge of this court in Bell v. State, 16 Ala. App. 36 , 75 So. 181 , certiorari denied 200 Ala. 364 , 76 So. 1 , as follows: “Prior to the adoption of the Code of 1907 (which, under section 1222 thereof, made an acquittal or conviction in municipal court for misdemeanor or for violation of an ordinance committed within the police jurisdiction of the municipality a bar to a prosecution for the same

1949The law in regard to separate prosecutions by a municipality and by the State for an act prohibited by both a municipal ordinance and the State law was clearly stated by Bricken, Judge, now Presiding Judge of this court in Bell v. State, 16 Ala. App. 36 , 75 So. 181 , certiorari denied 200 Ala. 364 , 76 So. 1 , as follows: “Prior to the adoption of the Code of 1907 (which, under section 1222 thereof, made an acquittal or conviction in municipal court for misdemeanor or for violation of an ordinance committed within the police jurisdiction of the municipality a bar to a prosecution for the same

1949The law in regard to separate prosecutions by a municipality and by the State for an act prohibited by both a municipal ordinance and the State law was clearly stated by Bricken, Judge, now Presiding Judge of this court in Bell v. State, 16 Ala. App. 36 , 75 So. 181 , certiorari denied 200 Ala. 364 , 76 So. 1 , as follows: “Prior to the adoption of the Code of 1907 (which, under section 1222 thereof, made an acquittal or conviction in municipal court for misdemeanor or for violation of an ordinance committed within the police jurisdiction of the municipality a bar to a prosecution for the same