municipality motion in Alaska

2025The superior court did not err by granting summary judgment to the Municipality on this claim. 16 AS 29.25.020(b)(2). 17 AS 29.25.020(b)(5), (6). 18 Liberati v. Bristol Bay Borough, 584 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Alaska 1978) (analyzing former AS 29.48.150(a)).

2016Co. v. Pioneer Mining Co., 205 F. 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1913); McGill v. Wahl, 839 P.2d 393, 396 (Alaska 1992). -6- 7126 the Municipality’s affirmative defense of adverse possession is traditionally an equitable defense and therefore could be tried at the same time as the other equitable claims, “the interests of promoting settlement and providing a more orderly disposition of the case” required that “the matter of adverse possession should not be adjudicated until after there has been a resolution of the title issue.” Following the order bifurcating the trial and in order to narrow the issues at

2016Co. v. Pioneer Mining Co., 205 F. 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1913); McGill v. Wahl, 839 P.2d 393, 396 (Alaska 1992). -6- 7126 the Municipality’s affirmative defense of adverse possession is traditionally an equitable defense and therefore could be tried at the same time as the other equitable claims, “the interests of promoting settlement and providing a more orderly disposition of the case” required that “the matter of adverse possession should not be adjudicated until after there has been a resolution of the title issue.” Following the order bifurcating the trial and in order to narrow the issues at

2016The superior court denied the Municipality’s motion but decided to bifurcate the trial and “first conduct a bench trial on the preliminary issue of who has proper title to the disputed property.” It noted that because “the validity of the parties’ competing title claims will be most similar to a common law quiet title action — a traditionally equitable action — the matter of title will be bench tried.”8 The court also determined that, while 6 Under AS 09.45.010 a party bringing a quiet title action must be in possession of that property. 7 See Davis v. Tant, 361 P.2d 763, 766 (Alaska 1961). 8

2016The superior court denied the Municipality’s motion but decided to bifurcate the trial and “first conduct a bench trial on the preliminary issue of who has proper title to the disputed property.” It noted that because “the validity of the parties’ competing title claims will be most similar to a common law quiet title action — a traditionally equitable action — the matter of title will be bench tried.”8 The court also determined that, while 6 Under AS 09.45.010 a party bringing a quiet title action must be in possession of that property. 7 See Davis v. Tant, 361 P.2d 763, 766 (Alaska 1961). 8

2014As the sponsors point out, “[a]ccepting the Municipality’s claim that the referendum would result in an impermissible divestiture of the Assembly’s 24 217 P.3d 818, 819 (Alaska 2009). 25 Id. at 821 (citing Griswold v. City of Homer, 186 P.3d 558, 561-62 (Alaska 2008)). 26 Id. - 9 - 6883 legislative power effectively would preclude all referenda on local ordinances, because all such referenda are by nature a way for the voters to reject one act of the local legislature.” Our holding in Carmony does not invalidate the referendum at issue here.

2014As the sponsors point out, “[a]ccepting the Municipality’s claim that the referendum would result in an impermissible divestiture of the Assembly’s 24 217 P.3d 818, 819 (Alaska 2009). 25 Id. at 821 (citing Griswold v. City of Homer, 186 P.3d 558, 561-62 (Alaska 2008)). 26 Id. - 9 - 6883 legislative power effectively would preclude all referenda on local ordinances, because all such referenda are by nature a way for the voters to reject one act of the local legislature.” Our holding in Carmony does not invalidate the referendum at issue here.

2014As the sponsors point out, “[a]ccepting the Municipality’s claim that the referendum would result in an impermissible divestiture of the Assembly’s 24 217 P.3d 818, 819 (Alaska 2009). 25 Id. at 821 (citing Griswold v. City of Homer, 186 P.3d 558, 561-62 (Alaska 2008)). 26 Id. - 9 - 6883 legislative power effectively would preclude all referenda on local ordinances, because all such referenda are by nature a way for the voters to reject one act of the local legislature.” Our holding in Carmony does not invalidate the referendum at issue here.

2014As the sponsors point out, “[a]ccepting the Municipality’s claim that the referendum would result in an impermissible divestiture of the Assembly’s 24 217 P.3d 818, 819 (Alaska 2009). 25 Id. at 821 (citing Griswold v. City of Homer, 186 P.3d 558, 561-62 (Alaska 2008)). 26 Id. - 9 - 6883 legislative power effectively would preclude all referenda on local ordinances, because all such referenda are by nature a way for the voters to reject one act of the local legislature.” Our holding in Carmony does not invalidate the referendum at issue here.

1995See Alaska Civil Rule 15. 20 The sole authority on which the Municipality relies, Adkins v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 769 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1985), upheld an order to rectify the prejudice the other side suffered due to unnecessary litigation.

1987In Martin v. Mears, 602 P.2d 421, 426 (Alaska 1979), we held that “all trial courts must expressly state whether they have in fact excluded or considered such materials in reaching their decisions.” Here, as in Martin , because the court did not exclude the outside materials, it was under “a mandatory duty” to treat the Municipality’s motion as one for summary judgment and to dispose of it as provided in Rule 56 after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

1987Id. at 426 .

1979In State v. Jennings, 555 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1976), we stated that there was no municipal immunity in Alaska.